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Abstract.
This thesis gives an extended account of the fictional and theoretical works of
writer, essayist and painter Pierre Klossowski. Through a close analysis of the
relationship between his essayistic and novelistic writings it considers the way in
which Klossowski comes to theorise the nature of the literary artefact as a space of
theatre or spectacle and how such a formulation questions received notions of identity
and traditional distinctions between the literary and philosophical per se.
The first chapter is devoted to Klossowski's writings on Sade. This involves a
short account of the articles he wrote in the 193Osbut also a comparison of the 1947
and 1967 editions of his full-length work on Sade entitled Sade mon prochain. This is
followed by a discussion of his later reading of Sade its relation to writings on Sade
by Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot. Through this the crucial shift in
Klossowski's conceptions of the Self and of identity that occurs between his earlier
and later writing has been traced.
The second chapter looks at Klossowski's writing on and relationship to
Nietzsche. This relationship is articulated under the motifs of parody, translation, and
myth. The sense of these motifs in relation to Nietzsche's texts is analysed with
reference to a number of works by Klossowski (La Vocation suspendue (1950),
Nietzsche et Ie cercle yicieux (1969), and Le Bain de Diane (1956)). From this
discussion Klossowski' s emphasis on the fortuitous character of the Self and on
writing as spectacle has been highlighted.
The third and final chapter examines Klossowski's trilogy of novels Les Lois
de l'hospitalite, and in particular the figure of Roberte, and concludes by arguing that
the truly transgressive force of his writing lies in the way in which it overturns the
notion of origin and with that the concept of identity and self-sameness.
List of Abbreviations.
The following abbreviations are used in this thesis:
SMP47 Sade mon pro chain (1947 edition).
SMP67 Sade mon prochain (1967 edition).
La vocation suspendue.
Un Si Funeste Desir.
Le Bain de Diane.
LH Les Lois de l'hospitalite.
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Introduction - 'La Persistance d'un nom'.
Toute I 'ceuvre de Klossowski tend vers un but unique: assurer la perte de
I 'identite personnel/e, dissoudre Ie moi, c 'est Ie splendide trophee que les
personnages de Klossowski rapportent d'un voyage au bord de la folie.:
Gilles Deleuze, Logique du sens.
The essays and fiction which bear the name Pierre Klossowski form a
strange and paradoxical body of writing, a body of writing obsessed with bodies
themselves and the intersection of bodies with proper names. Klossowski's work
bears witness to a proliferation of names, both historical and fictional, all of which
become the object of repeated questioning or obsessive fascination : Sade,
Nietzsche, Roberte, Octave, Ogier, Gulliver and others; all proper names
designating bodies of work or images of bodies. Each of these names suggests a
figure, a personal history or a recognisable ceuvre and yet, paradoxically, each
name also simultaneously marks a distinct point in a body of writing which seeks to
void the proper name of its identity, to overturn the notion ofa stable self which
would allow names to name, to properly designate a body or bodies.
Throughout Klossowski's ceuvre the proper name articulates a double and
paradoxical movement; it both designates a figure with an apparent identity, history
and coherence (Sade, Nietzsche, Roberte etc.), yet at the very same time it marks
the abolition or suspension of identity, history and coherence. This double
movement is the key aspect of Kloss ow ski's writing which I will seek to analyse,
elaborate upon and question in the chapters which follow. Such a paradoxical
movement has also structured my own general methodological approach to the
corpus which is itself signed with the name 'Pierre Klossowski'. In commenting on
2this body of writing one is confronted with two opposing and seemingly
incompatible demands. In the first instance to read Klossowski's ceuvre properly is
to place it within a context, a historical narrative and to address the propriety of a
name (i.e. the concerns of Klossowski's works, their content and how the issues
raised relate to the works of others associated with Klossowski). Yet to do this
properly in Klossowski's case is to challenge the very logic of such properness,
since his work as a whole turns, as Deleuze suggests, around the dissolution of
identity, and around the abolition of any propriety associated with the proper name
: 'Pierre Klossowski'. This means that, properly speaking, one should situate
Klossowski's work within a particular history in order to understand it, but at the
very same time to understand his work properly is to understand the way in which
it overturns the very concepts both of 'history' and of 'work' (in the sense of a
unified body with a name proper to it). So how have these two opposing demands
been met?
Throughout this thesis I have sought in the first instance to situate
Klossowski's writing within a historical perspective, tracing the development of his
own thinking from the period before the Second World War through to the late
sixties. I have also sought to trace the numerous associations that can be made
between Klossowski's writing and that of other key thinkers during this time (e.g.
Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot). A summary of his career would run as
follows. Born in 1905, Klossowski began writing in the 1930s, publishing articles
in a number of journals, which varied from the psychoanalytic (La Revue Fran~aise
1 Gilles Deleuze, 'Klossowski ou les corps-langage', Logigue du sens (paris: Minuit, 1969), pp.
325-50, (p. 329).
3de la Psychanalyse2) to the philosophical (Recherches Philosphiques3), and
including hybrid journals such as Esprit4 (centred around religious and political
concerns) and Acepha]e5 (centred around Bataille's project of the sacred). Already
in this period Klossowski was reading and commenting upon the works of two
figures which came to dominate his own writing in the following decades : Sade
and Nietzsche. In 1947 he published his first full-length work Sade mon prochain6.
He published four novels in the decade that followed : La Vocation suspendue,
Roberte ce soir, La Revocation de l'Edit de Nantes and Le Souftleur and also an
extended essay on myth Le Bain de Diane'. From the late 1940s onwards
Klossowski published numerous articles in journals as diverse as Critique, Les
Temps modernes, Paro, 84, Le Mercure de France and La Nouvelle Revue
Fran,.,aise8 (many of which are collected in the 1963 volume of essays Un Si
Funeste Desi[). In the 1960s he continued publishing in numerous journals (such
as Les Cahiers du Chemin and Change as well as many others), he brought out a
collected edition of Roberte ce soir, La Revocation, and Le Souftleur entitled Les
Lois de l'hospitalite (1965io and published his final novel Le Baphomet also in
2 'Elements d'une etude psychanalytique sur le marquis de Sade', Revue Francaise de
Psychanalyse, 6 (1933), 458-74.
3 'Le Mal et la negation d'autrui dans la philosophie de D.AF. de Sade', Recherches
Philosophigues, 4 (1934-35), 268-93 and 'Temps et agressivite', Recherches
Philosophiques, 5 (1935-36), 100-11.
4 'Qui est mon prochain?', in Esprit, 25 (December 1938),402-23.
S 'Le Monstre', Acephale, 1 (24 June 1936), non-paginated; 'Creation du monde', Acephale, 2
(21 January 1937), non-paginated and 'Don Juan selon Kierkegaard', Acephale, 3-4 (July
1937), reprinted in SMP47, pp. 135-52.
6 Sade mon prochain (paris: Seuil, 1947), revised edition 1967.
7 La Vocation suspendue (paris: Gallimard, 1950), Roberte ce soir (paris: Minuit, 1954), La
Revocation de rEdit de Nantes (paris: Minuit, 1959), Le Souftleur ou le Theatre de societe
(paris: Pauvert, 1960) and Le Bain de Diane (paris: Pauvert, 1956), Gallimard, 1980.
8 A full bibliography of all these books and essays is given at the end of this thesis.
9 Un Si Funeste Desir (paris: Gallimard, 1963).
10 Les Lois de rhospitalite (paris: Gallimard, 1965).
4196511. After publishing his extended work on Nietzsche in 196912, Klossowski
went on to produce further essays or collections of essays namely a volume on
Roman antiquity, Origines cultuelles et mythiques d'un certain comportement des
dames romaines 13, a book inspired by his reading of Sade and Fourier, La Monnaie
vivante, and a collection of essays on writing and painting La Ressemblance". He
was also a prolific translator, translation being, it would seem, his principle source
of income throughout his career". Klossowski translated texts from both German
and Latin including Holderlin, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Heidegger from the
German or Virgil and Tertullian from the Latin". Alongside his literary and
intellectual activities he began working as a painter in the 1950s and this became
his main preoccupation in 1972 when he gave up the writing of fiction and began
to exhibit widely in a number of countries'", Such a summary of Kloss owski's
work is by no means exhaustive but already gives some indication of the way in
which such a very diverse ceuvre might in itself challenge any notion of a coherent
whole and also the way in which it intersects with a number of different genres and
intellectual engagements.
This is matched by the diversity of his engagement with other figures who
have been prominent in French literary and philosophical circles both before and
after the Second World War. Klossowski was introduced to Gide by Rilke (his
11 Le Baphomet (paris: Mercure de France, 1965). Surprisingly Klossowski published a rewrite of
this novel in theatrical form in 1995 (at the age of 89!); see L'Adolescent immortel (paris:
Lettres Vives, 1995).
12 Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux (paris: Mercure de France, 1969), reprinted 1990.
13Origines cultuelles et mythiques d'un certain comportement des dames romaines (Montpellier:
Fata Morgana, 1968), reprinted 1986.
14 La Ressemblance (Marseille: Andre Dimanche, 1984).
15 Biographical information on Klossowski is generally rather sketchy. For the best biographical
sketch available see Alain Arnaud, Pierre Klossowski (paris, Seuil, 1990), pp. 181-91. All
biographical references throughout this thesis are derived from this summary.
16 Again, for a full bibliography of these translations see the end of this thesis.
17 All of Klossowski's exhibitions are likewise listed in the bibliography.
5mother's lover) in the early twenties and went on to meet Bataille in the 1930s with
whom he collaborated on the review Acephale and in the College de sociologie18•
After the war Klossowski met Maurice Blanchot (probably via Bataille) and was
closely associated with both Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault in the 1960s and
early 1970s. Throughout this thesis I have sought to locate the development of
Klossowski's writing within the various stages of his publishing career and also in
relation to the thought of the above thinkers. The first chapter in particular adopts
this historical perspective. It traces Klossowski's commentaries on Sade as they
develop from the thirties onwards, relating his own idiosyncratic reading of the
Divine Marquis to that of the Surrealists in the first instance and then in more detail
to the readings of Sade given by Bataille and of Blanc hot. More specifically this
first chapter has sought to contrast Klossowski's pre-war commentary on Sade,
comprising a number of writings collected as a whole in the 1947 Sade mon
pro chain, with his post-war commentary which is given in the 1967 re-edition of
that work. By comparing the first and second editions of Sade mon prochain the
key shifts in Klossowski's pre- and post-war thinking (namely in his relationship to
Catholicism) have been made clear.
The second and third chapters of this thesis continue to explore the
relationship of Kloss owski's writing to the thought ofBataille and Blanchot but
have also attempted to situate his post-war output in relation to the work of Gilles
Deleuze and to a lesser extent to that of Jean-Francois Lyotard. The second
chapter is devoted to Klossowski's writings on and around Nietzsche, the third to
Klossowski's trilogy of novels collected in the volume Les Lois de l'hospitalite.
However these two later chapters mark a stronger engagement with what has been
18 See Denis Hollier, ed., Le College de sociologie (paris: Gallimard, 1979), revised edition 1995.
6termed here the second demand of commenting on Klossowski's eeuvre. This
second demand turns around the need not simply to situate the body of work
bearing the name 'Klossowski' within a historical schema or set of relationships,
but rather to examine the way in which such a body of work undermines itself as a
coherent unity and questions the very concept of history itself (as a linear
narrative). As an oeuvre which undermines its own coherence arid unity
Klossowski's corpus is not an entity to which either a historical framework or the
name Klossowski can properly be applied (it is, on its own terms, not a discrete
self-same entity). The second approach of this thesis has therefore been to highlight
the resolutely paradoxical status of Kloss ow ski's texts and the implications of such
a paradoxical mode of writing for questions of literature and subjectivity in general.
Throughout my thesis this paradoxical mode of textuality is something that
has been traced both in its historical development (mostly in chapter one) and
examined in the way it abolishes any possibility of constructing a history or unity
(the second and third chapters). Properly speaking each of these approaches always
overlaps the one with the other. Other commentaries or full-length works on
Klossowski have largely adopted one approach to the exclusion of the other. Anne-
Marie Dardigna in her book on Klossowski Les Chateaux d'Bros ou les infortunes
du sexe des femmes" seeks to locate his work within a history of erotic texts by
male writers which reify and do violence to the female body (thus she locates him
within a very specific and polemically constructed history). Carolyn Dean devotes
part of her book The Self and its Pleasures" to analysis of Klossowski' s earlier and
later view of Sade, seeking to locate Klossowski's commentaries in much the same
19 Anne-Marie Dardigna, Les Chateaux d'Eros ou les infortunes du sexe des femmes (paris:
Maspero, 1980).
7way as does my own chapter one. Other discussions provide an intertextual, non-
historical reading of Klossowski's oeuvre, which situate his work principally within
the textual networks set up in the writing ofBataille and Blanchot and which tum
most centrally around the dissolution of identity within these networks. First and
foremost amongst these are Daniel Wilhem's Pierre Klossowski : Ie corps impie21
and Jane Gallops Intersections". Most of the other full-length books devoted to
Klossowski focus more centrally on themes and motifs within his work (e.g. the
'signe unique', the 'simulacre', or the figure of'Roberte); these include principally
Jean-Pol Madou's Demons et simulacres dans l'oeuvre de Pierre Klossowski" and
Alain Arnaud's Pierre Klossowski". This thesis differentiates itself from all these
works cited insofar as it seeks very self-consciously to combine the two opposing
approaches outlined above and to examine the paradoxical relationship between
them".
To do this I have focused my discussion around the question of the proper
name. In this context the double nature of Kloss owski's texts parallels the dual
argumentation of this thesis. Just as the persistence of proper names in
Klossowski's work acts (paradoxically) as proof of the dispersion of the name in its
very propriety, so a historical reading of that corpus signed 'Klossowski' shows
that, as a corpus, it is founded upon the abolition of any logic which would allow
20 Carolyn Dean. The Self and its Pleasures, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 170-87.
21 Daniel Wilhem, Pierre Klossowski : le corps impie (paris: UGE : 10118, 1979).
22 Jane Gallop, Intersections: Readings of Sade with Bataille Blanchot and Klossowski (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1981); see in particular pp. 67-112.
23 Jean-Pol Madou, Demons et simulacres dans l'reuvre de Pierre Klossowski (paris: Klincksieck,
1987).
24 Alain Arnaud, Pierre Klossowski.
25 The list of secondary material here is by no means exhaustive. A full bibliography is given at
the end of this thesis. In particular I have omitted any mention of commentaries on
Klossowski's work by those with whom he was associated e.g. Bataille, Blanchot, Foucault
Deleuze and Lyotard. Again these references are given in full in the bibliography. Specific
8such a historical reading to take place. It is this persistence of proper names which
has given my discussion its form, a form centred around three names, around three
decisive figures: Sade, Nietzsche, and Roberte.
points of convergence or divergence of my own commentaries with others will be signalled
as the discussion progresses.
Chapter One - Sa de.
on fout dans tous les cas, cher amour, parce que nous sommes nes pour
foutre, que nous accomplissons les lois de la nature en foutant, et que toute la
loi humaine qui contrarierait cel/es de la nature ne serait jaite que pour le
mepris
Sade, La Philo sophie dans Ie boudoir.'
In 1947 Klossowski's Sade mon prochain was one of the first full-length
literary and philosophical studies of de Sade's work to be published in French'. The
next year Gilbert Lely brought out his biographical work D.A.F. de Sade' which was
followed two years later by Maurice Heine's Le Marquis de Sade". After over a
hundred years of censorship the two decades leading up to the publication of
Klossowski's book and those immediately following it mark an unprecedented interest
in Sade's work amongst French artists, writers, psychoanalysts and philosophers alike.
Andre Breton and Paul Eluard, Jean Paulhan, Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot,
Simone de Beauvoir, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Philippe Sollers and Roland
Barthes have, along with many others, discussed, interrogated, analysed, promoted or
1 Sade, <Euvres completes, 16 vols in 8 (paris: Cercle du livre precieux, 1962-67), vol. III (1966), p.
410.
2 The full-length works on Sade which precede that of Klossowski emphasise more the medico-
psychological import of the Marquis' writing; see for example Dr. Cabanes, Le Marquis de Sade
et son oeuvre devant la science medicale et la litterature modeme, par le docteur Jacobus X ...
(paris: Carrington, 1901). However there are more general accounts of Sade's life and works;
for instance in 1933 Klossowski's himself published a translation of a German text by Otto
Flake, Le Marguis de Sade (paris: Grasset, 1933).
3 Gilbert Lely, OAF. de Sade (paris: Seghers, 1948).
4 Maurice Heine, Le Marquis de Sade, with preface by G.Uly (paris: Gallimard, 1950).
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resisted the writing and thought of the Divine Marquis', making him one of the
essential points of reference for modem French literary and philosophical cultures.
Klossowski's response to Sade has proved to be extremely influential in setting
the terms of debate for the French reception of the libertine writer during the years
after the Second World War. Alongside Bataille and Blanchot, Klossowski was one of
the first to see Sade's work as philosophically important and relevant to an
understanding of the transgressive potential of literary texts. It is important to note
from the outset that Klossowski's Sade is not just the author of pornographic or
shocking novels. His readings seek to engage with a complex logic of transgression
which underpins the discourse of the Sadeian libertine. The transgressive force of
Sade's texts, Klossowski argues, involves a paradoxical play with limits, with the
limits set by moral categories and interdictions but also with those of language, of
thought and of meaning. Within this general framework Klossowski's reading of
transgression in Sade's work undergoes a crucial shift, one which is marked by the
considerable changes he makes to the 1967 re-edition of Sade mon prochain. Broadly
speaking this shift is characterised by Klossowski's movement from a Christian
endorsement of moral categories (which he attributes to Sade also) in 1947 to a post-
S A bibliography of twentieth-century French commentary on Sade would be very extensive. Here,
however, are a few key references: Maurice Blanchot, Lautreamont et Sade (paris: Minuit,
1949), revised edition 1969, Simone de Beauvoir, Faut-il briiler Sade? (paris: GallimardIdees,
1955), Andre Breton, L' Anthologie de I'humour noir (paris: Pauvert, 1966), p. 52, Jean
Paulhan, 'Le Marquis de Sade et sa complice', in <Euvres completes (paris: Au Cercle du livre
precieux, 1967), Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les choses (paris: Gallimard, 1966), pp. 221-224,
and Roland Barthes, Sade. Fourier. Loyola (paris: Seuil, 1971). Georges Bataille, of course,
engaged with Sade's work in a sustained way throughout his career most notably in his essay
'La valeur d'usage de DAF. de Sade' (1930), La Littcrature et Ie Mal, (1947) and also in the
later L'Erotisme (1957). All these texts are gathered in Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, 12
vols. (paris, Gallimard, 1970-88) and will be discussed in further detail (with full references)
later on in this chapter.
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Christian position in 1967 which affirms the aspects of sexual perversion to be found
in Sade's writing against all normative values and structures (both moral and rational).
Klossowski's reading of transgression has made its mark in particular on the
discussions of Sade by figures such as Foucault, Barthes, and groups such as Tel
Ouel", The emphasis placed by such groups and thinkers on transgression as the
delimiting of structures of meaning and of the Self can be traced back to Klossowski' s
reading of Sade. It is not the simplistic and straightforward overturning of sexual
taboos in Sade's work that these writers value, rather he is perceived to be engaged in
a profoundly important philosophical and literary enterprise (and not an author
interested simply in moral turpitude or intent merely on shocking the bourgeoisie). It is
the originality of Kloss ow ski's commentaries on of Sade which make these later
readings possible.
In what follows I will trace the development of Klossowski's reading from his
early analyses in the thirties and their culmination in the 1947 publication of Sade mon
prochain, through to the revised re-edition of this work in 1967. Klossowski's
engagement with Sade spans the length of his writing career and by examining the
shifts his reading undergoes between the two editions of Sade mon prochain a general
outline of his development as a writer can be traced. Reading these analyses of Sade
alongside those of Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot shows how far Klossowski
6 Klossowski published an essay on Sade in Tel Ouel in 1967, 'Signe et perversion chez Sade'. The
entirety of this issue was devoted to Sade; other contributors included Roland Barthes, Philippe
Sollers, Hubert Damish and Michel Tort. See Tel Ouel. 28 (1967), 3-22. Klossowski's essay
subsequently became the introductory piece of the revised version of Sade mon prochain, 'Le
philosophe scelerat',
12
is central to an understanding ofa burgeoning need (after 1945) to think about Sade
differently and to think differently issues of literature, violence and immorality.'
Even today in this, the liberal late twentieth century, Sade's novels make
shocking reading. From the depiction of rampant coprophagy and rape to the detailed
descriptions of torture and murder, Les Cent-vingt joumees de Sodome, La
Philosophie dans Ie boudoir and the stories of Justine and Juliette appear to leave no
perversion unexplored, unrepresented or unjustified. Indeed, the ability of French
writers to raise an apologist for murder and an apostle of sexual violence to the status
of hero might seem to many to be a fact as shocking and remarkable as the novels
7 For a more detailed history of the reception of Sade in France see Marcel Henaff Les Ages de la
lecture sadienne, RIDS, 68 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen University Press, 1979) and particularly
Carolyn Dean The Self and its Pleasures (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 170-99.
For a selection of responses to Klossowski' s reading of Sade, see the following: Aime Patri,
'Notre frere damne', L' Arche (March 1947), 152-57 and Georges Bataille, La Litterature et Ie
mal, ffiuvres completes, 12 vols, (paris: Gallimard, 1970-88), vol9, (1971), pp. 245-53. As will
become clear Bataille's reading represents quite a highly critical response to Klossowski's
construction of a Christian Sade in the first edition of Sade mon prochain (which itself
contained an appendix with a negative critique of Bataille's Ac¢.phale project). For more recent
responses to Klossowski's writing on Sade see Dean. The Self and its Pleasures, pp. 177-86,
Jane Gallop Intersections (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1981), pp. 67-112 and also the
introduction to the English edition of Sade mon prochain by Alphonso Lingis, Sade my
Neighbour, translated by Alphonso Lingis (London: Quartet, 1992), pp. 5-8. In general these
three later critiques are sympathetic to Klossowski's engagement with Sade. Dean's commentary
focuses on Klossowski' s analysis of Sade in relation to the negation of God and moral categories
and the difference between the first and second editions of Sade mon prochain (more will be said
of this later). Gallop is interested in situating Klossowski's commentaries on Sade within the
intertextual networks set up by the analyses of Sade carried out by Bataille and Blanchot (and
herself); again this will be discussed later at greater length. Perhaps the most idiosyncratic
commentary is provided by Alphonso Lingis who examines the manner in which Klossowski's
reading of Sade in 'Le Philosophe scelerat' sets up a paradigm for the way rational projects
necessarily undermine themselves (the fact, for instance, that the project of scientific progress
can lead to the possibility of total annihilation in the invention of nuclear weapons). It is
interesting to note that nearly all the full-length works written on Klossowski which will be cited
or referred to in this thesis give little sustained attention to his reading of Sade, preferring rather
to discuss his engagement with Nietzschean and theological discourses or to focus on the figure
of Roberte in the trilogy Les Lois de l'hospitalite. This may testify to a general unease with
Klossowski's Sadeian engagement (for sexual political reasons"), one which is perhaps revealed
by the fact that both editions of Sade mon prochain are omitted from the nearly full
bibliographical survey ofKlossowski's works which is given at the back of his most recent
publication L' Adolescent immortel (paris: Lettres Vives, 1995).
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themselves", The very remarkable nature of this engagement with Sade's writing begs
the question as to why, after over a hundred years of censorship and clandestine
circulation, his work began, from the 1920s onwards, to be published and in tum
discussed by so many major figures in the French artistic and intellectual community.
One reason was that the philosophical and literary preoccupations of that community
had themselves changed. Indeed as will become clear from the following discussion
Sade's work in the twentieth century is being read within contexts which post-date the
time in which it was originally written. Whilst Sade's principal terms of philosophical
reference might have been say, Holbach or la Mettrie, for his modem commentators
they are most likely to be Hegel, Nietzsche or Freud. When Klossowski published his
first article on Sade in 19339 in a psycho-analytic journal he was writing in an
intellectual and artistic context which had been revolutionised by the reception of
Freudian theory on the one hand and by the cultural event which was Surrealism on
the other. It is with these two moments, therefore, that this discussion will begin.
8 See Nicholas Harrison, Circles of Censorship: Censorship and its Metaphors in French History.
Literature and Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). See in particular Harrison's discussion
of the Surrealist appropriation of Sade pp. 121-7l.
9 'Elements d'une etude psychanalytique sur le Marquis de Sade' published in Revue Francaise de la




'The history of human civilisation shows beyond any doubt that there is an
intimate connection between cruelty and the sexual instinct; but nothing has been
done towards explaining that connection, apart from laying emphasis on the
aggressive factor in the libido'
Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.lo
Published first in 1905 and then expanded in subsequent editions up until its
final version in 1925, Freud's Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality make crucial
observations about the place and nature of sexuality in human experience, observations
which transform conventional perspectives on Sade's theories". What rnight have been
perceived to be the pathological ranting and (albeit highly literary) self-justifications of
a sexual deviant become lucid thoughts on the nature and truth of human desire. Freud
like Sade insists that the basis of human experience lies in instinctual drives. In the
Three Essays Freud defines an instinct or drive as the 'psychical representative of an
endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimulation, as contrasted with a
"stimulus", which is set up by single excitations corning from without'". Itwill become
clearer throughout this discussion that the Freudian emphasis on the instinctual or
libidinal basis of experience marks a shift away from the classical model of the
Cartesian subject (based on the cogito and the primacy of reason) toward a new
10Freud. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works. edited and translated by James
Strachey, 24 Vols, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953-74), Vol. VII (1953), p. 159.
I I Late nineteenth-century sexologists such as Havelock Ellis and Kraft -Ebing had begun the process
of rereading Sade but he had been viewed essentially as a cataloguer of perversions not as a
thinker oftextuality (which is what he becomes after Freud). For a perspective on Ellis's
treatment of sexual deviance see Havelock Ellis, Sexual Inversion (London: Wilson Macmillon,
1897).
12preud. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, Vol. VII, p. 168
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conception of the Self whose thought and action have their foundations in the
movements of desire.
Also and perhaps more importantly, Freud, like Sade, insists on the at once
violent and sexual nature of the instincts. Sade gives his name to the perversion which
Freud describes as 'The most common and most significant of the perversions'!'. What
could once be considered as the most marginal and aberrant of human sexual
preferences now becomes a universal truth of human motivation, and in particular,
Freud claims, of human male motivation:
The sexuality of most male human beings contains an element of
aggressiveness - a desire to subjugate; the biological significance of it seems to
lie in the need for overcoming the resistance of the sexual object by means
other than the process of'wooing."
Such an observation can be compared to Dolmance's claims in the third dialogue of La
Philo sophie dans Ie boudoir:
la cruaute, bien loin d'etre un vice, est le premier sentiment qu'imprime en nous
la nature. [...]
La cruaute est dans la nature; nous naissons tous avec une dose de cruaute que
la seule education modifie."
So Sade's thoughts on humanity, once so unacceptable, can take on the status of
luminescent insights when re-read through the lens of Freudian theory. From that
perspective it is possible to conflate the former's use of the term 'instinct' or drive with
the latter's constant reference to the impulses of 'Ia nature'. Implied here too is an
equivalence between Freudian 'aggressiveness' and Sadeian 'cruaute'. In both cases
violent sexual impulses are considered to be part of the natural organisation of human
13 Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works. Vol. VII, p. 157.
14 Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works. Vol. VII, pp. 157-158.
IS Sade, (Euvres completes, Vol. III (1966), p. 437.
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life rather than exceptions from the norm. The rights and wrongs of such a conflation
of terms is not at issue here. What is important is the fact that from the twenties
onwards such a reading of Sade became possible. If this comparison is maintained then
Sade's theories not only take on a universal significance but Sade himself becomes one
of the single most important forerunners of psychoanalysis.
Andre Breton and the Surrealists who championed both the 'Divine Marquis'
and a certain idiosyncratic reading of Freud made just such a claim. When Breton
listed a whole host offigures as predecessors in his first 'Manifeste du surrealisme'" of
1924, Sade was amongst them and this promotion of the libertine philosopher
continued throughout the history of Surrealism". In his late work Anthologie de
l'humour noir Breton says of Sade's work:
psychologiquement elle peut passer pour la plus authentique devanciere de
Freud et de toute la psychologie moderne."
Such a comment makes explicit the assumptions which underpinned the Surrealist
championing of Sade from the twenties onwards. Yet Sade was not valued by the
Surrealists for his theoretical insight into the human mind alone, but also for his
contestatory attitude towards human law and society. After claiming Sade's work as a
16 Andre Breton, Manifestes du surrealisme (paris: Gallimard/Folio, 1985). It is interesting to note
that even though Breton championed Freud, Freud himself expressed some reticence as to the
value and meaning of the surrealist project. See Les Vases communicants (paris: Gallimard,
1955) and the exchange of letters between Freud and Breton published at the end of this volume,
pp. 173-179. Breton's reading of Freud has been much criticised by later commentators; see for
example Marcelin Pleynet, Art et litterature (paris: Seuil, 1977), pp. 237~2. Pleynet offers his
own account of Sade and modernity, pp. 147-160.
11 For a more detailed survey of the surrealist's views on Sade see Sade dans Ie surrealisme by Svein
Eirik Fauskevag (paris: Editions Prlvat, 1986).
18 Andre Breton, Anthologie de l'humour noir (paris: Pauvert, 1966), p. 52. The view that Sade is a
precursor to Freud has been challenged by Freudians most notably by Lacan in his paper 'Kant
avec Sade', Ecrits, (paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 765-90. Again, what is significant here is not that
this view may be correct but that such a comparison was made, and that it led to a certain
promotion of Sade's work.
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precursor to that of Freud in the quotation cited above, Breton immediately adds:
'socialement elle ne tend a rien moins qu'a l'etablissement, differe de revolution en
revolution, d'une veritable science des moeurs'". In the 1920s it was the transgressive
and revolutionary aspect of Sade's writing which the Surrealists sought to harness to
their own ends and over and above the reference to Freud, this was what they sought
to harness in the figure of Sade himself.
In the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality Freud emphasises all those
forces which inhibit the expression of the sexual instinct or libido and act to repress it.
Writing of the 'perversions' in general Freud comes to the following conclusion:
Our study of the perversions has shown us that the sexual instinct has to
struggle against certain mental forces which act as resistances, and of which
shame and disgust are the most prominent. It is permissible to suppose that
these forces playa part in restraining that instinct within the limits which are
regarded as normal;"
Freud's theory of repression is taken up by the Surrealists and conflated with social
oppression (which is what enables Breton to construe dream and reality, i.e. psychic
and social reality, as interconnecting chambers, the two 'vases communicants' of his
famous essay). The Surrealist aspiration to total human revolution involves a descent
into and recuperation of psychic material. This material has been repressed by the
conscious mind but for the Surrealists this means first and foremost that it has been
repressed by rational thought structures which are socially or culturally determined.
Breton affirms this idea of recuperation most explicitly in the 'Second manifeste du
surrealisme' of 1930 :
19 Andre Breton, Anthologie de l'humour noir. p.52.
20 Freud, The Complete Psychological Works: Standard Edition. Vol. VII, p. 162.
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l'idee du surrealisme tend simplement Iila recuperation totale de notre force
psychique par un moyen qui n'est autre que la descente vertigineuse en nous,
l'illumination systematique des lieux caches et l'obscurcissement progressif des
autres lieux, la promenade perpetuelle en pleine zone interdite."
Sade, insofar as he was a systematic exponent of violent sexual desire, affirmed,
perhaps more than any writer in history, : 'la promenade perpetuelle en pleine zone
interdite'. His constant rejection of human law and value systems, his persistent
violation of every possible taboo would seem to make him the ideal figure of revolt for
the Surrealist project. For the Surrealists, Sade's championing of violent sexuality
make him into a social revolutionary.
Man Ray's famous imaginary portrait of Sade where the Marquis stands
sculpted in the stonework of the Bastille as the fortress goes up in flames embodies
this view of him as a revolutionary icon. According to this view of Sade he is both a
victim of social oppression and a social liberator. In his article published in La
Revolution Surrealiste" Bluard claims that Sade suffered imprisonment in the Bastille
and general persecution because he was honest enough to recognise the truth of
human instincts (the link between sex and violence). Defending Truth, he also
becomes, in Eluard's view, a defender of Justice because he denounces the 'deraison' of
Christian morality and value systems :
pour avoir redonne Iil'homme la force de ses instincts primitifs, pour avoir
voulu delivrer l'imagination amoureuse et pour avoir lutte desesperement pour
la justice et l'egalite absolue, le Marquis de Sade a ete enferme pendant toute
sa vie."
21 Andre Breton, Manifestes du surrealisme. p. 86.
22 Paul Eluard, 'D.A.F. de Sade : ecrivain revolutionnaire et fantastique', La Revolution SurreaIiste. 8
(1926),8-9. For a commentary on Eluard's critique of Sade see Nicholas Harrison, Circles of
Censorship, pp. 159-60.
23 Paul Eluard, 'D.A.F. de Sade : ecrivain revolutionnaire et fantastique', La Revolution SurreaIiste, 8,
9
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Maurice Lever has justly remarked on the bad faith of Eluard's pronouncements on
Sade and his attempt to make him compatible with a revolutionary cause", The
arbitrariness of the libertine's power over his victims as it is demonstrated in the
closed-off world ofLes Cent vingt joumees or in the many encounters of Justine in
Les Malheurs de la vertu quickly reveal the extent to which Eluard's comments
manipulate the nature of Sade's thought.
Many critics have commented on the way the Surrealists and others have used
Sade to their own ends and have tended perhaps to obscure the reality and
unpleasantness of the Sadeian text itself", One has the sense that, although Surrealists
like Breton and Eluard might seek to champion Sade as a revolutionary, they showed
little desire to engage with any detailed reading of Sade's work itself Breton's
comments on sex and love in Les Vases communicants show just how far his position
was in reality removed from that of the Divine Marquis. He has, he claims, never
indulged in the 'enivrements vulgaires' of prostitution, because, he adds : ~e n'ai jamais
aime [...] une prostituee'. Love, he goes on, is a most serious matter and 'il me
paraitrait indigne par-dessus tout de vouloir chasser l'image d'un etre aime par celle
d'un etre ou de plusieurs etres non-aimes'". If one compares this with the
pronouncements of one of Sade's libertine heroes from La Nouvelle Justine the gulf
24 See Lever's biography, Le Marquis de Sade, (paris: Fayard, 1991). English edition The Marquis de
Sade translated by Arthur Goldhammer (London: Flamingo, 1995). For Bluard's comment see p.
390 of the English edition (all references to this text will be to the English translation since this
is by far the easiest edition to access). Bluard, Lever argues, censored the sexually violent details
of Sade's work so that he would appeal to a Marxist revolutionary audience.
2S Again see in particular Carolyn Dean's book The Self and its Pleasures. See also Xaviere Gauthier,
Surrealisme et sexualite (paris: Gallimard/Idees, 1971).
26 Les Vases communicants, p. 82.
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that separates these two writers becomes clear. Clement, the monk, tells his captive
Justine:
comment put-it venir dans la tete d'un homme raisonnable que la delicatesse
eilt quelque prix en jouissance? II est absurde de vouloir soutenir qu'elle y soit
necessaire; eIle n'ajoute rien au plaisir des sens : je dis plus, elle y nuit; c'est
une chose tres differente que d'aimer ou que de jouir; la preuve en est qu'on
aime tous les jours sans jouir, et qu'on jouit encore plus souvent sans aimer."
It is clear that in the libertine's world, where pleasure is never reciprocal and is
virtually always at the expense of the victim, there is no place for love. Breton's
promotion of monogamous love and of moral standards generally and his absolute
rejection of both dissolute lifestyles and debauched thinking has been well
documented, particularly as it manifests itself in his polemical exchanges with Georges
Bataille". Bataille's engagement with Sade and the relation of his reading to that of
Klossowski will be discussed in detail later on in this chapter.
However the reality and specificity of Sade's text is not of central importance
within the context of this discussion. Sade, for Surrealism, was more an icon of the
Surrealists own making than a writer to be read. In violating the taboos which inhibit
sexual expression of whatever kind he has become an anti-bourgeois revolutionary.
Sade, in his sadism, has become myth.
It is against this background of Breton's unwillingness to actually read Sade
(an unwillingness that is characteristic of the Surrealists as a whole) that the
importance ofK1ossowski's contribution to this debate becomes clear. Klossowski is
27 Sade, CEuvres completes, Vol. VI (1962), p. 396.
28 For an exposition of this polemic and an account of Breton's attitude toward sexuality see Michel
Surya's biography of Bataille, Georges Bataille, la mort a l'oeuvre (Paris: Gallimard, 1992). See
in particular pp. 142-74.
21
one of the first writers to read Sade seriously and in a sustained manner rather than
annexing him as an icon or mythical figure.
At the same time the Surrealists, through the lens of their particular
interpretation of Freud, have set the stage for a reading of Sade which involves the
interplay of two opposing forces. The forces of sexual desire are set up in opposition
to the strait-jacket of social convention and rational thinking (embodied in
conventional schema of meaning and form). In advocating the liberty of desire, Sade,
for the Surrealists, becomes an advocate of all liberty in general. That the true horror
and violent nature of Sade's text's appears to have been suppressed seems not to have
perturbed the Surrealists greatly". It is this context, opened up initially by the
Surrealists, which allows Klossowski to read Sade as a writer who is philosophically
important and who has an important contribution to make. Klossowski builds upon the
Surrealist reading but moves beyond it in such a way as to avoid the more simplistic
mythologisation in which they are engaged. His commentary on Sade focuses on this
interplay between the opposing principles of desire and social constraint in a different
and much more philosophically complex manner. Indeed one of the most important
virtues of Klossowski as a commentator of Sade was that he was one of the first, in
the wake of surrealism, actually to begin to read the text of Sade itself
29 BatailIe, however, was extremely critical of what he saw as the surrealist idealisation of Sade.
These views are expressed in his polemical pamphlet 'La Valeur d'usage de OAF. de Sade',




Klossowski's articles of the 1930s, many of which went on to be included in
Sade mon prochain after the war, lay the foundations for his reading of Sade. What
they reveal, however, is that the perspectives he brings to bear on the Sadeian text are
extremely diverse. The names of Saint Augustine, Hegel, Nietzsche, and of course
Freud signal only the most obvious terms of reference which inform his interpretation
of Sade's work and life. This diversity of perspective is reflected in the variety of
journals in which he chose to publish throughout the thirties. Beginning his career with
an article in the psychoanalytic journal La Revue Fran~aise de la Psychanalyse
Klossowski then went on to publish in Recherches Philosophiques30 and then in the
late thirties published in Esprie1 as well as collaborating with Bataille on Acephale32
30 Edited by A Koyre, H-Ch-Puech and ASpaier Recherches Philosophigues was a philosophical
journal set up in 1931 with a view to encouraging new and original explorations in
contemporary philosophy and was largely experimental in character. The 'Avertissement' which
headed the first issue described the 'Recherches' contained within it in the following terms:
'Elles font le depart entre originalite voulue et l'expression d'une remarque que ron croit
justifie par la nature des choses' and went on to add: 'En principe, rien n'est place ici sous le
signe de violences autonomes et de crtiteres absolues', Recherches Philosophigues, 1 (1931-32),
vii and viii. Contributors to Recherches Philosophigues included, in the earlier issues, Jean
Wahl and Martin Heidegger (1931-32) and later Caillois, Bataille, Levinas and Bachelard
(1935-36). The experimental nature of this journal would no doubt have been very attractive to
Klossowski interested as he was in looking at the philosophical import of a controversial ceuvre
like Sade's.
31 Esprit was a Catholic-orientated review published under the direction of Emmanuel Mounier which
promoted the doctrine of Personalism. Essentially this was an anti-totalitarian doctrine which
was also very much against parliamentary democracy in the form that was current at the time.
The doctrine of Personalism also rejected the power of the state in favour of 'organic'
communities based upon the sovereignty of the individual. For a history of the review Esprit and
other reviews close to it (Ordre Nouveau, Jeune Droite) see Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle, Les
Non-Conformistes des annees trente (paris: Seuil, 1969). See also John Hellman's Emmanuel
Mounier and the New Catholic Left (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
32 Pierre Klossowski, 'La monstruosite integrale' in Acephale, 1 (June 1936), non-paginated, 'La
creation du monde' in Acephale, 2 (January 1937), non-paginated, and 'Don Juan selon
Kierkegaard' in Acephale, 3-4 (July 1937), non-paginated. In this latter edition Klossowski also
published a review of Karl Lowith's Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkunft des
Gleichen, 2ndedition (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1956) in which he discusses the Nietzschean
doctrine of Eternal Return for the first time. The article on Nietzsche will be discussed in the
following chapter.
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and in the College de sociologie. Much of the material included in the 1930s articles is
reproduced in Sade mon prochain and will therefore be discussed in detail at a later
stage. In all these articles, however, Klossowski is reading Sade within the
perspectives opened up by the Surrealists and Freudian psychoanalysis. Yet unlike the
Surrealists, his arguments focus far more directly on the question of violence and
aggression. They explore the possibility that violence and aggression might be the
fundamental realities of human existence and seek to uncover the way Sade's text
articulates this. At the same time Klossowski's articles of the period testify to a strange
combination of affiliations. Such a diversity of affiliation (for instance publication in
both the Catholic Esprit and Bataille's Acephale) is indicative of divisions and tensions
within Klossowski's thought in the years prior to the appearance of Sade mon
prochain. A brief survey of his early articles shows that it is in the very existence of
divisions and tensions within the mind of Sade himself that Klossowski begins to
recognise the author of Justine as 'mon prochain'.
L.gB~w.~.fhm.wi~~_4(!_P$Y~h.qlJ.qly$_~!.
In 1930 Klossowski went to work as a secretary for the Parisian psychoanalyst
Rene Laforgue. Laforgue's clientele was drawn largely from the Parisian bourgeoisie
and he posed as a defender of homosexuality". Klossowski's employer was perhaps
not as liberal as he seemed, however, for when his young secretary published his
'Elements d'une etude psychanalytique sur Ie Marquis de Sade' in 1933 he was
scandalised and dismissed Klossowski immediately". This very early reading of Sade,
which Klossowski includes in the 1947 work (with a footnote disavowing the position
33 See Alain Arnaud, Pierre Klossowski (paris: Seuil, 1990), p. 186.
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adopted), bears witness to a close engagement with, but also to a divergence from,
Freud's psychoanalytic thinking.
Klossowski attempts, in this article, to trace Sade's thought back to a psychical
conflict within the mind of the Marquis himself. Sade's conflict, claims Klossowski, has
its roots in the Oedipus complex. Yet Sade's sadism, insofar as it is directed against
women, reflects this complex in an inverted form and here Klossowski diverges from
Freudian orthodoxy in a rather singular manner. Klossowski writes:
Chez Sade nous nous trouverions done en presence d'un complexe eedipien
negatif non pas determine, comme c'est le cas d'un grand nombre de nevroses
par une inhibition de l'inceste procedant de l'angoisse de la castration - mais dii
au regret d'avoir voulu sacrifier Ie pere a cette fausse idole,la mere (RFP,4S9).
The repeated torture and murder of women in general and of mother figures in
particular (e.g. Mme de Mistival in La Philo sophie dans Ie boudoir) represents,
according to Klossowski, an attempt to escape from the mother; it is the manifestation
ofa 'lutte desesperee pour degager son etre de son enveloppe originelle' (RFP,461).
This destruction of maternity, Klossowski argues, is carried out in favour of the
promotion of an opposing principle : that of paternity. If motherhood is identified with
caring, rearing, socialising, then for Sade the law of paternity embodies everything that
runs counter to this. All the sexually violent and transgressive acts of the Sadeian text
according to Klossowski affirm the power of the father over that of the mother :
La sodomie et l'inceste, voila ce que Sade exalte comme les attributs de la
paternite : Ie pere doit briser les chaines conjugales qui l'empechent de jouir
physiquement de ses enfants: aucune loi naturelle ne s'oppose pourtant a cela
(RFP,467).
34 Arnaud, p. 186.
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The opposition here between the maternal and the paternal implies an opposition of a
broader nature, the former being associated with social bonds ('chaines conjugales')
and the latter being founded on the force of nature ('loi naturelle').
It is at this point that Klossowski begins to assimilate Sade's psychic conflict
into a wider philosophical perspective. Paternity and Maternity become identified with
a myth of two distinctive forms of humanity, the one masculine, the other feminine.
The one is derived from nature and embodies humankind's aggressive animal instincts,
the other founds the social dimension of human life and implies the existence of God
and moral Law:
ce qui semble surtout ressortir de cette vision mythologique de deux
humanites, l'une naissant directement de la nature, l'autre de la femme, c'est
l'idee que l'introduction de la maternite dans le monde etablit la loi de la
reconnaissance de la creature envers le createur (idee de Dieu), de la
reconnaissance de la progeniture envers la mere, et qu'ainsi se trouva inaugure
le regne des contrats indissolubles donnant aux uns les moyens moraux de se
soumettre et d'enchainer les autres {RFP,470)35.
Although the aim of Kloss ow ski's article is to trace Sade's philosophy back to the
original psychical conflict which sacrifices the mother in favour of the father, he
concludes his discussion with a detailed elaboration of the philosophy itself, a
discussion in which psychology seems to be of secondary importance. Klossowski's
interest, it seems, lies not in tracing the philosophy back to the original psychical
conflict but rather in the way in which that conflict allows him to elaborate the
35Klossowski's interpretation of 'reconnaissance' and its relation to debt and moral law appears to
owe much to Nietzsche's reading of the origin of morality in The Genealogy of Morals. See La
Genealogie de la morale. translated by Isabelle Hildenbrand and Jean Gratien (paris:
Gallimard/Folio, 1971) Section II, Paragraph 20,.pp. 101-102. Throughout this thesis all
references to Nietzsche are to the French translation. This, as will be made clear in the next
chapter, is because of the focus of my argument on a specifically French reception of this
German thinker in which Klossowski plays a key role. Already his bias towards a Nietzschean
vision is making itself apparent.
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philosophical vision itself. Klossowski has inverted the (Edipus Complex so that he can
develop a Nietzschean critique of morality which opposes an order of 'reconnaissance'
(debtlmorallaw) to an order of aggression which overturns and transgresses moral
Law:
La conclusion philosophique qu'implique cette attitude negative vis-a-vis de
l'ordre maternel sera done l'affirmation de la loi anterieure a. cette ordre, la loi
de I'ingratitude, laquelle est proprement la loi de la nature (RFP,470).
Klossowski's psychological reading of Sade concludes in a philosophical interpretation
which is centred around the hypothesis of two orders of being. The primary order of
being is founded upon the egocentric and aggressive nature of man, the secondary
founded upon his social and moral being. Sade, Klossowski argues, transgresses the
latter in favour of the former.
At this stage one can already see that Klossowski's argument broadly a
restates the Surrealist reading of Sade. Where the Surrealists posited an opposition
between the movement of sexual desire and oppressive forces of rational thought and
social constraint, Klossowski posits his two orders of being, the maternal order of
morality and indebtedness as against the paternal order of natural aggression.
Klossowski's apparent preference for drawing philosophical conclusions from Sade's
texts rather than championing the more psychological insights of the Surrealists is
borne out by the fact that his next publication appears in a philosophical rather than a
psychoanalytic journal. It is this preference for a more philosophical approach and a
more Nietzschean bent which ultimately differentiates Klossowski's reading of Sade
from that of Breton and his associates.
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Klossowski published two articles in this journal. The first of these was entitled
'Le Mal et la negation d'autrui dans la philo sophie de D.A.F. de Sade'" and
subsequently went to make up the main section of Sade mon prochain, 'L'Esquisse du
systeme de Sade'. This article represents Klossowski's second attempt to give an
account of Sade's system as a whole and represents a further shift away from the
psychoanalytic context in which he began". The second article to be published in this
review entitled 'Temps et agressivite'" is less a discussion of Sade's thought proper
than an attempt to elaborate a theory of the experience of the Self in its relation to
temporality. Although this article post-dates 'Le Mal et la negation d'autrui', it does
however provide an insight into the theoretical and philosophical framework which
informs Klossowski's reading of Sade's system in the earlier article (and therefore in
the 'Esquisse du systeme de Sade' of Sade mon prochain 1947).
The two opposing orders which Klossowski posited in his first publication are
shown in this article to be subject to a complex interaction. This interaction, in tum,
founds the experience of the Self in time. By this point Klossowski has abandoned any
reference to paternity and maternity in his elaboration of the primary and secondary
orders of being. The former is now associated solely with Nature, the latter solely with
36 Pierre Klossowski, 'Le Mal et la negation d'autrui dans la philosophie de D.A.F. de Sade',
Recherches Philosophigues, 4 (1934-35), 268-93. The general theme of this issue was 'Les
Attitudes de la reflexion', Interestingly Klossowski' s article was published alongside an article
by Karl Lowith whose book on Nietzsche Klossowski later came to review in Acephale.
37 Since this article is reproduced in its entirety in the 1947 work it will not be examined until the
discussion of Sade mon prochain in the next section.
38 Pierre Klossowski, 'Temps et agressivite', Recherches Philosophigues. 5 (1935-36), 100-1l. All
references to this article will be to this volume giving the page number prefaced with the
abbreviation RP. As has already been indicated this issue included articles by Caillois, Bataille,
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moral and social law. Klossowski reproduces Sade's theory of Nature as the perpetual
movement of destruction, a concept which is of key importance throughout Sade mon
prochain. He describes this view of Nature thus:
Le spectacle des phenomenes de la Nature nous donne a penser qu'a l'origine
elle eut voulu une lois pour toutes parvenir a son accomplissement total: dans
cet effort, elle a produit les trois regnes, elle a produit les especes; elle a done
echoue puisqu'elle n'a jamais cree que des forces rivales; pour recommencer, it
ne lui reste qu'a les detruire (RP,lOl).
This desire of Nature to destroy its own creation manifests itself in human
aggressiveness, the violent nature of the primal Self. When Klossowski refers to
Nature in the thirties and in the first edition of Sade mon prochain he is really referring
to human aggressiveness and to the primacy of this function. Yet, Klossowski
recognises, humans also exist in a world populated with other humans where
r·,
contracts, both social and moral, regulate interaction and delimit the expression of
aggression. As in the earlier article two principles are opposed to each other, a
principle of aggression derived from Nature (which is perceived to have a primary
function) and a principle based upon moral contracts which provides the basis of
human social interaction.
The Self is experienced over time, asserts Klossowski, only in the interaction
between aggressive desire and the moment of encounter with others", When the
aggressive Self encounters another human being moral conscience is born and the
second order of being (that of moral law) is affirmed. Klossowski states:
Levinas and Bachelard all of which were gathered together under the heading 'Meditations sur
le Temps'.
39 This formulation borrows heavily from Kojeve's reading of Hegel and the Master/Slave dialectic of
the Phenomenology of Spirit. See Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction a la lecture de Hegel, edited
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au moment ou elle s'apprete a affronter le monde exterieur, Ie monde des
autres, l'agressivite se mue en conscience (RP,103).
This moment where conscience is born in the moment of encounter with other human
beings is of crucial importance to Klossowski's interpretation of Sade's system. The
self-reflexivity and self-awareness of the Selfis founded upon the moment when
primary aggression is halted in its movement and turned back towards itself under the
force of moral censure :
La conscience procederait done du mouvement de l'agressivite qui, s'attardant
aupres de son objet, se retourne contre elle-meme au lieu d'obeir a la necessite
aveugle de la destruction (RP,103).
Dans le retour de l'agressivite sur Ie moi, le sujet faisait l'experience de sa
permanence comme de sa personnalite totale. Et le remords serait dans ce cas
le retournement contre lui-meme de sa propre agressivite, que le moi
affectuerait pour se retrouver egal a lui-meme dans le temps (RP,l04)
The way in which this encounter with other human beings is lived determines the way
the Self experiences its own sense of permanence over time. Self-consciousness is
maintained through obeying the dictates of moral conscience. By implication any
attempt to circumvent moral conscience also has consequences for the experience of
self-consciousness. The Sadeian libertine's desire to annihilate his victim in favour of
his own aggressive drives becomes an all-important moment in the context of this view
of the Self This fate of the Self in this moment of encounter becomes the primary
theme of Sade mon prochain in 1947.
What Klossowski's argument in 'Temps et agressivite' has revealed is his belief
that the foundations of human experience are to be located entirely within the
movements of aggressive desire. A human is not a creation of Reason but one whose
by Raymond Queneau (paris: Gallimard, 1947). Klossowski attended Kojeve's seminars in the
1930s and his engagement with this important thinker will be discussed in more detail later.
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experience of reality and of Self is founded upon the manner in which: 'les etres et les
choses viennent a lui et Ie rejoignent a travers les sentiments qu'il en a dans I'attente
de leur venue' (RP,lOS). Our experience of and relation to others is not primarily one
of moral or rational consideration but rather one where aggressiveness is directed
either outwards (in a violent act) or inwards (in a feeling of moral conscience) : 'C'est
dans le reflux de sa propre agressivite sur lui-meme que les choses et les etres
viennent au moi' (RP,l 05). This emphasis on aggression as the primary foundation of
human experience recapitulates Freud's insights into the importance of sadism in the
Three Essays. But, more explicitly, it is a repetition of Nietzsche's assertion that the
censure of moral conscience is only ever a turning in of aggression towards the Self".
Clearly Klossowski is working within a post-Freudian context when he posits
aggressive desire as the foundation of human experience but the critique of conscience
and moral law that can be seen to emerge here (based upon debt and 'reconnaissance')
owes far more to a reading of Nietzsche.
As he develops this position, Klossowski is diverging considerably from the
Surrealist position. Breton's idealisation of'surrealite' as that level of experience or
world where 'la vie et la mort, Ie reel et l'imaginaire, le passe et le futur,le
communicable et I'incornmunicable, le haut et le bas cessent d'etre percus
contradictoirement'" (i.e. where all oppositions are fused into a unity) could not be
further from Klossowski's assimilation of the Nietzschean concept of aggression.
40 Nietzsche makes this point in his discussion of aggression and moral conscience in The Genealogy
of Morals. See La Genealogie de la morale. II, 16, p. 94. Deleuze repeats this point in his
discussion of Nietzsche's theory of'mauvaise conscience' in Nietzsche et la philosophie (paris:
P.U.F., 1963), p. 146.
41 Andre Breton, 'Second manifeste du surrealisme', Manifestes du surrealisme. pp. 72-73.
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Where the former posits a space of fusion 'above reality' as we conventionally know it,
the latter founds our experience in the animality of aggressive desire. It alludes to what
should rather be called a 'sous-realite', The Surrealists aestheticise sexual desire,
Klossowski emphasises its fundamental violence. It is this interrogation of, and
perhaps even fascination for, a kind of primary violence which separates both
Klossowski's and Bataille's reading of Sade from that of the Surrealist movement as a
whole.
This brief analysis of'Temps et agressivite' reveals that Klossowski's interest in
Sade lay, first and foremost, in his interrogation of the relationship between Self and
Other. More particularly he investigated the complex manner in which the Self relates
to the Other given that violence and desire are a primary fact of human existence. It is
the problematic raised by this form of questioning which gives rise to the ethical and
political considerations of Kloss ow ski's articles in the late 1930s. In a decade
characterised by the revolutionary zeal of those on the left and the anti-humanist, virile
and often anti-Semitic rhetoric of those on the right (often with National Socialist
leanings), the question of the nature~olence was of crucial importance. Despite his
assimilation of Nietzsche such a problematic, ultimately, leads Klossowski to adopt an
explicitly Catholic position in the years immediately before and after the Second World
War.
It might seem quite remarkable that Klossowski should be publishing work in
Bataille's review Acephale throughout 1936 and 1937 and then in the Catholic Esprit
in 1938. The former review, devoted to Bataille's project offounding an atheistic
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'religion du sacre' (based upon a particular conception and advocation of sacrifice) was
a forum whose aims were hardly compatible with that of the Catholic Esprit, founded
as it was to promote a specifically Christian spiritual response to the political and
social debates of the thirties. Yet this strange combination of allegiances reflects
exactly the tensions within Klossowski's thought throughout this period. The exact
drama of this tension, between Nietzschean vision on the one hand and a Catholic
theological perspective on the other will be explored fully in the discussion of Sade
mon prochain.
Klossowski's article 'Qui est mon prochain?' published in Esprit in December
193842 is interesting insofar as it is Klossowski's only overt contribution to political
debate that he makes throughout the thirties. It is interesting also because it addresses
the question of the relation between Self and Other that was seen to be his central
concern in 'Temps et agressivite'. His main point of consideration in this discussion
goes to the heart of what is at stake in his reading of Sade, namely that of:
l'elementaire besoin de remettre en question l'existence d'autrui pour accroitre
d'autant le sentiment de l'existence propre (E,404).
'Temps et agressivite' affirmed the way in which the consciousness of the Self was
determined in its encounter with others. Here Klossowski restates this position. 'Qui
42Pierre Klossowski, 'Qui est mon prochain', Esprit, 75 (December 1938), 402-23. References to this
article will be to this volume giving the page number prefaced with the abbreviation E. This
issue devoted itself to the highly topical, and extremely thorny question of the origins of French
fascism under the title 'Le Prefascisme francais', The opening article by Emmanuel Mounier
himself, entitled 'Les Deux Sources du prefascisme', defined fascism as : 'une subordination
totale de la personne aux appareils, politique ou technique', Seeing this 'subordination totale de
la personne' (323-34) as a phenomenon common to both Left and Right Mounier rejected the
possibility of a French fascism in favour of 'une democratie personnaliste'. Klossowski's article
appears under the general heading 'Les Forces de la haine' and should be understood within the
overall context of the December issue and its attempt to analyse the genesis of fascism. Other
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est mon prochain?', however, develops this argument in order to integrate it into the
political debate surrounding the nature of Fascism and the future of democracy. The
National Socialists of Germany have succeeded, argues Klossowski, in forming a
community based upon a fixed identity of the Self(the racially pure German) by
negatively constructing and then violently excluding the Other (the impure Jew). He
explicates this process with some prescience as follows:
quand les membres d'une communaute politique se veulent limiter aux liens
raciaux, ne peuvent-ils vivre la fraternite de ces liens dans la simple affirmation;
its ne le peuvent qu'en devenant une communaute de negation d'autrui; ainsi
que les terroristes de 1793, c'est peut-etre dans l'extermination meme d'une
minorite sociale et raciale que les nationaux-socialistes ont scelle une fraternite
(E,41S).
The Nazi constructs a fixed and communal identity for him or herself only in and.
through the negation of the Jew and, as Klossowski points out, this negation involves
a very real violence and even perhaps annihilation. The name of Sade is not mentioned
throughout the length of 'Qui est mon prochain?'. However, the point Klossowski
makes here raises an issue that dominates debates around Sade in the post-war period;
namely the question of whether or not Sade and his thought can be called Nazi". The
Sadeian libertine's ruthless annihilation of his victims has often been compared to the
cruelty of the death camps. However, Klossowski's particular form of Catholic
response to the phenomenon of Nazism in 'Qui est mon prochain?' is a precursor of his
Christian interpretation of Sade in the first edition of Sade mon prochain. This
contributors to this issue included Jacques Madule, Francois Perroux, A. Rossi and P. Henri
Simon.
43 The history of this debate about Sade in the decades after the Second World War is related by
Maurice Lever in his biography. See Lever pp. 392-392. The question of the complicity of
figures like Sade and Nietzsche with Nazism was already a question before the war however.
Bataille's revue Acephale devoted an issue to this question entitled 'Nietzsche et les fascistes'
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response founds his complete refusal of any identification between the philosophy and
writing of the Marquis and the tenets of National Socialism.
The Christian cannot, KIossowski maintains, demonise and negate the Other in
the way that the Nazi does the Jew. This is essentially because of the doctrine of
Original Sin. According to this doctrine we are all, as humans, guilty of evil in the eyes
of God, but at the same time we all are given the possibility of Redemption. Within
this context it makes no sense to brand another human being or group of human beings
as evil or inferior and one's own Self as good or superior because we all partake
equally of Sin. Of the Christian KIossowski asserts as follows :
tout crime ou tout malheur d'autrui, ille reconnait alors pour symptome de sa
propre culpabilite; toute vertu d'autrui, il l'accepte comme une chance de sa
propre redemption (E,408).
Any qualities one might be able to locate in others are always ultimately possibilities or
potentialities of oneself In negating the Other one is only ever refusing a set of
possibilities which are in fact already one's own. KIossowski expresses this view as
follows:
L"'ennemi" repond done a l'ignorance plus ou moins concertee ou je suis a
regard de rune de mes virtualites propres, virtualite que je reconnais d'autant
moins au dedans de moi comme une difference d'avec moi-meme que je crois
davant age l'eprouver comme une difference d'avec un etre exterieur a moi
(E,410).
Klossowski, departing from the Catholic doctrine of Original Sin, elaborates here a
plural view of the Self The infinity variety of others expresses, in reality, the infinite
possibility and multiplicity of my own identity. Or put another way, because Catholic
doctrine excludes no human from sin, it must include all humans within its community.
which sought to defend Nietzsche in particular against his appropriation by National Socialist
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The Nazi, Klossowski argues, is wrong to negate the Jew in order to fix his own
identity, for in doing so he is only ever negating his own possibility. The Nazi is only
ever refusing a difference within himself rather than affirming a difference with the Jew
because ultimately we are all equally guilty, all equally besmirched with the stain of
Original Sin. The refusal of this difference within himself and its projection onto the
Other can lead only to the violent and bloody negation of the Other. The conclusion to
which Klossowski comes as a result of this formulation is that an affirmation of
Catholic doctrine is the only response to the question of the difference between Self
and Other (implying as it does in his reading of Original Sin that the Self is always a
plural potentiality and is as such already different from itself). Through Christianity,
Klossowski argues, we must recognise that whatever we are, we are all an expression
of the infinite possibility within ourselves and thus tolerate and indeed love all the
differences of others. We are all infinitely guilty and can only be redeemed through
love of Christ and union in the breast of the One Church. To the question 'Qui est mon
prochain?' Klossowski replies 'mon pro chain, c'est moil (my phrase).
The argument of this Esprit article is important because it shows firstly
Klossowski's Christian view that the Other cannot be negated in any successful way
(this will be of crucial importance to his reading of Sade). Secondly it shows that, even
from within a Christian perspective, he is articulating a plural view of the Self Because
of Original Sin and the shared guilt of mankind the Self is constructed as being
essentially divided from itself, infinite in its potentiality and possibility. The only hope
of unity offered to humanity is redemption through God and Jesus Christ. God
ideologues such as Alfred Rosenberg and others. Acephale. 2 (January 1937).
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functions within these early writings to affirm unity and totality over all possible
divisions but only insofar as the doctrine of universal guilt allows us first to recognise
that those divisions are only ever within ourselves and not between one group and
another.
Crucial here is the extent to which this Christian line of thought informs
K1ossowski's view of Sade as figure whose own conscience is divided from itself The
Sadeian libertine, in his unsuccessful attempt to negate any relationship to the Other,
represents for K1ossowski a consciousness which is tom between Christian and
atheistic perspectives. In these articles of the thirties K1ossowski shows himself to be
very much divided between a Nietzschean affirmation of 'agressivite' as the foundation
of experience and a Christian view of Sin, Guilt and possible Redemption in the love of
God. In the same way, K1ossowski will argue, Sade is divided between an assertion of
aggressive desire which negates God on the one hand and the ultimate impossibility of
his negation on the other. At the end of'Qui est mon pro chain?' K1ossowski writes:
Des hommes en lutte au dedans d'eux-memes pouvaient se reconnaitre comme
semblables, commes freres <E,422).
To the question 'Qui est mon prochain?' K1ossowski in 1947 gave a definitive answer.
Sade as he writes, K1ossowski will argue, bears witness to a lengthy and complex
struggle within himself This is a struggle which K1ossowski recognises as his own and
which gives him the title for his work : Sade mon prochain.
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Being without Eternity: the 1947 edition of Sade mon proc/lain.
Quelque accoutume que I'on soit au jorjait, il est rare que la nouvelle de son
accomplissement n'effraie celui qui vient de le commettre. Cette terreur jait
rentrer un instant la vertu dans ses droits que lui ravit bientot le crime.
La Nouvelle Justine ou les malheurs de la vertu".
In Sade's novels rape, torture and murder are committed in the name of
unbridled pleasure. Sade himself spent over twenty years in prison as the result of
sexual crimes he committed" and, after the Revolution, as a result of the obscenity of
his writing in general. Yet this apostle of murder and all manner of violent crime, this
man who claimed that he would gladly be martyred for his atheist creed", is,
Klossowski argues, a Christian. Klossowski's first edition of Sade mon prochain47 has
as its central thesis the argument that all the thousands of pages of sexual violence that
fill Sade's novels and all the atheistic, materialistic justifications which accompany
them throughout his eeuvre are the result of bad conscience (what Klossowski will call
'la mauvaise conscience'). Sade's unflinching rejection of Christianity, maintains
Klossowski, conceals a profound affirmation of God's existence.
The surprising nature of this thesis might lead one initially to view
Klossowski's position as rather eccentric and misguided. This indeed was the view
adopted by Bataille in 1947 in his review of the work later incorporated in La
44 Sade, <Buvres completes, Vol. VII (1967), p. 240.
4S Many biographers have argued over the seriousness of the incidents in which Sade was known to
have been involved. For instance Gilbert Lely described the scandal of Sade's alleged abduction
of'Rose Keller as a mere 'spanking' and alluded to the insubstantial nature of the 'crime', For an
assessment of this incident and Lely's reaction see Lever's biography pp. 150-156.
46 See Lever, The Marquis de Sade, p. 451.
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Litterature et le mal" . Yet the idiosyncrasy of Klossowski's thesis is more apparent
than real; for he is not alone in reading Sade in order to discern certain forces at work
beneath the surface of the Marquis's text. The anti-rationalist surrealists transformed
the rationalist Sade into a hero to serve their own ends. Both Bataille and Blanchot
also place a question mark over Sade's apparent rationalism. Also, Klossowski is not
alone in suggesting that Sade's atheism does not run as deeply as its very virulence
might suggest. Huysmans inA rebours suggests a reading of Sade which is potentially
very close to that of'Klossowski" (and which therefore implies that Klossowski's
reading is not quite so strange and unique as it might at first seem). For both
Klossowski and Huysmans the claim that Sade is a Christian rests on two assumptions:
firstly that the rationalism of Sade's text is superficial because untenable and secondly
that his professed atheism is more a form of sacrilege which serves to confirm what it
so virulently denies, i.e. the existence of God. For his part Klossowski constructs his
argument affirming Sade's Christianity within the framework of a surprising number of
perspectives, at once Catholic, Hegelian and also Nietzschean. Yet most importantly
his argument centres on the problematic of violent desire insofar as this desire
structures the encounter between Self and Other. This problematic, so crucial to all of
47 Sade mon prochain (paris: Seuil, 1947). All references to the 1947 edition of this text will be to this
volume giving the page number prefaced by the abbreviation SMP47.
48 In his review Bataille suggests that 'dans son "Esquisse du systeme de Sade" Pierre Klossowski a
donne de l'auteur de Justine une image un peu construite' , Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes.
Vol. 9, p. 247. This review was published originally Critique, 15-17, (1947).
49 The narrator of A rebours writes of sadism : 'En effet, s'il ne comportait point un sacrilege, le
sadisme n'aurait pas de raison d'ctre; d'autre part, Ie sacrilege qui decoule de l'existence meme
d'une religion, ne peut etre intentionellement et patiernment accompli que par un croyant, car
l'homme n'eprouverait aucune allegresse a profaner une foi qui lui serait ou indifferente ou
inconnue'. A rebours (paris: Fasquelle, 1961), p. 202.
39
Klossowski's articles in the thirties, leads him to discern in Sade a complex interaction
of forces which underpins the professed atheism of Sade's libertine heroes.
Throughout the first edition of Sade mon prochain, but in the 'Esquisse du
systeme de Sade' in particular, Klossowski traces this interaction of forces through
numerous successive phases or moments which can be located within the Sadeian text.
As was suggested earlier this shift towards a close analysis of the dynamic of Sade's
writing itself articulates a movement away from the lionising of Sade by Breton (and
the failure of surrealism to read the works themselves). What follows will show that,
ultimately, it is the highly paradoxical character of Sade's writing that makes the
eighteenth-century libertine philosopher a figure of such key significance to
Klossowski, the twentieth-century writer, translator and painter. What Klossowski's
reading does is to identify Sadeian paradox as a figure of thought working at the limit
of thought itself In this focus on paradox Sade ceases to be some kind of iconoclastic
hero involved in a project of moral subversion, but rather becomes a philosopher and
writer of the limit.
'L'Esqllisse dll systeme de Sade' - Sade's dialectic.
The philosophical discourses of the Sadeian libertine make a constant appeal to
the light of reason and self-evidence yet do so in order to justify the most extreme
forms of irrational desire. Klossowski opens the central essay of Sade mon prochain
'Esquisse du systeme de Sade' by making just this point. Sade's writing, asserts
Klossowski, reproduces the 'terminologie reyue'(SMP47,48) of the rationalist
Enlightenment, but at the same time has as its foundation that very different moment
where: 'des forces obscures se levent au-dedans d'un homme' (SMP47,47). This is the
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first paradoxical moment which Klossowski locates in Sade's writing. The language of
reason is being deployed to justify and promote the highest form of unreason that of
violent and deviant sexual desire. Klossowski initially views this paradox as indicative
of the extent to which Sade is a prisoner of his time. Sade was a prisoner, asserts
Klossowski, not just in the Bastille and other prisons, but a prisoner also of the
language of his epoch, a prisoner
all nom de la raison et de la philosophie des lumieres, parce qu'ayant voulu
traduire dans les termes du sens commun ce que ce sens doit taire et abolir
pour rester commun, sous peine d'en etre lui-meme aboli (SMP47,48).
Klossowski's concern is to show that Sade's thought, whilst it may seem to affirm
some form of rationalist materialism, is clearly far more preoccupied with the irrational
and irrationally violent basis of experience. This is a crucial step in the movement
towards constructing a Christian Sade because it undermines the rationalism with
which Sade seeks to deny the importance of morality, and in particular the Christian
categories of moral value. Sade's dismissal of moral restraints may appeal to the
rational materialist philosophies of Holbach or La Mettrie (SMP47,52) but ultimately
what is at stake in the denial of morality is not the demands of Reason but rather those
of'des forces obscures'.
Klossowski develops this reading in such a way as to show that whilst Sade's
text might strive towards some form of materialist a-morality and a liquidation of
Christian moral categories, it always in fact begins from, and ultimately remains within
a position which is deeply complicit with them. Sade's heroes, however much they
might try to justify their actions or promote the pleasures and vices of Crime, are never
entirely freed from Christian values. The entirety of Kloss ow ski's argument centres
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around the encounter between Sadeian libertine and his victim. The essay 'Temps et
agressivite' showed the way inwhich the Self as a morally self-aware being was
determined in the moment of'rencontre' with the Other. In his analysis of Sade
Klossowski takes libertine and victim as a model for what is at stake in this 'rencontre'.
In order to torture and murder his victim the libertine must deny any moral contract
with others and to do so must also deny God and the existence of God's law. 'Temps
et agressivite', borrowing from Nietzsche, developed the thesis that violent desire was
directed either outward to negate the Other or inward in the form of moral conscience.
In the 'Esquisse du systeme' Klossowski develops this thesis further by giving it a
Christian emphasis. If the Self restrains its natural aggression in the encounter with
others then it is submitting to moral imperatives and is constituted in moral conscience,
characterised inCatholic terms by a knowledge of Original Sin and therefore by guilt
(i.e. the negative feeling of guilt is, precisely, that turning inwards of aggression). With
this God's Law is affirmed (and hence His existence). If, on the other hand the Self
unleashes its aggression in order to annihilate the Other (the Sadeian moment), then it
denies both God's Law and therefore also the existence of God. Within this framework
the existence of others, moral categories and God are mutually interdependent; the
affirmation or recognition of one implies an affirmation and recognition of the others.
This means that the libertine's straightforward denial of morality is not
satisfactory : he must still confront his victim and therefore confront his own moral
conscience and with that God's existence:
Sade, s'il adhere au debut cl la negation du Mal, ne se satisfait pas encore de
cette negation. C'est que le prochain se trouve mis en cause; et, tant que le
prochain existe pour I'ego illui revele la presence de Dieu (SMP47,57).
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What this shows is that Sade, for all his supposed rationalism, is not an atheist "'de
sang-froid'" (SMP47,59). The presence of other people implies limitations on the
assertion of aggression and therefore moral restraints, which in tum implies the
presence of God. Each attempt to murder or torture a victim must first involve a prior
encounter with the victim as other and therefore an implicit affirmation of both moral
categories and God. As long as Sade's heroes commit their Crimes with reference to
moral values they are secretly recognising God's existence.
Klossowski's assertion of Sade's Christianity is based upon the ultimate
impossibility of negating a moral relationship to others and therefore the impossibility
of negating God Himself. This assertion relies upon a twofold perspective which goes
beyond the Nietzschean construction of 'conscience' as an inward tum of aggressive
energy. The first is a traditional doctrine of Catholic theology, namely that a denial of
God or a transgression of God's Law is always ultimately also a recognition of and
appeal to His presence", Sade's promotion of crime and more importantly of Evil for
the sake of evil offers an example of this. Klossowski writes :
Aussi la conscience du debauche sadique maintient-elle avec les categories
morales le libre arbitre, en croyant pouvoir faire le mal (SMP47,61).
By promoting Evil, the libertine affirms moral categories even in the very process of
seeking to negate them and therefore also affirms God. Klossowski places this into an
explicitly theological context relating it to 'l'analyse du Mal pour Ie Mal de Saint
Augustin dans ses Confessions (SMP47,61). The second perspective is more
50 This doctrine is put forward by Augustine to whom Klossowski refers explicitly at various moments
throughout Sade mon prochain. See Augustine's Confessions (Oxford: OUP, 1991) p. 32.
Augustine comments on supposed unbelievers : 'Yet they put themselves at distance from you
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contemporary and involves a more complex play of affirmation and negation than the
theological construction just outlined. The libertine and his victim as a model of Self in
its encounter with the Other also stages the dialectical struggle between the Master
and the Slave as it is elaborated by Hegel in the Phenomenology of SpiritS1 •
The key figure in this assimilation of Hegel for both Klossowski and many
others throughout the thirties (most particularly Bataille) is Alexandre Kojeve", From
1933 through to 1939 Kojeve gave a weekly seminar translating and commenting on
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Klossowski, along with many other figures who
came to prominence after the Second World War attended this seminar. These
included Bataille, Lacan, Merleau-Ponty and also Sartre". A more explicit connection
between Klossowski and Kojeve is their joint participation in the 'College de
sociologie' founded by Bataille, Caillois and Leiris in the winter of 193754, Bataille's
pronouncements within this forum draw, in particular, on Kojeve's reading of Hegel.
Both Kojeve himself and Klossowski gave papers at the meetings of the College".
Kojeve's elaboration of the Hegelian Master/Slave dialectic emphasises the way in
which the Self is constituted as a discrete entity in the struggle for mastery which
occurs in its encounter with others. For Hegel-Kojeve all action is negation, a
and exalt themselves against you. But even by thus imitating you they acknowledge that you are
the creator of all nature and that no place can entirely escape from you'.
51 See G. W. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit. translated by AV.Miller (Oxford: Clarendon,
1977), pp. 111-19.
52 For a short account of Kojeve's relations with Bataille throughout the thirties see Michel Surya's
biography of Bataille Georges Bataille. la mort a l'oeuvre, pp. 229-33 and pp. 318-30. For a
more detailed account of Kojeve's life and work see Dominique AufIret's book Alexandre
Kojeve. La philosophie. rEtat. la fin de rhistoire (paris: Grasset, 1990).
53 See Carolyn Dean, The Self and its Pleasures, p. 5.
S4 See Surya, Georges Bataille. la mort a l'oeuvre, pp. 322-24.
55 These are gathered together and commented by Denis Hollier in Le College de sociologie (paris:
Gallimard/ldees, 1979 [Revised edition 1995]).
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destruction of an existing state of affairs in the name of something else. In this context
all recognition of the Other is thus necessarily an abolition of the Other and vice-versa
i.e. an attempt at abolition necessarily also entails a form of recognition. Klossowski's
Sade behaves in much the same way: when the libertine hero seeks to annihilate his
victim, he also necessarily recognises the reality of that victim (and therefore of moral
contracts). Because the Hegelian dialectic of the Master and Slave posits recognition
as a form of negation and therefore also negation as a form of recognition this parallel
between Master/Slave and Sadeian libertine/victim can be drawn. At the same time,
Kojeve's formulation of this dialectic parallels (though with different implications) the
Nietzschean formulation of the 'rencontre' between Self and Other (explicated in
'Temps et agressivite') insofar as it stresses that Desire (Kojeve's capitalisation) rather
than Reason founds the self-consciousness of the Self
In a text dating from 193956 in which he offers a detailed commentary of
Hegel's text Kojeve writes: ICIest le Desir (conscient) d'un etre qui constitue cet etre
en tant que Moi' (KOJ, 11). Not only is it the movement of desire which founds the
Selfbut also that movement of Desire as it confronts another Desire:
En effet, l'etre humain ne se constitue qu'en fonction d'un Desir portant sur un
autre Desir, c'est-a-dire - en fin de compte - d'un de sir de reconnaissance.
L'etre humain ne peut done se constituer que si deux au moins de ces Desirs
s'affrontent (KOJ,14).
56 See Introduction cl la lecture de Hegel, edited by Raymond Queneau (paris: Gallimardfl'el, 1947),
pp. 11-34. All references to this commentary will be to this volume giving the page number
prefaced with the abbreviation KOJ.
45
The reality of the Self, the presence of the Self to itself, is founded upon a struggle for
the recognition of mastery between two forces of Desire". This struggle for mastery is
resolved in the 'negation' of one desire by the other. In principle this negation of one
Desire by the other results in the death of one or other of the participants. Yet in the
death of one of the participants the desiring Self would find itself alone and would lack
the recognition needed to constitute itself as Self This means that in the struggle for
mastery between two confronting forces of Desire the victor must negate, but at the
same time conserve the opponent in order to gain recognition of its victory. This
negation, which is also a form of conservation, Kojeve calls a 'suppression dialectique',
a term which translates Hegel's Aufhebung :
"Supprimer dialectiquement" veut dire: supprimer en conservant le supprime,
qui est sublime dans et par cette suppression conservante ou cette conservation
supprimante. L'entite supprimee dialectiquement est annulee dans son aspect
contingent [.... ] : mais elle est conservee dans ce qu'elle a d'essentiel (KOJ,21).
The interdependence of those three elements : moral categories, recognition of the
Other and the existence of God has already been elaborated upon. However it is this
Hegelian/Kojevlan notion of dialectical suppression which structures the interaction
between Sadeian libertine and his victim (and therefore the interaction of these three
elements) throughout the 'Esquisse du systeme'. Kojeve's reading of the Master/Slave
dialectic provides the framework for what Klossowski calls the 'drame dialectique' of
Sade's system.
57 It is not possible to enter here into a detailed analysis ofK1ossowski's account of Hegel's dialectic of
Master and Slave. However it is important to retain certain elements of Kojeve's formulation in
order to understand Klossowski's reading of Sade in the 'Esquisse du systeme', Judith Butler in
Subjects of Desire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) discusses the Master/Slave
dialectic and its importance through Kojeve's seminar to twentieth-century French thought in
general. See also Michael Kelly, Hegel in France (Birmingham: Birmingham University Press,
1992).
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The opening essay of Sade mon prochain 'Sade et la Revolution' was given as a
paper at the College de Sociologie inFebruary 1939 and explicitly situates the
relationship between libertine and his victim within this Hegelian framework of the
encounter between Master and Slave. The eighteenth-century 'Grand Seigneur', argues
Klossowski, denies both God and therefore the Divine Right of the King. With this he
denies also the entirety of the feudal hierarchy and the rights and obligations that
accompany it (and regulate interaction between individuals). With this overturning of
the moral contracts which underpin the Divine and feudal order :
la loi de la jungle rentre en vigueur : les conditions de l'antique rapport du fort
et du faible, du maitre et de l'esclave sont retablies (SMP47,24).
Once the social hierarchy, which finds its legitimisation in the existence of God is
abolished (and along with this the moral codes of duty and obligation) a prior order
characterised by violence and appropriation is reinstated. This, of course, reiterates
Klossowski's formulation of two orders of Being in his articles of the early 1930's (in
La Revue Francaise de Psychanalyse and Recherches Philosophigues).
Yet although Klossowski begins his book by evoking the relationship between
Master and Slave as the principle which structures the encounter of Sade's heroes and
their victims, his use of dialectics in the 'Esquisse du systeme' is problematic.
Klossowski's sketch of Sade's system is based upon what he calls the 'mouvement
dialectique' of the Sadeian consciousness. This movement, as has already been
indicated, is based on Sade's attempt to liquidate moral categories (therefore both the
Other and God). However such a movement, claims Klossowski, passes through a
number of dialectical phases in which moral categories are both negated and yet
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maintained. The Hegelianism of Kloss owski's analysis has been questioned in particular
by Georges Bataille inhis review of Klossowski's work in Litterature et Ie Mal.
Bataille writes that Klossowski's analysis is 'tres hegelien, mais sans la rigueur d'un
Hegel'", A summary account of Kloss ow ski's argument reveals the following phases:
I. Sade's heroes promote Evil for Evil's sake and in so doing conserve moral
categories (SMP47,60).
II. Evil is justified by reference to an Evil creator God 'I'Etre supreme en
mechancete', who as 'I'Agresseur originel' has violated all moral contracts from
the outset. Yet this argument for Evil : 'a recours aux categories morales
comme a un pacte que Dieu aurait viole' (SMP47,65).
III. The notion of an Evil God is rejected in favour of a conception of Nature
as a Demonic force. Yet Nature as a ferocious power of destruction conserves
the idea of Good and Evil because it is constructed as a notion: 'toujours en se
placant au point de we des categories morales' (SMP47,7S).
IV. This is the final phase in the attempt to liquidate moral categories and is
based upon the conception of Nature as a perpetual movement of creation and
destruction. This movement is one of a blind necessity which transcends
individual consciousness. It is a universal, impersonal desire for destruction
which founds human passions and : 'si l'homme croit se satisfaire en leur
obeissant, it ne satisfait en realite qu'une aspiration qui depasse son individu,
(SMP47,Sl).
It is not entirely clear how one phase of this process follows on from or supersedes the
other by the operation of a mediating term (as a strictly Hegelian dialectic would
demand) and it is for this reason that one might, like Bataille, question the rigour of
Klossowski's formulation. Although there is a transition from one phase to another
there is no clear indication that the movement is one of ascension or one of an ever
greater synthesis, Rather each phase seems to repeat the same contradictory moment
in a different form. Yet it is clear that the importance of this process for the author of
Sade mon prochain lies in this repetition, in Sade's constant reference to moral
58 Bataille, <Buvres completes, Vol. 9, p. 247.
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categories and his inability to think without them. The outcome of this 'mouvement
dialectique' in the final phase is the key moment of Sade's system and involves a return
to the point with which the process began, namely the relation between libertine and
victim and the impossibility of the former being able to destroy the latter.
The notion of Nature as a perpetual movement of creation and destruction was
used by Klossowski from his very first article on Sade in 1933. From the outset his
interest in this notion is focused on the impossibility of total destruction'". If one
recalls the formulation in 'Temps et agressivite', Klossowski emphasised that Nature
desiring to 'une lois pour toutes parvenir a son accomplissment total' (RP, 10 1) failed
insofar as it created only competing forces. Rather than a stable and finished totality
the spectacle of Nature offers a multiplicity of interacting phenomena each trying to
assert itself as a totality: 'elle a done echoue puisqu'elle n'a jamais produit que des
forces rivales; pour recommencer, it ne reste qu'a les detruire' (RP,101). This means,
for Klossowski, that the movement of Nature is condemned to maintain itself in
perpetuity because whenever it destroys it also creates yet whenever it creates it is
moved also to destroy. Creation and destruction mutually imply each other, the one
always gives rise to the other. The relationship between Sade's heroes and their victims
parallels this play of creation and destruction in Nature :
59 It is interesting to note that, when in the 1940' s, in works such as L 'Experience interieure and La
Litterature et le droit a la mort, Bataille and Blanchot are investigating the limits of the
Hegelian dialectic, it is in the impossibility of total destruction (and subsequent reintegration
within the dialectic) that both find testimony to the limits of dialectical thought. As a result
death endures as an (impossible) experience of impossibility for both Bataille and Blanchot. As
will become clear, what Klossowski refers to here as the impossibility of total destruction is not
far removed from what Bataille calls the impossibility of dying (ecstasy) and Blanchot the il y a
(borrowed from Levinas). This gives an initial indication of the convergence between the
positions of Bataille, Blanchot and Klossowski in the post-war years. This will be examined
further at the end of this chapter.
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la conscience sadiste va decouvrir dans cette dualite son propre conflit et peut-
etre y entrevoir sa solution finale. Le probleme de la creation-destruction de
ses creatures qui se pose a la Nature, n'est-ce pas le probleme de la realite
d'autrui qui se posait a la conscience sadiste ... ? (SMP47,85).
The final phase of Sade's thought, the affirmation of Nature as an amoral movement of
creation and destruction returns Sade's libertines to the initial conflict of their situation.
The libertine may seek to annihilate his victim but must first also recognise the reality
of the victim. On one level Kojeve's translation of Hegelian Aujhebung as 'suppression
dialectique' is particularly useful here. Cruelty towards or the destruction of one
particular victim always involves a recognition of the Other at the same time it seeks to
negate it. The destruction of an individual victim is a 'suppression conservante' or a
'conservation supprimante' of the world of others. The other person may be dead, the
Other remains and as long as the world of others remains so does moral conscience :
'le monde des autres a place en chacun de nous son redoutable representant : la
conscience morale. Et ce n'est pas a l'exterieur, c'est en nous-meme que le monde des
autres do it etre detruit pour ne plus avoir d'empire sur nous' (SMP47,91). Yet on
another more profound level this moment marks a crucial break from the Hegelian
dialectic. This is because the return of moral categories is a repetition of the same
moment rather than a sublation or a progression to a higher level of synthesis.
Paradoxically, Nature as a perpetual and amoral movement of creation and destruction
does not signal the libertine's final escape from the categories of Christian moral
values. Rather it necessitates the infinite return of moral conscience".
60 Sade's libertines are always aware of this propensity of moral feeling to return after a crime has
been committed. For instance at the beginning of Juliette Mme Delbene speaks of the need to
strive ceaselessly to : 'eteindre totalement en soi cette voix confuse qui, dans Ie calme des
50
So the final phase of Sade's dialectic is subject, in perpetuity, to the affirmation
of God through the inevitable return of moral conscience. Yet the drama of Sade's
system does not end here, even if its dialectical movement does, for in response to this
situation the libertine develops what Klossowski terms the 'ascese' of 'apathie'. Ifmoral
conscience is the 'espion du monde des autres' which always returns as long as another
human being breathes on the earth then :
Pour depister cet espion, il faudrait que l'ego sut maintenir son agressivite dans
une sorte de mobilisation permanente, dans l'etat de mouvement perpetuel qui
lui est propre, car c'est dans le repos, dans le calme, que l'agressivite disponible
revient a nouveau alimenter la conscience morale (SMP47,92-3).
Moral conscience, since it is formed when aggression turns in on itself in the encounter
with the Other, can only be overcome once and for all by directing aggression
continually outwards in a movement of endless repetition. Nature, as perpetual
creation and destruction, necessitates the perpetual recapitulation of the sadistic act in
order to ward off moral conscience. Sade's heroes, then, must proceed from victim to
victim in a seemingly endless repetition of cruelty and murder. Because they can never
properly succeed in negating the Other they must move repeatedly to negate each
individual other being as it crosses their path.
Sade's dialectical drama, however rigorously dialectical its various phases may
be, has its outcome in the failure of the dialectic, in the repetition of the same moment
ad infinitum. A properly Hegelian dialectic would offer a teleological history,
ascending towards a moment of absolute knowledge or totality. Sade's dialectic,
however, collapses into this infinite repetition. The pages upon pages of Sade's novels
passions, vient encore reclamer contre les egarements ou elles nous ont pones', Sade, <Euvres
completes, Vol.VIII (1967), pp. 27/28.
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where tableau after tableau of torture unfold have at their root a movement where
negation always implies an affirmation and therefore always necessitates a further
negation and so on ad infinitum. Sade's ascetic of apathy is an affirmation of
aggression and an overturning of God's law but only insofar as that movement of
aggression can be perpetually recapitulated without ever attaining the total annihilation
it desires. What the 'Esquisse du systeme' has shown is the difficulty of maintaining
Sade's atheism as a straightforward and unproblematic doctrine. Sade's consciousness
is always deeply divided and deeply involved in an engagement with God and God's
Law. The ascetic of apathy, and the practice of delectatio morosa to which this
discussion will now tum, are all motifs of this repetition which constitutes the final
outcome of Sade's dialectic. The remaining essays of Sade mon prochain, however,
argue that repetition is an impossible mode of Being, one that demonstrates once and
for all, according to Klossowski in 1947, the impossibility of living without God.
Delectatio Morosa and the ruination of Being.
The chapter which follows 'L'Esquisse du systeme de Sade' consists of three
parts and makes explicit Klossowski's assertion of Sade's Christianity by being entitled
'Sous le masque de l'atheisme'. Once again the implication is clear: Sade is not what he
seems to be; his text hides other forces beneath its apparently rationalist surface. The
first two parts of the essay offer perhaps Klossowski's most singular approach to Sade,
an approach which he specifically disavows in a footnote to the 1967 revision of his
work. In the parts entitled 'Destruction et purete' and 'Hommage a la Vierge',
Klossowski places Sade's thought within the context of the early Christian heresies of
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Gnosticism". Sade, Klossowski argues, is engaged in a never-ending attempt to
destroy the material world, created by the evil Derniurge, in favour of the non-material
purity of the 'Dieu des Esprits'. This allows Klossowski to reach the perhaps surprising
conclusion that the libertine's liquidation of his victim is a result of his quest not for
evil but purity.
Although Klossowski's interest in Gnosticism runs throughout his career as a
writer and essayist (and is developed, in particular, in Le Baphomet), the shifts in
emphasis which his engagement with this particular form of early Christian heresy
undergoes will not be discussed in any detail here. What is important to note at this
point is that the attempt by the Sadeian libertine to destroy matter in favour of the
purity of non-matter is highly paradoxical. As such it proves resistant to any
progressive dialectic. The desire for purity, Klossowski argues is centred on the figure
of the Virgin (embodied in the character of Justine). In desiring the Virgin, the libertine
expresses his desire for purity. Yet this desire is founded on an impossibility, since the
desire for purity is itself inherently impure (being rooted in the flesh and therefore the
material world). The libertine finds himself in the position of having to say:
Je suis exc/u de la purete, parce que je veux posseder celie qui est pure. Je ne
puis ne pas desirer la purete, mais du meme coup je suis impur parce que je
veux jouir de I 'injouissable purete (SMP47, 109).
This is a recapitulation in a different form of the impossibility of destruction as it was
elaborated at the end of the 'Esquisse', Just as suppression of the Sadeian victim
61 For an introduction to Gnostic thought see E.C. Blackman, Marcion and his influence (London:
SPCK., 1948), and E. Filoramo, A History of Gnosticism, translated by A. Alcock (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell,1990). See also Hutin, Les Gnostiques (paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1959). Klossowski focuses on the dualism of Gnostic cosmology: the Evil of a fallen material
world as opposed to the Good of the universe of Spirits. Two Gods accompany this cosmology :
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implied its conservation, so here purity always implies its opposite, impurity. This
failed attempt to possess purity once more necessitates the endless repetition of the
same act or what Klossowski describes here as 'l'acharnement inlassable sur la meme
victime' (SMP4 7,108) (again Justine provides the ideal model for this moment of
Sade's text as she is subject over and again to rape and abuse). However at this point a
greater emphasis is placed on the fact that it is failure which founds the need for
repetition. Repetition only ever occurs because of impossibility and inevitable failure
(be it the failure to negate moral conscience or to possess purity) and this is the failure
Klossowski goes on to call 'exasperation'. The exasperation to which the repeated
acts of Sade's heroes give rise finds its fullest expression in the experience of
'Delectatio morosa'.
Klossowski explicitly draws the notion of'delectatio morosa' from Catholic
theology and signals the derivation ofthis term from the writing of Thomas Aquinas in
a footnote to his text (SMP47, 119-20). Klossowski defines this notion as follows:
La delectation morose consiste dans ce mouvement de l'ame par lequel elle se
porte volontairement vers les images d'actes charnels ou spirituels prohibes
pour s'attarder a leur contemplation (SMP47,120-1).
'Delectatio morosa', which is a propensity of the mind towards libidinal reverie, is a
direct consequence of the paradoxical relationship between the libertine and his victim.
Because the Other can never be truly destroyed or truly annihilated (but subjected only
to a 'suppression conservante') the libertine has recourse to a phantasy image of
destruction which carries with it the force of an infinitely repeated act of destruction.
The return of moral conscience in the aftermath of the sadistic act necessitates its
the Demiurge or Evil Creator God (a modification of'l'Etre supreme en mechancete' of the
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infinite repetition in the 'ascese' of apathy. Delectatio morosa lives out this infinite
repetition in an image of phantasy:
Les personnages de Sade prennent ainsi l'habitude de perdre fictivement en
s'attardant aupres de leur victimes :je veux que tu cesses etemellement
d'exister pour que je puisse etemellement te perdre, etemellement te detruire
(SMP47,118).
This represents an attempt to break with the cycle of creation and destruction which
underpins the 'ascese' of apathy and which means that moral categories always return :
instead of negating the Other and thereby affirming its reality, the libertine imagines a
moment where the Other has always already been negated and is always already
subject to perpetual destruction. Delectatio morosa represents the infinite aggression
of the sadistic act staged within the mind of the libertine himself and held within a
single moment. The return of moral conscience is warded offby a paradoxical
affirmation that that Other one seeks to destroy has always already been destroyed
(whilst at the same time secondarily only ever having been there in order to be
destroyed). Delectatio morosa stages a fantasy possession/dispossession in which the
world of'autrui' has always been subject to a primary act of negation=.
This devotion to a certain kind oflibidinal reverie has serious consequences for
the libertine's apprehension of reality as a whole. If one recalls the phrase from 'Temps
et agressivite' where Klossowski asserts of the Self that : 'les etres et les choses
viennent cl lui et le rejoignent cl travers les sentiments qu'il a dans l'attente de leur
second phase of the 'Esquisse') and the Good God of the Spirits.
62 Fantasy or 'Ie phantasme' becomes a key term in Klossowski's later writing. He does not use the
term specifically in this context, however. 'Delectatio morosa' refers to a mental scene or image
which is largely a wish fulfilment (of the paradoxical desire to both possess and destroy) and so
can be linked to Klossowski's interest in Freudian analysis. His later use of the term is based
more explicitly upon his engagement with Nietzsche and will be discussed later in this thesis.
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venue' (RP,105) then the deeper implications of this phantasy become clear. Delectatio
morosa, in staging the infinite reprise of the same act within the mind of the libertine,
overturns his apprehension of both the presence of others and oftime in general. The
experience of the present becomes a form of 'attente' in which others are encountered
in their absence rather than in their presence. Because the Other is subject to a primary
negation, because it is already nothing, it can only ever be encountered as an absence
or as Klossowski puts it : Ice n'est pas dans la presence mais dans l'attente des objets
absents que l'onjouira de ces objets' (SMP47,129). What this means is that the infinite
repetition that constitutes the ascesis of apathy is not lived as a simple reprise of the
same act. Rather the apathy has as its outcome an attitude of mind which ruins the
apprehension of reality as presence. The presence of the Other and the experience of
the Self as a cohesive entity over time is replaced by an experience of absence lived as
the eternal repetition of the same moment. Delectatio morosa constitutes the ruination
of Being and Time.
This is the conclusion that Klossowski comes to in the first edition of Sade
mon prochain namely, that any attempt to live without God results in the ruination of
Being through infinite repetition. Only in God, argues Klossowski, can Being be
experienced as plenitude and as the Self-sameness of the Self with the Self
Klossowski identifies three modes of being : the Christian, the Romantic and the
Sadistic. The first is characterised by the love of God and one's neighbour, the second
by nostalgia for a lost unity, the third by exasperation (the impossibility of
destruction). In this formulation only the Christian mode of existence is tenable:
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L'ame chretienne se donne a Dieu, l'ame romantique a sa nostalgie, l'ame
sadiste a son exasperation; mais en se donnant a Dieu, l'ame sait que Dieu se
donne a l'ame. Par contre la nostalgie ni l'exasperation ne peuvent restituer
l'ame que dans l'etat permanent de nostalgie et d'exasperation (SMP47,123).
Both the romantic and the sadistic attitude result in an experience of the insufficiency
of Being and of repetition. By giving ourselves to God the human soul experiences the
repose which comes from unity with the Divine; by turning away from God the human
soul experiences that ceaseless restlessness and exasperation which Sade's writing
exemplifies", This, for Klossowski, is the ultimately Christian lesson of Sade's oeuvre.
Through the many thousands of pages of his novels the Divine Marquis's aim is to
show how '[l'ame sadiste] se detourne done de l'eternel, de son fond divin, pour se
livrer toute entiere a la reverie, a une contemplation reveuse du temps qui ruine les
etres et les choses' (SMP47,126). Delectatio morosa is the final term of Sade's thought
and reveals the impossibility of an existence which is not grounded in a recognition of
God and of God's Law. Without such a recognition, asserts Klossowski, existence will
always be condemned to a futile repetition which has its root in an irreducible sense of
lack or absence. Sade's atheism, his rationalism and his justifications of rape, torture
and murder cannot be taken at face value. What the ceaseless repetitions of the
Sadeian text reveal is 'l'experience de la deficience de l'etre et du temps sans eremite'
(SMP47,118-19), they show that any attempt to live without an affirmation of God's
presence results in the futile infinity of repetition and in the ruination of Being. Sade,
63 Again Klossowski is drawing from Catholic theology here. That repose and unity can be found only
through God is a central thought of Augustine's Confessions. Augustine writes addressing God
directly: 'For you are supremely "the self-same" in that you do not change. In you is repose
which forgets all toil because there is none beside you, nor are we to look for the multiplicity of
other things which are not what you are. For "you Lord have established me in hope by means of
unity" (ps,4:10)' Confessions, p. 162.
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then, is a Christian, but only because his work reveals the impossibility of Being
without God, of Being without Eternity.
Klossowski's early writings on Sade show the way in which, from the
publication of'Le Mal et la negation de l'autrui' in 1934 onwards, he is engaging with
a complex logic of the Self and of experience. What Sade's writing bears witness to is
the fact that human experience is founded in an economy of desire characterised by
violence and aggression. The tradition of West em thought which locates the
sovereignty of humankind in the faculty of Reason and a capacity for free will is
rejected. The reality of the human Selfis located more centrally in the expression of
'l'egocentrisme primaire', in a Nietzschean aggression which Klossowski reads through
the lens of the Hegelian Master/Slave dialectic. Sade's writing bears witness to the fact
that, as Kojeve puts it,: 'l'etre humain ne se constitue qu'en fonction d'un Desir'. Yet
crucially, for Klossowski, the negation of violent desire and of violent transgression as
they are expressed in Sade's texts leads 'la conscience sadiste' into an impasse of
paradox and impossibility. The attempt to base human action and thought on the
promotion of violent desire and on the transgression of moral law leads to an
impossible mode of Being. For the Klossowski of 1947 this impossibility ruins Being,
condemns the aggressive subject to a futile repetition which can only be redeemed
through an acceptance and affirmation of God's Law". An emphasis on both the
violence of desire and on the impossibility of desire lies at the heart of Kloss ow ski's
64 In his essay 'Le Corps du neant' included at the end of 1947 version of Sade mon prochain
Klossowski offers a critique of Bataille which follows his critique of Sade. Bataille's Church of
the Sacred, he argues, is without the head of God, condemned to be 'neant', steeped in an
insufficiency of Being which can only lead to futile repetition. See pp. 153-183. In the 1967
edition of the work this explicitly Christian polemic against Bataille's project was excised.
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early readings of Sade. His formulation of this impossibility of Sadeian transgression
shifts in the years after the war when Klossowski's rejection of Catholicism engenders
a different reading of Sade and a different conception of impossibility.
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The Triumph of Perversion - The 1967 version of Sade mon prochain.
The 1967 version of Sade mon prochain6s is in many ways a very different
book from the one which appeared twenty years earlier. Two essays, 'Le corps du
neant' and 'Don Juan selon Kierkegaard' have been dropped from the text entirely
whilst the essay 'Le philosophe scelerat' (first published in Tel Quel in early 196766) has
been added to the front of the new edition. 'Sade et la revolution' remains unaltered
except for an additional note, and parts of the 'Esquisse du systeme de Sade' have been
entirely rewritten. The three parts of'Sous le masque de l'atheisme' remain unchanged
in the new version but Klossowski effectively disowns them in the 'Avertissement' at
the very beginning of the volume, rejecting (as he puts it) their 'pieuse intention'
(SMP67,14).
The very opening line of this new version of Sade mon pro chain signals an
important shift from the 1947 Christian position :
En m'eloignant d'un etat d'esprit qui me faisait dire: Sade mon prochain, tant
s'en faut que je me sois rapproche de ceux qui n'ont de cesse d'insister sur le
caractere foncier de l'atheisme de Sade pour preuve de la vertu liberatrice
d'une pensee liberee. Liberee de Dieu que l'atheisme declare n'etre rien, cette
pensee se serait done liberee de rien? Sa liberte serait-elle aussi pour ... rien?
(SMP67,11).
The original title of the work arose directly from the assertion that Sade was a
Christian. Sade, like Klossowski throughout the thirties and forties, was shown to be
tom between two opposing positions, the one Nietzschean and atheist, the other
6S Sade mon prochain (Paris: Seuil, 1961). All references to this edition will be to this volume giving
the page number prefaced with the abbreviation SMP67.
66 'Signe et perversion dans l'oeuvre de Sade', Tel Quel, 28 (May 1966), 3-22 (special edition devoted
to Sade).
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Catholic and Christian. Now, however, Klossowski is not seeking to make any claims
for Sade's Christianity: Sade's atheism is 'foncier'. Yet this is not the rationalist
atheism which Klossowski's earlier readings of Sade revealed to be untenable. The
atheism that Klossowski uncovers in the 1967 version of Sade mon pro chain just as
paradoxical and impossible. What has altered is Klossowski's response to the very
notion of paradox and impossibility. The changes Klossowski makes to the 'Esquisse
du systeme' reveal this shift in Klossowski's thinking in the years which separate the
two versions of Sade mon prochain.
The changes to the 'Esquisse du systeme de Sade '.
The changes to the main body of the 'Esquisse' are for the most part stylistic
ones but the end of the essay (section V) is almost entirely rewritten in such a way as
to radically alter its emphasis. This alteration centres on the final phase of Sade's
'drame dialectique' discussed earlier. Itwill be remembered how, in the 1947 text, the
doctrine of Nature as a perpetual movement of creation and destruction gave rise to
situation where the moral conscience of the libertine returned ceaselessly in the
moments after his sadistic act of passion and needed to be warded offby the infinite
repetition of that act. The ascesis of apathy, as Klossowski called it, was founded on
the impossibility of annihilating the Other; every suppression of the libertine's victim
was also always a conservation and recognition of the victim's reality as another
human being. The failure of this attempt to destroy the Sadeian victim and the endless
return of moral conscience that this implies is described in the fifth section of the
'Esquisse du systeme', Inboth the '47 and the '67 editions of Sade mon prochain the
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fifth section begins by returning to the paradoxical relationship between the Sadeian
libertine and his victim (one of creation and destruction/suppression and conservation)
and describes it in terms of a lovelhate relationship.
According to the Kojevian Master/Slave dialectic the Master needs the victim
to recognise his mastery and this is recognition which necessitates the conservation of
the victim as well as its suppression. It is this need for recognition which means that
the libertine loves (desires to conserve) as well as hates (desires to destroy) his victim.
The lovelhate relationship between libertine and victim is based on the need of the
former to compare his own good fortune (at being Master) with the bad fortune of the
latter. The change that Klossowski makes to this opening part of section V can best be
illustrated with two lengthy quotations. The first is from the 1947 text :
Si la comparaison avec le malheureux, indispensable a la conscience
libertine pour se sentir heureuse, supposait l'existence du prochain, la premiere
demarche a faire dans Ie sens d'une renaturalisation de la cruaute sera done de
nier la realite du pro chain - de vider la notion du prochain, la notion d'autrui de
son contenu. En impliquant le prochain, Ie plaisir de comparaison impliquait Ie
mal : I'amour du prochain, cette "chimere" dont Sade est hante, la conscience
libertine commettait l'erreur de le convertir en amour-haine du prochain :
l'amour-haine du prochain ne saurait etre qu'une etape sur le chemin de la
liquidation de la realite d'autrui amenant le regne integral du de sir.
Sade revient alors a l'egocentrisme primaire. Le premier effet de cette
dose de cruaute dont la nature a pourvu plus ou moins chaque individu est de
lui faire croire qu'il peut disposer a son gre du monde et des autres creatures
(SMP47,86-7).
In 1967 Klossowski revised these lines as follows:
Si la comparaison avec le malheureux, indispensable a la conscience
libertine pour se sentir heureuse, supposait l'existence du pro chain, la premiere
demarche a faire dans le sens d'une renaturalisation de la cruaute sera done de
nier la realite du prochain - de vider la notion du prochain de son contenu. En
impliquant le prochain, le plaisir de comparaison impliquait le mal : l'amour du
prochain, cette "chimere" dont Sade est hante, la conscience libertine
commettait l'erreur de le convertir en amour-haine du prochain. L'amour-haine
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du prochain ne saurait etre qu'une etape sur le chemin de la liquidation de la
realite d'autrui et de soi-meme.
Comment la conscience sadiste pourrait-elle jamais renoncer it son
objet, done it autrui pour accepter de detruire en toute purete, selon sa
representation d'une Nature liberee du besoin de creer? En renoncant non
seulement it autrui, mais encore it sa condition individuelle en tant que moi
(SMP67,129).
The argument of the first edition is clearly put forward in the first quotation here :
Sade's libertines seek to liquidate moral conscience in favour of an aggressive Self
whose movements of violent desire will find no restraint. The modification which
Klossowski's text has undergone in the second quotation makes clear the shift in
emphasis which has taken place between the two texts: the reality of others is not
negated in order to abolish moral Law and allow the aggressive Self a free expression
of its 'egocentrisme primaire', but rather the reality of the Selfis suppressed along with
the world of others. In the 1967 edition of Sade mon pro chain both Self and Other are
abolished in the same movement.
This point is one that is made by Jane Gallop in her book Intersections" in
which she surveys and resituates the intertextual networks traced in the readings of
Sade by Bataille, Blanchot and Klossowski. However, whilst Gallop highlights the
emphasis on the abolition of the Self in Klossowski's later reading of Sade, her
particularly playful approach to intertextuality leaves out any detailed account of the
exact logic which would explain this change in Klossowski's thinking. In order to
throw light on the logic of this change a restatement of the theological position of the
earlier text is necessary.
61 Jane Gallop, Intersections (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1981) p. 102-105.
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Klossowski's earlier argument centred on the interdependence of three realities:
that of the Other, moral categories and God Himself Yet implicit in this formulation
and underpinned by all the others is a fourth reality that of the Self as such. The Self
has an existence as a discrete entity only insofar as it is structured by the reflexive
movement of moral conscience (which combines an acceptance of God, God's Law
and a relation to others in one moment). Drawing from Nietzsche Klossowski had
described the birth of moral conscience, and therefore the birth of the Self as taking
place at that moment when aggression is turned inwards in response to the encounter
with the world of others. The Kojevian dialectic of the Master and Slave also stated
that the reality of the Self was constituted only in and through the encounter with the
Other (and the struggle for mastery). If, as Klossowski argues, the reality of the Selfis
founded upon the existence of both moral conscience and the 'rencontre' with 'le
monde des autres' it is necessarily dependent also on the existence of God. Klossowski
makes this explicit in his essay on Kierkegaard, 'Don Juan selon Kierkegaard'. The Self
he maintains only has a reality in the awareness of its own guilt and therefore in the
awareness of God:
l'existence au sein du peche, c'est la naissance du moi individuel - avec ses
ames, avec ses joies et ses douleurs - la naissance du moi sous le regard
inquisiteur, terrible et aimant de Dieu (SMP47,142).
The failure of the Sadeian libertine to escape moral categories and thus to live out an
integral form of atheism is rooted in the fact that the libertine is seeking to abolish both
the Other and God in order to affirm the mastery of his own aggressive Self (his
'egocentrisme primaire'). In affirming his own mastery he necessarily affirms the reality
of his victim and therefore that of moral categories and God (because he cannot
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escape the Kojevian dialectic in which the mastery of the Self is founded upon a
suppression of the Other which is always also a conservation).
In 'Don Juan selon Kierkegaard' Klossowski identifies this reversion to an
aggressive Self not with the Master of the Master/Slave dialectic but rather with the
Nietzschean doctrine of Will to Power and of the 'surhomme'. The appeal to the
aggressive ego of the 'surhomme' is in this context the only way to maintain the reality
of the Self after the Nietzschean proclamation of the Death of God (since the 'moi' has
a life only under the watchful eye of God). What cannot deny the existence of God (as
Sade's heroes seek to do) without abolishing also the reality of the Self:
La mort du Dieu de l'individuation exigera la naissance du surhomme : car, si
Dieu meurt, le moi individuel ne perd pas seulement son Juge, it perd son
Redempteur et son eternel Temoin : mais s'il perd son eternel Temoin, ilperd
aussi son identite eternelle. Le moi meurt avec Dieu (SMP47,140).
So it is clear here that even in the first edition of Sade mon prochain Klossowski
maintains that the successful negation of the Other (moral conscience/God) would also
entail the destruction of the Self Yet because Sade (and Nietzsche in the doctrine of
the 'Surhomme') is always seeking to affirm the Self in its 'egocentrisme primaire', he
also necessarily affirms the existence of his victim and of God. By this logic the only
successful way to break out of the Kojevian dialectic in which a suppression of the
Other is always also its conservation is to suppress the aggressive Self along with the
Other. The relationship between the libertine and the victim is no longer characterised
as a struggle for mastery through recognition, but rather the abolition of any
Self/Other distinction at all. This, Klossowski maintains in the revised edition of Sade
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mon pro chain, is the price of''l'atheisme foncier' : not only the Death of God and but
the Death of the Self too.
What the first version of Sade mon prochain shows is Klossowski's belief,
Catholic in origin, that the identity and propriety of the Self are dependent upon the
existence of God. This propriety of the Self is preserved in the earlier version because
any denial of God is always constructed in terms of the unleashing of a Nietzschean
aggression which ironically always ultimately proves the necessity of God's existence.
What the changes made to 1967 version of the 'Esquisse' show is Klossowski's
abandonment of this reliance on 'agressivite' as a covert or negative proof of God's
existence. The emphasis on 'agressivite' implied a unity of the Self (most clearly
expressed in Klossowski's use of the term 'egocentrisme primaire') which is
abandoned in the later text. This can be seen most clearly by a close comparison of the
two texts. Klossowski quotes from volume three of La Nouvelle Justine as one of
Sade's libertines proclaims the nothingness of the world of others in comparison to the
necessity of his desire :
Que sont, je vous le demande, toutes les creatures de la terre vis-a-vis d'un
seul de nos desirs? et par quelle raison me priverais-je du plus leger de ces
desirs pour plaire a une creature qui ne m'est rien et qui ne m'interesse en
rien ... (Cited SMP47,S7-S/SMP67,130).
Klossowski immediately adds to this in the two versions respectively :
Sade est done amene, pres d'un siecle avant Nietzsche, a developper une
morale de l'agressivite - de l'agressivite consideree comme l'etat normal, l'etat
de sante de l'homme (SMP47,88).
and:
De la it resulte que si l'autre n'est rien pour moi, non seulement je ne suis plus
rien pour lui, mais rien non plus a l'egard de rna propre conscience, et tant s'en
faut que la conscience soit encore mienne. Car si je romps avec autrui sur le
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plan moral, j'aurai rompu sur le plan de l'existence meme avec ma propriete : a
tout instant je puis tomber a la merci de l'autre qui ferait la meme declaration
(SMP67,130).
The term 'agressivite' is suppressed in the 1967 version and the emphasis on violence
has shifted. The text is no longer centrally concerned with the problem of the Self in
the moment when its primal aggression is directed towards others. Rather the later
version is concerned with a kind of violence which is directed towards the Self at the
very same moment as it directed elsewhere. Aggressive desire is working to dissolve
the unity of the ego rather than centre it and affirm its mastery.
In the 1967 text both Self and Other become 'rien' as the libertine attacks his
victim. Klossowski is no longer trying to maintain that Sade's rationalist atheism
always results in Christian theism. Sade's atheism has become 'integral' because
Klossowski follows through the logic of the earlier edition whereby the Death of God
always also implied the Death of the Self. Yet Sade's integral atheism as it is portrayed
in the transformed 'Esquisse' and in the essay 'Le Philosophe scelerat' does not
abandon the play between negation and affirmation, suppression and conservation
which had its outcome in paradox and repetition in the 1947 work. The propriety of
the Self is not abolished once and for all in an unproblematic movement of destruction.
The essay 'Le Philosophe scelerat' reproduces the structure of suppression and
conservation but modifies it so that it becomes something quite different. This
modification is expressed in a rewriting of the notion of apathy (the final term of the
'drame dialectique' in the earlier version). In section V of the new 'Esquisse' the 'ascese'
of apathy has been entirely reformulated. However, since this section is reproduced in
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'Le philosophe scelerat' with many of the sentences found in exactly the same form in
both essays it is to this new inclusion that one can now tum.
'Le Philosophe sce/erat' - Integral atheism.
In this new essay Klossowski identifies two kinds of atheism at work in the
Sadeian text: rationalist atheism one the one hand and what he calls 'l'atheisme
integral' on the other. In the first version of Sade mon prochain the superficial
rationalism of Sade's text concealed beneath its surface an appeal to 'forces obscures'
and an ultimate affirmation of Christianity. In the second version these two principles
(rationalist atheism and Christianity) are no longer placed in opposition to each other.
According to the Klossowski of'Le Philosophe scelerat' both rationalism and Christian
monotheism function to preserve the identity and propriety of the morally responsible
Self. The promotion of the one Truth of Reason (rather than that of God) is not
substantially different from asserting the one Truth of monotheistic belief:
Pour Sade cet atheisme-la n'est encore rien d'autre qu'un monotheisme inverse
et apparemment purifie d'idolatrie, qui le distingue a peine du deisme, puisqu'au
meme titre que la notion de Dieu it garantit le moi responsable, sa propriete,
l'identite individuelle. Afin que l'atheisme se purifie lui-meme de ce
monotheisme inverse, it faut qu'il soit integral (SMP67,20-21).
The rational ego is responsible in the same way as the Christian Self individuated
before God. This allows Klossowski to conflate rationalism and theism by constructing
the former as an inversion of the latter. Because they institute a responsible Self, both
guarantee the norms and institutions which regulate human thought and conduct
(norms which were referred to as 'categories morales' in the earlier text) and both
therefore guarantee human identity as self-same over time. Atheism can only become
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'integral' when it abolishes all the norms which flow originally from monotheism,
including - above all- that of the rationally responsible ego.
Klossowski does argue, however, for one significant difference between
rationalism and monotheism. Reason overturns the notion of God insofar as it seeks to
explain existence in rational terms alone without any appeal to transcendent or
supernatural forces. Yet in doing so Reason also undermines its own foundations.
Klossowski in 1967, although no longer a Catholic, still insists that norms of any kind,
be they rational or moral, require some form of transcendent foundation which the
existence of God (or some comparable theological principle) alone is able to
guarantee. This means that rationalism cannot be sustained because it does away with
the very principle which founds its possibility (i.e. God). Rationalist atheism can,
therefore, only be a stage in a necessary movement from monotheism to integral
atheism: 'l'atheisme, acte supreme de la raison normative, doit instituer le regne de
l'absence totale des normes' (SMP67,19). In this respect, Klossowski's analysis of
Sade's rationalism has shifted between the two editions of Sade mon prochain. In the
earlier edition Sade was shown to have a necessary recourse to the language of the
Enlightenment as a form of disguise or mask (he was a 'prisonnier' of rational
language). In 'Le Philosophe scelerat' Klossowski focuses on the untenability of
Reason itself Sade's rationalism shows the way in which Reason is not a self-sufficient
principle and will always carry within it that which undermines Reason thus leading to
the generalised overturning of norms under the reign of integral atheism.
This emphasis on the insufficiency of Reason provides the linchpin for
Klossowski's analysis of Sade in 'Le Philosophe scelerat'. The belief in the insufficiency
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of Being without God, which informed Klossowski's earlier position, has been
abandoned in favour of an argument about the unsustainability of rationalism. This
changes his formulation of 'Ia conscience sadiste' and the way he reads the libertine's
relationship with his victim. Where before the sadistic act was constructed as an
attempt to negate the Christian moral categories, in the later version the sadistic act is
understood primarily as an attempt to affirm the singularity of sexual perversion.
Perversion is the key term of reference for Klossowski's 1967 reading of Sade.
In this context, perversion is no longer a negation or transgression of God's moral
Law. Rather perversion, as a sexual act which is not subject to the ends of procreation,
represents a transgression against the norms of the human species. In the first version
of Sade mon prochain the aggression ofegocentrisme primaire', which denied God,
was opposed to the constraints of moral conscience which affirmed God. In 'Le
Philosophe scelerat' perversion embodies a certain singularity of desire which is placed
in opposition to the generality of human life as it is regulated by the norms of the
social collective. Perversion is, as Klossowski terms it, a form of 'contre-generalite'
(SMP67,19). In this sense Klossowski's use of the term 'les normes de l'espece' means
that moral conscience no longer implies the existence of God but rather exists only as
a function of the institutions of human society as a collective whole. The Self, which
has its life in moral conscience, is no longer a structure which is underpinned by the
existence of God but rather is a construction of social and institutional norms.
The social collective has as its foundation, Klossowski argues, the regulation of
sexuality by certain norms that subordinate all sexual activity to the goal of
procreation. Procreative sex and all the institutions which ensure its functioning within
70
society (e.g. marriage, property laws, naming of children etc.) guarantee the cohesion
of the social whole. For Klossowski in 1967 the sadism of Sade's libertines is no longer
specifically a matter of denying God, but rather of asserting the singularity of
perversion against the procreative norms of human institutions. Perversion overturns
all norms, both rational and moral and therefore is the only possible expression of
integral atheism (based as it is upon 'le regne de l'absence des normes')". What
becomes clear is that Sade's integral atheism, founded upon the perversion of Sadeian
sexuality, is no longer a revolt against God but rather an act of social subversion.
Yet integral atheism also entails a dissolution of identity and the propriety of
the Self. Perversion violates the structures of individuality just as it does violence to
the integrity of the social collective. The result of this is what Klossowski terms 'la
prostitution universelle des etres. Celle-ci n'est elle-meme que la partie
complementaire de la monstruosite integrale reposant sur l'insubordination des
fonctions de vivre, en l'absence d'une autorite normative de l'espece.' (SMP67,25).
The universal prostitution of beings undermines any possibility of propriety within
Being. The concept of the individual and all that can be said to be proper to it is
overturned. Any possible distinction between Self and Other becomes untenable as the
Self is suspended (along with all moral norms) in the ecstasy of the perverted act. The
notion of universal prostitution also carries with it the sense that the Self as Self is only
ever a social and linguistic fiction and has the arbitrary character of a disguise or mask.
The full implications of this contention will be investigated in the subsequent two
68 One might immediately object, here, that perversion itself is very much dependent upon the norms
it seeks to overthrow (just as transgression was seen to affirm God's moral law in Klossowski's
argument of 1947). This point is recognised by Klossowsld and is discussed below.
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chapters, particularly in the context of Kloss ow ski's readings of Nietzsche. At this
point it is important only to note the interconnection between the terms integral
atheism, perversion and universal prostitution; terms which appear in 'Le Philosophe
scelerat' and were not present in Sade mon pro chain 1947. Integral atheism, perversion
and the resultant 'prostitution universelle des etres' all refer to that moment when the
Sadeian libertine as he attacks his victim attacks also all those structures which
guarantee the cohesion of both society and Self.
Yet perversion clearly does not abolish all norms in any straightforward way
once and for all and it is here that Klossowski returns to the play of suppression and
conservation which structures the dialectical movement of his earlier work. In 1947
Klossowski analysed the way in which the mastery of the libertine was founded upon
the need to preserve his victim at the same time as he sought to annihilate it. By the
same token a perversion of a norm requires the maintenance of that norm in order to
have any value at all as perversion or as Klossowski puts it: 'La perversion [...] ne tire
sa valeur transgressive que de la permanence des normes' (SMP67.26)69. Likewise, as
Klossowski clearly acknowledges, the notion of 'Ia prostitution universelle des etres'
depends upon the structures of identity and propriety to have any sense or
transgressive force as prostitution:
Ainsi la prostitution universelle n'a de sens qu'en fonction de la propriete
morale du corps individuel. Sans cette notion de de propriete la prostitution
perdrait de sa valeur attractive: I'outrage tomberait cl vide (SMP67,25).
In the first edition of Sade mon prochain moral conscience was always negated (or
transgressed) but also affirmed in the sadistic act. Moral conscience always returned in
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the calm of the passions. Here it is the institutional norms which guarantee the Self
which are subject to a constant return. Once more a transgression of the Law also
implies a prior recognition and therefore an affirmation of that same Law. The morally
responsible Self returns as it did in the earlier version but again this return is
constructed differently. This difference can be seen in Klossowski's reformulation of
the 'ascese' of apathy.
Apathy was originally conceived of as a practice of self-discipline in which
aggression must be maintained at a constantly high level in order to ward off the return
of moral conscience. 'Agressivite', as has been indicated, is no longer a term of
reference in the reworked version of Sade mon prochain. In 'Le Philosophe scelerat' it
is not the vicissitudes of aggression which underpin the practice of apathy but rather
the fluctuations in the intensity of what Klossowski now calls 'forces impulsionnelles'.
These forces serve to unify or disagregate the Self according to their level of
concentration :
Telle que Sade le suggere, la pratique de l'apathie suppose que ce que ron
nomme "arne" "conscience" "sensibilite" "coeur" ne sont que les diverses, , , ,
structures qu'affecte la concentration des memes forces impulsionnelles. Elles
peuvent elaborer la structure d'un organe d'intimidation sous la pression du
monde institutionnel, comme celle d'un organe de subversion sous la pression
interne de ces forces, cela toujours dune maniere instantanee (SMP67,38).
The life of the Selfis constituted in a play between two types of pressure, one exerted
from the outside in, and the other from the inside out. Either impulsional forces are at
a low concentration and succumb to the intimidation of institutional structures (the
formation of the Self and moral conscience) or they are at a high level of
69 The implications of this 'permanence des normes' will be discussed in detail in the final chapter of
this thesis.
73
concentration, exert an outward pressure, and subvert or disrupt institutional
structures. This, it is clear, is a reworking of the play of 'agressivite' (directed either
outwards or inwards) as it was elaborated in Klossowski's early writing in the thirties.
There are two important differences however. Firstly, the structures of the Self and of
moral conscience are the result only of social constraints which are arbitrary in the
sense that they are culturally relative and are no longer, as Klossowski argued they
were, guaranteed by and transcendent principle (such as the existence of God).
Secondly, the notion of force itself has been more radically pluralised. In the 1930s and
40s the 'forces obscures' of the instincts (sexual and violent) manifested itself in the
more unitary 'agressivite' of 'egocentrisme primaire'. Violence was a function of the
ego in its attempt to assert itself In the 1960s the violence of 'forces impulsionnelles'
can no longer be harnessed by the aggressive Self: instinctual forces, violent though
they still are, only ever serve to dissolve the Self, to abolish norms and institute 'la
prostitution universelle des etresl7o• A crucial shift has occurred. Klossowski's thinking
in the years before the war centred on questions of the aggressive Self (questions
which were of great topical relevance at the time). After 1947 Klossowski focuses his
attention much more clearly on a type of violence which is prior to thought and
intentionality.
For Klossowski apathy now involves a movement where impulsional forces
reach their highest intensity and concentration in the Sadeian act of perversion and so
overturn norms and subvert institutional structures. As before however, in the
70 The origins of this notion of 'forces impulsionnelles' and they way they overturn identity will be
examined in detail in the next chapter within the context of Klossowski's post-war reading of
Nietzsche.
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aftermath of passion, these structures regain their power to intimidate, tum
impulsional forces back inwards and reassert institutional norms (thus reforming the
Selt). The fluctuations of impulsional force means that norms are transgressed but that
they are also then affirmed and maintained To this extent Klossowski can be seen to be
still adhering to the same logical structure as in the earlier version of Sade mon
prochain. The subversive movement of integral atheism, like that of the 1947 Sade, has
as its outcome the necessary repetition of the same act. Because 'forces
impulsionnelles' (like 'agressivite' before it) will always assert either an outward or an
inward pressure, conscience will still always be subject to a ceaseless return :
si maintenant la reiteration du meme acte doit "aneantir" la conscience, c'est
qu'a chaque fois aussi ce sont les memes forces qui par leur inversion la
retablissent, Inversees en censure, elles provoquent l'acte de nouveau
(SMP67,40).
Once more apathy is constituted in the endless reprise of the sadistic act in an attempt
to ward off the return of moral (and now also rational) consciousness. Sade's integral
atheism is held on the level of integrality only through infinite repetition. The life of the
Sadeian Selfis subject to ceaseless dissolution and ceaseless reformation".
Yet this reversion to repetition carries with it a different emphasis than the one
it was given by the Christian Klossowski immediately after the war. In Klossowski's
1947 text 'delectatio morosa' heralded the ruination of Being and, in the final instance,
a recognition of the impossibility of the Death of God. For the post-Christian
Klossowski repetition itself, rather than God, is the final term of affirmation in the
Sadeian text. This is because the return of the Self and moral conscience no longer
imply God's existence (they are after all only institutional structures with no
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transcendent foundation). More importantly, Klossowski's interest in this later essay is
primarily to demonstrate the way in which rational and normative structures always
necessarily engender that which undermines those structures. Perversion may
transgress and thereby affirm 'les normes de l'espece'. Yet, even though these norms
are thereby maintained, what Sade's text shows conversely is that norms necessarily
imply their own transgression. Just as perversion has sense only by reference to the
norm, so the norm exists only insofar as it represses the perverse. Perversion,
according to Sade, Klossowski argues, is therefore not secondary, as the perspective
of the norm suggests, but primary. Indeed any normative system relies on the
repression of 'forces impulsionnelles' in order to institute itself and this act of
repression will necessarily give rise to a contestatory reaction. This means that
perversion has, in a sense, an existence which is both prior to and in excess of'les
normes de l'espece'. This is why Sadeian apathy, although it bears witness to the
infinite return of moral conscience, now ultimately affirms the necessity of perversion
rather than that of the Law :
Sade pense la contre-generalite deja implicite a la generalite existante; non pas
pour critiquer les institutions, mais pour demontrer que d'elles-memes elles
assurent le triomphe des perversions (SMP67,34).
Klossowski, as will become clear later in this discussion, is reworking a Bataillian
motif here. Between the two editions of Sade mon prochain one can discern a
movement between two types or two concepts of transgression (or rather to ways of
understanding a particular logic of transgression). The first type transgresses the Law
(moral categories) but at the same time ultimately affirms the Law (it is sacrilegious
71 Again the full implications of this formulation will be discussed at length in the following chapter.
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and relies on the primacy of that which is transgressed). The second type (elaborated
in 'Le Philosophe scelerat') transgresses the Law but affirms the primacy of the forces
of transgression (i.e. perversion as a prior condition of the Law). This slippage
between two types of transgression is a central motif in all Klossowski's writings,
particularly in the trilogy Les Lois de l'hospitalite and I shall return to it in more detail
in the final chapter.
There is one final major shift in emphasis in Klossowski's 1967 analysis of
Sade's text which is worth mentioning. 'Les normes de l'espece' refer to structures
which are at once moral, rational, institutional as well as sexually normative, and all
function to underpin the experience of the Self as a coherent entity. Importantly for
Klossowski, they also refer to linguistic structures, or more accurately, to the
normative structure oflanguage in general. This is why Klossowski for Klossowski
Sade's attempt to affirm integral atheism in the writing of his oeuvre necessarily brings
into question the very act of writing itself. In Klossowski's later reading of Sade the
transgression of the norms of the human collective is also at the same time a
transgression oflanguage. This focus on language offers a key perspective on the
importance of Kloss ow ski as a reader of Sade and on his own turn to novel writing in
the 1950s.
Writing perversion.
If integral atheism is the overturning of all norms, Klossowski argues, it is also
the overturning oflanguage itself and the very possibility of communication. Language
and communication rely upon shared concepts, words, and meanings. They are a
77
product of generality which is in principle the opposite of the singularity of the
perverted libertine. Sade's attempt to write perversion must be necessarily paradoxical
therefore because it represents an adherence to the generality of language in favour of
the singularity of perversion. As Klossowski puts it in 'Le Philosophe Scelerat' :
Le fait proprement humain d'ecrire suppose une generalite dont un cas singulier
revendique l'adhesion et par la se comprend soi-meme dans l'appartenance cl
cette generalite (SMP67,lS).
The paradox of writing perversion is the same as that of the perverted sexual act
itself: the norm is both negated and yet affirmed in a movement which has no outcome
other than in repetition and a moment of aporia where the same gesture is re-iterated
ad infinitum. Ifwriting is founded upon generality, then the singularity of perversion is,
properly speaking, incommunicable. Writing perversion is thus an impossible
enterprise :
pour le pervers qui parle, l'obstacle n'est pas d'etre singulier, mais d'appartenir a
la generalite dans sa singularite propre (SMP67,35).
The paradoxical impossibility of writing the sadism of Sade could not be more
pronounced. What makes the writing of perversion possible (i.e. the existence of
Sade's novels) is the generality of language. Yet it is just this generality which at the
very same time renders the writing of perversion impossible (since perversion is
radically singular and excluded in the general). Writing both allows the transgressive
text to be and yet at the same time makes transgression itself impossible. Sade's text,
insofar as it seeks to write perversion, is made possible by the generality oflanguage
but only as it is also made impossible",
72 This notion of a foundational impossibility will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
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Because the norms of language are affirmed in the same moment as the writing
of perversion seeks to overturn them, the pattern of repetition which structured the
Sadeian act is once again instituted. Just as the Sadeian libertine must repeat his act of
impulsional intensity over and again, so Sade the writer must ceaselessly write
perversion in order to maintain the transgressive force of perversion. In this sense,
Klossowski claims, Sade's language itself becomes a space of transgression : 'le
langage logiquement structure par lequel Sade s'exprime, devient pour lui Ie terrain de
l'outrage, au meme titre que les normes' (SMP67 ,51). Writing, insofar as it seeks to
write that which by definition escapes expression, has become the ultimate mode of
Sade's insurrection against institutional norms. Writing has also become an impossible
event, an event which in its very impossibility is subject to infinite repetition. Sade's
words, writes Klossowski, represent the echoes of knocking on the door of language;
a constant tremor of the outside of language within language itself That outside
cannot ultimately be an object of commentary because: 'Le dehors est precisement ce
qui par soi-meme se passe de commentaire' (SMP67,53).
Klossowski's 1967 rewriting of Sade mon prochain reveals Sade to be still an
exemplary figure. Yet he is no longer an example of the failure to affirm the Death of
God. Rather he becomes exemplary of the Self in the moment of its self-transgression,
its self-abolition. The Sadeian text bears witness to the fact that the structures which
give a common shape and form to human experience are perpetually fragile : even as
they always reaffirm themselves, so they constantly undermine their own authority.
Sade's text is, above all, a writing of the impossible, where the singularity of
perversion paradoxically seeks to articulate itself within the generality of language,
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where abolition of limits is proclaimed from within the space delimited by those limits.
Sade's text affirms that structures of meaning and Selfhood are fortuitous but it can do
so only with recourse to those very structures. In 1947 the impossibility of Sadeian
transgression lead Klossowski to affirm the necessary existence of God. In 1967 Sade's
thought is seen to affirm paradox and impossibility as a necessary outcome of rational
discourse itself Rational discourse insofar as it abolishes God abolishes also its own
foundations; when carried to its term it always necessarily transgresses itself in an
impossible and paradoxical movement", Sade's writing is exemplary of that moment
when writing itself comes face to face with its own impossibility. In the Sadeian text
writing and thought are returned to the perversity of 'forces impulsionnelles' . Yet this
is a movement of negation whose paradoxical nature gives rise to infinite repetition. In
his later reading of Sade Klossowski has embraced the death of God and the death of
the Selfbut with that has affirmatively embraced also a logic of paradox and repetition.
In 1947 paradox and repetition revealed the insufficiency of an existence which denied
God and the norms embodied in God's Law. In 1967 paradox and repetition reveal the
insufficiency of all normative and rational structures because, Klossowski argues, such
structures perpetually undermine themselves just as they seek perpetually to sustain
themselves.
73 Carolyn Dean comments on the difference between the two editions of Klossowski's work in the
following terms: 'In Sade mon prochain, Klossowski in fact substituted for the paradox of an
'absent God' - [...] , the notion of what might be called an absent text'. This formulation does not
quite express the specificity of the transformation which Klossowski's text undergoes. As I have
argued, Klossowski substitutes the paradox of trying to render God absent with the paradox of
trying to overturn the norms of discourse. In both cases 'God' and discourse always reassert
themselves. In the later edition Klossowski does not seek 'an absent text' but rather an absence
of discourse, i.e. an abolition of the norms which underpin textual discursivity. See Carolyn
Dean, The Self and its Pleasures, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 185.
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This is a movement which, as the ensuing chapters will show in more detail, is
common to Klossowski's own highly individual fictional and essayistic enterprise. But
it is important to note that his reformulation of Sade in 1967 has not occurred in
isolation. Throughout the whole period between 1933 and 1967, Klossowski was not
reading Sade alone, but was doing so alongside both Bataille and Blanchot.
Klossowski's later reading when taken together with the commentaries ofBataille and
Blanchot show the importance of Sade for a more general debate around the nature of
writing and transgression which took place in France in the decades after the Second
World War.
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Writing on the limit - Bataille, Blanchot and Klossowski.
En soi-meme, en verite, parler de Sade est de toute facon paradoxale,
Georges Bataille, 'Sade et l'homme normal', L'Erotisme,
Idiosyncratic though Klossowski's approach to Sade appears, the issues his
account of Sade raises are far from peripheral to the more general debate taking place
in France after 1945 regarding the question of literature itself, its transgressive
potential, and its relation to thought as such. That this is so is clear from the
relationship between Klossowski' s writings on Sade and the work of Bataille and
Blanchot during the same period .. The question of transgression which has mostly
preoccupied this discussion until now is also, of course, a question of limits : the limits
of the Self and the limits of writing. The problem of the limit and the possibility of its
violation within the wider context of Kloss owski's writing (i.e. his fiction or essays on
Nietzsche) will occupy the remainder of this thesis in one form or another. This point
of intersection with Bataille and Blanchot through a certain reading of Sade represents
a moment where the singularity of Kloss ow ski's writing as a whole comes most clearly
into contact with a debate which is essential to any understanding of modem French
literary and philosophical culture.
The limits of the Self - Klossawski and Bataille on Sade.
Klossowski's association with Bataille dates back to 1934 and continued
throughout the years after the Second World War. Although they collaborated on a
number of projects in the late thirties (Acephale, Le College de sociologie) it has
already been indicated that Klossowski's Christian stance in the years leading up to the
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publication of Sade mon prochain marked a critical break from Bataille's strictly non-
theistic position. It is not possible to give a full analysis of the relation between these
two writers here. But given Klossowski's critique of Bataille in 'Le corps du neant' (a
conference given originally in 1941 and then published in Sade mon pro chain) in 1947
and Bataille's negative response to Sade mon prochain (in 'Litterature et le Mal') it is
clear that they were also, at times, intellectual opponents as well as accomplices'",
Nor, indeed, will it be possible to give any proper account ofBataille's work in
general. However, by focusing on the detail of Bataille's reading of Sade alone, what
follows will show to what extent Klossowski in 1967 borrows - while also developing
it in individual ways - Bataille's concern with the whole question of the limit.
Bataille's writing on Sade dates back to just before Klossowski's career began
when in 1930 he wrote an open letter attacking Andre Breton and the surrealist
appropriation of the Divine Marquis", 'La valeur d'usage de D.A.F. de Sade'" is both
a statement of Bataille's thinking as it stands in 1930 and an exposition of the central
importance of Sade to his project of 'heterology'. Bataille is first and foremost highly
critical of what he sees as the surrealist poeticisation and idealisation of Sade's work.
74 Klossowski's published two further essays which were explicitly devoted to Bataille's work, 'La
Messe de Georges Bataille', in 84 (September 1950), 77-81 (then in Un Si Funeste Desir (paris:
GaIlimard, 1963), pp.121-132) and 'Apropos du simulacre dans la communication de Georges
Bataille', in Critique (August-September 1963), 742-50 (then in La Ressemblance (Marseille:
Andre Dimanche, 1984), pp. 21-33). The former commentary generally repeats the argument of
'Le corps du neant', namely that Bataille's project maintains an inevitable reliance on 'le nom
de Dieu ' (Un Si Funeste Desir, p. 132), although is less polemical than the earlier piece. The
latter commentary is far more sympathetic to Bataille's project and Klossowski's analysis is very
much in line with his own 1967 reading of Sade.
75 This was part of a more extended polemic with Andre Breton. All the documents relating to this
exchange are republished in volume 2 of Bataille's <Euvres completes. It is not altogether clear
whether the open letter here in question was actually circulated. See Surya, Georges Bataille : La
Mort a l'reuvre, p. 632.
76 Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, Vol. 2, pp. 53-69.
83
As was indicated earlier, the surrealist promotion of Sade lacked any real engagement
with the more unpleasant or challenging detail of his writing itself For the surrealists,
Sade was a name and a myth to be used as a polemical weapon not a body of writing
to be engaged with in its full horror. As Bataille puts it :
Dans les cas les plus favorables, l'auteur de Justine est en effet traite ainsi qu'un
corps etranger quelconque, c'est-a-dire qu'il n'est l'objet d'un transport
d'exaltation que dans la mesure ou ce transport en facilite l'excretion
(l'exclusion peremptoire),
La vie et l'eeuvre de D.A.F. de Sade n'auraient done plus d'autre valeur
d'usage que la valeur d'usage vulgaire des excrements, dans lesquels on n'aime
le plus souvent que le plaisir rapide (et violent) de les evacuer et de ne plus les
voir.77
For Bataille it is precisely this excremental character of Sade's work that makes it so
centrally important to his own project. The value of Sade's thought lies in its very
status as a 'corps etranger', in the fact that it embodies all that is prohibited, horrific,
vile, shameful and disgusting. This is just what causes the surrealists to expel Sade's
thought as quickly as it has been assimilated and Bataille to retain it and champion the
Marquis's oeuvre as the ultimate excrement of all human creation.
Bataille's position in this pamphlet is made quite clear: human existence, and in
particular human social organisation, can be divided into two spheres each
characterised by a different principle, the one existing in direct opposition to the other.
These 'deux impulsions humaines polarisees'" Bataille calls 'I'EXCRETION et
I'APPROPRIATIoN'79. Understanding the way Bataille constructs these two opposing
principles offers the key to an understanding of his reading of Sade both in this
pamphlet and throughout his career. Excretion is the governing principle of all that is
77 Georges Bataille, (Euvres completes, Vol. 2, p. 56.
78 Georges Bataille, (Euvres completes, Vol. 2, p. 58.
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subject to any kind of taboo or interdiction within the social whole. It defines all that is
unassimilable or unacceptable to the social whole and that must be regulated either by
a straightforward exclusion (the censorship of Sade for example) or an inclusion within
the realm of the sacred (and therefore the untouchable)". Bataille defines the
'excretory' as follows :
L'activite sexuelle, pervertie ou non, l'attitude d'un sexe devant l'autre, la
defecation, la miction, la mort et le culte des cadavres [...], les differents
tabous, [...] presentent ensemble un caractere commun en ce sens que l'objet de
l'activite (excrements, parties honteuses, cadavres etc ...) se trouve traite
comme un corps etranger".
Excretion, therefore, refers to all that is radically other, to all that is in excess of the
normal, the familiar, the acceptable. By the same token, appropriation refers to all that
is the same, to the everyday. Appropriation is the principle which governs social life in
its normal functioning : it is the principle of civil organisation, politics, industrial and
commercial activity. It always accrues elements to build a stable and unified totality,
whilst excretion always expends and entails dissolution into multiplicity :
Le processus d'appropriation se caracterise ainsi par une homogeneite
(equilibre statique) de l'auteur de l'appropriation et des objets comme resultat
final alors que l'excretion se presente comme le resultat d'une heterogeneite et
peut se developper dans Ie sens de l'heterogeneite de plus en plus grande, en
liberant des impulsions dont l'ambivalence est de plus en plus accusee".
Bataille opposes the multiplicitous and violent disorder of all that is excessive and
other (the free play of the sexual instinct, death, decay, faeces and urine) to the
regulated sameness and order of social organisation. Moreover he argues that the
79 Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, Vol. 2, p. 58.
80 Bataille's thinking here is very much influenced by his engagement with anthropology and in
particular with the studies of Marcel Mauss. Bataille first encountered the work of Mauss
through his friend Alfred Metraux in 1925. See Surya, Georges Bataille : la mort a l'reuvre, p.
623.
81 Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, Vol. 2, p. 58.
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latter is founded upon a violent suppression of the former'", For Bataille human
existence is never anything other than the interplay between two kinds of violence : the
primary violence of excretion, of the instincts represented in the intertwining of sex,
death, decay etc. and the repressive violence of appropriation which excludes all that
is other in favour of all that is the same.
Bataille's project of heterology seeks to affirm the former process against the
latter and it is in this respect that Sade becomes for Bataille a figure of such great
importance. Against the repressive violence of appropriation Bataille advocates the
'dechainement' of aggressive instincts, the affirmation of all that is base and vile, the
'necessite de provoquer l'excitation violente qui resulte de l'expulsion des elements
heterogenes'". Sade's rape and torture, his promotion of the criminal and the
perverted make him an exemplary figure for such a project. Sade, in this very first
commentary by Bataille, is a hero of the heterogeneous, of all that is excluded from or
in excess of the limits which constitute the norm. The fact that Sade's work was
censored for so long, the fact that his writing is so unassimilable (and even unreadable)
lies in its thoroughly excremental character and it is just that quality which makes it so
fascinating for Bataille. Sade, as the most excremental thinker, is a hero of
transgression but in a far more radical manner than he was for the surrealists,
concerned as they were more with the 'merveilleux' than the 'merdeux'. Sade, Bataille
:~ ert:o~ges ~ataille, ffiuvres completes, Vol. 2, pp. 59-60.
It IS in this context that the significance of the terms subservience and sovereignty within Bataille's
thought can be situated. Put very simply the world of appropriation represents an enslavement
of man's chaotic reality and multiplicitous instincts; it represents their subjection to ends which
are not their own (it is therefore a world of subservience). The principle of excretion represents
the violent disorder of man's life as it attains to sovereignty; disorder is expressed as disorder
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would argue, embodies all that is always rejected and must always be rejected by a
social order in its need to preserve itself
Even at this early stage Bataille is clearly not engaging with limits as moral
categories which have some transcendent foundation (i.e. implying the existence of
God as they do for Klossowski). The taboos and interdictions of social organisation
are rather an anthropological phenomenon. As such taboos are universal to human
beings (differentiating them from animals), but they are constructed as a necessity of
human social life (the principle of appropriation) rather than of God's existence.
Klossowski's later reading of Sade repeats this position as he abandons his Catholic
point of view. In 'Le philosophe scelerat' it became clear that 'les normes de l'espece'
no longer had the theological significance of 'categories morales' but referred to
structures which were social and institutional.
In this context Klossowski's later reading of Sade has shifted and has come
closer to what is a constant ofBataille's thought. Bataille's belief in the universality of
the taboo as an anthropological phenomenon is expressed throughout his career from
the earliest writing through to the more systematised formulations of La Part maudite
and L'Erotisme. Yet, like Klossowski in 1967, Bataille, from the beginning of his
career, asserts that any human rationalised structure (be it a social institution or
philosophical body of thought) is insufficient in itself and will always engender that
which is in excess of and opposed to it. Such a structure always carries within it the
necessity of its own transgression. The social body or the structures of human thought
and is not subject to any goal outside itself, because, precisely, it is without goal, it is excess and
useless expenditure.
84 '11Georges Batal e, (Euvres completes, Vol. 2, p. 68.
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may be constituted in and through the institution of limits, but those limits necessarily
must first themselves be de-limited. The notion of the limit always implies an excess
which is subject to limitation but which then always necessarily exceeds that limitation.
Bataille makes this point explicitly in a celebrated essay from 1933 'La notion de
depense'" which dates from 1933 :
la vie humaine ne peut en aucun cas etre limitee aux systemes fermes qui lui
sont assignes dans des conceptions raisonnables. L'immense travail d'abandon,
d'ecoulement et d'orage qui la constitue pourrait etre exprime en disant qu'elle
ne commence qu'avec le deficit de ces systemes : du moins ce qu'elle admet
d'ordre et de reserve n'a-t-il de sens qu'a partir du moment OU les forces
ordonnees et reservees se liberent et se perdent pour des fins qui ne peuvent
etres assujetties cl rien dont il soit possible de rendre des comptes."
This is as clear a statement as one might hope to find of Bataille's theory of
expenditure and of his belief in the insufficiency of reason and of rational structures.
The violent disorder of excretion or ofdepense' are primary processes upon which the
order of appropriation is dependent. The limits, interdictions and taboos of social
organisation are only possible because of the prior reality of violent disorder. Because
they are founded upon disorder, upon the shifting plural chaos and 'travail d'abandon'
of human life (which, precisely, is without foundation), the systems which regulate
human life can never know closure or stability. This formulation is represented in a
different fashion in Klossowski's 'Le Philosophe scelerat' when he insists that the
contra-generality of perversion is always implicit in the generality of norms themselves
85 Published originally in La Critique sociale. 7 (January 1933). Reprinted in Georges Bataille,
<Euvres completes, Vol. 1 (1970), pp. 302-20.
86 Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, Vol. 1, p. 318.
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and that therefore the generality will always guarantee 'le triomphe des perversions'
(SMP67 ,34)87.
Another point of contact between Bataille's reading of Sade and Klossowski's
'Le Philosophe scelerat' is centred once more around the fate of the libertine and his
victim. From the very earliest of Klossowski's writings it has been clear that Sade's
sadism was being read as a paradigm or model for the relationship between Self and
Other. In the later edition of Sade mon prochain the encounter between the libertine
and his victim became a paradigm of the abolition of any distinction at all between Self
and Other in the ecstasy of the perverted act. This moment of abolition, where all the
limits which institute any distinction between Self and Other are abolished, is, of
course, a central moment for Bataille throughout his writing and likewise Sade is taken
as paradigmatic. This point is made explicitly by Bataille in La Litterature et le mal
when he is trying to show the fundamental identity between Sade and Hegel, for whom
absolute knowledge is a merging of subject and object (in the dialectical process of
thesis (Self), antithesis (Other) and synthesis (merging of both» :
Sade (en quoi il differe du simple sadique, qui est irreflechi) eut pour fin
d'atteindre la conscience claire de ce que le "dechainement" atteint seul (mais le
"dechainement" mime a la perte de la conscience), a savoir de la suppression de
la difference entre le sujet et l'objet. 88
The difference between Sade and Hegel, argues Bataille, is that Hegel arrives at
absolute knowledge while Sade is at the stage ofa suspension of knowledge. For
Bataille the Sadeian moment is not a fusion of Self and Other into a greater unity (as it
87 Bataille makes this point explicitly once more in L 'Experience interieure when he writes: 'iI n'est
pas de composition sociale qui n'ait en contrepartie la contestation de ses fondements' Georges
Bataille, <Buwes completes. Vol. 5, p107.
88 Georges Bataille, <Buwes completes, Vol. 9, p. 249.
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is for Hegel and also for Breton). Rather it is a decomposition of both into a chaotic
play of heterogenous forces (of excretion). Where Bataille opposes the unleashing of
chaotic energy to the limits and taboos of social organisation, Klossowski opposes the
singularity of perversion to the generality of the norms of the species. In both cases
Sade is seen as an icon of that moment when chaotic energy or perverted desire is
unleashed in order to transgress limits and norms and so to destroy the Self
Yet Klossowski's writings on Sade have shown that any attempt to violate
normative structures can never be straightforward or unproblematic. Such an attempt
appears always to be paradoxical or end in an impasse or aporia. The final parallel one
can draw between the Bataillian and the Klossowskian reading of Sade lies in the way
they come to terms with the paradox of writing on the limit. Sade's writing exists on
the limit in the sense that the limit itselfis never negated (traversed) without also being
affirmed (one remains inside the limit) such that negation and affirmation are opposed
to each other (without mediation or synthesis) in an infinitely repeated moment. This is
a question, in part, of the status of Bataille's or Klossowski's own discourse or
commentary.
Sade, it is clear once again, has become an exemplum of the Self as it
transgresses itself and is restored to the violence and disorder of its primary instincts.
Yet at the same time he has become an exemplum of the Self in the moment of its
dissolution, in that moment when the disorder of his instincts decompose the unity of
the Self The libertine writer has become a universal figure of Selfhood insofar as his
writing reveals the way in which Selfhood is destroyed by forces which are always in
excess of any unified structure. Yet this exemplarity and universality of Sade's writing
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is founded on a fundamental paradox. He becomes exemplary only because his sadism
embodies the anomaly and singularity ofdechalnement' or perversion. It is his very
singularity which makes him universal. How, might one ask, can the absolutely
anomalous or the perversion of the norm ever be universal? The very importance of
Sade is that his scandalous particularity transgresses and overturns the structures of
universality ('interdits' or 'les normes de l'espece'). Sade is an impossible exemplum.
Klossowski's 'Le Philosophe scelerat' shows that the value of Sade lies in his
overturning of generality itselfby an appeal to the contra-generality of perversion. Yet
the notion of an exemplum relies on a relation between the particular and the general,
where the particular embodies or is representative of the general. Klossowski and
Bataille appeal and seek to champion Sade's singularity but can only do so within a
discourse which remains within the conceptual arena of generality (i.e. the concept of
the exemplum). Once again the limit is being paradoxically negated and yet also at the
same time affirmed without any resolution or rational outcome to this impossible
moment of impasse. The paradox of Bataille's and Klossowski's readings of Sade lie in
the fact that they read him as an exemplum of that which destroys the very foundations
of exemplarity.
The paradox of Sade's writing, then, engenders readings which are themselves
paradoxical. Klossowski focused the argument of'Le Philosophe scelerat' on Sade's
attempt to plead the case of anomaly from within the language of generality. In his
essay 'Sade et l'homme normal' inL'Erotisme Bataille also underlines this gesture of
Sade's text which results in a moment of aporia or irreducible contradiction. Sade's
language, he argues, seeks to give voice to a fundamental violence which would
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abolish all the clear distinctions and limits which underpin both the world of society
and the life of the Self. Yet in so doing he seeks to give voice to a violence which
abolishes the possibility of language itself:
La violence porte en elle cette negation echevelee, qui met fin a toute
possibilite de discours."
As in Klossowski's 1967 Sade mon pro chain Sade here is perceived to be speaking on
behalf of that which necessarily escapes speech; he speaks 'au nom de la vie
silencieuse'". His writing affirms that which abolishes meaning at the same time as it
affirms meaning (by virtue of its status as meaningful language ). This moment of
aporia or paradox which underpins Sade's writing (speaking the unspeakable, pleading
the case of anomaly through structures of generality) parallels the paradoxical nature
ofBataille's and Klossowski's readings (making an example of that which undermines
exemplarity). Sade's singularity is being affirmed through its incorporation into a
universal discourse of the Self; his singularity is being universally affirmed but only
insofar as it overturns universality. Sade speaks the unspeakable; Bataille and
Klossowski exemplify the abolition of exemplarity.
This repetition of paradox in the commentary itself is a necessary consequence
of writing or commenting on the limit at all. If Sade's text seeks to articulate
singularity from within the limits prescribed by generality, so any attempt by a
commentator to speak about that singularity must perform the same gesture (since
commentary also is bound by the generality oflanguage and meaning). Reading Sade
with Bataille and Klossowski highlights that moment of aporia which underpins both
89 Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, Vol. 10, p. 187.
90 Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, Vol. 10, p. 187.
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the novelistic text and its commentary. Discourse itself is brought to this paradoxical
limit point where logical progression is suspended, rational comment overturned and
where there is no issue other than in the repetition of the same moment (an instance of
irreducible paradox). The commentaries ofBataille and Klossowski do not uncover the
'Truth' of Sade's text as such, they repeat it, they reiterate its impossible gesture.
Yet at the same time what these readings also assert is that such a moment of
aporia does not constitute the triumph of the norm. Reading Sade with Klossowski
and Blanchot shows that it is exactly that moment of aporia, which characterises the
encounter (or non-encounter) with the limit, which constitutes the radically
transgressive gesture of the Sadeian text.
The limits of writing - Klossowski and Blanchot on Sade.
For Maurice Blanchot writing, and the writing of the literary text in particular,
is irreducibly paradoxical. In the two essays which he devotes entirely to Sade, 'La
Raison de Sade,91and 'L'Insurrection ou la folie d'ecriret92, Blanchot focuses directly
upon the paradoxical nature of the Sadeian text. The argument of the first essay 'La
Raison de Sade' parallels Klossowski's reading in 'L'esquisse du systeme de Sade'
insofar as it highlights a movement of affirmation and negation which passes through a
number of phases. Sade's text is dialectical argues Blanchot in its 'pretension
essentiellement sadique de vouloir fonder la souverainete raisonnable de l'homme sur
un pouvoir transcendant de negation'". For Blanchot, however, what is crucial about
91 In Lautreamont et Sade (paris: Minuit, 1949); revised edition 1963, pp. 15-49.
92 In L 'Entretien infini, (paris: Gallimard, 1969).
93 L'Entretien infini, p.327.
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this transcendent power of negation in Sade's writing is that it is the same as that
exercised by literature itself in its negation of the world thus making Sade the 'ecrivain
par excellence' (this will be discussed further in due course in relation to the essay 'La
Litterature et le droit a la mort"). The Sadeian text, for Blanchot, embodies a
movement whereby total destruction is a principle of total affirmation and in this sense
it is in the last instance far from dialectical. Unlike Klossowski Blanchot does not
uncover a dialectic of recognition between the sadist and his victim. In Klossowski's
analysis such a play of recognition meant that the negation of the victim was always
also an affirmation of the victim. For Blanchot that moment of affirmation is only a
superficial and temporary moment of validation (of the victim's existence) which is
subject ultimately to an overriding negation:
Cette negation/tour cl tour il [Sade] s'est servi des hommes, de Dieu, de la
nature, pour l'eprouver. Hommes, Dieu, nature, chacune de ces notions, au
moment ou la negation la traverse, parait recevoir une certaine valeur, mais si
l'on prend I'experience dans son ensemble, ces moments n'ont plus la moindre
realite, car Ie propre de l'experience consiste justement a les ruiner et annuler
les uns par les autres."
Blanchot does not detect any dialectical movement at work in Sade's text, rather the
question of negation and affirmation in literature depends crucially on its global, total
nature which means that it is unlike 'work' in the Hegelian sense of a process of
progressive synthesis or 'Aufhebung'. As I argued in the discussion of Sade mon
prochain (1947) Klossowski makes an initial case for a progression of dialectical
phases in Sade's text only to show the way in which this progression breaks down into
infinite repetition (that of 'delectatio morosa'). This is close to Blanchot's analysis
94 'La Litterature et le droit a la mort' in La Part du feu (paris: Gallimard, 1949), pp. 303-45.
95 Lautreamont et Sade, p. 42.
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except that Blanchot argues that dialectical progression has in a sense always already
broken down since it is always already subsumed into this global negation or
destruction. For Blanchot Sade's text enacts an extreme movement of negation which
at the very same time is an extreme movement of affirmation (the two oppose each
other without mediation or synthesis). Where Klossowski, in the first version of the
'Esquisse du systeme', saw the breakdown of dialectical thought in terms of an overall
affirmation (of God), Blanchot's reading articulates this breakdown as a primary
negation which is simultaneously an overall affirmation, not of God but of literature.
Before turning more explicitly to Blanchot's theory oflanguage and literature a
little more needs to be said about his discussion of negation in Sade's text the manner
in which it compares to that of Kloss ow ski. In the earlier version of Sade man
pro chain God's Law and moral categories were primary in such a way that any attempt
to transgress them always confirmed them. As I have suggested, for Blanchot the
negation which occurs in Sade's text has, in a certain sense, always already taken
place. When the libertine murders his victims he does not recognise them as other
human beings but rather bears witness to their nothingness, hence the facility of their
destruction:
s'ils disparaissent avec cette facilite derisoire, c'est qu'ils ont ete prealablemenr
annihiles par un acte de destruction totale et absolue, qu'ils ne sont la et qu'ils
ne meurent que pour porter temoignage de cette espece de cataclysme originel,
de cette destruction qui ne vaut pas seulement pour eux, mais pour taus les
autres.'"
Whilst Klossowski argued that the Sadeian libertine necessarily recognised his victim
as human beings, Blanchot argues that the libertine's act of destruction merely affirms
96 Lautreamont et Sade, p. 33.
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that: 'illes a toujours deja anterieurement tenus pour nuls,97.So Blanchot's reading of
Sade uncovers a movement of negation in the Sadeian text which has always already
taken place. For Blanchot this negation is part of the very structure of language and
literature both of which become possible to the extent that they negate the world as
such, transforming objects into concepts and the world into an absence of the world ..
By that very same token negation becomes total affirmation : a destruction of the
world that is also the affirmation ofa radical absence of the world (with these two
moments opposed to each other without any possibility of dialectical progression or
greater synthesis).
This point is echoed by Klossowski in his later reading when he affirms that the
negation of the victim is always also a negation of the Self: 'si l'autre n'est rien pour
moi, non seulement je ne suis plus rien pour lui, mais rien non plus a regard de rna
propre conscience' (SMP67,130). The path that Klossowski takes in order to reach
this formulation (via his reading of'Kojeve) has already been retraced. For Blanchot
the 'cataclysme originel' of primary negation, that which makes Sade's victims always
already nothing, is the effect oflanguage itself In his essay 'La Litterature et le droit a
la mort' he elaborates the view of language and literature alluded to above which he
derives from Hegel (via Kojeve and Mallarme"), According to Blanchot (and the
Adamic myth of naming he borrows from Hegel) language itself is constituted in a
paradoxical play of affirmation and negation. The word which describes an object (the
word 'rose' for example) also destroys that object. It provides the concept or meaning
97 Lautreamont et Sade, p. 36.
98 For Mallarme's view of language as negation see the poem 'Toast funebre' and the essay 'Crise de
vers' collected in <Euvres completes (paris: GaIIimard, Pleaide, 1945), p. 54 and pp. 360-68.
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of the object but at the same time necessarily affirms the absence of the object. When
one says 'rose' the real rose is rendered absent, is negated, but what is affirmed is the
general concept 'rose'. In this sense the ontological status of the linguistic sign is
paradoxical because it is both a form of being and of non-being, a presence which is at
the very same time an absence, or as Blanchot puts it :
Le mot me donne l'etre, mais ilme le donne prive d'etre. II est l'absence de cet
etre, son neant, ce qui demeure de lui lorsqu'il a perdu l'etre, c'est-a-dire Ie seul
fait qu'il n'est pas99.
The Being of the world as it is apprehended through the structures of language and
signification is always apprehended as non-Being. Being is given as non-Being, is
present only in its absence. The 'cataclysme originel' of language is a form of negation
which renders all Being as nothing from the start. This formulation of language and
Being in 'La litterature et le droit a la mort' is complex and cannot be fully elaborated
here. What is important to note is that the fact that, for Blanchot, Sade's text and the
violence of his heroes testify to the nothingness of Being (precisely because the victims
are 'toujours deja anterieurement tenus pour nuls') and at the same time to the excess
oflanguage over Being (since it is in language that this testimony is possible). For
Blanchot what seems essential about literature is the way in which it survives the
moment of total destruction as that which cannot be negated.
What the endless destruction of victims, of God and Nature represent in Sade's
text is an affirmation of negation pushed to its limit; a paradoxical affirmation that the
world is always already negation. The Sadeian libertine affirms his sovereignty only
through absolute negation. Blanchot writes of Sade ICe qu'il a poursuivi, c'est la
99 La Part du feu. p. 325.
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souverainete a travers l'esprit de la negation pousse a son point extreme'l'".
Affirmation and negation are pushed to their extreme in a moment of irreducible
paradox (since of course they exclude each other by definition). In this movement of
negation pushed to its paradoxical extreme the taboo or limit (as moral category) is
not dialectically conserved as it is in Klossowski's earlier reading of Sade. Rather it is
infinitely surpassed or delimited. Blanchot writes in 'L'Insurrection ou la folie d'ecrire' :
L'interdit assurement joue son role, comme limite qu'il faut depasser, dans ce
mouvement d'illimitation. Mais ce n'est pas nullement la l'ultime limite.'?'
Sade's text seeks to negate everything, to delimit the limits of language and of the
world itself This extreme of negation which is also an extreme of affirmation pushes
Sade's text up to the limitless limit of human thought and language. Sade's text, in its
'pouvoir transcendent de negation', shows language and thought to be, in a sense,
without limit, for to name the limit of language one must already be situated beyond
that limit, and it is therefore no longer a limit. For Blanchot the paradoxical nature of
Sade's writing reproduces the fundamental logic of language itself which is both a
negation of the world (its destruction) and an affirmation (the production of meaning),
where Being is always given as non-being, presence as absence. What this means is
that Sade's text, in the extremity of its negation, seeks to affirm from within language
that which is prior to language and which founds language i.e. the primary annihilation
of the world which makes possible concepts and meanings and the apprehension of the
world. The paradoxical nature of Sade's text shows this to be an impossible task
because the extreme of negation as also always an extreme of affirmation. Sade's
100 Lautreamont et Sade. p. 42.
101 L'Entretien infini 328~=~-=-<.~n~l, p. .
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writing shows that language at its limitless limit cannot transgress itself, rather it can
only repeat an instance of aporia.
This intransgressibility of the limitless limit enacts the true transgressive force
of the Sadeian text. In seeking to negate, Sade's text also always affirms and so must
endeavour to negate once more and so on ad infinitum. For Blanchot the infinite
negation of Sade's text represents the point at which discursivity is arrested at an
impossible and paradoxical extreme and where the logical progression of dialectical
thought is thrown into hiatus, is held at that point of impossibility. This interruption
Blanchot calls the 'inconvenance majeure' of Sade's writing:
c'est a la force simplement repetitive qu'est remise 1'inconvenance majeure,
celIe d'une narration qui ne rencontre pas d'interdit, parce qu'il n'en est plus
d'autre [...] que le temps de l'entre-dire, ce pur arret que ron ne saurait
atteindre qu'en ne cessant jamais de parler.l'"
'L'inconvenance majeure' : such is the transgression of Sade's writing. In seeking to
negate the limit the Sadeian text also always affirms it in a gesture which institutes an
infinite movement of repetition. Repetition reveals that Sade's language is one which
'ne conceit pas de terme' other than that moment of aporia where the dialectical
progression of thought itself, which even as it strives for ever greater totality and
synthesis, is interrupted, ruined, thrown into the hiatus of repetition. For Blanchot this
is the very movement of literature itself Sade's absolute negation of all limits makes
him 'l'ecrivain par excellence'!", For Blanchot, as for Klossowski and Bataille, Sade is
exemplary of writing in its transgressive mode yet this is a transgression which does
not consist in disobeying and thus confirming the law, but rather one where the
102 L'Entretien infini, pp. 328-9.
103 La Part du feu p. 311.
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paradoxical play of writing on the limit suspends the aggressive totalising gestures of
the law itself.
Klossowski in 'Le Philosophe scelerat', like Blanchot in 'L'lnsurrection ou la
folie d'ecrire', comes to the view that it is Sade's writing itself that is the 'terrain de
l'outrage' (SMP67,51), the space inwhich the transgressive force of the Sadeian text is
enacted. For Blanchot, Klossowski and Bataille, Sade's text exemplifies a different
mode of thought and writing, one which destroys the very logic of exemplification
itself and which affirms the paradoxical nature of discourse held at the limitless limit of
discourse itself. This writing on the limit bears witness to the fragility of the Self as a
construct and to also to the fragility of all the norms which underpin human thought.
Such a mode of writing affirms heterogeneity over totality, paradox and repetition
over rationality and dialectical progression. According to Bataille, Blanchot and
Klossowski, Sade's writing shows us that human existence is always in contradiction
with itself, that it is constituted always in the negation of that which initially makes it
possible.
Klossowski's relationship to this different mode of thought is at first ambivalent
as the argument of the earlier Sade mon pro chain reveals. His later writing shows that
he has fully embraced the disruptive impossibilities of Sade's texts (that Bataille and
Blanchot elaborate in their readings) without trying to recuperate them into a theistic
world view. At the end of 'La Raison de Sade' Blanchot writes of Sade's thought :
elle nous montre qu'entre l'homme normal qui enferme l'homme sadique dans
une impasse et le sadique qui fait de cette impasse une issue, c'est celui-ci qui
en sait le plus long sur la verite et la logique de sa situation et qui en a
l'intelligence la plus profonde, au point de pouvoir aider l'homme normal a se
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comprendre lui-meme, en l'aidant a modifier les conditions de toute
comprehension.l'"
Klossowski's Sade mon prochain in its various guises, along with the readings of
Bataille and Blanchot, point towards this modification of'les conditions de toute
comprehension'. The scandalous particularity of the Sadeian text leads its modem
readers in the years before and after the Second World War to a notion of writing as
paradox and repetition, to the idea of human identity as fortuitous, fragile and
arbitrary.
Klossowski's writings on Sade and the wider debate in which his reading of
Sade can be situated can serve as a blueprint for the issues which are central to the rest
of his essayistic and fictional output. The figure of Nietzsche has constantly loomed
large in Klossowski's writings on Sade from the very beginning of the thirties onwards.
The notions of sovereignty and of repetition around which the readings of Klossowski,
Bataille and Blanchot tum carry strong echoes of the Nietzschean doctrines of the
'Ubermensch' and of 'Eternal Return'. Indeed, in this whole debate surrounding Sade,
the Self and writing on the limit the figure of Nietzsche has never been far away. In
order to look at this modification of'les conditions de toute comprehension' in more
detail it is to Klossowski's writing on Nietzsche that one can now tum.
104 Lautreamont et Sade, p. 48-9.
Chapter Two - The Uses of Nietzsche.
Klossowski on Nietzsche.
Klossowski's writings on Nietzsche, like those on Sade, span the length of his career.
His first essay on Nietzsche appeared in 1937 in the second issue of Bataille's journal
Acephale which was entitled 'Nietzsche et les fascistes". Bataille, along with
Klossowski, Andre Masson, Jean Wahl and lRollin, in publishing this issue, sought to
rescue the German philosopher's work from its hijacking by German National Socialist
ideology. Klossowski's contribution consisted in the essay entitled 'Creation du monde'
and also in two reviews on books about Nietzsche, one by Jaspers, the other Karl
Lowith's Nietzsches Philosophie der Ewigen Wiederkunft des Gleichen'. It is in the
second of these that Klossowski first explicitly discusses Nietzsche's doctrine of
Eternal Return (or Recurrence), the motif which, as shall become clear, is central to
his later writing. He then published two essays in the fifties, one an introduction to his
1954 translation of Die frohliche WissenschafP, 'Sur quelques themes fondamentaux
1 AC¢Phale. 2 (21 January 1937).
2 Lowith, Karl, Nietzsches Philosophie des ewigen Wiederkunft des Gleichen, 2ndedition (Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer, 1956).
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Frohliche Wissenschaft, Kritische Studienausgabe, Giorgio Colli and
Mazzino Montinari ed., 15 vols (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967-77), Vol. 3. All references to
Nietzsche in the original German will be to this edition prefaced by the abbreviation KSA and
followed by the volume and page number. For the French edition see Le Gai Savoir , translated
by P.Klossowski (paris: Gallimard, 1956). Throughout this chapter, citations from Nietzsche's
texts will be given in their French rather than their English translations and followed with a
reference to the original German. This is because the GallimardIFolio works referred to are all
translations of the most recent ColliIMontinari edition of Nietzsche's eeuvre as yet untranslated
into English. Most importantly the ColliJMontinari edition organises all the posthumous
fragments according to chronological order (superseding the work Der Wille zur Macht,
tendentiously arranged as it was by Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche and Heinrich Koselitz (peter
Gast) (Stuttgart: Kroner, 1959); see Douglas Smith. TraJlS\laluations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
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de la 'Gaya Scienza' de Nietzsche', the other a lecture given at the College de
Philosophie in 1957, 'Nietzsche le polytheisme et la parodie'; both of these were
collected in 1963 in the volume Un Si Funeste desir" (which also contains several other
essays from the previous two decades). Klossowski then wrote a number of essays
based on Nietzsche's later fragments that were published between 1967 and 19695
were then collected in his full length work, Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux" (1969).
Finally he gave a short paper at the conference on Nietzsche at Cerisy-Ia-salle in 1973
entitled 'Circulus vitiosus deus",
This extensive body of writing makes Klossowski one of the key commentators
on Nietzsche in post-war France. His reading of Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal
Return and his emphasis upon the motifs of repetition, parody and mask exerted an
influence inparticular on the interpretations of Nietzsche by both Gilles Deleuze and
1996), p. 2. Also the translators into French for the Gallimard ColliJMontinari complete works
are by and large working within the same intellectual perspective from which Klossowski is
reading Nietzsche. To avoid the problems posed by the very different Anglo-American tradition
of Nietzsche translation and commentary I have preferred to address myself here to a specifically
French face of Nietzsche.
4 Klossowski, Pierre, Un Si Funeste Desir (paris: Gallimard, 1963). All references to essays in this
volume will be preceded by the abbreviation SFD followed by the page number.
S 'Oubli et anamnese dans l'experience de l'eternel retour do meme', in Nietzsche. ed. Martial
Gueroult, Les Cahiers de Royaumont-Philosophie, VI, (paris: Minuit, 1967) (This was a paper
given originally at a conference on Nietzsche attended by among others Deleuze and Foucault).
'La Periode turinoise de Nietzsche', L'Ephemere (Spring 1968), 57-85. 'Le Complot', Change.
5 (2nd trimester 1969), 88-98.
6 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux (paris: Mercure de France, 1969). All references to
this volume will be preceded by the abbreviation N followed by the page number.
7 In Nietzsche aujourd'hui (2 vols), Publications do centre culturel de Cerisy-a-salle (paris: UGE,
1973), vol I, pp. 91-103. This conference was a major event in the reappraisal of Nietzsche by
contemporary French philosophers; other contributors included Deleuze, Lyotard, Derrida,
Kofman, Nancy, Lqcoue-Labarthe, I.M. Rey and numerous others. For a discussion of the
importance of both this and the earlier Royaumont colloquium see Douglas Smith,
Transvaluations, in particular pp. 150-68.
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Michel Foucault". The importance of Kloss ow ski in relation to the French reception of
Nietzsche (and to that of Deleuze in particular) is analysed in detail by Douglas Smith
in his work Transvaluations. Nietzsche in France 1872-19729. His discussion highlights
the centrality of Kloss ow ski's apparently eccentric concerns to the French assimilation
of Nietzsche in the years between 1962 and 1972 (when the crucial Cerisy colloquium
was held) and in particular the importance of Kloss ow ski's reading of the doctrine of
Eternal Return".
What I want to argue here is that Klossowski's relationship with Nietzsche is
more complex than the existence of a specific, chronologically ordered body of
commentaries might suggest. This is because the philosopher's presence pervades
much, ifnot all, of Kloss ow ski's other writings. Also, the questions raised within these
commentaries themselves explicitly problematise the formulation of such a relationship
8 See Gilles Deleuze, 'Conclusions: Sur la volonte de puissance et I'eternel retour', in Martial
Gueroult ed., Cahiers de Royaumont Philosophie IV, Nietzsche (paris: Minuit 1966) , pp. 275-
86 and Difference et repetition. (paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968). See also Michel
Foucault, 'Nietzsche, la genealogie, I'histoire', in Epimethee. Hommage a Jean Hyppolite,
(paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), pp. 145-72. Specific points of convergence
between Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche and the interpretations of Deleuze and Foucault will
be signalled as this chapter progresses.
9 Douglas Smith, Transvaluations, pp. 140-84.
10 For some specific responses to Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche see Gilles Deleuze, 'Klossowski
ou les corps-Iangage' in Logigue du sens (paris: Minuit, 1969), pp. 325-50; see in particular
pp.341-50, and Maurice Blanchot, 'Le Rire des Dieux' in L'Amitie (Paris: Gallimard, 1971),
pp. 192-207; see in particular pp. 204-07. See also Michel Balzamo, 'Klossowski et le "cas
Nietzsche" in Revue des Sciences humaines, 197 (1985),23-34 and Brice Parain, 'Son
Nietzsche', L'Arc, 43 (1970),78-80. For some responses contemporary to the publication of
Klossowski's book on Nietzsche see Jean-Pierre Faye, 'Nietzsche et Klossowski' in Change. 2
(2nd trimester 1969), 87-88, and Andre Marissel, 'Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux', La Nouvelle
Revue Francaise (January 1970), 131-32. For a more extended commentary on Klossowski's
reading of Nietzsche see Jean-Pol Madou, Demons et simulacres dans I'ceuvre de Pierre
Klossowski (paris: Klincksieck, 1987); see in particular Chapter Two, 'Le Chaos et la
coherence', pp. 25-33.
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in any straight-forward or traditional way (e.g. in terms of influence)!'. In this sense, to
tell the story of Klossowski on Nietzsche in the way the introductory chapter sought
to tell the story of Kloss ow ski on Sade (in terms of a historical! conceptual
development of a body of writing) proves to be an undesirable if not impossible
enterprise. This is not simply because the writings on Nietzsche are so varied and
complex but rather because such a project would run counter to what Klossowski
could be said to be 'doing' with the German philosopher throughout his numerous
commentaries.
What this chapter will seek to do, therefore, is to look at Klossowski's essays
on Nietzsche together with some of his other works in order to locate the 'uses'
Klossowski makes of Nietzsche in his texts. My aim here is not specifically to look at
Klossowski as a commentator and analyse the substance of those commentaries.
Rather my purpose is to throw some light on the manner in which Klossowski reads
Nietzsche and to see how this reading determines the problematic of his own writing in
general. Within this problematic one can see the way in which writing, either
philosophical or fictional, is recast into a different mode. In this context the act of
writing can no longer systematise or describe an external 'reality' (it does not perform a
referential or mimetic function) but becomes rather a form of movement or gesture.
This also problematises from the outset any attempt to articulate a 'relationship'
between those bodies of writing signed with the names Nietzsche and Klossowski.
11 This point is made explicitly by Douglas Smith in his discussion of the relationship between
Deleuze and Nietzsche. See Douglas Smith, Transvaluations p. 171.
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To do this I shall examine three of Kloss ow ski's texts under the rubric of
motifs which could be said to derive from his reading of Nietzsche. So to begin with I
will nevertheless outline the substance of one of Kloss ow ski's commentaries on
Nietzsche so that these key moments or 'motifs' can be located. His 1957 essay
'Nietzsche, le polytheisme et la parodie' offers a useful starting point in that it takes as
its theme the advent of many gods after death of the one God. As the first chapter
showed the 'Death of God' was a theme of crucial interest to the Catholic Klossowski
who later came to renounce his Catholicism after traversing a religious crisis.
From Catholicism to Polytheism - 'Nietzsche le polytheisme et la parodie'.
L 'apparencepour moi, c'est la realite agissante et vivante elle-meme,
qui, dans safacon d'etre ironique a l'egard d'elle-meme, vajusqu'a me
faire sentir qu'il n'y a la qu'apparence,feu follet et danses des elfes, et
rien de plus - queparmi tous ses reveurs mot aussi, en tant que
"connaissant'~je danse ma propre danse; que le "connaissant" n'est
qu'un moyen a trainer en longueur la danse terrestre.
Le Gai Savoir, Aph 5412•
Klossowski himself is keen to stress that his interest in Nietzsche is not that of a
traditional exegete or philosopher. In his introduction to Nietzsche et Ie cerc1e vicieux
he claims, for instance, that the book is a 'fausse etude' and describes it as 'un livre qui
temoignera d'une rare ignorance'. Likewise at the beginning of 'Nietzsche, Ie
polytheisme et la parodie' Klossowski questions whether he might not be charged with
abusing Nietzsche's text, by exploiting it for his own ends:
peut-etre aurais-je l'air de me servir de Nietzsche pour demontrer en revanche
l'existence de plusieurs dieux et legitimer bien mal a propos Ie polytheisme; et,
12 Le Gai savoir. 54, p. 91, Die Frohliche Wissenschaft, KSA3, p. 417.
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jouant sur les mots, je n'echapperai pas au reproche, sous pretexte de montrer
le sens de la parodie chez Nietzsche, de faire moi-meme de la parodie, et done
de parodier Nietzsche (SFD,187).
Klossowski is not putting these disclaimers into his text merely to fend off the critics
he may encounter amongst professional philosophers or academic commentators.
Rather he is emphasising an important aspect of his reading of Nietzsche itself His
relationship to Nietzsche in these texts is, he suggests, one of falsity and parody; his is
not a project of elucidating a specific body of knowledge. This is not, he stresses, a
matter of his own personal whim but is very much part of the structure of what he is
seeking to do with Nietzsche and what Nietzsche does with him in the process of
interpretation: 'pour autant que l'on est amene a interpreter la pensee d'un esprit que
l'on cherche a comprendre et a faire comprendre, iln'en est point qui, autant que
Nietzsche, amene son interprete a Ie parodier' (SFD,187-8). The way inwhich
Klossowski reads falsity and parody as affirmative values and then comes to
characterise his own reading as parodic can be seen by looking more closely at the
argument of 'Nietzsche, le polytheisme et la parodie'.
What became clear from Klossowski's reading of Sade and the changes that it
underwent was that, as an interpretation, it was very closely tied in with Klossowski's
own personal itinerary from an ambivalent and tom Catholic in the pre-war years to a
non-Christian in 1967 when the second version of Sade mon prochain was published.
Klossowski's preoccupation in his early texts was the impossibility of affirming God's
non-existence. Towards the beginning of 'Nietzsche, le polytheisme et la parodie'
Klossowski describes Nietzsche's ceuvre not as a system of philosophy but rather as a
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set of'variations sur un theme personnel' (SFD,189). This might initially suggest
grounds for Klossowski's prolonged and intense interest in Nietzsche. His personal
engagement with Catholicism and the subsequent crisis of this engagement proved to
be central to an understanding of the developments in Klossowski's thought and
writing between the two editions of Sade mon prochain. If one accepts Klossowski's
judgement on Nietzsche, it would seem that neither are pursuing certain philosophical
questions in purely academic terms (for example the death of God), rather they are
examining the philosophical together with experiential and personal considerations (for
example a questioning of their own identities). The proclamation of the 'Death of God'
in the famous passage from Le Gai Savoir, L'insense', alludes to the gravity of these
consequences :
Qui nous a donne l'eponge pour effacer l'horizon tout entier? Qu'avons-nous
fait, a desenchanter cette terre de son soleil? Vers ou roule-t-elle a present?
Vers quoi nous porte son mouvement? Loin de tous les soleils? Ne sommes-
nous pas precipites dans une chute continue? Et cela en arriere, de cote, en
avant, vers tous les cotes? Est-il encore un haut et un bas? N'errons nous pas
comme a travers un neant infini?"
The death of God radically decentres human existence, sending it into a vertiginous
spin where all truths and all stable points of reference, which give coherence to human
existence, are undermined and shown to be without foundation. Klossowski's essay on
the motifs of polytheism and parody is an attempt to elucidate further on Nietzsche's
view of an existence which is given up to a 'chute continue'. This essay (like most of
Klossowski's work) proves very difficult to summarise since, as Klossowski himself
says, it is dealing with a body of thought and writing in which, 'a proprement parler, il
13Le Gai Savoir. 125, pp. 149-50, Die Frohliche Wissenschaft, KSA3. p. 481..
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n'y a guere de point de depart ni exactement de point d'arrivee' (SFD,188). A point of
departure is, however, necessary and this can be found in Klossowski's discussion of
the notions of the 'monde apparent' and the 'monde vrai' as they are discussed and re-
evaluated in Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols.
'IT/alit est change et rien n'est change," (SFD.195)
Nietzsche's argument runs as follows. The existence of God is what underpins
the existence of a transcendent world of reality and Truth on the one hand and a fallen
world of appearances, illusion and falsity to which mortals are bound on the other.
This distinction is, of course, a reiteration and modification of the Platonic vision of
Ideal forms which holds our own reality to be merely the multiple and derived
manifestations of these forms and therefore as being always at one remove from Truth.
For Nietzsche it is just such a distinction which exists at the heart of metaphysical and
philosophical discourse as such; one which renders any form of knowledge claiming to
have purchase on 'Truth' or 'Reality' ultimately theological in its essence. In 'Nietzsche,
le polytheisme et la parodie' Klossowski comments at some length on Nietzsche's
aphorism from Twilight of the Idols. 'Comment Ie monde vrai finit par devenir fable'",
and traces the six stages of the world becoming fable, parodying the six days of the
world's creation as it is told in the Biblical narrative. The final stage articulates what is
at stake in the Death of God' :
6. Nous avons supprime le monde vrai; quel monde subsiste alors? Le monde
des apparences? Nullement : avec Ie monde vrai 1l000S avons du meme coup
supprime le monde des apparences! (Cited SFD, 193).
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If one abolishes the notions of 'Truth' and 'Reality' one also abolishes those of falsity
and illusion since falsity only exists in contradistinction to what is true, illusion only in
contradistinction to what is real. The world in which such notions no longer have any
significance does not then become the real world of positivistic science (since that
maintains the criteria of truth and falsity which have just been abolished) but, in
Nietzsche's words, becomes a/able. This notion of the world as fable is, as
Klossowski himself puts it, 'gros de consequences' (SFD,195).
Construing world as fable places language, story-telling and therefore fiction at
the heart of understanding and knowledge. As Klossowski tells us: 'fable signifie
quelque chose qui se raconte et qui n'existe que dans le recit; le monde est quelque
chose qui se raconte, un evenement raconte et done une interpretation : la religion,
I'art, la science, l'histoire, autants d'interpretations diverses du monde, ou plutot
autant de variantes de la fable' (SFD,193). In such a world there is not one Truth but a
plurality of truths, of interpretations which do not exclude each other but which make
up the fabric of a multiple and varied narrative. The world is written but in many ways
and with many strands. At the same time because the world is written (the passive is
significant), seeing the world as fable reintroduces the experience of fatality into
existence. Fiction implies fatality. The Latin/abula derives from the Latin/ari ('to
foretell/ to ramble, rave') whose past participle isfatum ('foretold' but also 'fatality'). A
fable is not told but tells itself Therefore the world as fable is not the result of human
agency or design but the result of fatality, of a necessity beyond human agency.
14 Crq,uscule des idoles. pp. 30-31, (Paris: Gallimard:Folio, 1974), GOtzen-Dttmmerung. KSA6. pp
80-81..
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Nietzsche's conception of necessity is paradoxical insofar as it implies an existence
given up to randomness but at the same time one which is subject to constraint (the
constraint of random determination). This notion is central to Klossowski's reading
and, as will become clear, is particularly important to the way in which he formulates
the doctrine of Eternal Return. This notion offable as fatality in tum alters the way in
which temporal progression can be conceived. In a world which 'tells itself existence
also loses its subjection to an end or telos since it is not 'being told' by anyone, God or
human, to any specific end. Klossowski links the notions of fiction and fatality with a
view of the world as unhistorical. History (narrative) is dependant uponfaturn
(language and fable); it may involve transformation and change but is not subject to
linear progression and is therefore eternal and mythological:
Ainsi quand on dit que le monde est devenu fable, on dit egalement qu'il est le
fatum, on divague, mais en divaguant, on vaticine, et l'on predit le destin;
toutes choses que nous retenons ici en raison du role de la fatalite, de la notion
de fatum capitale chez Nietzsche. La refabulisation du monde signifie
egalement que le monde sort du temps historique pour rentrer dans le temps du
mythe, c'est-a-dire dans l'eternite (SFD,194).
Fable and the way it implies both fatality and a temporality which is subject to
suspension provides the first of the motifs with which other works by Klossowski will
be examined later in this chapter, namely that of myth. The universe of myth which
replaces the universe of'monde vrai' and 'monde apparent' is eternal because it is not
subject to any end outside or higher than itself a mythical existence: 'se revele comme
rendue a elle-meme sans autre but que de revenir sur elle-meme' (SFD,189). Such a
formulation is highly paradoxical because it ultimately abolishes the possibility of a
'rneme' to which existence might be returned and at the very same stroke abolishes the
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foundations of any subject who might apprehend such an existence. This will be
discussed in further detail later. For the moment what is important is that Nietzsche's
formulation of this situation, claims Klossowski : 'revient a une decision en faveur de
l'existence de l'univers n'ayant d'autre but que detre ce qu'elle est' (SFD,190). The
doctrine and experience of Eternal Return is very much part of the structure of a
mythical universe which is both timeless yet which has no existence outside of what it
is in anyone instant. Again, this will be returned to in more detail later on in this
discussion. However the consequences of the 'refabulisation du monde' are not limited
to a different conception of fatality and temporality alone. A mythical existence which
is 'rendue a elle-meme' (SFD,189) does, in the moment of its apprehension, radically
alter the nature of the identity of the human subject. It alters the very possibility of
there being a 'meme' to which existence might be 'rendue' in the first place.
To say that existence is eternal is not to say that it is fixed and unchanging.
Indeed the very abolition of the distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' undermines all
possibility of there being any fixity and continuity in existence at all (guaranteed as
they were by the presence of God). In these terms an eternal existence, which is
nothing other than what it is at each moment, is an existence given up to
transformation and flux in a paradoxical time without time or a time of the absence of
time (an impossible time where transformation and timelessness coexist). This has
direct consequences for any experience of the self. Human identity is stable and fixed
(therefore autonomous and morally responsible in the traditional sense) only with
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reference to an essence which the proper name might be thought to embody". The
world of essences, to reiterate this, is precisely what is lost with the death of God and
the suppression of the 'real' world along with the 'apparent'. So in attempting to think.
this suppression, Nietzsche has, according to Klossowski, : 'donne conge au monde
dans lequel i1 porte tout de meme le nom de Nietzsche, et s'il continue a ecrire sous ce
nom c' est pour sauver les apparences' (SFD,195). In proclaiming the abolition of
essences, Nietzsche proclaims also the abolition of human identity. This brings one to
the crux of the problem around which Klossowski is turning in this essay. For, in
attempting to elaborate under the name of Nietzsche a view of the world which is
denied the unity of the One God, Nietzsche is engaging in a highly paradoxical
enterprise. Whilst writing under the name of Nietzsche he is affirming a view of the
universe inwhich 'Nietzsche' as a proper name has no stable referent, no fixed identity.
The experience which he is attempting to write excludes him therefore as a thinking or
writing subject at the very moment he sets out to write it. Nietzsche : 'se voit amene a
enseigner l'inenseignable' (SFD,189) because his enterprise by its very nature renders
itself impossible. It is in this sense that Klossowski describes the Nietzsche's
experience as 'inelucidable' (SFD,214). The experience ofa world without God (a
world offable and myth) cannot be spoken by the conscious, thinking self because it
abolishes the very foundations of that conscious thinking self Nietzsche's project
turns, then, on the paradoxical attempt to translate into the realm of thought that
which conscious thought by its very nature excludes. This brings one to the second of
the three motifs under which this chapter will examine Klossowski's 'relationship' to
1S Within this context the proper name can be thought of in other very different ways. This will be
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Nietzsche, namely that of translation. By this Imean not only translation in the sense
of moving from one language into another, as, for instance, when Klossowski
translates Nietzsche from German or Virgil from Latin, but also translation in the sense
of seeking to think something or transpose into the realm of thought that which lies
outside thought, to write something which cannot be written. The question of identity
is crucial here. Translation traditionally presupposes the existence of two texts or
languages with stable identities or meanings, the one being exchanged with the other
on the basis of their mutual equivalence. Since identity is precisely the thing which is
abolished in a fictional universe the very notion of translation and of 'equivalence' is
called into question. The notion of identity as it is subjected to dissolution in the
'refabulisation du monde' leads one onto the third and final of the headings of this
chapter.
The death of God announces the disintegration of the stable and morally
responsible self this is a point to which Klossowski has consequently returned both in
his comments on Nietzsche touched on so far and throughout his writings on Sade.
Yet how is our very real experience of our own identity and selfhood to be construed
in these circumstances? The death of the continuous, unified self along with the One
God leads to the advent of many selves, many Gods and many truths, or in
Klossowski's terminology : polytheism:
au sein de la fable il y a une pluralite des normes ou plutot it n'y a aucune
norme proprement dite au sens de ce mot, parce que Ie principe meme de
r identite responsable y est proprement inconnu tant que r existence ne s'est
pas explicitee ou revelee dans la physionomie d'un Dieu unique qui, en tant que
discussed in the next chapter in relation to the 'nom de Roberte'.
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juge d'un moi responsable, arrache l'individu a une pluralite en puissance
(SFD,220).
The unified self gives way to a multiplicity of selves spread out across time each
entirely disjunctive with the other. In Sade's writings the selfwas seen to decompose
and recompose according to the vicissitudes of its aggressive impulsional energies.
Klossowski's reading highlighted a central interaction between the disindividuating
force of libidinal drives and the unifying power of moral and rational norms (enshrined
in language). What he emphasises in this essay on Nietzsche is the entirely fortuitous
character of the self in the moment of its composition within language and the 'norms
of the species'. Each self, fortuitously given, relativises all the others and as a
fortuitous construction anyone self (i.e. the name Nietzsche and its cohesion in any
one instant of time), might just as well be any other; Ice probleme', Klossowski notes:
concerne immediatement la propre identite de Nietzsche, la remise en question
de cette identite consideree comme fortuitement recue, et done assumee
comme peut I' etre un role - en tant que le role choisi plutot que d' autres a
jouer pouvait etre rejete comme un masque en faveur d'un autre parmi les
milliers de masques de l'histoire (SFD,21S).
Because any given self does not relate to any transcendent and immutable Identity (as
it would if the 'real' and 'apparent' worlds were maintained) it becomes totally arbitrary
(in the sense that it is random and exists only as a construct oflanguage) and takes on
the character of role or mask. As conscious, thinking people, however, we are never
entirely free of the illusion of identity, choice and free will. As Klossowski puts it: 'On
croit choisir librement d'etre ce que ron est, mais on est, en fait, contraint de jouer un
role, n'etant pas ce que I'on est; done de jouer Ie role de ce que ron est hors de soi. On
n'est jamais la ou I'on est, mais toujours la ou ron n'est que l'acteur de eel aUlre que
115
ron est (SFD,218). What I really am is never what I think I am; I only ever play at
being at what I think I am because that which is most essential to my human existence
is always excluded by the grammatical 'I' and the illusory, self-same self that it posits.
The self as a fortuitous instance or as a role or mask returns one to the
question offatality. As I have suggested Nietzsche's notion of necessity paradoxically
combines fate (as constraint) with fortune (chance, randomness). Nietzsche is not
talking about predestination but rather about an existence each moment of which is
beyond human agency, and occurs as a unique moment and is therefore perceived as
both random and necessary from the perspective of human agency. In this context the
notion of fatality and that of the self as mask combine to make the world of fable and
myth a world characterised by dissimulation:
On ne peut pas ne pas se vouloir, mais on ne peut jamais vouloir autre chose
qu'un role. Savoir cela, c'est jouer en bonne conscience. Jouer le mieux
possible revient a se dissimuler (SFD,218).
Consciously to dissimulate is paradoxically to act with good conscience in a Godless
universe for it is basing action on the premise that one is only ever involved in playing
a role. In dissimulation we recognise and affirm the fact that our identity, as we have
previously known it, is only ever a false mask received by chance in the narrative of
the world. It is here that Klossowski locates parody as a key term. The life of the self
as it is experienced is always a matter of parody because, as a fortuitously given
instance and arbitrary structure, the self is always acting out something which it is not;
thought always acts out a gesture of fixity and coherence which in fact has no
foundation.
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Parody is also bound up with the question of translation already alluded to. In
trying to speak of an experience which is radically unspeakable or to translate into
thought that which cannot be thought, Nietzsche's writing can only ever be a form of
parody. His doctrines are parodic and by the same token Klossowski, in commenting
on those doctrines, can only ever parody Nietzsche (who has already only ever
parodied himself). This motif of parody provides the third and final of the headings
which will be used to examine Klossowski's relationship to Nietzsche.
It is immediately clear that these three motifs :parody, translation and myth,
overlap and mutually implicate each other. The nature of this overlap will become
clearer as the discussion progresses. Yet because of such an overlap it is not possible
to construct any form oflogical progression from one motif to another. Each of the
following sections will therefore stand alone to a large degree. Each will show the way
in which the 'logic' of Kloss ow ski's writing can be characterised in its various moments
with reference to these motifs. 'Logic' needs to be placed within inverted commas here
because in a world offable and myth, a world of discontinuity, masks and role play, it
is the overarching and universalising claims of logic which are thrown radically into
question. In such a context, beginning to comment on a body of writing which affirms
the world as fable proves problematic. One finds, as Klossowski does when he begins
to comment on Nietzsche, that: 'il n'y a guere de point de depart ni point d'arrivee'
(SFD,188). However, since a point of departure is necessary, the artificial logic of
chronology will be adopted. Klossowski's first novel La Vocation suspendue (1950)16,
16Klossowski, Pierre, La Vocation su!!pcndue (paris: Gallimard:L'imaginaire, 1950). All references
will be to this edition preceded by the abbreviation VS and followed by the page number.
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a tale of religious crisis, allows this chronological starting point to be considered along
with this discussion's previous point of departure, the notion of the 'Death of God',
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La Vocation suspendue and the play of parody.
Es-tu vrai? Du seu/ement un comedien? Representes-tu que/que chose, ou est-ce
to; qui est represente? Enfin tu pourrais n'etre qu'une imitation de comedien ...... '
Nietzsche, Crepuscule des idoles 38, p. 17.
Parody as a literary critical term has developed an imprecise and variable
meaning, as Gerard Genette notes in Palimpsestes : 'Le mot parodie est
couramment le lieu d'une confusion fort genereuse, parce qu'on lui fait designer
tantot la deformation ludique, tantot la transposition burlesque d'un texte, tantot
l'imitation satirique d'un style,l1. Ifone looks at the definition of parody given in the
Oxford English Dictionary one finds: 'A composition in which the characteristic
turns of thought and phrase of an author are mimicked and made to appear
ridiculous, especially by applying them to ludicrously inappropriate subjects', a
definition which rearticulates the 'imitation satirique' and 'transposition burlesque'
to which Genette refers. In trying to trace the specific history of the meaning of
parody and then to elaborate a 'structural' definition of the term Genette
demarcates it from the satirical function conventionally ascribed to it and offers a
new formulation : parody as the 'transformation non-satirique' or 'ludique' of a text.
In turn, he opposes transformation with imitation thus removing his use of the term
parody further from its conventional meaning.
Parody, for Genette, is therefore not the satirical imitation of a text but
rather its playful reproduction in a different mode for serious purposes. Parody in
the K1ossowskian context can usefully be situated between Genette's new
'structural' definition on the one hand, and the conventional dictionary definition on
the other. It implies both imitation and seriousness, bringing it closer to Genette's
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term 'forgerie' (which he describes as an 'imitation serieuse'), Klossowskian parody
carries with it the sense of counterfeiting and false reproduction. However, whilst
both the traditionally accepted meaning of parody and Genette's new definition
imply the existence of an original which is parodied, Klossowski's formulation of
parody brings the question of origin and authenticity radically into question. In this
sense, parody has much broader implications here than it does inGenette's use of
the term, which has its value within the specifically literary typology he is
attempting to elaborate. In Klossowski's first novel La Vocation suspendue these
broader implications of parody are explored to show the way in which the very
possibility of authenticity is thrown into crisis and with that the possibility of a
stable human identity which such a notion underpins.
Published in 1950, La Vocation suspendue is situated between Klossowski's
earlier Christian texts and his later 'polytheistic' writing." In the 1947 edition of
Sade mon prochain Klossowski preserved the notion of a stable human identity by
appealing to a notion of 'egocentrisme primaire' on the one hand and the existence
of God on the other. In the later commentary on Sade the continuity of the self was
shown to be without foundation as it was constantly dissolved and then
17 Gerard Genette, Palimpsestes (paris: Seuil, 1982), p. 33.
18 Few critics have devoted extensive commentary to La Vocation susnendue. For instance Jean-
Pol Madou devotes only three pages to the novel in his full-length work on Klossowski; see
Jean-Pol Madou, Demons et simulacres dans l'a:uvre de Pierre Klossowski, pp. 99-10l. This
lack of attention may have its roots in Klossowski's own ambivalence to the work - at one
point he renounced it in much the same way as he did the first version of Sade mon
prochain (in the preface to the 1967). He later readopted the work into his corpus. The
reasons for such an ambivalence should become clear as this discussion progresses. There is
some secondary commentary on the novel however. Michel Foucault devotes some of his
article to a discussion of La Vocation Suspendue; see 'La Prose d' Acteon', Dits et ecrits, 4
vols (paris: Gallimard, 1994), vol I, pp. 326-37; see in particular p. 336. Marcel Spada
devotes a chapter of his pamphlet to the novel (Spada's short work of sixty-three pages also
has chapters devoted to Bataille and La Fontaine); see Fictions d'Bros (Ghent: Annales des
hautes etudes de Gand, 1970), Tome VIII, pp. 29-36. In general both Foucault's and
Spada's comments on the text focus on the way it undermines any possibility of O~gin
(Spada emphasising what he calls 'I'esprit parodique de Klossowski', Fictions d'Eros, p. 36,
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reconstituted in the flux and reflux of 'force impulsionnelles'. In this sense,
Klossowski's first novel can be seen to occupy a space of transition between the
theological readings of Sade in the thirties and forties and the more radical
perspective of his post-1950 output. This transition can be seen in the manner in
which Klossowski constructs the play of parody throughout La Vocation
suspendue. The force of parody in this novel calls into question the logic which
allowed Klossowski to affirm the existence of God in the first edition of Sade mon
prochain.
The most obvious aspect of the text, namely that it is a commentary on a
novel called La Vocation suspendue and is thus an imitation or copy of itself, will
be dealt with later in this discussion. The novel/commentary that is La Vocation
suspendue begins by detailing the publication of the novel La Vocation suspendue :
'sans nom d'auteur, edite a "Bethaven, 194 ... '" (VS,II), describing it as appearing
initially like any number of: "'Entwicklungsromane" catholiques ou protestants'
and then proceeds to situate it within the terms of a literary debate surrounding the
moral function of literature and the projects of the 'Christian' and the 'atheist' novel.
What the text goes on to describe is a paradoxical situation whereby it is atheist
authors who, following their own logic, would write novels representing a
moralising world view, and Christian authors, who, following theirs, would portray
a world devoid of any order of morality. The argument which the commentator
presents in the opening section of the novel can be placed within the debate
surrounding Sartre's Qu'est-ce que la litterature?19 and the whole question of
and Foucault centring his discussion on the question of the simulacrum). Any convergence
or divergence of these readings with my own will be signalled as this discussions proceeds.
19Qu'est-ce que la litterature? (paris: Gallimard, 1948).
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'litterature engagee' as it developed in France from the late forties onwards".
Atheist literature, we are told, affirms itself as moral and moralising in the way it
'cherche cl etablir une morale sans Dieu' (VS,17). The commentator remarks on the
facility with which, as he puts it 'Un Sartre, un Camus se doivent d'etre des
directeurs de conscience, puisqu'ils en sont cl construire un decalogue qu'il y aura
d'autant plus de merite cl accepter qu'il sera plus loisible de le rejeter' (VS,20-21).
Christian literature performs quite the opposite function; its purpose, in the terms
of this argument, would be to present an amoral picture of the universe. The truth
of God's existence and the proclamation of His Greatness in all its manifestations
are not the realm of fiction which by its very nature is concerned with falsity and
illusion. This argument repeats of course the Platonic conception of fiction and
literary representation as it is set forth in the Republic21. If the world we experience
is itself a falsification or pale shadow of the world of Ideas, then fiction, as a
representation or copy of the world, is doubly false; it lies at one further remove
from the Truth to which only philosophical discourse can gain access. In the terms
of the argument elaborated here by Klossowski's narrator-commentator it is not
the place of Christian authors to fictionalise Truth or to proclaim their writing to be
God's word; rather they should create a fiction which would affirm God's absence
(from the illusory fictional world) but which would thereby ultimately and
paradoxically be also an affirmation of God's presence (in the transcendent world
of Truth). The commentator notes with regard to 'l'auteur chretien' :
20 In fact between August 1948 and September 1950 Klossowski published a number of articles in
Les Temps modernes (reproduced in the collection Un Si Funeste Desir). 'Hegel et la mage
du nord', Les Temps modernes. 35 (August 1948), 234-38, 'Sur Maurice Blanchot', Les
Temps modernes, 41 (February 1949), 293-314, 'En marge de la correspondance entre
Claudel et Gide', Les Temps modernes, 56 (June 1950),2152-74, 'Gide, Du Bos et le
Demon', Les Temps modernes, 59 (September 1950), 3457-76.
21 Plato, Republic, translated byHD.P. Lee (London: Penguin, 1955), Book X, pp. 370-86.
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parce qu'il ne saurait etre un hagiographe de saints imaginaires, et qu'il n'est
rien de plus outrecuidant que de parler de la grace comme si l'on en
disposait, sa tache sera de representer ce que cela signifie quand on dit que
la grace a ete refusee (VS,20).
This is a reiteration of the logic which underpinned Klossowski's 1947 reading of
Sade. As was shown in the previous chapter Sade's writing was seen to reveal
'l'experience de la deficience de l'etre et du temps sans eternite' (SMP47,118-19).
This is what made him the Christian author par excellence, because the Sadeian
universe is precisely a universe which has been denied God's grace. Klossowski's
position here is based on an awareness that literature, as fiction, is a space of
illusion and falsity and that this, in tum, renders the truly Christian writer - by dint
of being a writer - capable only of going against God's designs and Truths because
of the very fictionality and falsity of his construct :
s'il reconnait qu'it est un faux prophete, que tout ce qu'il dit du royaume des
Cieux n'est qu'une contrefacon qui doit sans cesse faire appel aux appetits
les plus charnels de ses lecteurs pour les mettre en etat de recevoir le gout
de la saintete, puisque ce n'est pas a lui de la leur donner, et qu'il ne peut
que les distraire par ses fascinations, it aura au moins le merite de demeurer
conscient des moyens de son travail qui consiste beaucoup plus a contrarier
les voies imprevisibles du Seigneur qu'a les imaginer (VS,21-2)
The conception of art and literature as 'contrefacon' founds the opposition, implicit
in this argument, to any Sartrian notion of an atheist 'litterature engagee' and
reflects the anti-mimetic, anti-rationalist view of literature that Klossowski shares
with Bataille and Blanchot. So at the beginning of La Vocation suspendue the
reader is presented with an argument in which a firm distinction is drawn between
the fictional on the one hand and the theological on the other. The text of
revelation (e.g. the Bible) and literature proper do very different things, the one
being concerned with the articulation of God's Truth, the other being concerned
with falsity and the insufficiency of a world which is denied God's Grace. Yet
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although art conceived of as counterfeit underpins the Christian position elaborated
at the beginning of La Vocation suspendue, the relation between the theological
and the fictional is worked through in the text as a whole in such a way that the
Christian logic of Kloss ow ski's pre-1950 writings begins to undergo certain shifts.
The 'crisis' described in La Vocation suspendue is, on the level of the story,
the calling into question and then subsequent failure of a religious vocation. The
narrator tells the story of Jerome, a young seminarist, who finds himself at the
centre of numerous intrigues between various religious factions of a Catholic
Church under occupation by a foreign power. The setting, although always slightly
veiled, is undoubtedly that of occupied France during the Second World War (the
indeterminate and allusive nature of the text will be discussed later). The
suspension of Jerome's vocation with which the novel culminates is intimately
bound up with the question of parody. Parody here carries with it not only the
sense of imitation and counterfeiting but again, as in the essay 'Nietzsche, Ie
polytheisme et la parodie', also the sense of acting and of role-play. Being
defrocked is not the same as losing a job in secular life but involves rather an entire
'mise en question' of personal identity, as the commentator remarks of the
prospective priest who is forced to give up his vocation : 'On lui demande, ni plus
nimoins, de cesser d'etre le personnage qu'il s'est cru et it faut le convaincre d'avoir
joue un role de cornedie' (VS,107). Once the authenticity of a vocation has been
called into question he who thought he was called is reduced to the status of actor
and comedian, dissimulator par excellence rather than the disseminator of God's
Truth. In this sense the authenticity of the vocation underpins the authenticity of
both the personal identity of the Priest and of God's Word as it is pronounced in
the rites and rituals of the Church. The authentic vocation renders possible the
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coincidence of the priest's gestures and pronouncements with Transcendent
Reality, with the gift of God's Grace. At one point Jerome recalls the feeling which
the carrying out of priestly rites confers onto him who knows he has been divinely
called:
Tout est en suspens, rien ne s'est encore produit, i1 sent sa propre unite
dans les actes purs qui viennent de s'accomplir; il est cele - voila qui serait
plus interessant si c'etait developpe davantage - ilest cele dans ces figures
et ces rites par quoi s'est prononcee la Presence reelle (VS,l14).
The gestures and rituals of the priesthood and the oneness of the priest with those
gestures affirm the existence of the divine 'Presence reelle' and with this the unity
and authenticity of self-identity is also affirmed and made manifest. Immediately
one can see that at stake in the success of Jerome's vocation is the entire question
of identity, essence and Truth which is central to Klossowski's engagement with
Nietzsche and the 'Death of God' as it has been characterised thus far. The
authenticity of the vocation is bound up with the question of stable identity and its
foundation in the existence and presence of God. Yet throughout the various
stages of the narrative the possibility offered to Jerome of properly authenticating
his vocation is continually challenged.
For instance, when he interviews the Abbe Persienne he is confronted with
the existence of a priest within the Church who does not himself even believe in
God. The success of this 'pretre euthanasien' in combining a psychoanalytic view
of the world with a justification of his position and function within the Catholic
Church provides a major threat to Jerome's confidence in his vocation in two
specific ways. Firstly because in refusing to believe in religious experience as
anything other than a purely earthly experience the Abbe Persienne offers no means
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offounding or establishing the authenticity ofa vocation by appealing to a source
of transcendent power, which begs the question that Jerome himself poses :
"D'apres quoi etablissez-vous qu'une vocation est authentique, puisqu'il n'y
a pas, selon vous, si j'ai bien saisi votre pensee, it n'y a pas de voix qui, de
la-haut, appelle celui qui croit entendre cette voix assez fortement pour lui
obeir? et comment l'Eglise qui, tout entiere, s'est levee a I'appel de cette
voix, et qui recoit ceux qui obeissent a cet appel, peut-elle songer venir
consulter un esprit qui estime que cet appel est illusoire, parce que cette
voix n'aurait jamais appele?" (VS, 101).
If one does not accept religious experience to be divinely inspired then it has no
basis as religious experience, there is no possibility of distinguishing it from
hallucination, self-deception, or any other misleading mental phenomenon.
Secondly, and more importantly in terms of Jerome's own personal itinerary, the
Church can accommodate the Abbe within its ranks without concerning itself as to
whether he truly believes in the transcendent value of the rites he is administering;
the Catholic Church: 'ne demande rien d'autre a l'Abbe "euthanasien" que
d'administrer en son Nom: queUe que soit sa maniere a lui d'interpreter les gestes
sacramentels' (VS,103). The admission into its ranks of someone who perceives the
sacramental rituals of the Church to be nothing other than sophisticated form of
role-play articulates the crucial point of rupture which leads to the conclusion of
Jerome's crisis.
The Church, whose task it is to pronounce the 'Presence reelle' through the
rites and rituals of the priest, allows itself in Klossowski's novel to become infected
with the logic of fiction, that is, offalsity and dissimulation. In terms of the literary
argument advanced at the beginning of the novel, the roles of the priest and the
artist must be kept firmly apart. The former pronounces the Word of God and
offers purchase on divine truth, the latter is a 'faux prophete' and offers only image
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and illusion; the theological and the aesthetic must be held far from each other. The
inclusion of the Abbe within the Church represents the point where these two
separate realms cease to have secure boundaries and begin to infiltrate each other's
territory. In performing the sacrament the Abbe could only ever be performing a
role with which he does not coincide; he could only ever be involved in
dissimulation and the parodying of the divine sacrament, the creation of false
images. Jerome falteringly and incompletely draws the consequences of this
inclusion: 'Voulez-vous dire que l'Eglise ... demande Jerome, voulez-vous dire que
Notre Sainte Mere l'Eglise ne serait que l'image ...' (VS,I02-3); the Church ceases
to be situated in the realm of 'Real Presence' but is shifted into the realm of the
image, of the aesthetic. This collapse of the boundary between the theological and
the aesthetic is at the heart of La Vocation suspendue and reaches its climax
towards the very end of the novel when Jerome renounces his vocation after having
recognised the dual identity of the painter Malagrida. The moment when Jerome
witnesses the mass whose 'pretre celebrant' is suddenly revealed also to be the
avant-garde painter (who has figured largely in his distant and more immediate
past) is the moment of ultimate crisis where the artist and the priest become fused
and where the logic of parody as counterfeit and role-play completely overturns the
logic of authenticity and self-identity. Seeing the 'peintre-pretre' enact the Holy
Mass Jerome asks himself:
Est-it possible que ses longs doigts souples que Jerome avait naguere
regardes avec mefiance, que ses doigts tiennent le Corps du Seigneur que
maintenant il porte a. Jerome? Voici qu'illui met la Presence du Verbe sur
la langue [....] (VS,13I).
In this moment 'Real Presence' becomes dissimulation, counterfeit and playacting.
The 'faux prophete' is fused with the priest whose task it should be to embody the
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'vrai'. There is no real priest but only someone 'acting' as a priest, only someone
playing out a role. The priest is only an imitation, a copy, a forgery of a real priest.
Yet since the priest is only ever 'real' insofar as his gestures evoke and coincide
with 'Real Presence', it follows that as soon as his acts become infected with role-
play the possibility of there ever being a 'real' priest is undermined. In this moment
the whole integrity of the priestly function is called into question. As was the case
with the Abbe Persienne the existence of the priest-painter within the Church calls
into question the very premises upon which the Church itself is built. The priest as
painter parodies 'Real Presence' in such a way as to undermine all possibility of its
being either 'Real' or 'Present' because it is only ever an imitation of presence, an
illusion of the 'faux prophete', of the artist actor. This moment of collapse between
the two spheres of the theological and the aesthetic is also a collapse oflanguage in
its capacity to articulate Truth or to describe a stable and knowable world. Indeed
the failure of the priest to enact the miracle of true presence points to a worrying
and catastrophic failure of language as a vehicle of representation. Not only does a
vocation come to an end in this moment but the 'Presence du Verbe' as it is acted
out and parodied in Malagrida's gestures is revealed to be an absence of the Logos.
This disintegration of the 'real Presence' into the parodic operation of role-
play is articulated before this moment of climax on different levels throughout the
text. The fresco encountered by Jerome in the early stages ofthe book functions as
a premonitory mise-en-abyme and offers an example of this. It depicts various
episodes in the life of the Virgin Mary and reproduces the moment where the
divine gesture or image is revealed to be without foundation in any revelation of
Truth. The fresco offers itself, in the first instance, as a symbol of the theological
crisis into which Jerome is thrown. It is divided in to three portions, the left panel
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representing the crowning of the Virgin Mary by the Angels, whilst a number of
scholars look on and discuss the proceedings. The central part shows the apparition
of Mary to Saint Bernadette as a confirmation and triumph of the doctrine of the
Virgin. The right panel, which as a whole is only an incomplete sketch in
comparison to the rest of the painting, depicts two figures, one, a portrait of Pope
Pius IX, raising his arms towards Bernadette's vision, the other, a Carmelite sister,
lying down on her death bed. As a set of images the fresco initially appears to be
representing a single and divine Truth, that of the doctrine of the Virgin Mary. Yet
its significance is plural, both within the context of the religious communities
alluded to in the course of the narrative and in terms of its significance within the
text as a whole. Firstly the painting is the subject of much controversy and
theological dispute and is held up by the commentator as indicative of the rifts and
factions within the Church; the commentator remarks :
I'idee de la fresque inachevee a semble a l'auteur un pro cede commode a
figurer l'effervescence d'un certain milieu ou s'opposent diverses ferveurs et
diverses formes de la foi qui se veulent exclusives, parce que chacune
affirme un temperament (VS,76).
Immediately the authority of the dogma is undermined by the plurality of its diverse
interpretations. Secondly, as the latter half of this comment suggests, the fresco
articulates some form of relationship between images of Truth and obscure forces
of temperament which cannot be spoken or formulated within language :
l'auteur a pu voir dans son theme de la fresque un moyen, parfaitement
propre a l'atmosphere de l'action, de montrer que les representations des
objets de la foi (ici sous la forme plastique) peuvent faire de ces objets des
pretextes de realites humaines qui ne se manifesteraient pas autrement
(VS,77).
The images of the fresco are not a representation of Revelation but rather a
'pretexte' for 'forces obscures'. This marks an interesting modification of
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Klossowski's 1947 reading of Sade. Throughout his earlier reading the life of the
self and the assertions of rational/logical thought were shown to have their
foundation in aggressiveness or 'forces obscures'. Yet the Truth of God was kept
distinct from this (since it was affirmed only through the attempt by rational
atheism to negate it). Here, however, the episode of the fresco insofar as it posits
this relationship between 'les objets de la foi' and 'forces obscures' disrupts the unity
of theological truth in the same way as the unity of rational truth was disrupted in
the earlier text. Both now are being constructed as phenomena of human life
having their basis in the obscure movements of 'forces impulsionnelles'. The fresco
is many things to many people since it is a 'pretexte' for something specific each of
them (their own hidden aggressive desires and impulsesi2• Once again what is
supposed to be unique and manifest itself as the presence of divine Truth is shown
to be without divine foundation. The relation of the fresco to the transcendent
reality of the dogma it depicts is disrupted as its uniqueness degenerates into a
multiplicity of interpretation. What the fresco reveals is its own quality as
counterfeit and copy.
This is doubly emphasised when Jerome uncovers the history of its
creation. The final panel offers one of the most striking features of the painting in
the figure of the Carmelite sister on her death bed looking at the image of
Bernadette as she regards the Virgin :
cette derniere figure frappe d'autant plus que la tete, sur Ie fond demeure
blanc, se fait remarquer comme la partie la plus executee de toute la
fresque; c'est le visage d'une jeune femme, la bouche entrouverte, les yeux
ravis en extase par la vision (VS,41-2).
22 The relationship between 'forces obscures' or 'impulsions' and language, the self, truth will be
discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter.
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This figure embodies the intensity of authentic religious experience as the woman's
features are transformed by the force of the revelation to which she is bearing
witness. In this sense it offers, along with the portrait of Pope Pius IX with his
arms raised, the key to the whole painting, for the truth of the dogma the fresco
propounds as a whole finds its guarantee in the authority of religious experience.
Yet as the intrigues in which Jerome becomes embroiled progress, the origin of this
part of the fresco are revealed. La Mere Angelique tells Jerome that the models
used for the Pope and the dying sister are other than what he might expect :
Si vous y regardez de pres [...... ] vous reconnaitrez que les traits du
Souverain Pontife ne sont pas ceux de Pape Pie IX, mais de quelqu'un que
vous rencontrerez ici, et quant a la soeur carmelite, le modele qui a servi a
composer ses traits etait une morte fraichement ensevelie et presque
aussitot exhumee (VS,SO)
La Mere Angelique then shows Jerome a photograph representing scenes of violent
sacrilege committed in Barcelona by anarchists during the Spanish civil war in
which a body of a dead sister has been dug up. It seems highly probable that the
model for the Pope to which La Mere Angelique alludes would be the Spanish
painter Malagrida (the 'pretre peintre' of the climax) and particularly so when the
true genesis of the painting is finally discovered. The photograph of the civil war
sacrileges is not at all authentic either, but is itself'false; a tableau arranged and
photographed by Malagrida in the home of one libertine 'Docteur Carpocrates'. The
model for the corpse in tum proves to be no corpse but rather Sister Theophile, the
one character that seeks to support the success of Jerome's vocation in the novel,
and whom he now also remembers having seen in the libertine avant-garde circles
he frequented before he joined the priesthood. Like the Abbe persienne and
Malagrida, Soeur Theophile is involved in the milieux of both Church and art; she
too implies the mutual permeability of the theological and the aesthetic. The
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religious experience which the sister in the painting represents has no existence. All
the images in the fresco no longer incarnate or refer to divine revelation, rather
their origin is lost in a series of counterfeits, where once again the falsity of art
consumes the authenticity of 'real Presence'. The fresco as a representation of the
Truth, in fact parodies Truth, in the same way as the 'pretre-peintre' parodies the
divine as he role-plays the rites of the religious sacrament. The fresco is an image
whose fictionality renders any genuine coincidence with divine revelation
impossible, because there is no relation between image and Truth, but rather only a
series of images which copy other images and whose originating moment becomes
obscured.
This rupture between the image and a transcendent reality to which it might
refer underpins the narrative strategy of La Vocation suspendue as a whole. The
fresco as a form of mise-en-abyme mirrors the moment when Malagrida and the
Inquisitor are revealed to be one and the same and both instances reflect what is at
stake in the activity of the novel overall. This narrative strategy manifests itself in
two closely related ways; firstly in the way proper names are used throughout the
text and secondly in the general structure of the novel, which presents itself, as I
have mentioned, as a commentary on itself
The entire proceedings in the novel are self-consciously hidden beneath a
veil of anonymity, allusion and elusion. For instance, the existence of the 'Parti
Noir,' so central to the intrigues of the novel, clearly alludes to recent French
history, particularly to the years of occupation by the Nazis during the Second
World War. Yet at the same time as the name alludes to the Nazis there is a
suggestion that it may well refer to something else. The uncertainty is only
amplified by moments of the text which remind the reader that it is a commentary
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on itself (on a text called La Vocation suspendue), on an absent text which the
reader cannot of course consult in order to verify exactly what is being suggested :
Tantot il est question de l'oppression que fait peser sur la societe religieuse
aussi bien que civile, le "Parti noir" avec ses troupes, sa police et ses
bourreaux, et l'on croit comprendre qu'il ne s'agit que de l'occupation nazie.
Tantot au contraire il s'agit d'un ordre religieux de l'Eglise, qui exerce a lui
seull'Inquisition' (VS,2S).
The identity of the 'Parti Noir' is plural and indeterminate. The same is true for
that of the characters of the novel and the proper names attached to them. On one
level it is clear that La Vocation suspendue is a 'roman a clef; each character has its
equivalent within the milieux that Klossowski moved before, during and after the
war years23. Yet whilst the characters of, for instance, both La Montagne and
Malagrida offer themselves up to being interpreted as biographical portraits they
are also more than this and can be seen as doubles or aspects of Jerome's own
personality whose internal conflicts they seem to accentuate. At one point for
example the commentator suggests :
Le personnage de Malagrida surviendra ici en tant que "repoussoir", sinon
meme en tant que double du personnage de Jerome. Avec lui, c'est Ie passe
du seminariste qui resurgit et la fresque qui sert a representer des conflits
dogmatiques et devotionnels, n'etant que l'oeuvre de Malagrida, ce sont en
quelque sorte les objets de la foi - effectivement peints par son propre
demon - Malagrida n'est pas autre chose - qui servent a travestir les peches
secrets de Jerome (VS,83-4).
Malagrida, the 'pretre-peintre', like the fresco, figures an aspect of the inner conflict
to which Jerome is subject, namely the blurring of the boundaries between revealed
Truth and false image. Malagrida, the fresco (whose referent has already shown to
be obscured in a play of counterfeit and imitation) and Jerome are linked in a chain
23 It would be impossible to identify all the keys to this novel without careful research. One can
only hazard a few guesses. For instance Malagrida is probably Dati, La Montagne is
probably Massignon. For some idea of Klossowski's acquaintances during the period prior
to, during and immediately after the Second World War, see the biographical notes in Alain
Arnaud, Pierre Klossowski (paris: Seuil, 1990), pp. 186-87.
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of reference so that none of these refers to anyone thing but is caught up in chain
of substitution, which is theoretically without end. One can read Jerome's story as
a biographical portrait detailing Klossowski's personal itinerary throughout the war
years and indeed one is invited to do so. At the very same time Jerome is identified
with the author of La Vocation suspendue (also to be identified with Klossowski)
only for the commentator immediately to disrupt this identification and prevent it
from becoming stable:
entre celui que nous croyons etre l'auteur et celui dont l'auteur a fait son
personnage, it resulte moins le rapport d'un auteur avec son propre portrait
qu'un rapport de ressentiment tel qu'il existe entre deux hommes qui,
trompes par des analogies de caract ere, ont cru pouvoir s'unir pour agir
apparemment de concert, mais en fait dans l'obscure intention que l'un
asservira l'autre; a la fin, l'un des deux se derobe (le heros) et l'autre
(l'auteur) lui avoue son haine eternelle ... (VS,33).
The proper names of La Vocation suspendue are detached from any stable referent
in such a way that the principle of identity no longer functions. Each individual
character name proves to be in some way a repetition of another name. Malagrida
is a repetition of Jerome, Jerome of the 'auteur', the 'auteur' of Kloss ow ski and so
on, each figure relating to the other through being both similar and yet different,
but never identical". This repeats the break which was seen to occur in the relation
between image and Truth that the history of the Fresco revealed. But as has been
seen the Fresco itself is not guaranteed any stable symbolic position within the
economy of the text as a whole as each individual motif (Name, image, symbol)
repeats or mimics another.
The lack of any exact match between author (the 'auteur' referred to in the
text and Klossowski) and Jerome, is repeated in the non-identity of the
24 The important questions of similarity, difference and repetition will be dealt with fully in the
discussion of Eternal Return in the next section.
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commentator, whose text we are reading, and of the author on whose text the
commentator is commentating". The novel by Klossowski entitled La Vocation
suspendue presents itself as a commentary by an anonymous narrator of a book
entitled La Vocation suspendue by an author who himself is anonymous. La
Vocation suspendue presents the reader with a singular use of the mise-en-abyme
structure whose significance can best be elucidated with reference to Lucien
Dallenbach's work Le Recit speculaire26• Dallenbach's study attempts to construct a
typology of all the different forms of mise en abyme which can occur within a
narrative. His project lies very much within the narratological framework
elaborated by Genette in Figures27. Dallenbach identifies a number of different
'mises en abyme elementaires' which in their most basic form can be listed as
follows: 'la reflexion de enonce, de l'enonciation et du code'". In the first instance,
it is the action of the narrative which is reflected run amour de Swann for example
reflects and prefigures what happens to Proust's narrator in his amorous relations
throughout La Recherche and would thus be according to Dallenbach a 'mise en
abyme de l'enonce prospective'). In the second instance, it is the act of writing or
producing the narrative itself which is reflected" (For example Edouard in Les
Faux-monneyeurs is writing a novel called Les Faux-monneyeurs) and in the third
2S This point is echoed by Marcel Spada in his commentary on La Vocation suspendue : 'les
perspectives du livre, c'est-a-dire le double ecart, entre Jerome et l'anonyme auteur d'une
part, Pierre Klossowski et Ie pseudo auteur d'autre part, rejette la verite ultime du texte dans
l'irrealite d'une vision au troisieme degre', Fictions d'Bros, p. 31.
26 Dallenbach, Lucien, Le Recit spCculaire : Essai sur la mise en abyme, (paris: Seuil, 1977).
27 Genette, Gerard, Figures, (paris: Seuil, 1972).
28 Dallenbach, Lucien, Le Recit sp¢culaire, p. 74.
29 Dallenbach describes this as follows: 'ron entendra par mise en abyme de l'enonciation i) la
"presentation" diegetique du producteur ou du recepteur du recit ii) la mise en evidence de
la production ou de la reception comme telles, iii) la manifestation du contexte qui
conditionne (qui a conditionne) cette production-reception', Le Recit w¢cUlaire, p. 100.
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instance the manner, technique or means of textual production is represented" (for
instance the episode of the madeleine). La Vocation suspendue as commentary on
a novel entitled La vocation suspendue fits into this scheme in an interesting way.
The novel bearing the title La Vocation suspendue which one picks up to read is a
commentary on a book with the same title. By implication therefore the novel
called La Vocation suspendue which is commented on is itself also a commentary.
La Vocation suspendue insofar as it is a commentary on a commentary is a 'mise en
abyme de I'enonciation' but in a very singular sense. In commenting it reflects the
moment of production of the novel it comments on (itself a commentary) therefore
it is 'la mise en evidence de la production'", Yet it is only ever commentary on an
original moment which never takes place". The novel La Vocation suspendue
which would be just the novel itself and not a commentary is infinitely deferred; it
is only ever a commentary of a commentary. So as 'mise en abyme de l'enonciation'
La Vocation suspendue reflects a moment of'enonciation' which never actually
occurs; it is always only the reflection of a reflection and there is never a point of
origin where one can encounter that which was reflected. One does read a narrative
within the text as well as comment and indeed there is a constant and uncertain
slippage between the two but one is only ever reading the narrative at a second
degree through the lens of commentary. This brings Klossowski's use of mise-en-
30 This he describes as the moment where the text attempts to : 'narrativiser de maniere plus ou
moins explicite la problematique de son ecriture' Le Recit sp¢culaire. p. 128.
31 Le Recit S¢culaire. p. 100.
32 Foucault makes a similar point 'La Vocation sumendue est un commentaire simule d'un recit
qui est lui-meme simulacre, puisqu'il n'existe pas ou plutot qu'il reside tout entier en ce
commentaire qu'on en fait. De sorte qu'en une seule nappe de langage s'ouvre cette distance
interieure de l'identite qui permet au commentaire d'une eeuvre inaccessible de se donner
dans la presence meme de I'eeuvre et a I'eeuvre de s'esquiver dans ce commentaire, qui est
pourtant sa seule forme d'existence: mystere de la presence reelle et de l'enigme du Meme',
Oits ettcrits. Vol.I, p. 336. For Foucault the 'distance d'identite' he refers to sets up a kind
of presence/absence of the original text within the text - my own commentary has chosen to
emphasise the radical absence of the original text.
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abyme close to what Dallenbach terms a 'mise en abyme transcend antale' (which he
analyses in relation to Beckett's Watt, pp. 133-138) and which, he argues, points to
a structure given up to 'un decentrement narratif generalise,33. This structure
articulates a rupture within the ontological cohesion oflanguage itself because any
possibility of language coinciding with an originary moment of being is
At the end of the second section of his book Dallenbach offers three main
types ofmise-en-abyme structure, what he calls 'reduplication simple (similitude)',
'reduplication a l'infini (mimetisme)' and 'reduplication aporistique (identite)'". The
first he designates as the reproduction within the work of tune meme eeuvre', the
second as the reproduction of 'Ia meme oeuvre' and the third as that ofl'eeuvre
meme'". The point to be made is that La Vocation suspendue is only ever the
reproduction of a reproduction; there is no original work to be reflected, only the
act of reflection itself The mise-en-abyme structure of the novel does, therefore,
repeat the problematisation of the notion of origin which has been seen to be at
play in both the episode of the fresco and the shifting masks of the 'pretre-peintre',
Malagrida. The novel, like the fresco is an 'eeuvre d'art inachevable et
inexecutable' (VS,84). One only ever encounters a copy of the novel which is itself
always a copy of a copy. Any attempt to locate the moment of origin will send the
reader into a vertiginous spin as one is passed from commentator to 'auteur',
'auteur' to Jerome, Jerome to Klossowski, or indeed any of these to any of the
33 Le Recit speculaire, p. 137.
34 Dallenbach writes of this narrative decentring : 'Des lors que Ie Logos qui surplombe toute
I'histoire de la metaphysique occidentale ne soustend plus les vocables et que s'affole le point
central qui etait Ie site du Maitre-Mot, Ie langage, loin d'etre Ie "berger" et la "demeure de
I'etre", se desinvestit de son statut ontologique. Les deux instances qui sont le reel et le
discours ne se rejoignent plus' Le Recit speculaire, p. 137.
3S Le Recit sp¢culaire, p. 142.
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others. La Vocation suspendue is itself so to speak 'suspendue'; it parodies itself in
such a way as to defer it ever actually being achieved as the novel which it purports
to be in the title that is given to it.
Parody is, therefore, the repetition of masks, whereby one mask, once
uncovered, will only ever reveal another mask. One image will lead only to another
image in a movement which causes the narrative logic and structure of La Vocation
suspendue to founder and any point of origin or foundation to be lost. This loss of
origin which such a structure of repetition implies destabilises the Christian logic
through which Klossowski reads Sade in 1947, for not only the assertions of
rational truth are shown to be without foundation but so too are those of
theological truth. Yet there is some degree of ambiguity in this text. La Vocation
suspendue can be recuperated within the earlier position which argues that the
work of fiction must represent a world which is denied God's grace. The narrative
structure and play of images and substitutions emphasise the work's status as false
image, as fictionality. One might argue that this is entirely consistent with the
Christian logic elucidated at the beginning of the novel since as a whole the
narrative does indeed describe a world without transcendence and affirm itself as
fiction and false image. However it is this crucial point at which the Church and
Divine Revelation come into contact with the play of parody which makes La
Vocation suspendue as a text point forwards to Klossowski's later position rather
than backwards to his earlier Christian writings.
If the Catholic outlook of Kloss ow ski's early commentaries on Sade rested
on the possibility of keeping a distance between the work of fiction and the work
of Truth (in the form of revealed text/priestly rituals) then Klossowski's first work
36 Le Recit spCculaire, p. 142.
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of fiction shows that it is not possible to keep such a distance. In the moment he
takes up writing 'Klossowski' (as a proper name) is taken up by Writing. The
stability and self-identity of the Self as it is embodied by the proper name becomes
dissolved in the endless round of substitutions and copies, which the logic of
parody instigates. The circle of negation and affirmation in which a denial of God
was always also a confirmation of God is modified, because the parodic logic of
writing is shown to be at work in the theological and religious spheres as well as in
the realm of the purely aesthetic. Any theological position which seeks to uphold a
transcendent reality itself becomes an aesthetic construct, moved inevitably to
mimic the transcendent, to offer only a counterfeit copy of it. The world as fable,
that the Nietzschean death of God announced, is a world which is written, a world
in which self-identity is transformed into the repetition of similarity and difference,
where one is only ever a 'comedien' acting out a role of what one is not, where one
is finally only ever 'une imitation de comedien',
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Translating Nietzsche.
Ce qui passe Ie plus mal d'une langue dans une autre, c'est Ie rythme de
son style, qui tient au caractere de la race, au pour m'exprimer en termes plus
physiologiques de son "metabolisme". II est des traductions honnetes qui sont
presque des trahisons, qui banalisent involontairement l'original, simplement
parce qu'elles echouent a rendre son rythme hardi et joyeux, qui court et saute au-
dela de taus les perils des mats et des chases.
Nietzsche, Par dela bien et mae'.
Throughout his career Klossowski has been a prolific translator. From
German he has translated figures as diverse as Holderlin and Kafka, Kierkegaard,
Wittgenstein and Heidegger, while from Latin he is the author of versions of
Virgil's Aeneid and of Tertullian's treatise Du sommeil des anges et de la mores.
Most notably and perhaps most importantly, he has also been a translator of
Nietzsche. He begins to translate Nietzsche in 1954 when he publishes the French
edition of Die Frohliche Wissenschaft together with the Fragments Posthumes
1880-1882. He then goes on to publish a translation of the later posthumous
fragments (1887-1888) in 1976 (his translations of these later fragments form the
basis of commentaries in Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux3~. Klossowski has clearly
made an important contribution in making Nietzsche available to a French
readership. Translation is also a crucial question within the context of Kloss ow ski's
commentaries on Nietzsche. In what follows I will aim to show to what extent the
same problematic of translation informs both Klossowski's practice as a translator
31 Par-deIA bien et mal, translated by Cornelius Hein (Paris: Gallirnard, 1971), p. 47, Jenseits des
Gut und Bose, KSA5, p. 46.
38 Virgil, L'Eneide, translated by Pierre Klossowski (paris: Gallimard, 1964). As will become
clear this translation proved to be rather controversial. Tertullian, Du Sommeil. des songes et de
la mort, La Licorne, 2 (winter 1948).
39 Friedrich Nietzsche Le Gai Savoir and Fragments posthumes (1880/1882) (Paris: Club
Francais du livre, 1954); re-edited Nietzsche, <Buvres completes, 14 vols. (paris: Gallimard,
1967-76), vol V (1967) and Gallirnard/Folio, 1982. Fragments posthumes (1887/1888),
collected in <Buvres completes, vol. XII (1976). Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux (Paris:
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of and as a commentator on Nietzsche. The relationship between Klossowski and
Nietzsche can be seen to tum on this question of translation and this is never
clearer than in a text such as Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux.
As I have argued, the argument of Kloss ow ski's early commentary in the
essay 'Nietzsche, Ie polytheisme et la parodie' centred on the attempt by Nietzsche
to 'enseigner l'inenseignable', that is to find written form for an experience that
paradoxically lies outside thought and language and the principle of identity that
underpins them (the revelation of Eternal Return in the mountains ofSils-Maria
and its subsequent formulation into a doctrine). This project is closely bound up
with the question of translation. To translate a text presupposes a relationship
between translator and text in which both translator and text function as self-
identical identities. I have suggested that what is most important, for Klossowski,
about the Nietzschean text is that it seeks to undermine the principle of self-identity
and therefore any possibility of viewing the question of translation in any
straightforward or traditional way. Within this context the issue of translation can
be formulated on three levels. In the first instance Nietzsche can be said to be
engaged in a project of translation (irrespective of any relationship to Klossowski)
as he seeks to articulate his experience of Eternal Return within the signs and codes
of the German language (translating an experience beyond language into language
to form the original Nietzsche text). In the second instance Klossowski translates
Nietzsche's original German into French (translation in the conventional sense e.g.
of Die frohliche Wissenschaft as Le Gai Savoir). Klossowski's attempt to re-
formulate Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal return in the two essays of Un Si Funeste
Mercure de France, 1969); all page references will be to this edition preceded with the
abbreviation CV.
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Desir and in Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux is a third and final instance of translation
(i.e. commentary as a form of translation). This threefold formulation place the
question of translation at the centre of Kloss ow ski's engagement with Nietzsche.
An close examination of Klossowski's version of Virgil's L'Eneide will therefore
throw light on Klossowski's relationship to translation in general and to
Nietzsche's thought and writing in particular.
The whole concept of relation and of relationality is subject to hiatus within
Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche. A relationship (as well as a translation)
traditionally implies a relation between two discrete and self-identical entities. If,
however, both Nietzsche and Klossowski are attempting to speak of and affirm the
doctrine of Eternal Return which undermines the possibility of 'self-identical entity'
then to speak of a relationship between the two in a traditional sense would be
inappropriate. To do so under these circumstances is to posit an identity between
the two and a self-identity of both with themselves which, Klossowski would claim,
the aims and strategies of their texts seek to overturn. In attempting to articulate
the relationship Nietzsche-Klossowski this discussion must re-situate the very
concept of'relationship' inthe same way as the preceding analysis sought to modify
the traditional meaning ascribed to the term parody.
An examination of Kloss ow ski's version of Virgil's Aeneid and the theory
behind its translation offer a key to the untangling of this difficulty. Reference to
Walter Benjamin's essay 'Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzers"? and to subsequent
40 Walter Benjamin. 'Die Aufgabe des Obersetzers', Gesanunelte Schriften. 7 Vols (in 14)
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972-89), Vol. IV.l (1972) pp. 9-21. The English translation by
Harry Zohn is collected in Illuminations (London: Fontana, 1973), pp. 70-82.
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discussions of Benjamin's argument by Paul de Man and Maurice Blanchet" open
a way into an analysis the questions of both translation and relation.
L'Eneide and 'The Task of the Translator'.
Klossowski's L'Eneide is perhaps the most experimental of his translations.
This is in part due to the fact that he made an effort to reproduce the verse form
(and therefore the syntax and word order) of the Latin original without making any
concessions to the syntactic or stylistic conventions of the French language. There
is a strong sense throughout his version of Virgil's work that Klossowski is seeking
not to render the Latin into 'good' French but rather to imbue his French with the
force of the original Latin. In this he is following the technique of translation
suggested in a comment by Rudolphe Pannwitz that Benjamin cites at the end of
his essay on translation, namely that the translator should allow his own language
to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue rather than allowing that foreign
tongue to be 'tamed' by his own language".
Nietzsche's comment from Par-del a bien et mal which opens this discussion
can be seen to prefigure the theory of translation for which Benjamin argues in his
essay and which informs Klossowski's technique in his version of Virgil's Aeneid.
The key point to note is that Nietzsche is giving a prior place not to the
reproduction of meaning in the process of translation (the 'traductions honnetes')
but rather to the possibility of rendering that which in the original exceeds its
purely semantic content. What is most important is the rhythm of the original, the
41 Paul de Man, 'On the "Task of the Translator"', The Resistance to Theory (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 73-105; 'Traduire' in Blanchot, Maurice, L'Amitie
(paris: Gallimard, 1971), pp. 69-73; See also Derrida's essay 'Des tours de Babel' in PSYche
(paris: Galilee, 1987), pp. 203-35.
42 Cited by Benjamin, Gesamrnelte Schriften, vol. IV.1, p. 20; Illuminations, p. 81.
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linguistic materiality of its "metabolisme" (the body metaphor here is highly
significant as will later become clear). For Nietzsche what is most necessary in
translation is to reproduce the physical musicality of the original language.
Klossowski himself emphasises this priority of 'metabolic' rhythm over meaning in
the introduction to his French version ofLEneide :
dans la traduction d'un texte tel que I'Eneide, tout, a peu de chose pres,
tout de cette instrumentation incantatoire disparait, des que ron se restreint
au sens rationnel du discours, deroulant l'epopee. [ .... .].
Le mouvement vrai n'est pas dans l'action, mais dans la melodie interne, le
tableau dans des accords et dans des images contrastees, mais les images
elles-memes jaillissent du choc des mots, non pas en ce qu'ils designeraient
quelque chose (L'Eneide, preface, pp. xi-xii).
Sense is to be subordinated to the presentation of the more rhythmic visceral
patterning of the verse. The entirety of Kloss ow skiIS rendering of the Latin text
follows these opening premises and results in a form of French which is
unconventional if not at times straightforwardly ungrammatical. At the time of its
publication Klossowski's translation proved to be somewhat controversial. The
classic opening to the famous Book VI of the Aeneid gives a good impression of
the unusual nature of his French text :
lIs allaient obscurs sous la desolee nuit a travers l'ombre,
a travers les demeures de Dis vaines et les voyeurs d'inanite,
tel par une incertaine lune sous la lumiere maligne
est Ie chemin dans les forets ou Ie ciel i1cache dans l'ombre,
Jupiter et aux figures la nuit a ote impenetrable la couleur."
This extract was published in Le Monde in August 1964 accompanied by an
interview with Jean-Edern Hallier in which Klossowski talks further of what he was
trying to do in this translation :
43 L 'Eneide, chant VI.
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J'ai surtout travaille les inversions pour sauvegarder les images, en
m'efforcant de faire passer dans la langue francaise ce qu'elle refuse au nom
des conventions'"
As the preface to his translation suggested Klossowski is explicitly attacking the
'conventions' of the French language in order to preserve a certain integrity of the
original text. Nevertheless this emphasis on his deliberate transposition of
inversions did not prevent one A-F. Baillot from writing a letter to Le Monde a
week later with scathing criticism of Klossowski's technique and indeed of his
French grammar, offering his own 'correct' translation of the opening lines of
Book VI:
Pour exprimer l'intention de l'auteur on est autorise it traduire : 'lIs allaient
solitaire par la nuit obscure'
Baillot's point is that Klossowski's attempt to keep to the syntax of the original
Latin obscures the 'true meaning' of the original:
Au-dela du mot it mot grammatical it fallait rendre la pensee du poete, qui
donne autant de "resonance" que la traduction litterale."
Baillot's criticism of Kloss ow ski does not just hinge on the ungrammaticality of his
translation but rather seeks authority with reference to authorial intentionality and
'la pensee du poete', These, of course, are the very notions which Klossowski's
readings of both Sade and Nietzsche overturn. For Klossowski, the criticism
Baillot makes would be rather irrelevant. Klossowski is deliberately not concerning
himself with 'la pensee du poete', rather his translation is far more concerned with
doing violence to the conventions of the French language by 'invading' it with the
foreignness of another.
A number of sympathetic reviewers did, along with Klossowski, also frame
this 'literalness' of the translation in terms of a desire to reproduce in French that
44 Jean-Edem Hallier, 'Un entretien avec Pierre Klossowski nouveau traducteur de Virgile' Le
Monde (8 August 1964),7.
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which is integral to the Latin original. In his review in the Mercure de France46
Pierre Leyris writes :
Une metrique plus concertee, plus unifiee - a supposer qu'on en soutint
l'effort tout au long de l'Eneide - n'aurait pu restituer d'aussi pres le
jaillissement originel du poeme et l'emouvante revelation de la matiere brute
du latin".
The physical emphasis of jaillissement' and of 'matiere brute' echoes here
Klossowski's appeal to the 'instrumentation incantatoire' of the verse and to the
'choc des mots' in the preface to his translation. It is clear that Leyris has
appreciated the quality of Klossowski's translation which the criticism ofBaillot
misses, i.e. its restitution of the physicality of the original (its syntax and form)".
It is at this point that the connection to Benjamin's essay on translation can
be brought out. Klossowski knew Benjamin and translated the essay 'Das
Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeir'" under his
supervision. Benjamin's essay entitled in the original 'Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzers'
was published in Heidelberg in 1923 as an introduction to his own translation of
Baudelaire's Tableaux Parisiens (from Les Fleurs du mal) and, as subsequent
commentators have remarked, stands as a founding contribution to modern
theories of translation. The importance, for Klossowski, of Benjamin's reference to
Pannwitz at the end of his essay has already been alluded to. Benjamin, like
45 Le Monde (15 August 1964), 5.
46 Pierre Leyris, 'L'Eneide restituee', Mercure de France, 1214 (December 1964),666-73.
See also Michel Foucault, 'Les Mots qui saignent' in L 'Express (29. August 1964), 21-22,
collected Michel Foucault, Dits et ecrits, 4 vols. (paris: GaUimard, 1994), 1, pp. 424-427
and Deguy, Michel, 'L'Eneide' in La Nouvelle Revue Francaise, 144 (December 1964),
1082-93.
47 Mercure de France, p. 671
48 Michel Deguy in his review of Klossowski's translation also picks up on this point, speaking
of 'le genie latin, l'intention romaine de Virgile' which Klossowski's translation renders
more immediately to the French reader, 'L'Eneide', La Nouvelle Revue Francaise
(December 1964), 1084.
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Klossowski, stresses that it is not meaning or its restitution that is crucial in judging
the aims and value of a translation, but rather something beyond meaning :
die Ubersetzung [betiihrt] fluchtig und nur in dem unendlichen kleinen
Punkte des Sinnes das Original, urn nach dem Gesetze der Treue in der
Freiheit der Sprachbewegung ihre eigenste Bahn zu verfolgen"
What Benjamin does here is to put forward a radically anti-mimetic theory which
overturns the idea that the translation relates to its source text in the way that a
copy would relate to its original (in the Platonic sense). Benjamin is quite explicit
on this point, that the relation between translation and original is not one of
resemblance or likeness : 'anstatt dem Sinn des Originals sich ahnlich zu machen,
muf die Ubersetzung liebend vielmehr und bis ins Einzelne hinein dessen Art des
Meinens in der eigenen Sprache sich anbilden'". One can read 'Art des Meinens'
here as referring to the physical linguistic form of the original (or 'linguistic flux') in
the same way as did Klossowski's emphasis on the 'instrumentation incantatoire' of
Virgil's Latin. Benjamin's essays contains certain ambiguities insofar as it turns
around the notions of 'die Verwandschaft der Sprache' (the 'kinship of languages')
and that of 'die reine Sprache' ('pure language'). These somewhat opaque terms
have led readers to believe that in fact Benjamin is advancing a metaphysical and
even messianic theory of translation. Benjamin has been seen by some to be
positing some form of essentialist or transcendent account of language. In his
discussion of Benjamin Paul de Man seeks to show the reverse, i.e. that Benjamin's
49 Walter Benjamin, 'Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technoschen Reproduzierbarkeit',
Gesammelte Schriften. voII.2, pp. 470-508; 'L'eeuvre d'art a I'epoque de sa reproduction
mecanisee', translated by Pierre Klossowski, Gesammelte Schriften. vol1.2, pp. 709-739.
so Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. IV. I, p. 20. The English text runs : 'a translation
touches upon the original lightly and only at the infinitely small point of sense, thereupon
pursuing its own course according to the laws of linguistic flux' ('The Task of the
Translator', Illuminations, p. 81).
SI Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. IV. I, p, 18; 'translation, instead of resembling the sense
of the original, must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original's mode of signification,'
Illuminations, p. 79.
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theory is distinctly unmetaphysical and turns rather on the fragmented, incomplete
and differential nature of language.
As de Man points out 'Verwandschaft' is the concept which Benjamin uses
to formulate the relationship between different languages, a relationship which does
not involve the resemblance of one language to another but rather is predicated
upon the contention that 'aIle uberhistorische Verwandschaft der Sprachen [beruht]
darin, daB in ihrer jeder als ganze jeweils eines und zwar dasselbe gemeint ist, das
dennoch keiner einzelnen von ihnen, sondern nur der Allheit ihrer einander
erganzenden Intentionen erreichbar ist : die reine Sprache,s2. By 'pure language'
Benjamin refers to the state in which these differing modes of intention which
underlie all languages are reconciled into a totality. What de Man does in his essay
on 'The Task of the Translator' is to make central Benjamin's point that the totality
of'reine Sprache' is not accessible. He does this by reading very closely both the
English and the French translations of Benjamin's essay by Harry Zohn and
Maurice de Gandillac respectively. In particular he focuses at one point on Zohn's
rendering of the metaphor of the fragment in the text. When Benjamin remarks on
the lack of resemblance between translation and original and the need for the
former to incorporate the latter's 'Art des Meinens' ('mode of signification') he goes
on to say,
'urn so beide wie Scherben als Bruchstuck eines Gefafes, als Bruchstuck
einer grolleren Sprache erkennbar zu machen'".
which Zohn translates as :
52 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. vol. IV.I, p. 13; 'the intention underlying each language as
a whole - an intention, however, which no single language can attain by itselfbut which is
realised only by the totality of their intentions supplementing each other' Illuminations. p.
74.
53 Benjamin, GesammeIte Schriften. vol. IV. I, p. 18.
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thus making both the original and the translation recognisable as fragments
of a greater language just as fragments are part of a vessel".
Zohn's translation, says de Man, asserts the totality of the vessel far more and
ignores the emphasis Benjamin places on the fragmentation of the vessel, on the
radical irrecuperability of anything resembling a 'pure language', on the essentially
fragmentary nature of the text in both its source and target language. Benjamin, he
adds, : 'is not saying that the fragments constitute a totality, he says the fragments
are fragments, and they remain essentially fragmentary". This notion of both
languages (source and target) being essentially fragmentary is central to de Man's
argument and the theory of translation he is trying to derive from Benjamin's textS6.
What he argues is that the languages of the original and the translation are not only
different from each other (they do not relate in terms of resemblance or likeness)
but that each, insofar as they are both 'essentially fragmentary', is also different
from itself (i.e. each language is a self-identical and closed unity). What translation
does, therefore is to reveal both itself and its original as originally and irrecoverably
fragmentary. Translation, de Man states, is therefore an activity parallel to the
activities of critical theory, literary theory and history in the way they relate to an
original discourse, text, or event respectively:
they disarticulate, they undo the original, they reveal that the original was
always already disarticulated. They reveal that their failure, which seems to
be due to the fact that they are secondary in relation to the original, reveals
an essential failure, an essential disarticulation which was already there in
the original. They kill the original by discovering that the original was
already dead".
S4 Benjamin, Illuminations. p. 79.
ss De Man, The Resistance to Theory, p. 91.
56 Carol Jacobs makes this point inher discussion of Benjamin in her essay, 'The Monstrosity of
Translation', in Modem Language Notes, 90 (1975), 755-66. See in particular p. 759 (on
'Verwandtschaft' as articulating the differential nature of languages) p. 764 (on languages as
fragmentary).
S1 De Man, The Resistance to Theory. p. 84.
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A language, whether that of the original or of translation, is not completed and
self-identical and therefore neither can be said to have any form of identity with
each other. The vessel which would be the 'pure language', where all the different
intentionalities of language become one, is and always was an impossibility : 'there
was no vessel in the first place, or we have no knowledge of this vessel, or no
awareness, no access to it, so for all intents and purposes there has never been
So translation, which has traditionally been based on a notion of an
equivalence and sameness between the meanings of different languages, is
transformed via de Man's reading of Benjamin's essay into an activity founded on
the fragmentary nature of language, an activity which is predicated on difference;
on the difference oflanguages from each other but also and most importantly from
themselves. This is a view articulated clearly by Maurice Blanchot in his essay
'Traduire' which is also in part a commentary on Benjamin's text. The translator, he
asserts, 'vit de la difference des langues'", not in order to suppress that difference
and make languages similar but rather to affirm it; the translator, Blanchot
continues,
est le maitre secret de la difference des langues, non pas pour l'abolir, mais
pour l'utiliser, afin d'eveiller, dans la sienne, par les changements violents ou
subtils qu'illui apporte, une presence de ce qu'il y a de different,
originellement, dans l'original'",
Here one can return once more to Klossowski's translation of The Aeneid. To say,
as did A.-F. BailIot, that it turns the original Latin into an incorrect and
ungrammatical French would be to miss the point entirely for such a criticism
confers on the French language a unity and stability which it does not possess.
ss De Man, The Resistance to Theory. p. 91.
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Klossowski performs on the French language '[des] changements violents' but in
doing so his translation locates itself within a space which is not either entirely
French (conceived of as a self-same grammatical unity) nor entirely Latin, but
rather within a space which is constituted in the difference between the two. The
translation is located in a space of discontinuity, that which subsists between
French and Latin but also the internal discontinuity of each language with itself".
What is true of translation in the literal sense is also valid, Klossowski argues, of
commentary. Both would traditionally presuppose one self-identical body (of
language or ideas) which could be transposed into another. Since Nietzsche's
thought does, according to Klossowski, undermine the principle of self-identity in
language as such the translation of The Aeneid and the theoretical perspective
which underpins it can serve as a model for the consideration of Kloss owski's
commentaries on Nietzsche particularly those of Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux
where translated fragment and comment are juxtaposed directly.
To attempt to elaborate the way in which the notion of translation as an
affirmation of difference usefully describes the structure of Nietzsche et le cercle
vicieux (and the relationship Nietzsche-Klossowski in the text) Iwant here to take
a short detour and look at the substance of Kloss ow ski's commentaries, i.e. to
outline the arguments and meanings that the work articulates. These fall into two
closely interlinked parts; firstly a theory of the genesis of language and the self in
relation to bodily drives or 'impulsions' and secondly the doctrine ofEtemal
Recurrence or the Vicious Circle.
S9 Blanchot, L'Amitie, p. 70.
60 Blanchot, L'Amitie, p. 71.
61 This is the point which Michel Foucault explicitly makes in his essay on Klossowski's
translation, 'Les Mots qui saignent' : 'Pour traduire, Klossowski ne s'installe pas dans la
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'Impulsions', the fortuitous self. and the 'code des signes',
What Klossowski's reads in Nietzsche is a conceptualisation of the body as
a locus of multiple 'impulsions'S, energies (,Triebe' in German) which are literally
insignificant, in that they have no signification or identity and exist outside the
system of exchange constituted by language. The body for Nietzsche, contends
Klossowski, is a fortuitous existence not 'belonging' to anything but simply existing
in the world for a span of a lifetime. Klossowski outlines this theory of the body
and its relation to language and identity in the one of the earlier sections of
Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux entitled 'Les etats valetudinaires de l'ame Ii l'origine
d'une semiotique pulsionnelle'. In this section Klossowski follows the history of
Nietzsche's illness in terms of his 'cephalalgies'. Using these biographical details he
tries to develop Nietzsche's notion of the conflictual relationship between
consciousness (the activity of the brain) and the visceral and multiple drives and
forces which have their locus in the activity of the body'". This 'energetic' model of
the human body leads Klossowski to a key conception of the body as 'fortuitous'.
As the locus of drives which escape or otherwise exceed intentionality, the
existence and activity of the body is essentially random:
ressemblance du francais et du latin; ilse loge au creux de leur plus grande difference',
L'Express (29 .. August 1964),21-22, collected Michel Foucault, Oits et ecrits I,p. 427.
62 'Impulsions' is the term Klossowski uses to render Nietzsche's 'Triebe' in his 1954 translation
of Die Frohliche Wissenschaft. The aim in this discussion is not, however, to compare
Klossowski's and Nietzsche's texts closely, or to read Nietzsche's text with Klossowski, but
rather to look at the detail of Klossowski's commentaries and the way in which it
problematises the relationship between the two.
63 Although Klossowski speaks explicitly of the body here, what eventually arises from his
reading is a notion of the human Self which refuses the traditional mind/bOdy distinction
(based on a belief in the existence of a soul or stable Self).
152
Le corps est le resultat du fortuit: il n'est rien que le lieu de rencontre d'un
ensemble d'impulsions individuees pour cet intervalle que forme une vie
humaine, lesquelles n'aspirent qu'a se desindividuer (CV,52-3t4
As self-aware human beings, we have consciousness of ourselves as fixed identities
and of our bodies as belonging to us in an essential way only because of what
Klossowski terms 'le code des signes quotidiens'. The multiple unconscious forces
which make up the life of bodily organs and functions are radically inimical to the
unity and stability of the linguistic '1'. So it is only within the codified system of
language and the fixed meanings that it seeks to institute that the essential fortuity
and multiplicity of the body is obscured by the illusion of propriety. This is because
it is within language and particularly the grammatical forms Je' and 'moil that the
conscious self attains to a sense of fixity and self-identity. Although the bodily
'impulsions' are continually at work to disindividuate the self we gain a constant
sense of ourselves as ourselves and of our bodies as belonging to ourselves because
the 'code des signes' remains fixed over time. The cohesion of the body as a
structured unity is predicated upon the illusory cohesion of the self as it is instituted
within the fixed signs oflanguage :
Mais les differents ages du corps sont autant d'etats differents, l'un naissant
de l'autre : et le corps n'est le meme corps que dans la mesure ou un meme
moi peut et veut se confondre avec lui, avec ses vicissitudes : la cohesion
du corps est celIe du moi : it produit ce moi et ainsi sa propre cohesion.
Mais pour soi-meme ce corps meurt et renait plusieurs fois selon des morts
et des renaissances auxquelles Ie moi pretend survivre dans son illusoire
cohesion. Les ages du corps ne sont, en realite, que les mouvements
impulsionnels qui le forment et le deferment et tendent ensuite a
l'abandonner (CV,55).
What Klossowski is outlining here is the structure which informed his writings on
Sade where the self as constituted within the institutional framework of language is
constantly decomposed and reformed according to the flux of impulsional energies;
64 The emphasis in this text is Klossowski' sown.
153
a mouvement whereby 'nous sommes saisis, abandonnes, repris, et surpris : tantot
par le systeme de designations pulsionnel, tantot par le systeme des signes
quotidiens' (CV,67). The only reason we know of an individual and irreversible
destiny (and why we can't wake up and say 'I'll be Hitler today') is because the
same body achieves cohesion again and again with an illusorily same self over time
(thanks to the 'code des signes'). Yet in reality the body is always without identity,
is always a fortuitous and random existence.
Each formation of an individuated self is itself also entirely fortuitous as
was pointed out earlier in this chapter in the discussion of 'Nietzsche, Ie
polytheisme et la parodie'. That every instance of the self is fortuitous means that
as a series of selves spaced out over time no principle of identity subsists between
them but rather they are discontinuous with each other, or as Klossowski puts it:
Nous ne sommes qu'une succession d'elals discontinus par rapport au code
des signes quotidiens, et sur laquelle la fixite du langage nous trompe:
tant que nous dependons de ce code nous concevons notre continuite,
quoique nous ne vivions que discontinus (CV,69).
It is this notion of each moment of the self being radically discontinuous with every
other which brings Klossowski's thinking very close to that of Gilles Deleuze. In
particular this formulation in Le Cerc1e vicieux recalls the arguments of Difference
et repetition (published a year earlierj." Each 'case' of the selfis conceived of in
terms of durable Identity only within the context of the 'code des signes'. In and for
itself it is nothing but a 'cas fortuit' the random product of a combination of
65 Difference et repetition. (paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968). Deleuze explicitly
acknowledges the importance of Klossowsld's reading of Eternal Return in his discussion of
the doctrine linking it to the functioning of the simulacrum: 'Glorifier le regne des
simulacres et des reflets. Pierre Klossowski, dans Ies articles que nous citons precedemment,
a bien marque ce point: l'eternel retour, pris dans son sens strict, signifie que chaque chose
n'existe qu'en revenant, copie d'une infinite de copies qui ne laissent pas subsister
154
'impulsions' which combine together in a certain relation of intensity. The relation
of'impulsion', 'intensite', 'signet and 'code des signes' is a complex one which will be
addressed shortly. What is first important in the context of the discontinuity of
successive 'cas fortuits' and the relationship to Deleuze is that each fortuitous
moment is singular and relates to the others through difference rather than
sameness. Each formation of the self is part of a series of repetitions, where
repetition is always repetition of difference and difference is always a repetition; or
as Deleuze puts it :
La repetition comme conduite et comme point de vue conceme une
singularite inechangeable, insubstituable. Les reflets, les echos, les doubles,
les ames ne sont pas du domaine de la res semblance ou de l'equivalence
[ .... ] Repeter, c'est se comporter, mais par rapport a quelque chose
d'unique ou de singulier, qui n'a pas de semblable ou d'equivalent,"
or later:
Quand le corps conjugue de ses points remarquables avec ceux de la vague,
il noue Ie principe d'une repetition qui n'est pas celIe du Meme, mais qui
comprend l'Autre, qui comprend la difference.f?
Because each instance relates to every other according to the principle of non-
equivalence or difference the principle of identity is radically undermined. Each
instance (or 'coup de des' as Deleuze sometimes puts it) is only ever the repetition
of difference, of something radically singular. The self as a 'cas fortuit' is a
singularity which is never self-identical. As with the body, the illusory cohesion and
fixity conferred to it by the 'code des signes' can never displace its fundamental
discontinuity with itself. Yet this does not address the relation between 'impulsion'
and the sign system of language which allows the illusion of a fixed self to be
formed.
d'original nimeme d'origine', Difference et repetition, p. 92. In this context it should be
noted that Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux is dedicated to Deleuze.
66 Difference et repetition, p. 7.
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In this context repetition is what constitutes the possibility of signification
in the first place, and it is under the sign of repetition that Klossowski places the
relation of 'impulsion', 'intensite' and 'code des signes'. The mouvements of
'impulsions' combine at intervals according to varying 'fluctuations d'intensite'
(CV,99). An intensity, as a combination of 'impulsions', has no meaning in and for
itself, : 'L'intensite n'a jamais d'autre sens que d'etre l'intensite. II semble que
l'intensite n'ait en soi aucun sens' (CV,98). But, asks Klossowski, how does the
intensity come to signify :
Comment alors lui vient un sens et comment se constitue le sens dans
l'intensite? Mais justement, en revenant sur elle-meme, meme dans une
fluctuation nouvelle! En quoi, se repetant et comme s'imitant, elle devient
un signe; (CV,98)
Only in the repeated fluctuations of singular 'impulsional' intensities are sense and
sign constituted. Signification subsists only in and through repetition. Meanings
and language then become possible because signs become codified, i.e.
communicable to the generality of individuals (hence the term 'code des signes
quotidiens'). In this process of codification all that is singular and unique to a
fluctuation of 'inten site' is lost and the sign is voided of all impulsional energy",
Originally, however, meaning only occurs because of the random, fortuitous and
insignificant (chaotic) 'afllux' of intensities. No matter how much the 'code' may
seek to stabilise and fix meaning it will always be predicated upon the fortuity and
non-identity of repetition:
67 Difference et r¢petition, p. 35.
68 In this context communication and representation are always conceived of in terms of a loss of
intensity or energy. Deleuze and Lyotard put forward similar views in papers given at the
conference on Nietzsche held at Cerisy-Ia-salle in 1973; published as Pierre Boudot et Qt.,
Nietzsche aujourd'hui? (paris: UGE, 1973). The significance of the bodily metaphor
('metabolisme') in the opening quotation from Nietzsche can now be seen. To translate the
rhythms or 'metabolisme' of a language rather than the meaning is to seek to transfer what
remains of impulsional intensity into the target language.
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nonobstant le signe OU culmine la fluctuation d'intensite, la signification,
parce qu'elle n'est que par afflux. ne se degage jamais absolument des
mouvants abimes qu'elle recouvre. Toute signification demeure fonction du
Chaos generateur de sens (CV,99).
Meaning and identity, no matter how much an illusory coherence is ascribed to
them, are always fortuitous and a product of repetition as always the repetition of
difference. It is important to outline carefully this theory of meaning (or of the non-
meaning of meaning) because it gives the key to the way Klossowski interprets the
doctrine of Eternal Return and as will become clear is crucial to Klossowski's
'translation' of Nietzsche.
Eternal Return and the 'signe du Cercle Vicieux'.
This is the second aspect of Kloss ow ski's 'translation' of Nietzsche. He
initially formulates Eternal Return on two levels; firstly as a direct experience or a
revelation that Nietzsche underwent at Sils-Maria (although as will become clear
its status as an 'experience' is problematic) and secondly as the presentation of the
doctrine of the 'Cercle Vicieux'. The first level Klossowski speaks of as a moment
of the highest intensity or 'la plus haute tonalite de rame'. In this moment of
revelation the conscious individual apprehends itself as being what it truly is (i.e. a
fortuitous moment) through a process of passing through previous instances of
selt9. This moment is fundamentally paradoxical, for how can conscious thought
become conscious of its own fortuity when the fact of that fortuity itself
undermines the integrity of conscious thought? This, as will become clear, is a
paradox which, far from being overcome, is in fact constitutive of the doctrine of
69 Klossowski elaborates on this process in most detail in the section headed: 'Oubli et anamnese
dans l'experience vecue de l'eternel retour du meme' (CV,93). As was indicated at the
beginning of this chapter this was the paper Klossowskis originally gave at the Royaumont
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Eternal Return. On the second level Klossowski speaks of Eternal Return as a sign
or a doctrine to which the conscious self adheres. If the revelation of Return voids
thought of its content (by affirming its fortuity) then it is an experience which is
radically incommunicable. Since the illusion of a stable consciousness exists only
within language, to destroy the one is equally to abolish the other. The sign of the
Vicious Circle is therefore also a paradoxical one for it is a sign which in some way
voids itself of its own content as a sign.
On the first level Klossowski draws his description of Eternal Return as a
moment of revelation from the imperative that Zarathustra formulates in the
aphorisms 'De la Redemption' and 'D'anciennes et de nouvelles tables'".
Zarathustra brings together the possibility of'vouloir' and of''necessite', 'necessity'
referring here to the irreversibility of past moments oflife (and therefore by
implication the necessity of all present and future moments). Zarathustra speaks of
the need to
racheter le passe de l'homme et recreer tout "cela fut", jusqu'a ce que d'it le
vouloir: "Mais ainsi le voulus, ainsi le voudrais!""!
If the past is irretrievable, then to will it as it was is paradoxically to will necessity -
to will that which is beyond will. For Klossowski what happens in this moment,
when necessity is willed and every 'It was' becomes a 'I willed it thus and thus
would I will it', is that the present conscious self is rendered inactive and the whole
preceding series of selves (singular fortuitous instances) is passed through (each a
single 'It was'). This whole process is possible because of forgetting and
conference on Nietzsche in 1964. See Martial(iteroult ed., Nietzsche. Cahiers de Royaumont
Philosophie, IV (paris: Minuit, 1966).
70 Ainsi parla Zarathoustra, translated by Maurice de Gandillac (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 'De la
Redemption', pp. 175-80, 'D'anciennes et de nouvelles tables', pp. 245-66. It is interesting to
note that Gandillac (French translator of the Benjamin essay) explicitly signals in his
introduction the use of a mode of translation similar to that suggested by Benjamin.
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remembering ('oubli et anamnese') which are essential to the way Klossowski
constructs Eternal Return. Forgetting is crucial to the possibility of a coherent self
being able to establish itself through the fixity of the 'code des signes quotidiens'.
Because in reality the self is nothing other than a discontinuous series of non-
identical and fortuitous instances, anyone instance can only establish itself as a
coherent consciousness in the forgetting of all the other moments in the series or as
Klossowski puts it : 'rna conscience actuelle ne se sera etablie que dans l'oubli de
mes autres possibles identites' (CV,95). Eternal Return, as a passing through of
previous selves, is therefore a forgetting (disactualisation) of the current self, and a
remembering of the others each in tum until one returns to the self which first
underwent the revelation of Return. To quote at length for the sake of greater
clarity, Klossowski articulates this moment as follows:
LEternel Retour, necessite qu'il faut vouloir : seul celui que je suis
maintenant peut vouloir cette necessite de mon retour et de tous les
evenements qui ont abouti a ce que je suis - pour aut ant que la volonte ici
suppose un sujet; or, ce sujet ne se peut plus vouloir tel qu'il a ete
jusqu'alors, mais veut toutes les possibilites prealables; car embrassant d'un
coup d'eeil la necessite du retour comme loi universelle, je desactualise mon
moi actuel a me vouloir dans tous les au Ires moi dont la serie doit eire
parcourue pour que, suivant le mouvement circulaire, je redevienne ce que
je suis a l'instant ou je decouvre la loi de I'Eternel Retour (CV,94).
As each past moment is passed through, each past self is rewilled, but rewilled as a
necessary instance, as an instance which was not produced itself by a moment of
conscious will but as a fortuitous instance, as a singular 'cas fortuit'. This means
that when the circle is closed and the revelation returns to the point in the series
when the revelation itself occurred something radical happens :
n ne me reste done qu'a me re-vouloir moi-meme, non plus comme
l'~b~uti~sement de ces possibilites prealables, non plus comme une
realtsatIon entre mille, mais comme un moment fortuit dont la fortuite
71 Ainsi parla Zarathoustra. p. 248, Also sprach Zarathustra. KSA4. p. 249.
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meme implique la necessite du retour integral de toute la serie,
Mais se re-vouloir comme un moment fortuit c'est renoncer a etre
soi-meme une lois pour toutes : puisque ce n' est pas une fois pour toutes
que i'v ai renonce et qu'il faut le vouloir : et je ne suis pas meme ce
moment fortuit une lois pour toutes si tant est que je doive re-vouloir ce
moment une lois de plus! (CV,95)
What Eternel Return as a revelation represents is an apprehension of the self in all
its separate moments as a series of'cas fortuits'. It is the revelation of the non-
identity of identity and of existence as repetition (in the sense outlined above with
reference to Deleuze). The vision of Eternal Return reveals the span ofa human life
to be nothing other than a repeating series of random dice throws prior to all will
and conscious intentionality. The conscious self apprehends its own dissolution as a
conscious and fixed self. Again one can see the way that this is an irreducibly
paradoxical moment in that consciousness is consciously apprehending the
dissolution of its own consciousness. More seriously it thereby renders the status
of the revelation as an experience itself paradoxical if not impossible. Indeed how
can the experience of Return be an experience at all if, by definition, it lies outside
the realm of experience (i.e. that of a thinking self-aware subject)?" The title of the
section 'Oubli et anamnese dans l'experience vecue de l'eternel retour du meme'
therefore carries with it a certain irony, firstly because 'l'eternel retour' as an
experience is always an impossible experience and secondly because it overturns 'le
meme' and places experience under the sign of repetition and difference.
It is here that the importance of the construction of Eternal Return on the
second level of doctrine or sign (the Vicious Circle) becomes apparent. If Eternal
Return lies outside the possibility of language and experience then in fact the
process just outlined which Klossowski described as the 'Revelation' of Return is
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always already a formulation of the doctrine (since it is being described in
language). The parodic aspect of the doctrine of Return now becomes apparent; it
is parodic (in the sense developed in the previous section) because it is always
describing something which escapes that description, the doctrine of Return can
never be coincident with Eternal Return itself. As that which reveals the non-
identity of experience it can never be coincident (identical) with anything at all (not
even its own revelation). Yet this paradoxical moment still subsists when
Klossowski speaks of the Vicious Circle as the Sign of Eternal Return. The Vicious
Circle is a sign which voids the identity of whoever speaks it (since it is the
apprehension of the self as fortuitous) :
Voici un signe dans lequel moi-meme je ne suis rien, que je ne revienne
toujours pour rien. Quelle est rna part dans ce mouvement circulaire par
rapport auquel je suis incoherent, par rapport a cette pensee si parfaitement
coherente qu'elle m'exc1ut a I'instant meme queje lapense? (CV,lOl)
'I' (as a coherent self-same identity) am nothing in this sign which overturns all
identities. Despite this, what is essential about the sign of the Vicious Circle is that
it places the entirety of individual experience, of meaning and language, under the
law of repetition, non-identity and discontinuity. By existing under the parodic sign
of the 'Cercle Vicieux' the nature of existence changes and, although as a conscious
self one remains always within the illusion of fixity and coherence, the nature of
one's positioning as regards that illusory unity is radically altered:
Sous le signe du Cercle vicieux, c'est (independamment du vouloir humain)
la nature meme de l'existence, done aussi des actes individuels qui se
modifie intrinsequement (CV,106).
Irrespective of one's conscious intentionality existence under the sign of Return
changes the very substance of experience. It also, crucially, changes the nature of
72 Maurice Blanchot makes this point in his essay on Bataille with respect to 'l'experience
interieure', See 'L'Entretien infini, (paris: Gallimard, 1969), p. 311.
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writing, because again even though one writes from within the perspective of
meaning and identity, writing, under the sign of the Vicious Circle, is deployed in
such a way as to affirm its own lack of foundation in the random play of
'impulsions' and 'intensites'.
The 'semiotique impulsionnelle' and fragmentary discourse.
These two aspects of Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche return us to the
question of translation with which this discussion began. Klossowski locates in
Nietzsche's text an attempt to return writing to the discontinuity of its 'impulsional'
foundation and through this to affirm its lack of foundation in the non-identity of
repetition. Although, by the very fact of writing, it is not possible to place oneself
outside the illusory coherence of meaning, identity and the 'code des signes', one
can seek to place discourse in a new relation to 'les intensites pulsionnelles' so that
the functioning of the 'code des signes' is in some way interrupted. Discourse,
whilst speaking from within the space of self-sameness, must try to affirm its lack
of foundation in the absence of self-sameness. The fundamental incoherence which
traverses all communication must be strategically gestured towards in order to
'dejouer' the illusory mechanisms of coherence. Klossowski formulates this most
explicitly in the 'Note additionelle sur la semiotique de Nietzsche' at the end of
Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux :
Pour que le discours evite de retomber au niveau de la coherence
Jallacieuse, illui faut se contraindre a une pensee qui ne revienne point sur
elle-meme (soit a l'intellect) dans quelque edifice de pensees subsequentes,
mais a une limite ou elle mette un terme a elle-meme (CV,361).
According to Klossowski, Nietzsche attempts to prevent his discourse from
asserting itself as self-identical through recourse to the fragmentary structure of the
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aphorism. Even though Nietzsche is writing from within the space of coherence
(since he is speaking) the aphoristic structure allows him to do so whilst all the
time fragmenting that coherence; within this structure, Klossowski claims, 'hl
meme, le recours au code des signes quotidiens se presente comme un exercice a se
maintenir continument discontinu a regard de la continuite quotidienne' (CV,102).
Eternal Return is, as has been indicated, radically untranslatable into the realm of
experience and language since it voids both of all content and significance. To
'translate' Eternal Return is not so much to formulate a doctrine within the
codified signs of a given language but rather to deploy writing in a different way.
What Nietzsche is attempting to do is to translate one mode of discourse (the
coherence of the 'code des signes') into another mode of discourse (the aphoristic
structure which asserts its own discontinuity under the sign of the Circle). The
second mode Klossowski calls a 'semiotique impulsionnelle' :
it s'agit non pas de detruire ce que Nietzsche nomme l'abreviation (de
signes) des signes proprement dits - le chiffrage des mouvements -, mais de
retraduire la semiotique "consciente" en la semiotique impulsionnelle
(CV,Sl).
Within the aphoristic structure of the 'semiotique impulsionnelle' the energy which
was suppressed in the coherence of the codified sign is re-affirmed. In other words
the multiplicity and singularity ofintensites impulsionnelles' are gestured towards
in and through the fragment because, as fragment it asserts the essential division of
discourse from itself, its internal multiplicity and lack of self-identity. Eternal
Return as the law of repetition finds its 'translation' not because language can speak
something which would be equivalent to it, but rather because language can assert
its own lack of equivalence with itself Through the 'semiotique impulsionnelle'
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language can attempt to affirm its own internal disarticulation in a movement of
self-fragmentation.
This aspect of Nietzsche's writing is analysed in a similar way by Maurice
Blanchot in his essay 'Reflexions sur le nihilisme'". The fragmented discourse of
the aphorism is a way of placing discourse in relation to the fragmentation which
lies outside the totality and coherence oflanguage : 'Le fragmentaire ne precede
pas le tout, mais se dit en dehors du tout et apres lui'74;'la parole de fragment', as
Blanchot calls it, affirms 'le fragmentaire' (the outside) by virtue of its being:
Parole unique, solitaire, fragmentee, mais, a titre de fragment, deja
complete, entiere en ce morcellement et d'un eclat qui ne renvoie a nulle
chose eclatee".
This recalls the point that de Man makes with regard to the vessel in Benjamin's
essay, namely that the fragment, as fragment, does not refer to any greater unity or
whole. So by fracturing the illusory coherence of language from within the
aphoristic structure does not signify or make itself equivalent to the law of Return
but, as writing under the sign of Vicious Circle, it seeks to repeat the discontinuity
of repetition, of an originary (or 'disoriginary') fragmentation: 'L'eternel retour dit
le temps comme etemelle repetition, et la parole de fragment repete cette repetition
en la destituant de toute eternite'". Translation, here, is therefore occurring, along
the lines outlined in the opening section of this discussion. The fragmentary
discourse of Nietzsche's text 'translates' Eternal Return not by reproducing the
meaning of it (for it is precisely without meaning) but by reproducing its mode of
non-meaning. Each fragment, by virtue of its being fragment, resists any
articulation of Nietzsche's text into a whole. Fragmentary discourse affirms its own
73 Blanchot, 'Rtflexions sur le nihilisme', L'Entretien infini, pp. 201-55
74 L'Entretien infini. p. 229.
75 L'Entretien infini. p. 229.
164
'disarticulation' (to use de Man's term) with itself, and this repeats the law of
Eternal Return as the repetition of difference 77.
This provides the key to situating the relationship of Nietzsche et le cercle
vicieux as a whole in relation to Nietzsche's texts. As a mosaic of fragments both
by Nietzsche (the 'Fragments posthumes' (1887-88) and by Klossowski (his
commentaries) Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux is written under the sign of the
Vicious Circle. By mixing his own fragmented commentary with Nietzsche's
aphorisms Klossowski repeats the original disarticulation of Nietzsche's texts and
repeats also the internal disarticulation of his own. Within this structure the texts of
both Nietzsche and Klossowski are affirmed as non self-identical constructs. Any
articulation of the content of Nietzsche's thought on the level of argument or
commentary can only be construed of as a parody of Nietzsche (since such
discourse is already parodic inNietzsche's text itself). To draw an 'argument' from
Nietzsche's thought involves giving his writing a coherence which falsifies the
status of his text (in this way the book, insofar as it is an 'etude', is as Klossowski
claims a 'fausse etude' (CV, I I)). It is only on the level of the fragmented overall
structure that any relationship Nietzsche-Klossowski can formulated. But this
relationship is a paradoxical relationship of non-relationship based not only on the
lack of sameness between one and the other but also on their lack of sameness with
themselves.
The conception of translation which de Man and Blanchot derived from
Benjamin's essay and which was shown to inform Klossowski's translation of
Virgil's Aeneid, can now be seen to inform also the 'translation' of Nietzsche by
76 L 'Entretien infini. p. 238.
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Klossowski and the relationship between the two as it subsists within Nietzsche et
Ie circle vicieux. The disarticulation of the 'target' language (Klossowski's work)
gestures towards the disarticulation of the source language (Nietzsche's fragments).
Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux, like Klossowski's L'EmSide, seeks to locate itself
within and affirm a space of difference. 'Klossowski' translates 'Nietzsche' by
juxtaposing his own discontinuous discourse with that of the 'Fragments
posthumes'. The law of repetition and difference as the originary and radical
fragmentation which constitutes existence is not articulated within language
(except in the parody of Eternal Return as a doctrine) but is repeated by language
as the language of the fragment.
So how are we to construe the value of the proper names 'Nietzsche' and
'Klossowski' when talking about the one translating the other in this way? Neither
refers to a coherent unity; neither is ever identical with each other or with
themselves but rather each is a singular instance which can be applied to anyone
fragment at anyone moment. The referent of the proper names 'Nietzsche' and
'Klossowski' is dispersed within the fragmentary textuality of their works. The
fragment, as an affirmation of discontinuity, is an instance of meaning which relates
to other fragments as one 'cas fortuit' would relate to another, i.e. through
difference rather than identity. The proper names of 'Kloss ow ski' and 'Nietzsche'
can be constructed only as 'cas fortuits' within the fragmentary structure of the
aphorism, as arbitrary signs which circulate and repeat their own difference from
themselves. They may he appended to any instance of discourse, to anyone
77 Blanchot, like Deleuze, makes it clear that repetition is always the repetition of non-identity or
difference: 'L'eternel retour fera pressentir que la difference s'eprouve comme repetition et
que la repetition est difference', L'Entretien infini, p. 242.
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fragment, but within the textual strategy of Kloss ow ski's or Nietzsche's discourse
they do not seek to designate any stable totality".
What this points to is a reassertion of Klossowski's opening comment in
Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux that the work is not a work of philosophy but rather
something else. Its value as a 'commentary' on Nietzsche lies not in what is said 'on'
Nietzsche but in the work's structure which repeats the fragmentation of 'Nietzsche'
(both as the person bearing that proper name and as a coherent body of thought),
thus parodically repeating the fragmentation of language itself (affirming the law of
Return). Yet there remains one final moment of paradox. It must be taken into
account that just as this commentary has returned to the words of Kloss ow ski in
order to gain a sense of the function of the fragment in his 'relationship' with
Nietzsche, so Klossowski returns to the words of Nietzsche in order to construct
the fragmentation of a 'semiotique impulsionnelle' as an affirmative structure. Just
as Klossowski's text seeks to dissolve 'Nietzsche' as a point of stable origin which
would govern his own text he appeals to Nietzsche in order to derive a textual
strategy (fragmentation) which would affirm that dissolution. Klossowski's text
returns to the content of Nietzsche's thought in the same moment in which he seeks
to dissolve the self-identity of that content and construct it as parodic. His writing
is bound up with the explicit substance of Nietzsche's text in the very same moment
as he attempts to affirm that explicit content as parodic, arbitrary and fortuitous. In
the same way this discussion has returned to what is coherent in Klossowski's text
to show the way that text comes to denounce itself as incoherent. One can only
make sense of fragmentation as the fracturing of coherence by reading that which
78 Derrida makes much of the issue of proper names and translation in his discussion of
Benjamin's essay and translation in 'Des tours de Babel'; see ~ pp. 203-235.
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in the fragments is itself coherent. Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche or the reading
of Kloss ow ski being elicited here both relies upon and overturns the authority and
foundation of the text being read.
This means that the relationship Nietzsche-Klossowski is one which
nevertheless remains within the space of coherence and identity at the same
moment that it seeks to construct itself as non-identical in and through the
language of fragmentation. 'La parole de fragment', as Blanchot would call it, is
never entirely coincident with 'le fragmentaire'; indeed 'la parole' by virtue of being
'parole' excludes 'le fragmentaire' just as the sign of'le cercle vicieux' can only ever
parody and falsify Eternal Return. There is a double logic here which involves an
oscillation between two instances : the moment when discourse is fractured by the
aphoristic structure, when the proper names 'Klossowski' and 'Nietzsche' are
denounced as fortuitous cases under the sign of repetition and difference, and that
other moment when such a strategy of self-fracturing is itself articulated from
within the language of coherence and sameness. These two mutually exclusive
moments are entirely coextensive the one with the other. The instance of fracturing
is itselfungraspable and unlocatable. It is the gesture of the text beyond itself,
never the text itself which is in the end always subject to the logic of coherence and
identity. Klossowski writing on Nietzsche is always affirming two mutually
exclusive instances, the identity of the proper name and the non-identity of the
proper name, its fortuity. its quality as role or mask.
Klossowski's text is as he himself describes it a 'fausse etude'. It oscillates
between fragmentation and cohesion in the same way as the self oscillates in its
singular journey through time. The textual strategy of Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux
affirms the disruptive disindividuating forces of the 'impulsions' but only in a
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parodic dissimulating fashion because it also always necessarily affirms the illusory
cohesion of the 'code des signes'. The life of the self which is always experienced as
coherent and autonomous and yet which is in reality only ever a series of'cas
fortuits' is repeated in the double logic of meaning which structures the
'translations' of Nietzsche et le cerc1e vicieux.
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Le Bain de Diane and the mythological image.
11faut que les images du my the soient les esprits demoniaques, les gardiens
invisibles mais partout presents
Nietzsche - La Naissance de la tragedie79.
Klossowski's treatment of myth brings together all the issues raised so far in
the preceding discussions of parody and translation. Klossowski' s published work
includes two essays which deal directly with myth, the first being Le Bain de Diane
(1956), which is a series of meditations and variations upon the story of Diana and
Actaeon as told by Ovid in the Metamorphoses. Secondly and over a decade later
Klossowski published Origines cultuelles et mythiques d'un certain comportement
des dames romaines'" (1968), an account of the roles of women in the erotic rituals
of Roman religious cults which examines the development of these rituals into
scenic representations performed away from strictly religious centres of worship.
In what follows I shall be looking at the 1956 work Le Bain de Diane and I
will aim to show how Klossowski uses the fable of Diana and Actaeon to articulate
what is at stake not only in the mythological image but also in writing more
generally. Clearly this has been Klossowski's concern in both his essays on Sade
and on Nietzsche but what is most significant about Le Bain de Diane is that
Klossowski does not so much comment on Ovid's story but rather retells it in such
a way that it undergoes a number of variations. It has been argued that the purely
discursive, expository status of the essays on Sade and Nietzsche is undermined by
the arguments these essays themselves put forth. Le Bain de Diane is more directly
79 La Naissance de la tragedie. translated by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, (Paris: Gallimard : Folio,
1977), p. 133; Die Geburt der TragOdie. KSAl, p. 145.
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and immediately already a work offable and fiction. More than any other work that
has been dealt with so far it occupies an ambiguous space between the discursive
essay form and the narrative structure of Klossowski's novels. As a meditation
upon, but also the retelling and transformation of, a mythical fable, Le Bain de
Diane stands at a point of convergence between Klossowski's essayistic
commentaries and his fictional output.
In the opening lines of his book Klossowski tells us that the image and
story of Ovid has been : 'vulgarises par les encyclopedies'. Diana, the virgin
goddess and huntress, bathing with her nymphs, is espied by Actaeon, hunter and
grandson of Cadmus King of Thebes, as he strays from his hunting party. Then,
outraged that her nakedness has been seen by a mortal she splashes him with water
from her bathing pool upon which he is transformed into a stag and flees. He is
found by his hounds and hunting party and tom to pieces, since neither dogs nor
comrades are aware of who he really is. The many aspects of this tale have, asserts
Klossowski, been 'reduit a la seule vision d'un bain de femmes surprises par un
intrus' (BD,7)81.
In retelling this mythical vision Klossowski seeks to restore unto the names
of Diana and Actaeon their 'intense eclat' and 'leur sens cache' (BD,S). He does
this, firstly, by returning Diana to the diversity of her origins as a figure in Greco-
Roman mythology and thus to the richness of the symbolism which attaches to her
person. Diana is first and foremost the virgin goddess, who demanded of the King
of the gods that she be allowed to remain eternally a maiden and never take a lover
80 Le Bain de Diane (paris: Gallimard, 1956); reprinted 1986. All references will be to the
Gallimard edition prefaced with the abbreviation BD. Origines cultuelles et mythigues d'un
certain comportement des dames romaines, (paris: Fata Morgana, 1986).
81 For Ovid's version of this tale see Ovid, Metamorphoses, translated by Mary Innes, (London:
Penguin 1955), pp. 77-80.
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nor a spouse. This is what renders Diana exemplary as a mythical figure. A virgin
goddess, Diana is also Artemis (her Greek name) but as Artemis she is also Elaphia
and Britomartis, goddess of the island of'Crete'" : 'en Artemis, Elaphia s'assoupit,
et Britomartis la douce vierge apparait au tendre sourire' (BD, 10). Diana is a figure
who, as moon, is by definition always changing and Klossowski suggests that she
encompasses many other figures each a transformation or different manifestation of
the type of the virgin goddess. Discussing the origins of Artemis in the
'Eclaircissements' at the end of his work Klossowski stresses once again the
diversity of sources from which her genealogy can be drawn. Associated closely
with the cult of Apollo and Delphi, Artemis is described in the Homeric tradition as
being daughter of Zeus and Leto, and sister of Apollo but via Egyptian sources as
being the daughter of Zeus and Demeter, and therefore sister of Persephone. She is
also at times identified with Persephone herself or at others is the daughter of
Persephone and therefore the mother of Eros.
By making the goddess Diana the focal point of his work and by
emphasising her diverse origins and many guises Klossowski brings the question of
transformation to the fore. In fact transformation occurs on different levels and in
different ways throughout Le Bain de Diane. Firstly, Klossowski transforms and
retells the story of Diana and Actaeon a number of times on the narrative level.
Secondly, within the narrative itself Actaeon is subject to metamorphosis in the
moment when he spies Diana and is changed into a stag. Thirdly, as has already
been indicated, Klossowski emphasises the way in which the virgin goddess is
herself a symbol which is manifested in many different ways. The question of
82 For the tale ofBritomartis see The Larousse Encyclopaedia of Mythology, translated by
Richard Aldington and Delano Ames, with an introduction by Robert Graves (London:
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transformation appears to be at the heart of Klossowski's treatment of myth in Le
Bain de Diane.
It is clear why Klossowski should have become interested in the question of
myth in general. His engagement with both Nietzsche and psychoanalysis (one
must remind oneself that Klossowski began his career publishing in a
psychoanalytic review) would have facilitated such an interest, whether it be
around the question of <Edipus (in his first article Klossowski discovered an inverse
ffidipus complex at work in Sade's writing") or ofDionysos (a key figure for
Nietzsche throughout his work). Yet such an emphasis upon the mythological
symbol in its multiple transformations suggests a less obvious point of contact with
the issue of myth. That the mythological symbol is multiple and yet seems to be a
manifestation of an archetype (the Virgin goddess) raises the question of the
relationship of Klossowski's use of myth in Le Bain de Diane to that made of it by
C.O. Jung within the context of his general analytical psychology. Although it is
not clear whether Klossowski in fact read Jung extensively, there are explicit
indications within Le Bain de Diane that he has read some Jung (as will be made
clear shortly) and is situating his own work in some relation to the Iungian
treatment of myth. More specifically Klossowski' s emphasis upon the motif of
transformation invites one to draw comparisons and maybe contrasts with the
treatment of myth in a text such as Symbols of Transformation". In the first
instance Klossowski's central focus on the virgin goddess in her plural
manifestations suggests a strong similarity with the Jungian notion of the archetype
Hamlyn,1968), p. 86. For main account of the story of Artemis, see pp. 120-122.
83 'Elements d'une etude psychanalytique sur le marquis de Sade', Revue Francaise de
Psychanalyse, 6 (1933), 458-74.
84 lung, C.G., Symbols of Transformation. Collected Works, vol.S, translated by R.F.C.Hull
(London: Routledge, 1956).
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and points to some congruence in the way each conceives of myth and the
mythological symbol.
In Symbols of Transformation Jung describes the space of Greek
mythology as follows :
We move in a world of fantasies which, untroubled by the outward course
of things, well up from an inner source to produce an ever-changing
succession of plastic or phantasmal forms".
The 'phantasmal forms' of myth vary constantly but only in relation to an 'inner
source'. For Jung the mythological image constitutes the basis of unconscious
dreams and fantasies. Unlike the Freudian unconscious image the Jungian
'phantasmal form' does not have its basis in childhood sexual trauma. Itmight
appear in childhood more because it is simply less repressed in the unsocialised
infantile psyche :
In reality we are concerned with primitive or archaic thought forms, based
on instinct, which naturally emerge more clearly in childhood than they do
later"
The 'inner source' to which the transformations of the mythological symbol have
reference within the Jungian context is always a primordial form, a universal unity
whose existence is rooted in the shared primal existence of mankind. Klossowski's
use of the archetype where the key figure of Diana is also shown to be doubled in
the goddesses Artemis, Britomartis and Elaphia is highly suggestive of this Jungian
conception of myth.
This relation to Jung is indicated further by an omission in the
'Eclaircissements' at the end ofLe Bain de Diane. The 'fond mythique' of the
relations between Artemis, Persephone and other manifestations are, Klossowski
tells us, recounted in the Kore by Kerenyi in a work entitled Introduction a
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l'essence de la mythologie87. What Klossowski does not mention in his reference to
this work is that it is co-authored with Carl Jung and is very much devoted to the
explanation of myth within the Jungian context of primordial archetypal images. In
tracking down the various manifestations of the virgin goddess in his essay on the
Kore, Kerenyi seeks to establish a relation of identity between them as
manifestations of a single primordial image. At different points in his argument he
explicitly links various goddesses with each other as embodiments of the same
essence; Hecate, Demeter, Persephone, Artemis and Diana and others can, he
claims, all be conflated into the same figure:
the Greeks attached the name 'Hecate' to a goddess who united in herself
affinities with the moon, a Demetrian nature, and Kore like characteristics -
not only those of Persephone but of Artemis as well [..... ]
Hecate and Artemis, Trivia and Diana are used so often as equivalent
names that we cannot regard this as wholly groundless, any more than we
can the familiar equation of Persephone with the moon and Diana with
Luna88.
The daughter as a goddess originally quite independent of her mother is
unthinkable; but what is thinkable, as we shall see, is the original identity of
mother and daughter".
The equivalence of these names is not wholly groundless, because, Kerenyi would
argue, all these goddesses refer back to the same primordial essence. Kerenyi's
argument carries with it throughout echoes of the Jungian conception of myth.
Indeed myth is described in the opening of Introduction to a Science of Mythology
in terms which echo Jung's comments in Symbols of Transformation; it is 'the re-
8S Symbols of Transformation. p. 21.
86 Symbols of Transformation. pp. 28-9.
87 e.G.lung and K.Kerenyi, Einfuhrung in das Wesen der Mythologie, Introduction to a Science
of Mythology, translated into English by RF.C.Hull, (London: Routledge, 1955).
88 Introduction to a Science of Mythology, pp. 155-6.
89 Introduction to a Science of Mythology, p. 168.
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arising ofa primordial unity in narrative form''". This reference to Kerenyi's work
at the end ofLe Bain de Diane and the concomitant suppression of any reference to
Jung underlines the importance of the Jungian context an elucidating Klossowski's
treatment of myth. Up until this point I have emphasised the similarities between
the Klossowskian and the Jungian archetype, namely the use of a single figure
which is manifested in a plurality of forms. Yet the omission of any reference to
Jung is perhaps systematic of crucial differences. Admittedly there are a number of
reasons for the suppression of Jung's name. Firstly one might imagine that the
generally unsympathetic response to Jung in France together with Jung's Nazi
leanings made him not so much of a popular figure to be associated with in the
post-war period" and that Klossowski therefore thought it judicious to leave his
name out even though his treatment of myth was so similar. Secondly Klossowski
simply may not have needed to make the reference explicit since the two names
Jung and Kerenyi were widely associated with each other in France during the
fifties. Thirdly, and perhaps more interestingly, the suppression may be read as a
deliberate attempt not to associate his own use of myth and key emphasis on the
figure of the virgin with the Jungian notion of archetypes. It is clear that Jung's
view of myth as archetype, and the way that such a notion posits the identity and
unity of human experience in existence of primordial forms, needs to be
differentiated in some way from all that has so far seemed to inform Klossowski's
writing (loss of origin, identity etc.). By contrasting Klossowski's use of myth with
90 Introduction to a Science of Mythology. p. 7.
91 The reception of Jung inFrance has generally been very slight, for whatever reasons. This can
be seen by the relatively few and brief references made to the man and his work in Elisabeth
Roudinesco's history of psychoanalysis inFrance, La Bataille de cent ans; see Elisabeth
Roudinesco, vol. 2, (paris: Seuil, 1986).
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its Jungian conception, the nature of transformation, and the metamorphosis of the
mythological image in the Klossowskian context can be made clear.
Kerenyi describes the 'elemental virginity' of Kore/Persephone/ Artemis etc.
not as an anthropomorphic quality but rather as 'a quality of the unadulterated
primal element which had given her birth,92,again laying the stress on the
primordial nature of her essence. For Klossowski, however, the virgin is a figure of
key significance because she embodies an irreducible paradox. At this point it is
worth recalling the importance of the virgin in Klossowski's 1947 edition of Sade
mon pro chain. There the figure of the virgin, embodied first and foremost in the
character Justine, articulated the dilemma of the 'conscience sadiste'. She acted as a
symbol of absolute purity to which the libertine aspired but to which he was at the
same time denied access because of the inherent impurity of his desire. The 'image
paradoxale de la vierge, objet de possession, qui exclut la possession,'
(SMP47,107) condemned the Sadian hero forever to repeat his cruel acts in the
constant frustration of his desire. The virginity of Diana! Artemis offers a repetition
and at the same time a modification of this motif. Klossowski describes this
virginity as:
Un etat d'integrite basee sur la mort de la virilite exterieure - cette derniere
etant suspendue comme une menace sur son immortelle integrite (BD,23).
Once again the stress is laid upon the frustration and failure of''virilite' but the
quality of the virgin's 'integrite' has altered somewhat. She is no longer a sign of
disembodied and transcendent purity in the way it was framed in the section
'Hommage a la vierge' in the first edition of Sade mon prochain. Rather her
'immortelle integrite' is reformulated to bring it more explicitly into line with
92 Introduction to a Science of Mythology. p. 207.
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Klossowski's non-Christian 'polytheistic' viewpoint and his post-war reading of
Nietzsche.
This repetition of the Sadeian motif of fiustrated virility leads one to the
way that Klossowski recasts the fable of Diana and Actaeon into what he calls : 'la
scene encore inedite de la legende', namely: 'Diane saillie par Acteon, a la tete de
cerf (BD,31). Actaeon attempting to rape Diana and then dying, tom apart by his
hounds, reworks the exasperation of the libertine in Sade mon prochain. In this
sense what is again at stake is the impossibility of desire to reach the absolute
towards which it is directed. However here, the central encounter of Le Bain de
Diane is constructed in the terms of Kloss owski's later reading of Sade. Actaeon's
attempt to rape Diana embodies a desire which is subordinate to a goal and
meaning (and therefore subjected to the world of representation, work and utility)
but which at the same time seeks to exceed that state of subordination. Diana, as
will become clearer, embodies the principle of'inutilite', offorces which exist
outside of goal, meaning, and representation". The structure, like that articulated
in the 1947 'Hommage a la vierge', is highly paradoxical. Actaeon, in seeking to
possess Diana, desires consciously to possess that which is beyond conscious
desire. Klossowski reverses this, putting the point of view of Diana when he
describes the prey of the hunter goddess :
Le gibier de Diane, ce sont nos propres energies aveugles domptees par la
deesse et consommees par les energies laborieuses : les unes et les autres
detournees par la chasse et par le travail sous le pretexte d'un besoin, d'une
utilite - "au benefice" de la sereine inutilite (BD,27).
Just as Sade's hero desired purity and was denied this because of the very impurity
of that desire, so the desire of Actaeon, whose goal is to possess Diana violently, is
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an impossible one because she represents a principle which, precisely, is without
goal (Tinutilite'). This is why the virginal integrity of Diana entails what Klossowski
has called 'la mort de la virilite exterieure' (BD,23). The consequence of Actaeon's
attempt to possess Diana can only be his destruction as a conscious desiring
subject. As has been indicated, the structure of this situation repeats that of the
Sadeian libertine as is framed in the later essay 'Le Philosophe scelerat' (in Sade
mon pro chain 1967). Yet what is more explicitly at stake here in the encounter
between Diana and Actaeon is the point of intersection between the world of
meaning and representation (as embodied in Actaeon's violent desire), and the
world of 'inuti lite' which is without goal or sense. This point of intersection was
exactly what came into question in the discussion of the way Klossowski 'translates'
the Nietzschean experience of Eternal Return in Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux; i.e.
how one formulates or consciously seizes an experience which lies outside the
possibility of consciousness or conscious formulation. Here it is a question of how
Diana, divinity and principle of''inutilite' is able to appear to Actaeon in the first
place, because, embodying such a principle she should be unrepresentable. What
interests Klossowski, therefore, in retelling the story of Diana and Actaeon is the
way it allows him to specify the exact nature of that point of intersection between
the world of human goals, thought and action and the realm of divine uselessness
where energy incessantly expends itself without goal or meaning.
In order to appear to Actaeon in the form of a visible image Diana must
make a pact with what Klossowski calls 'un demon intermediaire'. Her'sereine
93 This, of course, explicitly recalls Klossowski's reworking of Bataille in his later writings on
Sade and the economy of transgression which this articulates.
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inutilite' can only manifest itself to the world of man via this demon who allows
some form of reflection to take place between one world and the other :
Diane pactise avec un demon intermediaire entre les dieux et les hommes,
pour se manifester it Acteon. Par son corps aerien, Ie demon simule Diane
dans sa theophanie, et inspire it Acteon le desir et l'espoir insense de
posseder la deesse. II devient l'imagination d'Acteon et le miroir de Diane
(BD,46).
As an intermediary between the gods and men the demon becomes an image of
Diana in the imagination of Actaeon and allows the goddess to reflect herself as a
mythological image within the space of representation. The revelation of the gods,
the 'theophanie' ofLe Bain de Diane, is nothing without the intermediary demon.
But what, exactly, is the nature of this demon? It is interesting here to compare this
point of mediation between gods and man with the way Nietzsche constructs the
notion of'le mythe tragique' in his first work Die Geburt der Tragodie. As the
opening quotation highlighted, Nietzsche characterises mythological images as 'les
esprits demoniaques' which immediately echoes the way Klossowski is formulating
them in positing the existence ofa 'demon intermedaire'. For the Nietzsche of Die
Geburt der Tragodie tragic myth arises from the possibility of mediation which can
occur between the Apollonian and the Dionysian.
The Dionysian in this early context is not the expenditure of energy or the
universe of Eternal Return but rather is more closely related to the
Schopenhauerian notion of the Will. The Will is at once a primordial unity which
underlies and transcends all the manifestations of the phenomenal world but also a
constant contradiction and striving of desire. The Apollonian is the world of plastic
images, individuation (subjectivity) and representation. The tragic myth mediates
between these two worlds by what Nietzsche describes as the quality of'Gleichnis',
which translates into English as allegory or simile, and appears in the French
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translation as 'substitut analogique'. 'Gleichnis' founds the possibility of tragic myth
(which for Nietzsche is the only true form of myth) because it is a quality of
resemblance or analogy that allows Dionysian knowledge to be communicated into
the plastic realm of the Apollonian. Nietzsche gives the following definition of
tragic myth :
le mythe tragique, c'est-a-dire le mythe qui exprime par substituts
analogiques la connaissance dionysiaque."
This possibility of communication and synthesis between the Apollonian and the
Dionysian is founded on the privileged position Nietzsche ascribes to music within
this Schopenhauerian context". Music, as, according to Schopenhauer, a non-
representational form, allows direct access to the Will and therefore to a universal
reality. Through music we can have access to the Dionysian and this access allows
the mythological image to be 'insufflee' with tragic force :
Entre la validite universelle de la musique et l'auditeur predispose a l'emoi
dionysiaque, la tragedie installe done un substitut analogique sublime - le
mythe - et de telle sorte qu'elle finit par donner l'impression que la musique
n'est que le plus puissant des moyens dont dispose la representation pour
insuftler vie au monde plastique du mythe."
This mediation between the Dionysian and the Apollonian through the universal
force of music takes place via the satyr chorus of Greek tragedy. The satyr chorus
as mediator between these two worlds founds the possibility of tragic myth. Insofar
as it is only the inclusion of the Dionysian element which gives art any universal
validity at all, it founds also the possibility of representation in general. In
mediating between the two worlds of the Apollonian and the Dionysian it is clear
94 La Naissance de la tragedie, p. 100; Die Geburt der Trag<>die,KSAI, p. 107.
95 Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung 1,2 vols. (Zurich: Diogenes, 1977), vol. 1,
pp.321-35.
96 La Naissance de la tragewe, pp. 122-23; Die Geburt der Trag<>die,KSAI, p. 134.
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that the 'choeur satyrique' operates in the early Nietzschean formulation of myth as
an equivalent of Klossowski's 'demon mediateur' inLe Bain de Diane.
Yet although Nietzsche's emphasis on the satyr chorus as mediator suggests
close similarities with the intermediary demon in Le Bain de Diane, there are
important differences to be noted which differentiate Klossowski from the early
Nietzsche. To begin with the primordial unity of the Dionysian as it appears in La
Naissance de la tragedie is not, as has been shown, the world of Eternal Return
without 'but', 'sens' or 'utilite' but rather it is the primordial unity of Schopenhauer's
wil197• Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the mediation of the satyr chorus
allows for some kind of a synthesis or harmony between the Apollonian and the
Dionysian which gives art and experience a universality through a recognition of its
tragic foundation. This Nietzsche calls the 'dialectique esthetique' of tragedy which
he opposes to the 'dialectique socratique' oflogical rational thought. One of
Nietzsche's aims inLa Naissance de la tragedie is to attack the rational dialectic of
Socratic thought and the art to which it gives rise. This is because its inherent
optimism breaks the ground of tragedy by denying the Dionysian element in
experience and thus interrupts the 'dialectique esthetique' which constitutes tragic
myth". The satyr chorus is a reliable mediator who grounds the possibility of
97 See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie (paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962),
pp. 12-19. In his book on Nietzsche Gilles Deleuze offers an analysis of the difference
between La Naissance de la tragOOie (which he refers to as L'Origine de la tragOOie) and the
later works. Deleuze argues that while Nietzsche is concerned in the earlier work to
articulate a dialectical relationship between the Apollonian and the Dionysian in his later
work he is more concerned with affirming the Dionysian against the Socratic (rational
dialectical thinking) : 'Car, des L'Origine de la tragOOie, la vraie opposition n'est pas
l'opposition toute dialectique de Dionysos et d' Apollon, mais celle, plus profonde, de
Dionysos et de Socrate [ ... J et Socrate n'est pas plus apollinien que dionysiaque', Nietzsche
et la philosophie p. 15.
98 In his later criticism of La Naissance de la tragOOie in Ecce Homo Nietzsche says he detected
'des relents indiscrets d'hegehanisme' in the earlier work; by this he is certainly referring to
his 'dialectique esthetique' of the Apollinian and the Dionysian: Ecce Homo, translated by
Jean-Claude Hemery (paris: GallimardIFolio, 1974), p. 140, Ecce Homo. KSA6, p.31O.
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representation in and through the communication of the tragic. In Le Bain de
Diane, however, the 'demon intermediaire' who allows Diana to take form in the
imagination of Actaeon proves not to be so reliable. Klossowski describes the
demons of myth as follows:
les demons sont ou bien mediateurs entre les dieux et les hommes, ou bien -
et c'est le cas le plus frequent - it ne sont que des masques, les mimes qui
jouent leur role. Dans les deux cas its simulent les dieux, et parfois, quand
ces derniers se sont retires dans leur impassabilite - qu'en realite its ne
quittent jamais -, indifferents aces etres qui se confondaient un instant avec
eux, ces histrions demoniaques continuent ales contrefaire (BD,47-8).
Here Klossowski returns to his interest in simulation, masks and role-playing that
has characterised both the way parody was seen to operate in La Vocation
suspendue and his description of the Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux as a 'fausse
etude'. The reflection that the intermediary demon allows between the divinity of
Diana and the world of Actaeon's conscious desires and thoughts is always a
simulation. Diana as she appears to Actaeon is only ever a false mask because her
principle is always radically beyond the realm of visible appearance. In La
Naissance de la tragedie Nietzsche founded representation upon the possibility of
mediation between tragic Dionysian knowledge and the security of the Apollonian
image. Yet in taking on a false mask to create an image of the goddess
Klossowski's intermediary demon creates a different space of representation; one
which is neither the eternity of the gods nor the time of thought and reflection, nor
even a synthesising and reliable ground between the two.
As has been indicated, Diana's divinity embraces the principle of eternity;
her universe is without goal or meaning, one which is radically 'inutile' (recalling
Bataille's notion of''depense'). Diana's divinity embodies the movements of Eternal
Return, of 'inten sites', 'impulsions'. This is the movement of repetition as the
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repetition of difference, the repetition of an intensity which, being singular, is
outside meaning and 'n'a d'autre sens que d'etre l'intensite' (CV,98). In Le Bain
de Diane Klossowski describes this as 'l'espace absolu du mythe', where the
gestures of the goddess are eternally repeated :
Or, dans l'espace absolu du mythe qui est identique a l'essence irreductible
des dieux, Diane inscrit l'eternel retour de sa periodicite feminine (le
croissant lunaire) et le mouvement d'une progression circulaire (la chasse, le
bain, la remontee a I'Olympe, la chasse etc.) (BD,62).
Yet since the images of what Klossowski calls this 'periodicite feminine' (the
crescent moon, hunting, bathing) exist as images only via the intermediary demon,
this leads to the formulation of two types of mythic space : absolute mythic space,
the radical beyond of divinity, and mythic space as we know it, that of demonic
images. As an intermediary, the demon:
projette dans l'espace mythique Ie temps de la reflexion; it recupere ainsi
l'espace mythique qui est pour lui le dehors, en espace interieur ou "mental"
(BD,60).
The space of demonic, mythical images results from the projection of temporal
thought into the space of the gods and their serene uselessness. Yet the
recuperation of the outside into the inside never actually occurs; it is only ever
simulated. Diana appears as image but her essence always remains untouched; she
is, as Klossowski puts it, forever 'impassible' and Actaeon's attempt to seize her is
forever doomed to result in his own destruction. The projection of reflective time
into the timelessness of the gods can never subjugate their divinity, it can only seize
hold of fragments of image :
le temps ne peut asservir la divinite qui est une avec le temps mythique
jusque dans sa periodicite; mais par le temps reflechi, la reflexion asservit
les accidents du corps que la divinite emprunte (BD,63).
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The mythical image is, therefore, always only a fragment. Yet it is a fragment not
of some greater primordial unity but rather its relation is one of falseness and
simulation to an outside which is always pure difference and singularity. It is now
clear that this is very different from the Jungian conception of myth which first
appeared to inform Klossowski's use of the virgin goddess archetype in Le Bain de
Diane. Klossowski is not interested in positing the original unity and continuity of
experience in the existence of primordial forms. On the contrary he is once again
specifically interested in asserting the radical discontinuity of the life of the subject,
the fact that experience is entirely without foundation. There are no primordial
essences or archetypes, no universal striving of the Will, only the fortuitous and
chaotic play of energies and forces without 'but' or 'sens' which always subtend the
illusory coherence of the conscious subject. IfKlossowski suppresses the reference
to Jung in Le Bain de Diane it is arguably because his use of the mythological
symbol and the view of subjectivity this implies is very different. If Klossowski' s
use of myth is characterised in this way, in contradistinction to the notion of myth
found in Nietzsche's early writing (informed by Schopenhauer) or that found in
Kerenyi's Kore (informed by Jung), then one is led back to the question with which
this discussion began, namely that of transformation.
Throughout Le Bain de Diane Klossowski describes and redescribes the
various aspects and attributes of Diana and Actaeon. He tells, for instance, how
Diana received her silver bow and quiver of arrows from the Cyclops Brontes
(BD,1S-16). He tells of the nature of the bow and the targets of the arrows
(BD,20-2S)99. Also and specifically at the end ofLe Bain de Diane Klossowski
99 Klossowski goes into some detail in describing the nature of Diana's four targets 'un orme', 'un
chene', 'un/auve', and 'une Cite des mechants' (BD,21). He questions whether these aspects
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retells the scene of encounter between goddess and hunter a number of times. In
these final scenes the process of destruction of Actaeon and then the rebirth of both
protagonists to repeat the scene over again is described (BD,83-97). Yet
throughout the book, each time it is retold the scene is modified. One aspect
reveals itself in one telling, another in a subsequent telling. The tale is at one
moment that of Artemis the huntress, at another of Diana the bather; it is of
Actaeon the hunter, Actaeon the voyeur, and then as Klossowski introduces the
'scene encore inedite de la legende' it is of Actaeon the rapist. Le Bain de Diane
itself is a proliferation of mythological images each a transformation of that which
preceded it. Because Actaeon fails in his aspiration to possess Diana the repetition
of this fable is a necessity as much as was the repetition of the libertine's violence in
Sade mon prochain. The frustration and subsequent destruction of Actaeon is also
the motif of his return in the modified retellings of the mythical fable. Diana's
principle of divinity always refuses incorporation into the world of man and rejects
any subjection to his desires and goals and so man, in the figure of Actaeon, is
doomed. He is condemned forever to repeat the mythical moment when his demon
reveals divinity to him and he is moved with the impossible desire to seize it. The
desire may be impossible but in its flux and reflux the Self always returns to desire
once more. Diana's body takes shape over and again and Actaeon goes to his
destruction once more, forever unable to speak of or represent the essence of the
of Diana's activity are 'figures qui explicitent l'indicible essence de sa divinite' (BD,20).
What is important in the context of this discussion is the way Klossowski uses these to
multiply the image of Diana. A detailed discussion of Klossowski's comments on Diana's
'arc d'argent' is not possible within this context.
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gods which he will forever desire to possess'?'. Thus the mythical image repeats
itself, each a transformation, each a singular scene of representation.
It is this scenic, visual quality of the mythological image and its
transformations which becomes all important for Klossowski because it offers the
key to the significance of myth with regard to writing and representation as a
whole. Reflecting on the transformations of the divine image he writes :
Les diverses modifications de la pensee divine qui ne sont que pur jeu en
soi, sans nulle utilite, si ce n'est la depense des energies dans des formes
sans cesse renouvelees, sans autre but que de se maintenir hors de tout
asservissement a une utilite quelconque, hors d'un asservissement meme de
la divinite a la divinite, exaltent le mortel hors de sa sphere de servitude, des
que dans la rencontre avec l'homme, ces modifications, ces jeux constituent
pour lui un evenement a partir duquel sa vie, jusque-la soumise a une
necessite sans figure, s'eleve a la legende de pareils jeux : ainsi les dieux ont
enseigne aux hommes de se contempler eux-memes dans le spectacle
comme les dieux se contemplent eux-memes dans l'imagination des hommes
(BD,44-5).
This lengthy and complicated sentence contains the essence of what has been
shown to be at stake in Klossowski's construction of the mythological image so far.
The transformations of the mythological image and the key point at which the
conscious subject is destroyed offers a moment from which a certain type of
experience becomes possible, where the life of man can become mythical, can be
raised 'a la legende de pareils jeux'. Man, in the contemplation of his own
destruction as exemplified by Actaeon, raises his existence to the level of fable, to
the play of the mythological image. Man releases himself from subservience to the
laborious world of utility and rational thought, divests himself of the constraints
imposed upon his desires by social propriety and the imperatives of commerce and
100 Ovid's tale itself incorporates the impossibility of Actaeon being able to speak what he has
seen. As Diana transforms him with a splash of water she says : 'Now if you can you may
tell of how you saw me undressed'. Klossowski incorporates this into his own text :
Nunc tibt me posito visam velamine narres
Si poteris narrare, licet? (BD,80),
and makes of it the heading of one of its parts.
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becomes the spectator of himself He beholds his own discontinuity in the demonic
images of myth, in their repetitions and modifications and in so doing goes to his
destruction over and again.
As Nietzsche did in La Naissance de la tragedie, Klossowski uses a specific
conception of myth as a point of departure for a practice of writing and
representation, and, as in Nietzsche's text, the theatrical, scenic character of
representation has a central place. This is clear from Klossowski's treatment of
myth in the text Origines cultuelles et mythigues d'un certain comportement des
dames romaines. This work charts how the erotic rituals of Roman cults developed
into the ~eux sceniques' which eventually came to be performed outside temples
'dans les cirques et sur les scenes de theatre''?'. The relation between the Roman
gods and the myths which are engendered in these scenic representations is the
same as was constructed in Le Bain de Dianel02. The constant emphasis throughout
this text falls on the way in which the erotic rituals and '[eux sceniques' of the
Roman cults all partake of the 'gratuite' of the gods; they are not subordinated to
the utility of the state or of civil society, because as sacrifice to the gods and ritual
play they constitute the expenditure of energies without goal or reason. The
representation of the gods, exemplified in the tale of Diana and Actaeon, is an
attempt to seize a principle beyond the goals of utility and of rational knowledge,
and, as such, is always a matter of spectacle. The mythological image offers the key
to a practice of writing and representation which is spectacular and scenic. Theatre
101 Origines cultuelles et mythigues d'un certain comportement des dames romaines. p. 67
102 Speaking of the divinities Klossowski stresses that they :
'exigent des sacrifices et precisement des jeux : par quoi elles revelent qu'elles ne sont pas
seulement identifiables a la procreation, mais qu'en tant que son principe elles representent
I'existence inepuisable parce que etemeUe; eternelle parce que sans but, et donc inutile'
Origines cultuelles et mythiques d'un certain comportement des dames romaines, p, 13.
This text as a whole is very much a reworking of Le Bain de Diane and so will not be dealt
with in detail here.
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becomes the dominant figure for a mode of representation which seeks to embody
the gratuitous beyond of the gods and always fails, collapsing into the repeated
production of false and simulated images. In Origines cuituelles et mythiques
Klossowski speaks of: 'le theatre qui est la fiction meme,103;fiction has become
theatre, role-play, false mask.
Yet Klossowski's use of the mythological image as a 'point of departure' for
an experience of the self and for a practice of writing and representation involves,
as one might now expect, a play of paradox. What the mythological image tells us
is, precisely, that there is no point of departure, no originary moment or primordial
unity which could found the life of the conscious self Fiction, as the moment when
man contemplates the gratuitous play of the gods and raises himself 'a la legende de
pareils jeux' (BD,45), is founded as theatre and spectacle in the impossibility of
possessing the gods. Diana as the virgin goddess offers a key image of this
founding impossibility. Her virginity, which both inspires and denies possession, is
what necessitates the repetition of images as always the repetition of false images.
Yet this is a foundation which is without foundation, because since Diana is herself
a mythological image, she is herself a false image, an image which articulates the
failure of any foundation at all. The founding impossibility is also an impossible
foundation. The virginity of Diana is a key sign not because it is an archetypal
essence but rather because it figures this foundation without foundation, this
moment from which the discontinuous existence of man can be affirmed in the
spectacular contemplation of demonic images. This is the crucial point, namely that
the scene of Diana and Actaeon is itself a mythological image and therefore it is
nothing other than a false demon. Le Bain de Diane, as myth, is part of 'une vaste
103 Origines cultuelles et mythiques d'un certain comportement des dames rornaines, p. 54.
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entreprise d'imposture demoniaque''?'; it speaks to us of writing as spectacle but it
is always itself only ever spectacle, simulation, demonic image.
Parody. translation, myth - figures ofthe outside.
What Klossowski's various writings around Nietzsche have revealed is the
essential falsification which lies at the heart of existence, thought, and writing. It
has become clear that what parody, translation and myth all have in common is this
quality of falsification, which ultimately makes them figures of the same moment :
that point of intersection between the inside of thought and the outside of
singularity and difference, that moment when thought seeks to exceed itself and
becomes the spectacle of falsified images. Yet the term 'falsity', even though
Klossowski himself uses it (describing Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux as a 'fausse
etude') is problematic within this context to the extent that it would appear
necessarily to imply its opposite: truth. Likewise all of the three motifs dealt with
in this discussion imply antithetical structures. A parody of something normally
exists in opposition to an authentic act or moment which it parodies; a translation
is normally a translation of an original text and myth normally appeals to an
originary unified moment in opposition to the multiplicity of our everyday
experience (as the discussion of lung showed). Yet, while Klossowski maintains
these oppositional structures, he does so to destroy the very norms on which they
depend. What has been shown though is that in all cases these motifs are deployed
in such a way as to reveal the oppositions which structure their meaning as artificial
and unfounded. What parody, translation and myth affirm in Klossowski's writing
is the loss of a point of origin or foundation which would allow oppositions to
104 Origines cultuelles et mythiques d'un certain comportement des dames romaines, p. 69.
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function in the conventional way. In Klossowski's texts parody operates in such a
way that everything is 'always already' infected with parody; translation is no longer
based upon the principle of equivalence, it does not imply self-same original and
copy but rather affirms the decentring and the difference of both 'original' and
'copy' from themselves (so that the whole notion of original and copy must be
abandoned). Likewise myth is always 'une vaste entreprise d'imposture
demoniaque', the repeated transformations of radically discontinuous images. The
traditional structures of all these motifs have been displaced so that they no longer
function as oppositions which imply or affirm an original moment of origin or
authenticity.
They all figure or affirm a space which is exterior to that oflanguage where
the oppositions of truth/falsity, original/ copy etc. operate. Yet, at the same time, by
referring to this space as an 'outside', what these motifs are trying to figure is the
fact that the 'outside' always already inhabits the inside, that there is no proper
opposition between the two. The 'inside' of thought and identity with all its
antithetical structures which give the self its stability and coherence is only ever an
illusion. It is an illusion because the oppositions which structure thought have no
foundation other than in the arbitrary grammatical forms which constitute them.
The antithetical structures oflanguage are always suspended above the moving
chaos of fortuitous intensities which constitute human existence. These intensities
are radically incoherent and discontinuous, without meaning or end. Yet knowing
this brings one no nearer to being able to escape the structures of thought and
meaning. So 'inutilite' can only be figured through the space of utilite', difference
through that of identity, singularity through that of sameness. Language always
falsifies and the figures of the outside can only ever be falsifications as they seek to
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speak of truth of language. Parody, translation and myth are oppositional
structures whose traditional meaning is modified so that they gesture towards a
space beyond oppositional structures. They become figures of non-meaning, forms
of coherence which speak of incoherence.
All these motifs can never properly encompass that which they are
attempting to articulate. This shift in the way they are used can only ever simulate
an experience or truth which by their very nature they exclude. Whilst always
implying an oppositional structure the denounce oppositional structures. Like
Klossowski's commentaries on Nietzsche they are bound by a double logic whereby
as forms of meaning they pronounce meaning itself to be without foundation.
By the same token these three motifs also perform that which they speak
about. They speak of an inability to seize the 'outside' and are themselves unable to
do so. As terms which theorise language as simulation, as non-self-identical, as
both spectacle and theatre, all three always simulate and are never identical with
the experience they seek to speak of. Thus they are always also a performance of
that which they theorise. Language becomes theatre in the moment when it realises
that it is without foundation and then seeks to affirm that lack of foundation.
Writing becomes spectacle when the thinking subject seeks to seize hold of the
fundamental discontinuity which subtends all human existence and in so doing is
led to self-destruction.
Once again this is clearly a repetition of the key moment in Klossowski's
writings on Sade. What has become clearer here, however, is this notion of writing
as theatre. As was indicated at the beginning of the discussion on myth, Le Bain de
Diane occupies an ambiguous space between the fictional and the essayistic, insofar
as it involves the telling of a story which tells of the nature of story-telling. Yet
192
insofar as it lays the emphasis on the spectacular character of writing in general it
shows us once more, and more clearly than before, that Klossowski is only ever
writing theatre. In this sense any traditional distinction that could be drawn
between a theoretical, analytical or philosophical discourse on the one hand and a
fictional narrative mode on the other is rendered inoperative. Likewise any
distinction between commentary and original text also becomes untenable.
Textuality and discourse, once they have been deprived of any reference to Truth
or to an 'authentic' original, become the repeated transformation and performance
of an always singular scene of writing. Any hierarchy or division one might seek to
establish between the essays of Un si funeste desir for example, Le Bain de Diane
and La Vocation suspendue is purely arbitrary, for all of them tum around that
paradoxical moment where language seeks to grasp that which lies outside or
beyond itself and where its own lack of foundation is affirmed. There can be no
distinction between discourse of'Truth' or 'theory' on the one hand and discourse
of 'fiction' or 'practice' on the other because all of these different writings are
simulated images whether it be the image of Sade's hero slaying his victim, of the
fresco in La Vocation suspendue or of Nietzsche experiencing the revelation of
return in Sils-Maria. Language itself has become the scene upon which sundry false
masks ceaselessly circulate : Sade, Nietzsche, Diana and Actaeon and, of course,
Klossowski himself
CHAPTER III - ROBERTE.
Ces dessins etaient en dehors de tout; ils sautaient, pour la plupart, par-dessus les
bomes de la peinture, innovaient un fantastique Ires special, un fantastique de
maladie et de delire.
Huysmans - A Rebours'
ON WRITING AND PAINTING 'LE PHANTASME'.
Octave, the ageing, perverse theologian of Les Lois de l'hospitalite, is a
collector of offensive and sexually indecent paintings. The canvases of the little known
nineteenth-century painter Frederic de Tonnerre will not, he believes, be to everyone's
taste. Indeed Octave is tempted to think of his collection as 'inexposable'. Better, he
remarks, that the authorities should do what they do best, that, is censor such
material : 'Au demeurant, j'applaudis de tout cceur a la sage rigueur des responsables
de l'ordre, au souci qu'ils ont de soustraire pareitle exhibition plastique aux regards
des jeunes gens, surtout a la fouler quitte aux amateurs avises de s'en reserver la
jouissance exclusive".
Octave's concern about his Tonnerre collection could easily be applied to
Klossowski's creative output as a whole. This is particularly so when one realises that
the works of the fictional Tonnerre are in fact paintings by Klossowski himself 'La
I Huysmans, A Rebours (paris: Fasquelle, 1961), p. 95.
2 Pierre Klossowski, Les Lois de I'ho!iPitalite (paris: Gallimard, 1965), p. 83. This collects, together
with an unpublished preface and postface, the following works : La Revocation de rEdit de
Nantes (paris: Minuit, 1959), Roberte ce Soir (paris: Minuit, 1954) and Le Souftleur (paris:
Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1960). All these works remain unchanged in the collected edition. All
references to the novels of Les Lois de l'Hosoitalite will be to this edition giving the page
number and prefaced by the abbreviation LB.
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Belle Versaillaise' as it is described by Octave towards the end of La Revocation de
I'Edit de Nantes' resembles, down to the smallest detail, the painting of the same name
signed by Klossowski. This resemblance allows one to pose similar questions about
Klossowski's oeuvre as Octave does about that of Tonnerre. Should our response as
commentators and critics be like that of the authorities or 'responsables de l'ordre'
(LH,83) as Octave calls them. Should it be our business to censure Klossowski's
perverse taste for portraying female figures as they submit to violent possession by
sundry male protagonists? Should we censor his work by banishing it to the dungeon
of literary pornography where Sade's novels have languished for the better part of their
life, to a domain where only a select few will enjoy them for their own singular
purposes?
This, of course, would be the effort of any moral or sexual political reading of
Klossowski's work, one which might seek to condemn it simply because it is obscene,
or in a more complex way because it may be deemed to position the female body as an
object of possession beneath a masculine gaze". What the ensuing chapters will argue
is that the manner in which Klossowski stages such scenes of sexual violence itself
seeks to problematise the very same questions of appropriation in language which
inform any sexual political critique of his representation of the female body. I shall
attempt to argue that Klossowski's concern with overturning fixed subject positions
and denouncing identity as arbitrary is also a denunciation of all the appropriative
3 Hereafter referred to as La Revocation.
4 Anne-Marie Dardigna's book is a key example of a rather hostile response to Klossowski' s work
from a femi~st perspective and will be discussed in detail later; Anne Marie Dardigna, Les
Chateaux d'Eros (paris: Maspero, 1980). Her second book is far more sympathetic to
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gestures one might ascribe to a properly 'masculine gaze'. At the same time
Klossowski seeks to overturn or call into question all fixed positions from which
rational or moral judgements might be made. Klossowski's readings of Sade and
Nietzsche show that his interest in perversion or what he calls 'les constructions
mentales ou plastiques relevant immediatement de la pathologie" lies in the possibility
of such constructions being able to contest all moral or rational norms. The
contestatory force of his work implies an attempt to overturn normative values in the
way that was outlined in the essay 'Le Philosophe scelerat'. These are the very values
one must bring to bear in order to judge his work from the perspective of any moral or
political standpoint (since a judgement for or against a work on moral or political
terms implies a series of rational norms and principles).
This question of sexual politics brings one to the heart of a debate surrounding
the status of the transgressive text in the work of diverse French authors from Bataille
to Robbe-Grillet and literary movements from the surrealists to Tel Quel. Broadly
speaking all these writers or groups could be said to view the representation of
forbidden sexuality as a force which is subversive of social structures or norms". This
question of sexuality and subversion has already been discussed in the first chapter in
relation to the writings of Sade and his appropriation by the surrealists, Bataille,
Blanchot and Klossowski. The most critical responses to all those writing from within
this broad perspective tum on the question of whether the 'morally subversive'
Klossowski's project insofar as she identifies him as a key modem thinker of 'Ie discontinu';
5 Anne Marie Lugan-Dardigna, Klossowski, l'homme aux simulacres (paris: Navarin, 1986).
Pierre Klossowski, 'Protase et apodose', in VAre, 43 (1970), 9.
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gestures of their texts do not, ultimately, affirm the sovereignty of a traditional male
subject and, in particular, a traditional male appropriation of the female body'. In what
follows I will seek to problematise such judgements in relation to Klossowski's
fictional writings by investigating the difficulty of any attempt to position a stable,
appropriating or appropriated subject within the texts themselves. I will argue that
such an attempt must negotiate the kind of complexities and paradoxes which have
been seen to inform Klossowski's analyses of Sade and Nietzsche. These complexities
and paradoxes render any reading of his writing which does seek to identify a stable
masculine subjectivity at work in his texts problematic from the outset. Klossowski's
promotion of 'perversion' does not mean that his writing seeks to be 'morally
subversive' through a simple and straightforward representation of forbidden sexuality.
Rather it seeks to ironise or interrupt the very activity of representation itself, to
suspend that movement of meaning through which one subject can appropriate,
objectify and enslave another. In the earlier discussion of Klossowski's Le Philosophe
scelerat it was shown that the transgressive force of the Sadeian text lay, not in the
overturning of the taboo or limit, but rather in the paradoxical play of a text which
sought, impossibly, to overturn those norms upon which it depended for its existence.
It is this impossibility or paradox of trying to write beyond the limit (from within the
limit) which characterises Klossowski's novels also and which distinguish them from a
6 For a historical overview of the Tel Quel group see Patrick Ffrench, The Time of Theory: A History
of Tel Ouel (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995). See also Alain Robbe-Grillet, Projet pour une
Revolution cl New York (paris: Minuit, 1973).
1 Two key texts in this debate are Susan Suleiman, Subversive Intent (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1990), and with reference to Klossowski in particular, Anne Marie Lugan-
Dardigna's Les Chateaux d'Eros, See also Nicholas Harrison, Circles of Censorship: Censorship
and its Metaphors in French History. Literature. and Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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text which, whilst attempting to be subversive, nevertheless affirms the sovereignty of
a traditional male subject.
Two figures dominate Klossowski's writing, that of 'La Femme de trente ans'
and that of the male youth or 'adolescent". Roberte in Les Lois de l'hospitalite and
Diana the goddess ofLe Bain de Diane are manifestations of the former and have a
central place in Klossowski's work throughout the fifties and very early sixties.
Antoine the nephew ofLes Lois and Ogier ofLe Baphomet and L'Adolescent
Immortel embody the latter, The figure of the adolescent remains dominant in both
Klossowski's writing and painting from the publication ofLe Baphomet in 1965
onwards". Klossowski's obsessive repetition of these figures in both pictural and
written form provide a context in which to discuss his novels in relation to his
paintings.
Klossowski writes of Actaeon's vision in Le Bain de Diane: 'le Bain de Diane
est au-dehors: Acteon pour Ie decouvrir, n'a point a Ie situer en tel ou tel endroit,
mais doit sortir de son propre esprit; alOTSce que voit Acteon se produit au-dela de la
naissance de toute parole: it voit Diane se baignant et il ne peut dire ce qu'il voit'!'.
Klossowski, like Actaeon, is a man of visions; visions of Diana, visions ofRoberte,
visions of Ogier. Indeed, he has made the comment that before he ever set pen to
paper, pencil or crayon to canvas, he 'saw' the scenes depicted in his novels, drawings
8 'La Femme de Trente ans' is, of course, a classic figure from nineteenth-century French literature
(e.g. a number of figures from Balzac's novels, the central character of the novel La Femme de
trente ans itself or for instance Mme Arnoux in Flaubert's L'Education sentimentale).
9 Hereafter referred to as Les Lois.
I 0 For a discussion of the figure of the adolescent between Klossowski himself and Alain Jouffroy see
Klossowski/Jouffroy, Le Secret Pouvoir du sens, (paris: Ecriture, 1994), pp. 23-56.
II Le Bain de Diane, pp. 68-9.
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or paintings. This poses an important question of whether one can speak of a hierarchy
between Klossowski's use of visual and written forms of expression. IfKlossowski,
like Actaeon, cannot speak what he sees, is a painting a more immediate or 'authentic'
expression of his vision? Indeed, given the apparent inadequacy of language to convey
the singularity of certain incommunicable moments (Sade's perversion or Nietzsche's
experience of Retum), one may wonder to what extent vision itself takes on a central
and primary role in the whole of Klossowski's oeuvre.
Itmay be remembered that this impossibility for language or conventional signs
to express certain singular moments of experience (or non-experience) was central to
Klossowski's writings on both Sade and Nietzsche. It founded (in its paradoxical
absence of foundation) the force attributed to the motifs of parody, translation and
myth as they were discussed in the last chapter. Such an impossibility gives force also
to the term 'simulacre' which will provide the central focus for much of the ensuing
discussion", The term simulacrum describes an image which both simulates,
dissimulates and proclaims its own difference from itself". Even though this term has
12Klossowski explains what he understands by this term on many occasions, most particularly at the
end of Origines cultuelles et mythigues d'un certain comportement des dames romaines (in
relation to Augustine's discussion of 'theologica theatrica' (Varroj), in Le Bain de Diane, at the
end of Nietzsche et Ie cercle vicieux but also in the essays' A propos du simulacre dans la
communication de Georges Bataille', Critique (August-September 1963), 742-50, and 'Protase
et apodose', L'Arc, 43 (1970), 8-20 (Incorporating 'Du caractere incommunicable des lois de
l'hospitalite' and 'De l'usage des stereotypes et de la censure exercee par la syntaxe classique').
Both these articles are reproduced in the volume La Ressemblance (Marseille: Andre Dimanche,
1984), pp. 21-3 and pp. 9-19 respectively.
13 For a discussion of the 'simulacre' in Klossowski's work and the relation of this term to Plato's
thought see Gilles Deleuze, Logigue du sens (paris: Minuit, 1969), pp. 292-307. Deleuze
describes the simulacrum in the following terms: 'Le simulacre est construit sur une disparite,
sur une difference, i1 interiorise une dissimilitude. C'est pourquoi nous ne pourrons meme plus
Ie definir par rapport au modele qui s'impose aux copies, modele dont derive la ressemblance
des copies. Si Ie simulacre a encore un modele, c'est un autre modele, un modele de l'Autre dont
decoule une dissemblance interiorisee', Logigue du sens, p. 297. Deleuze goes on to add 'Le
simulacre inclut en soi le point de vue differentiel; I' observateur fait partie du simulacre lui-
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not been alluded to so far throughout the previous chapters, when talking about Sade
writing perversion, about parody, translation or myth it has always also been the status
of the 'simulacrum' which has been at stake. This is true also for both Klossowski's
painting and writing in general.
In a text published recently in a collection of interviews with Alain Jouffroy, Le
Secret Pouvoir du sens" Klossowski gives a brief definition of the term :
Par simulacre, je n'entends pas, comme on l'a cru ou compris de facon
malveillante, un tableau simule, mais le tableau simulant materiellement une
vision interieure, done intime et moralement eprouvee (le phantasme), soit la
contrainte qu'elle exerce et ainsi exteriorisee selon les regles traditionnelles de
l'image.
It is interesting firstly to note that Klossowski applies the term simulacrum to both his
writing and painting. Any attempt, therefore, to see the painting as more immediate an
expression of Klossowski's visions is highly problematic since the painted and the
written image both comply to the constraints of regles traditionnelles'. Both painting
and writing seek to represent this 'vision interieure', Yet neither represent it in any
direct or immediate way; they only ever simulate it. Whereas representation implies the
creation of an image or copy of an originary moment of vision, simulation implies that
the image produced always incorporates its difference from what it seeks to represent
it always affirms itself as a bad or unfaithful copy. The remaining three sections of this
thesis will investigate the passage from 'le phantasme' (an interior vision) to the
meme, qui se forme et se deforme avec son point de vue', Logique du sens, p. 298. This
formulation is very close to K1ossowski's (his close relationship to Deleuze was revealed in the
last chapter) and is particularly important insofar as it alludes to the functioning of the
simulacrum and the position of the subject (as part of the simulacrum). The 'meaning' ofthe
simulacrum in relation to Klossowski's writing and painting will be highlighted as this chapter
progresses.
14 Le Secret Pouvoir du sens, pp. 58-60. This text was a written response to a conversation Klossowski
had previously had with Jouffroy.
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simulacrum (an artefact or work of art) as a movement of 'simulation' which is proper
to both Klossowski's fiction and his painting. In the first of these I will discuss
Klossowski's attempt to write 'Ie phantasme' in La Revocation and Roberte ce soir". In
the second the very notion of 'Ie phantasme' as visual or as a moment of vision will be
examined (in relation to Klossowski's painting). At the same time the question of the
primacy of 'vision' (and therefore also the primacy of visual art over written word will)
be posed. In the third section the singularity of the 'phantasme' will be investigated
more closely within the context of Klossowski's discourse around economy or
exchange. Octave's conception of 'Les Lois de l'hospitalite' and Klossowski's will
provide the focus for this final discussion.
Throughout, this passage from 'Ie phantasme' to 'Ie simulacre' as it is
constructed in Klossowski's work will discussed alongside the issues alluded to earlier.
His novels and paintings, as they obsessively simulate 'Ie phantasme' in a movement
apparently without end, continue to provoke the considerations with which this
discussion began. As the reader witnesses Roberte taken roughly from behind,
resisting and then succumbing pleasurably to her possessor, should he or she not feel
some discomfort? Will she quite rightly have more reserves in overcoming this
response than he might? Negotiating such potential discomfort alongside the
paradoxes and aporias of Klossowski's artistic enterprise will occupy the remainder of
this thesis.
IS This focus on the figure of Roberte rather than that of the 'adolescent' will mean that Le Baphomet
and L'Adolescent immortel will not be discussed here. In focusing on the terms 'phantasme' and
'simulacre' and the relation between the two, it is necessary to concentrate on either one figure or
the other rather than both and that, broadly speaking, the same issues are at stake in both Les
Lois de l'hospitalite and Le Baphomet.
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Writing.
La Revocation de l'Edit de Nantes and Roberte ce soir offer their reader an
alternation between familiar and extremely unfamiliar settings. The narrative begins in
a Parisian household where the ageing Octave and his wife dwell along with their
nephew Antoine. Guests are invited into the household to tutor the young adolescent.
In her diary Roberte remembers the latter days of the Second World War which she
spent in Rome. In his diary Octave muses upon his Tonnerre collection and upon his
strange domestic custom - 'Les lois de l'hospitalite'. Through this unusual custom the
unfamiliar comes to inhabit the text. Octave's complex formulation of'Les lois de
l'hospitalite' will be addressed in more detail later. In its simplest form, however, it
expresses his desire, in the name of hospitality, to offer Roberte up to guests of his
house for the purposes of sexual encounter. The Parisian dwelling, the cellar of a Paris
boutique or the interior of a Roman church all become unfamiliar with the sudden
emergence of fantastic or improbable figures who begin to engage Roberte in all
manner of sexual caresses.
If these scenes of sexual encounter introduce the unfamiliar into the text, they
are also potentially disturbing. This potential manifests itself because, as has already
been indicated, Roberte is not a willing sexual partner. In all these encounters Roberte
is subject to the violence of constraint. In the opening scene of La Revocation, the
'scene de la grave offense' (LH,17-20), Roberte enters a church in Rome on an errand
to recover a list of Jewish refugees hidden in a tabernacle (a task which, we learn later,
was given to her by a hospitalised Nazi officer). As she removes the paper from the
tabernacle three knocks of a halberd upon the floor announce the approach of a giant
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figure in the costume of a Swiss Guard. At the same time two hands, identical to her
own, emerge from the tabernacle, seize and immobilise her. The giant figure traps her
body between himself and the alter. One ofRoberte's hands, having been covered with
a fine cream by the pair of hands which emerged from the tabernacle, is then seized
and pressed onto a page of the Bible. The giant figure, still pressing Roberte up against
the alter, then sprinkles carbon dust over the page to bring her hand-print into relief
The giant figure turns Roberte around to look at her face and body as she describes
herself 'serree dans rna gaine, les epaules, les bras et les cuisses nus', turns her around
again and comments '«De dos, vous faites encore mieux que de face ... »' (LH,20) and
on that ominous note, which implies that her sexual encounter is by no means finished,
the scene ends.
The sexual violence done to Roberte is repeated throughout a number of
episodes in the trilogy of novels. Later in La Revocation she is forced into a cellar by
another giant figure (the same?) and a squat dwarf-like character, attached to a set of
gymnastic parallel bars with handcuffs, and has her hands licked (LH,40-5). In the
central scene ofRoberte ce soir (LH,137-47) the heroine has her genitals licked by a
hunchbacked, spaniel headed dwarf, and once more is sexually assaulted by a giant
figure in a scene where sexual organs (including an extended and erect clitoris) are
described using Latin words ('utrumsit' for vagina, 'quidest' for clitoris and 'vacuum'
for anus(LH,145-7».
These are just three examples of the sexual scenes in Les Lois de I'hospitalite,
but even such a brief outline suggests that these key moments of the text are at once
bizarre and disturbing. They are potentially disturbing because they portray what
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amounts to sexual assault or rape and this intum raises ethical or sexual political
questions with regard to the portrayal of the female body. One might ask, for instance
whether it is desirable to portray the assault of a woman who, whilst initially showing
resistance, then succumbs willingly to her aggressor and whether this is not an
unfortunate repetition of certain violent male fantasies. At the same time, however, the
very bizarre nature of these scenes (e.g. the theatricality of a Swiss Guard's costume,
the focus on unusual hand fetishism and the parodic use of Latin words) render them
very different from anything resembling pornography or titillating prose which would
stimulate or otherwise repeat nefarious sexual fantasies. Should the reader respond as
Roberte does when she espies the Swiss Guard's costume in the 'scene de la grave
offense' and says' A peine eus-je reconnu en lui un suisse pontifical que tout sentiment
de serieux m'abandonna' (LH,19)? These scenes should not perhaps be taken
seriously but be viewed only as parody or pantomime where 'la parole n'est plus
qu'une incarnation de la trahison et les mouvements de la chair la pantomime des
esprits' (LH,144). What follows will analyse the difficulty of situating these scenes as
scenes of fantasy to which any stable or gendered subject can be attributed and argue
that it is precisely their theatrical and parodic character and their status as pantomime
which undermines or displaces the violence which one normally associates with
pornography (e.g. the reification of the female body for the benefit ofa male gaze).
It soon becomes clear on closer reading that the status of these scenes of erotic
encounter is unclear. For instance, there is no straightforward indication within the
text of the relation of such scenes and their fantastical protagonists to Octave's 'Lois
de l'hospitalite'. The reader is more often than not given no clues at all as to the
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identity of these figures. One is not sure whether they are constructed within the text
as Octave's projections, or whether they can be attributed to Klossowski's own
unconscious (and distinctively masculine) desire. That they entail the sudden eruption
of the unfamiliar and the fantastic into the settings of La Revocation and Roberte ce
soir suggests, perhaps, an implicit reference to Freud and to his concept of the
Uncanny. This might suggest, then, that these are scenes of sexual fantasy in a
traditional psychoanalytic sense in which the images and symbols can be interpreted in
such a way that one might eventually be able to construct a subject of the fantasy and
analyse therein the forces of desire which are at work.
It is evident from the discussion of Klossowski's writing around Nietzsche that
in a universe which has become fable distinctions between reality and fiction or reality
and fantasy are suspended and no longer function as they would in an existence which
has as its foundation 'Ie monde vrai'. In a universe become fable, one which is itself a
form of narrative, the very concept of'reality principle' (which gives the term fantasy
its force) must be abandoned along with the classical philosophical distinction between
the 'real' and the 'apparent'. This became most evident during the discussion of La
Vocation suspendue. The narrative structure of this text, and the play of parody to
which it gives rise, articulated a fundamental break within language. The language of
the narrative no longer 'referred' to a real world or commented on a real book but
revealed itself to be the repetition of an always already absent moment. The
commentary which was only ever a commentary of a commentary staged the loss of
that originary moment which would allow the text to coincide with an authentic 'real'
(or even itself). As the various motifs associated with the fresco referred the one to the
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other within the text (in a movement seemingly without end) and the spheres of the
artistic and the theological were collapsed in the figure of the painter/priest, any
moment where the text might transcend itself and attain Truth was shown to be
infinitely deferred.
The same process of textual disorigination structures the narratives of La
Revocation and Roberte ce soir. As in La Vocation suspendue. reference is made to a
real historical context (that of the Second World War) and to real geographical spaces
(occupied France, Paris, Rome). At the same time, as in La Vocation suspendue, the
narrative also constantly suggests its own ever-present textuality. In Roberte ce soir
there is reference to a work seemingly very similar to Roberte ce soir itself, entitled
Tacita. Ie colo sse et Ie bossu and authored by Octave. Does Tacita refer, then, to
another work within its pages which would be similar yet different to both Roberte ce
soir and Tacita (and does that work refer to another similar work and so on ad
infinitum)?
This infinite regression from work of art to work of art is suggested in a
different way by Octave inLa Revocation through his discussions of painting, his
references to Frederic de Tonnerre and to the question of the tableau vivant. The
tableau vivant, as it is discussed by Octave in the opening pages of his diary, calls into
question the notion of origin in much the same way as did the existence of the fresco in
La Vocation suspendue. It will be recalled that a figure in the fresco, which
represented a Carmelite sister on her death bed, had as its model a photograph from
the Spanish civil war. This photograph depicted the desecration of a dead nun whose
body had been dug up in Barcelona by anarchists. In turn this photograph proved to be
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a fake, a tableau arranged by the painter Malagrida, the dead nun being represented by
the live nun of the novel Sister Theophile (who modelled for the painting before she
ever became a nun). What appeared to be a representation of a specific event (the
moment of revelation depicted in the fresco) was shown to be caught up in a chain of
substitutes and false copies without any reference to an authentic originary moment.
The same is true of sexual scenes ofLes Lois de l'hospitalite.
These scenes are sometimes events narrated in either Octave's or Roberte's
diaries, at others they are descriptions given by Octave ofa Tonnerre canvas (e.g. La
Belle Versaillaise). It is difficult however to distinguish properly between the two.
Tonnerre's La Belle Versaillaise, which depicts a woman of some social standing being
sexually attacked by two young communards is described in detail by Octave in one of
his diary entries (LH,80-3). On first glance this episode seems to be a straightforward
description of a painting. However there are certain indicators in the text which render
this judgement problematic. Octave asks at one point with reference to the detail of his
description 'Me dira-t-on que je fais ici de la petite histoire, que je reve a haute voix,
j'attirerai l'attention de l'amateur desabuse sur le rapport remarquable ici entre la
mimique des mains et la facture du visage de la dame' (LH,82). Octave is refuting that
his description is simply a 'reverie' but nonetheless suggests the possibility. He does
this again later when he remarks 'Ne serait-ce pas deja un risque suffisant pour rna
propre description, si elle ne s'appuyait sur la realite materielle du tableau, qu'elle
laissat transpirer une reverie morbide' (LH,83). Once again whilst insisting on the
material existence of the painting Octave is opening up the possibility that his
description is not that of an objective reality. The similarity between the scene Octave
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describes from the Tonnerre painting (or his own 'reverie morbide'?) and the other
scenes of La Revocation (there is a scene where Roberte is again engaged sexually by
two adolescents, that of the Collegiens which will be discussed later) once again poses
this question of origin. Perhaps Octave is interpreting La Belle Versaillaise through his
own predilections and obsessions and perhaps also the scenes of sexual fantasy are
projections of this. By the same token Octave would be the 'origin' of all these
episodes insofar as they are productions of his own conscious or unconscious desires.
Yet Octave's discussion of the tableau vivant at the beginning of his diary
immediately throws such judgements into doubt. He describes the tableau vivant as
'ce genre faux en soi' (LB,16) which contrary to what its name implies never
represents a moment of real presence. Octave goes on to ask 'N'y a-t-il pas toujours
''tableau vivant" au prealable, la OU it y a tableau? Oui et non! Mentalement chez
l'artiste le motif passe par le ''tableau vivant" avant de passer sur la toile' (LB,16).
The tableau vivant precedes the painting itself (or perhaps also the written description)
but not as a moment of presence within the mind of a stable subject :
En effet, si le genre du tableaux vivant n'est qu'une maniere de comprendre le
spectacle que la vie se donne a elle-meme, que nous montre ce spectacle sinon
la vie se reiterant pour se ressaisir dans sa chute, comme retenant son souffle
dans une apprehension de son origine (LB,16)
This is a repetition of the terms of La Bain de Diane. Life becomes spectacle when
seeking its own origin it finds itself to be without origin and repeats the same failed
moment over and again ad infinitum (as did Actaeon). This loss of origin is described
usefully by Octave in the context ofTonnerre's use of the tableau vivant in the
nineteenth century; he writes :
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on s'inspirait generalement d'un tableau celebre present a l'esprit de tout Ie
monde pour Ie reconstituer, Ie plus souvent dans un salon, avec Ie concours de
personnes, acteurs improvises, et on s'amusait a rendre, avec la plus grande
fidelite des gestes, des poses, de l'eclairage, l'effet que l'on supposait produit
par Ie chef-d'oeuvre de tel ou tel maitre (LH,16).
Whether one is talking ofa Tonnerre canvas or any other of the key scenes in the
novel, implies Octave, it is their status as representations of tableaux vivants which is
most crucial. The motif precedes the painting or written description (and by
implication the consciousness of Octave himself), but is itself not a point of origin
since whatever is being represented is always caught up in the infinite 'detour' of the
already written, the already figured. There are many aspects of La Revocation and
Roberte ce soir as a whole which reflect this. For instance the familiar context of
Octave's household and his love of paintings carries along with it echoes and
resonances of Symbolist decadence. Octave, one might say, is already a literary type,
his obsessions and perversions being prefigured in characters such as Huysmans' des
Esseintes in A .. ebours. For example, des Esseintes' collection of paintings, alluded to
in the epigraph of this chapter, testify to his own love of the artificial, the unnatural
and the perverse. Given this formulation of the tableau vivant at the beginning of La
Revocation as a textual disorigination, any attempt to construct the sexual episodes as
scenes offantasy 'belonging' to a stable subject is clearly problematic. As will become
clear, this is borne out in a detailed analysis of the scenes themselves.
In his commentary on Freud's Interpretation of Dreams in Discours,figurel6
Jean-Francois Lyotard argues in the context of this question of reality and its relation
to fantasy or fiction that Freudian fantasy does not necessarily imply a stable reality or
16 Jean-Francois Lyotard, Discours. figyre (paris: Klincksieck, 1971),
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a reality principle (which Klossowski's text so clearly wishes to overturn). For Lyotard
the Freudian conception of unconscious fantasy radically destabilises reality in its
traditional sense in a manner which is not dissimilar to the disorigination of the real
which occurs inKlossowski's text. The Freudian reality principle, Lyotard argues,
refers to that realm of experience from which the fulfilment of desire has been denied
(it has been repressed to form unconscious desire). Reality is not objective but simply
part of the imaginary from which desire has been withdrawn or within which desire is
foreclosed :
la realite est constituee cl partir de l'imaginaire. Ce qui est donnee d'abord, c'est
l'objet fantasmatique. La formation d'un objet "reel" est une epreuve qui
correspond dans le sujet cl la constitution du moi-realite. La realite n'est jamais
qu'un secteur du champ imaginaire auquel nous avons accepte de renoncer,
duquel nous avons accepte de desinvestir nos fantasmes de desir'".
The terms fantasy and reality are no longer distinct or in opposition to each other but
rather they describe an experience which is either invested with unconscious desire or
one which is not (what we would call reality). Likewise with reference to the sexual
scenes inKlossowski's text no distinctions between fantasy and reality or fiction and
reality are tenable (since as tableaux vivants they never refer to anything which implies
a stable 'real'). It is therefore problematic to talk of an interruption of the 'fantastic'
into the realistic settings of La Revocation or Roberte ce soir (i.e. the eruption of
repressed material which 'subverts' the reality principle). Rather, like Lyotard, one
must talk of the familiar and the unfamiliar, or perhaps, as does Lyotard, one must talk
of the 'reconnaissable' and of the 'rneconnaissable' :
La ligne de partage qui est pertinente pour notre problems ne passe pas entre le
reel et l'imaginaire, mais entre le reconnaissable et le meconnaissable. lei
17 Discours. figure. p, 284.
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s'introduit la consideration du troisieme espace, different aussi bien de celui du
langage que de celui du monde, la difference est proprement l'inconscient".
This comment offers a useful framework for identifying the specificity of the sexual
scenes of La Revocation and Roberte ce soir. When, for instance, an impossibly giant
figure appears to Roberte in a Roman church the reader is not passed from a realistic
setting to a fantastic one but rather from one which is familiar (a church) to one which
is unfamiliar (a space where bizarre creatures suddenly appear which would belong
more properly in a Gothic novel). A comment by Roberte reflects this:
Pres d'un pilier se discernaient les contours d'un personnage trop gigantesque
pour ne pas etre le simulacre d'un autre monde : appuye sur la hampe de sa
hallebarde, en costume de lansquenet, ses yeux etincelant sous le heaulme, tout
irreel, comme brusquement sorti de quelque tableau de vieux maitre pour epier
ici rna propre irrealite (LH,19).
The reference made to the 'tableau de vieux maitre' echoes Octave's claim that the
tab/eau vivant is always a copy or a repetition of an already represented scene. This in
tum emphasises that both figures, Roberte and the giant, are 'irreel', both are self-
consciously artificial constructions, elements of fiction - simulacra. The distinction that
is made is that the colossus figure is a 'simulacre d'un autre monde', and Roberte,
Octave, Parisian apartment or Roman church are simulacra of this world, bound as it is
by history and society and the renunciation of desire. A simulacrum of this world
carries a resemblance to the familiar world of the everyday (e.g. post-war Paris). A
simulacrum of 'un autre monde', gestures elsewhere, toward unfamiliar terrain. The
difference, as Lyotard puts it, is the unconscious. What the scenes of sexual fantasy
stage is desire, that of 'Ia vision interieure', of 'le phantasme'. Yet as the discussion of
the tab/eau vivant has implied 'le phantasme' is not a fantasy to which a subject can be
18 Di fiscours, gure, p. 285.
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attributed but rather suggests a more impersonal force of desire which is without
ongm.
A close examination of these sexual scenes reveals the difficulty inherent in any
attempt to 'situate' them, either within a specific geographical location (where they
seem, ostensibly, to occur) or within the mind of a specific character. This uncertainty
oflocation is manifest first and foremost in the way narrative indicators of space and
time undergo certain shifts in the sexual episodes of, in particular, La Revocation de
l'Edit de Nantes.
Place and time.
This question of location and responsibility can be addressed by examining
closely the manner in which some of the key scenes in La Revocation and Roberte ce
soir are narrated. The strangeness and unfamiliarity of these scenes in relation to the
rest of the narrative is most evident in two of the major sexual episodes of La
Revocation, that of the 'barres paralleles' and of 'les collegiens'. The first is told by
Roberte in her diary and has already briefly been alluded to. In it Roberte is taken into
the basement ofa boutique in the Palais-Royal by a large figure (the 'colo sse') and an
'homme trapu', where she is then attached to a set of parallel bars and sexually
caressed in a number of ways. The strangest of these entails the licking of her hands
and wrists by the 'colosse'. The second scene will be discussed later and occurs in an
anonymous room in a building 'entre Condorcet et Saint-Lazare' (LH,60). Here
Roberte has a sexual encounter with two of her nephew Antoine's 'college' associates,
with the accompanying props of a footstool and a torch.
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The location of these encounters in relation to the narratives contained in either
Roberte's or Octave's diary is, however, ambiguous. Although it is clear, for instance,
that the incident of the 'barres paralleles' occurs in the cellar of a boutique in the
Palais-Royal, the manner in which it is recounted renders such clear geographical
determinations uncertain. Firstly it must be noted that the incident is told twice; once
in severely elided form and secondly, in more detail from a retrospective viewpoint.
Roberte tells of how she espies an improbably large figure on a bus who looks her up
and down, focusing particularly on her hands. The figure then follows her off the bus
and finally corners her in a boutique where he is joined by the 'homme trapu'. She
describes the episode as follows :
Passant par le portique du Palais-Royal, je m'engageai dans la galerie de
Montpensier. Sous les arcades a peu pres desertes a cette heure-la, des pas
repondaient aux miens, se rapprochaient; chose banale pour une parlementaire,
on me suivait. L'individu, sorte de colosse gras, glabre, type du parfait
indicateur a la petite semaine, s'arrete a un intervalle de deux ou trois vitrines
chaque fois que je jette un coup d'eeil dans l'une ou I'autre devanture. OU done
se situe la nouvelle chemiserie que m'avait suggeree Gilberte? Je passe enfin
sous la voute de la galerie Beaujolais: c'est bien bien la, a droite. Mais a
present l'indvidu m'a doublee. Je pousse une porte vitree, me trompe de
boutique - celle-ci n'est qu'en transformation -I'individu y penetre a son tour.
Bien qu'au-dehors les personnes qui circulent ou stationnent devant l'etalage
du bouquiniste d' en face puissent apercevoir par les vitres a demi depolies ce
qui se produirait d'anormal dans cette boutique vide, nul n'y songe un instant.
Le dos contre la porte vitree, le colo sse m'interdit le passage des que je veux
ressortir, la main sur la poignee. Alors, par une porte du fond, apparait un
autre homme, de taille moyenne, trapu, en manches de chemise. Tous deux se
devisagent d'un regard convenu. Le second se retire et laisse la porte
entrebaillee ...
... Moins d'une heure plus tard je vais m'asseoir a la terrasse de la
Regence, les tempes battantes. Mais mes mains tremblent sans doute et le
garcon me demande tout de suite si ea ne va pas. Je souris, me leve pour aller
aux lavabos, me considere dans la glace: inutile de me repeindre le visage, j'ai
excellente mine. Somme toute, que leur reprocher au juste? Si'ils ont goute un
lamentable plaisir ... Pour moi, c'est a present que Ie plaisir commence. Je
regagne la terrasse et je recapitule. Alors que sur la plate-forme de l'autobus je
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me tenais le dos contre le bastingage, le bras leve, la main egaree sur la barre,
Ie colo sse, qui causait d'abord avec Ie receveur, m'avait pris les doigts. J'etais
allee a l'interieur choisir une banquette vide; mais lui, venu s'asseoir en face de
moi, me scrutait alors d'insolente facon (LH,41-2).
Perhaps most striking about this sequence of events is that it a large section of it is
narrated in the present tense. This question will be addressed in more detail shortly.
Important here is the fact that the encounter between Roberte and her assailants is
entirely elided from this straightforward telling of events (the 'points de suspension'
that form the break between the two paragraphs of this passage are Klossowski's). A
detailed account is only given when Roberte sits down afterwards and recounts the
incident from memory: 'Je regagne la terrasse et je recapitule' (LH,42) (and when she
does this the past tense is restored). This elision and subsequent retelling is significant.
The scene is not told as part of a sequence of events that 'happened' in any
straightforward way. It is told in such way that it is clearly filtered and to some
uncertain extent modified in Roberte's recollection. As she sits on the cafe terrace
afterwards what is recounted seems, in part, to have a status separate from that
encounter which has just been elided: 'Somme toute, que leur reprocher au juste? Slits
ont goute un lamentable plaisir ... Pour moi c'est a present que Ie plaisir commence'
(LH,42). Itwould seem that the events narrated by Roberte, which the reader
identifies as the episode of the 'barres paralleles', did not in fact occur beneath a
boutique in the Palais-Royal but rather can be located in the imagination of Roberte.
Perhaps this, then, is her fantasy; whatever did happen has been reworked along the
lines of her own desire and her own pleasure.
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This supposition is, however, complicated by other comments Roberte makes.
The central motif of this fantasy is the attaching of Roberte to the set of parallel bars
and the licking of her hands by the 'colo sse' . She suggests that the whole impetus of
the scene stems from the moment on the bus when the 'colosse' strokes her fingers :
n fallait qu'il me touche les doigts et, des lors, plus moyen pour lui de s'arreter
jusqu'a la descente dans le sous-sol. A partir de cet attouchement furtif mais
irrepressible, quel scenario a la fois rapide et minutieux a dil se derouler sous
son crane? (LH,42).
The entire contents of this scene, the fetishised moment of hand-licking, could
therefore be attributed to the sexual pathology of the 'colosse'. The significance of the
hand-licking here is unclear. However, the 'colo sse' from the very first encounter with
Roberte in La Revocation is clearly obsessed with her hands. As has already been
mentioned, during this first encounter he takes a print of her palm with carbon dust
whilst pinning her down from behind in a sexual position. The significance of Roberte's
hands will be looked at in more detail as this discussion progresses. The question that
must be posed here is whether the fetishism ofRoberte's hands which the 'colosse'
displays over a number of episodes can lead the reader to believe that this is properly
his fantasy. Can one say, once more, that the events described do not take place in an
identifiable location in Paris but rather in the mind of this strange figure, in the strange
world of his private desire, acted out 'sous son crane'? If so, what is the identity of this
figure?" The incident of the parallel bars seems to hang indeterminately between three
locations : the geographical space of the boutique, and the respective imaginations of
19 This question will be addressed in detail shortly. However it is worthy of note at this stage that in
the paintings entitled 'Les Barres paralleles' (1972) the figure licking Roberte's hands seems to
resemble Klossowski himself.
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Roberte and that of the 'colosse'. Roberte herself alludes to the uncertain status of this
encounter towards the end of her diary entry :
Cette occasion particuliere de me sentir moi-meme depuis l'instant OU j'etais
montee a I'aventure dans cet autobus jusqu' a celui ou, dans ce sous-sol, je me
retrouvais suspendue et secouee, cette occasion-la n'est des lors ni plus ni
moins que l'arc tendu de rna reflexion au-dessus de cette apres-midi oisive
(LH,45).
The reference to 'l'arc tendu de rna reflexion' recalls the silver bow of the goddess
Diana in Le Bain de Diane. This allusion could be of help here. In Le Bain de Diane
the intermediary demon which simulates the theophany of the goddess was described
as 'l'imagination d'Acteon et le miroir de Diane?'. This episode can perhaps be located
in that demonic intermediary space, both in the imagination of the 'colo sse' and in
Roberte's 'reflexion' (carrying with it as it does the connotation of'miroir'). Or rather it
cannot be located in either, but rather in a space which, because it is intermediate,
spills beyond the control of anyone subject, with the result that it is subjectivity itself
as a figure of responsibility which is suspended or effaced.
Roberte's encounter with the 'collegiens' also bears witness to this suspension
of subjectivity. Although it is narrated by Octave, it becomes clear that the scene, if it
can be said to have 'happened', did so as the result of a bet between Vittorio and the
two adolescents involved, and that it was recounted to Octave by Vittorio who himself
was not present. The events are narrated in great detail, yet all the details have no
guarantee of authenticity. One cannot be sure if they occurred in fact or whether they
were modified by Vittorio as a result of his own fantasy. Octave alludes to the problem
of giving any credence to what he recounts on several occasions; for example :
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Roberte allait deja franchir la porte de sortie, lorsqu'un groom, venant en sens
inverse, portant je ne sais quoi de gras et de tachant dans un recipient en aurait
verse au passage sur les souliers de Roberte; et aussitot les deux petits cireurs
qui attendaient, de se precipiter, d'avancer l'escabeau, etc., etc. Mais je n'en
crois rien - ce detail me semble avoir ete invente apres coup pour expliquer
l'incomprehensible geste de Roberte ... (LH,56).
The details may have been changed or modified at any stage. The use of the
conditional tense 'en aurait verse', implying, as it does, an event which was alleged to
have happened, suggests this. Also Octave's account is so detailed that it could not be
recounted in such a way unless he himself were present or he were himself imagining
it. Again the question is posed: is this an event that took place in a building between
Condorcet and Saint-Lazare or is it a fantasy which could be attributed to any number
of the characters in the novel, Vittorio, as the instigator of the bet, Octave, as the
narrator, or even the nephew Antoine?" Again no clear answer to this question can be
gained from a reading of the text itself.
In this way, then, in both the scenes of the parallel bars and that of the
'collegiens' one can see that the narrative does not allow the episode recounted to be
positioned either in the geographical place in which they ostensibly occur or within the
imagination or fantasy ofa particular character. The sexual fantasy seems to be located
in a kind of impersonal space or non-space which cannot be reduced to the mind of the
narrator (the diaries of either Roberte or Octave). This point is reinforced by the use of
tenses in both these episodes.
20 Le Sain de Diane, p. 46. The identification of Roberte with the goddess Diana is, however, a
complex one and will be discussed in more detail later.
21 Antoine, of course, has complex sexual feelings towards his aunt and one could see this scene as
some form of sexual projection on his part given the figures involved are adolescents like him. It
could be noted once more that when this scene is painted in 1989 it is given the title Roberte et
les collegiens ou Ie cauchemar d'Antoine and features several figures on the right-hand side of
the painting depicting an anguished dreaming adolescent.
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The difficulty of spatial determination in these sexual scenes is paralleled by an
uncertainty of temporality. This is signalled by a shift in tense usage at key moments in
the narration. In the incident of the parallel bars, for example, there is a distinct point
at which the narrative moves from the use of past tense to the use of the present tense.
If one recalls part of the passage already cited :
Passant par le portique du Palais-Royal, je m'engageai dans la galerie de
Montpensier. Sous les arcades a peu pres desertes a cette heure-la, des pas
repondaient aux miens, se rapprochaient; chose banale pour une parlementaire,
on me suivait. L'individu, sorte de colo sse gras, glabre, type du parfait
indicateur a la petite semaine, s'arrete a un intervalle de deux ou trois vitrines
chaque fois que je jette un coup d'oeil dans l'une ou dans l'autre devanture
(LII,41).
This, it could be argued, is exactly the moment of transition between the familiar and
the unfamiliar. Up to this point Roberte has referred only to an unspecified figure who
touched her on a bus and to someone (perhaps the same person, one cannot be sure)
who stared at her to the point where she got off the bus. From the moment that she
actually identifies her potential assailant as a 'sorte de colosse gras' the narrative shifts
into the present tense. The narrative then continues in the present tense until the
moment after the elision referred to above when Roberte writes 'Je regagne la terrasse
et je recapitule' (LII,42). At this moment there is a return to the use of the past tense
which continues until the point where Roberte narrates her descent into the cellar :
Avisant une sortie au palier superieur qui prend jour sans doute sur la rue de
Beaujolais, j'ai voulu m'elancer. Mais le trapu, qui m'attendait sur les marches,
abat sa main sur mes doigts agrippes a la rampe; et moi qui crois encore
possible de fuir, je les retire d'un geste brusque, redescends et - a deux pas de
l'arriere boutique, ce moment ou, encore resolue a me defendre, de mon sac
frappant le colosse au visage, je l'ai w s'accroupir, mais crouler presque ...
quand, deja sous rna jupe, sa main s'insinue entre la jarretelle et la chair, saisit
en plein le gras de rna cuisse, son bras enlace mes jambes, me souleve, me fait
basculer sur son epaule, mouvement inattendu et si precipite que j' ai dil me
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retenir des deux mains a sa nuque - et alors sa folIe descente avec moi, par
l'escalier en limacon au sous-sol (LH,43).
As Roberte retells the episode it is only when she enters the site of the encounter itself
that the tense changes once more. As the unfamiliar and the sexually perverse invade
the text in this way the time of diary narrative gives way to a present tense. This use of
the present is by no means unusual in French. The <historic present' is often employed
to lend past events a degree of immediacy and excitement which a simple retelling in
the past would not convey. Yet what it does in this instance is, also, to propel the
scene of sexual encounter out of a determined sequence of past events (the diary
entry) into a non-determined temporal space". Klossowski's use of this classical device
allows the present tense forms to erupt, as it were, into the narrative sequences told in
the past. This eruption of the present suspends action by taking it out of the time of
the story and placing it into an ever-present moment, which lies outside the normal
sequence of narrated events.
This same process occurs in Klossowski's use of another narrative device in the
telling of the 'collegiens' episode. In this case the shift is not from a usage of the past
to the present tense but rather from one kind of past tense to another. In the following
passage the transition between the 'passe simple' and the 'imparfait' signals the first
point of sexual engagement between Roberte and the 'collegiens' :
Et ce fut en se penchant vers la glace, amoureusement sans doute, que
machinalement, c'est le moins qu'on puisse dire, elle posa un pied sur l'escabeau
22 Klossowski's use of terms which have theatrical connotations emphasise this suspension of normal
time. 'La rampe' is an inclined surface but is also the array of lights at the foot of a theatre stage.
Theatrical time (the succession of events on the stage) entails by definition a suspension of 'real'
time (that of our everyday experience). Such theatrical references also recall Klossowski's
formulation of writing as spectacle in Le Bain de Diane. pp. 44-5 and Origines cultuelles et
mythigpes d'un certain comportement des dames romaines. p. 54.
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qu'on lui avancait. Les deux petits frotteurs s'empressaient et elle, laissant faire,
en etait a se mettre du rouge aux levres, lorsque la lumiere s'eteignit. En un
toumemain, la substitution etait faite. X. avait saisi le pied de Roberte, pose sur
l'escabeau, tandis que F., place derriere eUe, passant ses bras par devant,
relevait les pans du manteau par le revers de la jupe et, les faisant glisser sur le
genou leve de Roberte, les remontait jusqu'a la ceinture; x., d'une main, avait
immobilise a la cheville la jambe avancee de Roberte et, de l'autre main,
recevait une lampe de poche que F. faisait clignoter sous la cuisse de Roberte
(LH,57).
From the moment when 'la substitution etait faite' the 'passe simple' is abandoned in
favor of the imperfect. Here, and in other parts of the narrative like it, the imperfect is
used to describe a suspended moment, where the actions are held and seem to be
always ongoing (as in a tableau vivant). This usage of the imperfect can be usefully
analysed through a comparison with Proust's novel A la Recherche de temps perdu.
Genette comments on Proust's use of the imperfect in his essay 'Discours du recit?'.
Genette makes the distinction between actions which are narrated as unique events in
what he calls the 'recit singulatif and actions which are narrated as habitual or repeated
by the 'recit iteratif'. Genette claims in his essay that no literary work, other than
Proust's: 'n'ajamais fait de l'iteratif'un usage comparable". The narration of habitual
actions of Sunday routine in Combray, for instance, all rely on iterative narration. Yet,
Genette argues, the way in which Marcel recalls his childhood leads to a blurring of
the distinction between the 'singulatif and the 'iteratif into what he calls the 'pseudo-
iteratif', He defines the 'pseudo-iteratif as follows :
c'est-a-dire de scenes presentees, en particulier par leur redaction a l'imparfait,
comme iteratives, alors que la richesse et la precision des details font qu'aucun
23 Gerard Genette, Figures III (Paris: Seuil, 1972).
24 Gerard Genette, Figures III, p. 148-49.
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lecteur ne peut croire serieusement qu'elles se sont produites ainsi, plusieurs
fois, sans aucune variation".
A similar merging of the singular and the iterative can be observed in KIossowski's use
of the imperfect to narrate Roberte's encounter with the 'collegiens', Gestures which
are discrete events and which do not appear to be ongoing (e.g. 'X. [...] recevait une
lampe de poche') are placed in this tense of suspended incompletion. As the episode is
narrated. filtered through the fantasy of Vittorio/Octave/Antoine, the singular action is
transformed into something which suspends narrative time. Moreover narrating the
action in the imperfect places it within the temporality of repetition.
Proust himself signals the transformational power of the imperfect tense in his
famous article on Flaubert 'A propos du style de Flaubert'". He calls the imperfect
tense as it is used inFlaubert's L'Education sentiment ale 'cet eternel imparfait' and
affirms that it can 'change entierement l'aspect des choses et les etres'27. Proust's
comment offers a clue to Klossowski's adoption of this convention in La Revocation.
By placing the singular action into the mode of the 'pseudo-iteratif', the use of this
convention removes it from a strictly past temporality and places it into a tense of
timelessness and repetition. The force of this convention is ultimately very similar to
the use of the 'historic present' in the 'barres paralleles' episode. In both cases narrative
time is suspended. The narration of the central scene ofRoberte ce soir in the present
tense now takes on greater significance. A sense of timelessness or eternity is
reaffirmed when the 'colosse' appears suddenly at the door ofRoberte bathroom just
2S Gerard Genette, Figures III, p. 152.
26 Proust, 'A propos du style de Flaubert', Contre Sainte-Beuve suivie de essais et articles, (Paris:
Gallimard.Pleaide, 1971), pp. 586- 600.
27Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve suivie de essais et articles, p. 590.
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prior to her sexual encounter with both him and the aborted dwarf figure she finds
clinging to her thigh. Describing the 'colo sse' the narrator says :
Sous l'ample manteau gris negligemrnent jete sur les epaulettes, il serre la
cravache dans son poing gante de blanc, tandis que l'autre, pose sur la hanche,
semble indiquer que c'est de toute eternite qu'il se tient ainsi, la grabuette
livrant passage au gigantesque membre qui pointe vers Roberte son gland lisse
et admirablement bombe (LH,138).
In all these scenes including that from Roberte ce soir, narrative time appears held in
an eternal present, a time of an eternally repeated moment. Fantasy, then, is not only
irreducible to a specific subject or personality, it is also without time. This re-iterates a
point made by Freud in his essay 'The Unconscious'. In this essay Freud writes: 'The
processes of the Ucs [Unconscious] are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally,
are not ordered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all'". The
particular intensity of the scenes of sexual fantasy in La Revocation de l'Edit de Nantes
and Roherte ce soir comes from the way in which they rework this Freudian notion of
unconscious a-temporality in that they stand outside traditional determinants of space
and time. As narrative events they appear to signal themselves as being beyond or in
excess of narrative perspective and narrative sequentiality.
The implication is that the reader is witnessing neither a male fantasy of
Roberte's possession nor Roberte herself reworking that fantasy along the lines of her
own female desire (nor, indeed, Klossowski unwittingly betraying his own patriarchal
unconscious in assuming Roberte could rework such scenes for her own pleasure).
Rather the text seems to be gesturing towards a scene of fantasy which is without a
subject, to a form of desire which would be ungendered and impersonal. This is
28 'The Unconscious', The Collected Psychological Works of Freud. vol. XIV, pp. 159-216, p. 187
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because it is unclear what relation these scenes might have to the events in the novels
of which the reader can be more sure e.g. (the interactions of the Octave household,
conversations between Octave and Roberte, Octave and Antoine etc.). Again a
reference to Freud's conception offantasy and of the unconscious is helpful. As well as
asserting that the unconscious is without time, Freud also makes the point that the
subject is represented in a very opaque way in the scene offantasy (i.e. that it can not
be identified with anyone figure or motifbut is potentially dispersed amongst many
figures); the subject of the dream is subjected to symbolisation and transformation".
Yet Klossowski takes this one step further in that the sexual scenes appear to have no
clear or determinable subject at aleo. In the gesture they make towards an impersonal
a-temporal space (or non-space) the narration resists any possibility of assimilating
these scenes to the imagination of any one character. A more traditional Freudian
reading might at this point turn to an examination of motifs and symbols in order to
detect and decipher a desiring subject which would be encrypted within the images of
the fantasy. In the case of Klossowski's text, however, as I hope to show, one finds
that the motifs and symbols in these fantasies are, like the narration, carefully
29 See in particular Chapter Six of The Interpretation of Dreams 'The Dream-work', The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Freud. vol. V, pp. 339-508. Freud refers to this
process of symbolisation as a 'dramatisation' of the subject's unconscious thoughts; he writes
'Condensation, together with the transformation of thoughts into situations ('dramatisation'), is
the most important and peculiar characteristic of the dream-work', Freud, 'On Dreams', The
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works ofFreu~ vol. V, pp. 633-86, p. 653.
30 This point is echoed by Daniel Wilhem in his book on Klossowski. In the key moments of
encounter between Roberte and the 'invites' of the text characters cease to function as discrete
entities such that they become in a sense interchangeable in what Withem calls the 'Tete-beehe
du theatre et de l'hospitalite' : 'Les retours et les detours du visiteur des Lois sont machines; la
peripetie est reglee, programmee; mais les figures simulacres se renversent selon les vents, les
eaux, les fers, les courants, les intensites : les debauches se retournent en censeurs, les
seminaristes deviennent officiers nazis, les persecuteurs se retrouvent bienfaiteurs; tous les
corps, ni actifs, ni passifs, mais intensifs, sont indefiniment convertibles; le tete-beebe est
generalise', Daniel Withem, Pierre Klossowski : Ie corps impie (paris: UGE, 1979), p. 71.
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constructed so as to resist any reduction of the fantasy to anyone stable and unified
subject.
Motifs.
The two motifs which recur most often throughout the sexual encounters
recounted in La Revocation and Roberte ce soir are the 'colosse' himself and the
Roberte's hands. The 'colosse' is an apparently anonymous figure who, if his identity
could be fixed, might allow one, nevertheless, to locate the 'subject' of these fantasies.
Likewise the repeated reference to Roberte's hands, to the gestures she makes with
them, and to her gloves as they are removed or remain in place, implies a use of
symbolism which may offer the key to interpreting these scenes and the way they
function in relation to the rest of the text.
However the 'colosse' is a motif rather than a character precisely because it
remains anonymous. It is a figure who certainly is at times identified with a specific
character (Vittorio or Victor) but at others is described as 'un simulacre d'un autre
monde' (as was shown earlier), and again at another point as 'un pur esprit' (LH,140).
The moment in the text when the identity of this figure appears unequivocal is the
central scene ofRoberte ce soir when it is given the name Victor. The reader has
already been introduced to this character in the pages immediately preceding this
episode. In a long and convoluted exchange with his nephew, Octave discusses a
photograph taken during a visit he supposedly made to Madame de Watteville in
Ascona. The photograph depicts Roberte standing by a fire at the moment when her
skirt catches fire. In the same instant a young man is tearing the flaming dress from her
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to reveal her naked legs. Octave identifies this figure as Victor or Vittorio della Sante-
Sede, erstwhile member of the Roman Church and future tutor of Antoine, who is due
to arrive the next day. In the following scene where Roberte is engaged in sexual and
theological congress with the 'colo sse' and 'le bossu' the 'colo sse' is explicitly identified
with Victor:
Tentee de prendre un bain, elle s'eloigne du miroir ou se noie son visage
redevenu severe, mais face au siege pres de la baignoire, elle porte ses doigts
sur ses fesses pour relever sa longue jupe noir, lorsqu'elle avise, s'echappant
de la boite a papier hygienique, les feuillets d'un chapitre de l'ouvrage censure
d'Octave, intitule : Tacita, le colosse et le bossu. Assise sur le siege, elle relit
pour la centieme fois ces elucubrations qui la vexent, sans doute suffisamment
satisfaite de la decision qu'elle vient de prendre au conseil pour commencer a
pisser, pourtant plus outree que satisfaite pour ne pas s'arreter d'uriner, quand
soudain la porte s'ouvre sans bruit sur l'enorme personnage. Le casque a cimier
brille moins que l'email des dents et le blanc des yeux dans la face basanee de
Victor (LH,138).
It is interesting to note that the appearance of Victor is announced by Roberte's
reading of Octave's Tacita. Ie colo sse et Ie bossu. This would once again beg the
question as to whether the fantasy is Octave's (since he is clearly obsessed enough
with this scene to write a book about it) or Roberte's (since she has obviously read the
scene over and again and is very familiar with it). Once again no clear answer is given
to such a question. At the same time this moment of identification of the 'colosse' with
Victor could allow the reader always to associate these two figures with each other.
Like the giant figure in the church at the beginning of La Revocation the 'colosse' is,
here, dressed in elaborate armour and has piercing features (shining eyes in the former
scene and bright white enamelled teeth in the latter). Yet how far does this
identification help in the location of a stable subject position within the sexual scenes
of La Revocation and Roberte ce soir?
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Octave's 'Lois de l'hospitalite' allow one to make sense of this identification.
His desire in formulating this custom is, put in its most banal form, to permit the
adulteration of his wife with a stranger, with guests invited into his household. Victor,
in his role as Antoine's tutor, is clearly the 'invite' of the piece. It could be argued
therefore that Victor's participation in these scenes in the form of 'Ie colosse' is quite
simply a projection of Octave's desire as it is expressed in 'Les Lois de l'hospitalite',
The scenes of sexual fantasy in the text have their source in the imagination of Octave
as he visualises his wife being 'taken' by the stranger Victor. If the 'colo sse' is the key
figure of each fantasy then Octave is its source, Octave is fantasising. Yet such an
attempt to place the fantasy squarely within the imagination of Octave encounters all
the resistances outlined in the discussion of place and time and so must remain highly
problematic. The far from straightforward nature of the character Victor himself also
disrupts the stability of this interpretation. All that is learnt of his history subsequent to
the central scene of 'le colo sse et le bossu' makes it impossible to attribute to him a
clear role or coherent identity.
In a conversation between Octave and Roberte the latter tells of Vittorio della
Sante-Sede's past life at the end of and after the German occupation of Rome. As
some form of bet with a Nazi camp commandant called Binnsnicht'" he parachutes into
Rome 'tenant un ostensoir' (LH,J55). Soon both Sante-Sede and Binnsnicht are
captured by the allies, the former is released the second is held to be tried as a war
criminal until he is discharged for lack of evidence by the British. The commandant
Binnsnicht judges it prudent to change his identity and so exchanges his for that of
226
Sante-Sede, Binnsnicht on his way to a rendez-vous in Switzerland under his assumed
name is recognised and lynched in Milan. Vittorio who hears of the lynching decides to
keep Binnsnicht's rendez-vous in Switzerland, pretending to be Binnsnicht pretending
to be Sante-Sede, or as Octave paraphrases it 'Vittorio fait done passer sa veritable
identite pour la fausse identite d'un autre' (LB,156). When his cover is blown by news
reports ofBinnsnicht's death he seeks refuge in a monastery only to find Binnsnicht
himself hiding there, still alive after all. The situation is now very complex and
confusing because no one now knows : 'Lequel des deux est Sante-Sede, lequel des
deux Binnsnicht' (LH,157) except the 'prieur' of the monastery. This equivocation is
left hanging. The identity of Victor is, therefore, itself indeterminate. IfRoberte's
account is to be believed one cannot know whether Victor is an erstwhile member of
the Catholic clergy or a Nazi war criminal. This uncertainty is compounded by
Octave's assertion of Victor's presence at M
me
de Watteville's residence in Ascona
when the photograph of the flaming dress was taken, a fact of which Roberte is
entirely unaware. Who then is Victor? He is implicated in the past of both Roberte and
Octave. His identity is subject to fluctuation, and he seems to be many things or as
Roberte says 'Victor? ou plutot le ramas de choses qui porte ce nom' (LH,163). It is
true that Victor is the 'invite' ofRoberte ce soir, but his status as a figure whose
identity remains constant is called into question. If Roberte knows so much of his
uncertain past how is it that she did not recognise him when her dress caught fire at
Ascona? In each case are we talking about the same Victor and if so what is it that
guarantees that sameness? And even though a photograph of this incident at Ascona is
31 The name suggests the German phrase 'Ich bin es nicht', roughly translating as 'I am not it' and
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referred to, is it not so far-fetched that it would have had to have been staged
(returning us once more to the motif of the tableau vivant)? This confusion between
the figures of Victor and Binnnsnicht and the impossibility of attributing to him a fixed
role render any identity one might ascribe to him entirely arbitrary. Klossowski's
emphasis throughout his writings on Nietzsche on the fortuitousness of self-identity on
its quality as arbitrary role or mask is borne out in the character of Victor.
Even though the figure of the 'colosse' is in part associated with Victor, this
does not seem to help any attempt to establish its identity. Just as the locus of the
'barres paralleles' episode was seen to hang in an uncertain space between the
imagination of the 'colo sse' and Roberte, so the identity of the 'colo sse' itself is
suspended somewhere in between reference points belonging to both Roberte and
Octave. Referen2e points which themselves are ambiguous (the impossibility of
knowing whether Sante-Sede is Binnsnicht or vice-versa, the uncertainty over the
'jupe enflammee' episode). Again the space offantasy appears to resist reduction to
any clear and distinct determinations. This resistance is characterised, above all, in
what is in fact a key Klossowskian motif, a gesture of the hands as they are held 'a
demi repliees'.
This, one might argue, is the most oft repeated gesture throughout all the
sexual scenes of these novels. Indeed it appears to be the most commonly repeated
gesture throughout Klossowski's entire painted oeuvre. This is pointed out by Alain
Jouffroy in an interview with Klossowski in Le Secret Pouvoir du sens. In a note to his
book Jouffroy gives a list of paintings inwhich the gesture of the hand features. His
indicating absence of identity.
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list is, he claims, probably not exhaustive but nonetheless totals over eighty canvases".
The significance of the gesture is glossed by Octave himself in his commentary on
Tonnerre and his discussion of'le solecisme'. An error in the syntax or idiom of
painting human figures has, at its root, he claims, an inconsistency between bodily
gesture and apparent conscious intent. Octave cites Quintilian on this point with a
phrase he has placed as an epigraph to the catalogue of his Tonnerre collection:
"Certains pensent qu'il y a solecisme dans le geste egalement, toutes les fois
que par un mouvement de la tete ou de la main on fait entendre le contraire de
ce que l'on dit" (LH,14).
The hand or the head can betray a desire or a meaning which runs counter to the
conscious pose or intention of a character as it is painted. In reference to the female
figures of Tonnerre's paintings, Octave later writes of the hand gesture:
Car, en placant le revers d'une main devant une toison devoilee, en imprimant
telle expression aux doigts, en moulant la paume des mains, en articulant bien
l'index et le pouce, [l'artiste] met une agitation spirituelle aupres de telle ou
telle partie du corps, d'un tangible volume. La, on voit precisement jusqu'a quel
degre la femme s'appartient encore ou voit ses appas echapper a sa volonte
(LH,24).
In portraying this moment when desire is in excess of conscious intentionality the
gesture of the hand signals the difference of the painted figure from itself, its lack of
self-coherence. This gesture of the hand signals an irreducible division within Roberte
herself where two moments oppose each other without any mediation or possibility of
synthesis : she says no but at the very same time always also says yes. On the one hand
this moment of division brings one to the most difficult and potentially uncomfortable
aspect of the sexual tableaux of these two novels. Roberte always begins by resisting
her assailants but then part of her succumbs and begins, despite herself, to experience
32 Alain Jouffroy, Le Secret Pouvoir du sens (paris: Ecriture, 1994), pp. 184-6.
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sexual pleasure in the encounter. It is difficult to imagine a more obvious cliche of
male sexual fantasy. The woman may say no, the scenario runs, but deep down 'she
wants it really'. This play between resistance and acceptance is figured by the 'mains
aux doigts a demi replies'. This is made clear in the description ofRoberte's hands in
the episode of the 'barres paralleles' :
C'est la ce que declare sa main a la renverse, a hauteur du menton, le creux de
cette main avec cette voluptueuse naissance du pouce, ces longs doigts qui
semblent habiles a beaucoup mieux qu'a corriger, qu'a secouer un enfant
difficile; main qui s'agite dans une reminiscence de possible aventure, tandis
que l'autre main, que ron voit de dos, les doigts tendus soutenant le bouquin,
appartient encore a un etat responsable, si adorablement dementi par la main
grande et longue dans l'affolement que suscite le vilain lutin (LH,SO).
A critique of this moment might run as follows : although the text may resist any
attempt to locate a subject of this fantasy, the specifically male desire to overcome a
woman's 'resistance' and force her pleasure is nevertheless and without doubt reflected
in this motif of the hand. However, it is important to note that it is not a transition
from no to yes that this gesture of the hands evokes but rather a simultaneous and
paradoxical no and yes which, as will become clear, expresses Roberte's difference
from herself.
The distinction that is set up in the above cited passage is between a part of the
body which represents desire (the 'voluptueuse naissance d'un pouce' which suggest a
certain phallic imagery implying arousal and erection) and to another part of the body
which represents 'un etat responsable', i.e. the conscious self, bound as it is by moral
imperatives and interdictions which inhibit desire. The implication is that, if fantasy this
be, the gesture of the hand which welcomes obscene caresses does not represent
Roberte as she succumbs to a real attacker per se. Rather it represents the moment
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when her conscious, responsible self is opposed to and fractured by that otherness
within, which is the force of desire. Roberte's refusal and her gesture of acceptance
coexist, mutually excluding each other, figuring an irreducible and paradoxical division
within the supposed unity of her person". This is not a representation of a woman
who refuses an external assailant but who is shown in reality to desire him despite her
protestations. Rather it articulates that point where conscious intentionality is divided
from itselfby the impersonal movement of desire. Roberte herself gives this
interpretation in one of her diary entries in La Revocation. She describes her reaction
to the central encounter ofRoberte ce soir 'le colo sse et le bossu'. To say that such a
scene implies the willingness of a woman to succumb to an agressor 'in real life' is
itself, she argues a masculine assumption:
Le lieu choisi : rna salle de bains et la scene qui s'y deroule - nuitamment
(quelle erreur!) - s'inspirent de cette idee bien virile qu'une femme qui consent a
s'abandonner a une reverie libidineuse doit infailliblement se livrer a un
agresseur fortuit, parce qu'elle n'aura plus le discernement necessaire pour le
chasser comme un intrus. Inutile de dire ici que jamais femme vraiment femme
n'a connu ce genre d'altemative : si elle reve de cette facon-la, elle ne desire
personne de l'exterieur et de toute evidence mettra n'importe qui a la porte, mt-
ce un dieu. Si eUe se livre, c'est alors seulement qu'elle commence a rever
(LH,66).
What the sexual scenes like that of'les barres paralleles' and 'les collegiens' portray,
therefore, is Roberte caught in that moment where the unified mask of her rational self
is split by the desire of 'Ia reverie'; she is held in that instant when she becomes
different from herself, is divided, doubled. The folding of the hands signal this moment
33 Daniel Wilhem makes a similar point in reference to the removal of Roberte gloves: 'Le
degantement, par Roberte, marque le retour de la pensee a son effet pur, a son pur intensite. Le
degantement, par les partenaires de Roberte, marque le retour de la pensee a son impersonnalite
et met a nu I'incoherence du sujet pensant', Pierre Klossowski : le corps impie, p. 63.
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of division where conscious self is interrupted by the forces of desire, where conscious
thought is suspended in the no which is also always a yes and vice-versa.
The difficulty of situating the sexual scenes of La Revocation and Roberte ce
soir within the mind of anyone subject takes on its full importance here. The space of
desire, of 'le revel or of 'le phantasme', is an impersonal one. Fantasy cannot be reduced
to the mind ofa particular character, because it marks the limit point beyond which
subjectivity is dissolved and anonymity is affirmed". The 'colo sse' is anonymous
precisely because it figures this limit point offantasy. It is a 'pur esprit', which Roberte
defines as a 'terme bien pittoresque pour designer les forces obscures que le travail et
la raison dissipent et que la volonte reduit' (LH, 171). All these sexual encounters
gesture towards a space of desire which is in excess of identity. This gesture is enacted
through the confusions of spatial and temporal location which structure their mode of
narration. Wherever they are situated it is in a space, or rather an absence of space,
'beyond' the language which recounts them. This is signalled by the use of 'points de
suspension' in the text at key moments. The way in which the 'barres paralleles' scene
is elided using this technique was shown earlier. At the end of the 'collegiens' scene as
Roberte climaxes there is another lacuna :
X. ne distinguait plus la raison de son plaisir, tandis que Roberte, les cuisses et
les fesses ruisselantes de l'impertinence de nos deux neophytes, s'abandonnait a
ses ultimes secousses, ahanant et vouant a tous les diables ses obligations a la
Chambre, et de deputee devenant pute entre Condorcet et Saint-Lazare ...
(LH,60).
34 This can be usefully compared to a comment made by Maurice Blanchot in his essay 'Rever,
Ecrire'. He poses the same question which has been at the centre of this discussion : 'dans Ie
reve, qui reve? Quel est Ie "Je" du reveT and comes to the formulation 'La ou je reve, cela
veille', It is this kind of impersonality, which Blanchot speaks of in relation to dream, that
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This signalling that the scene of desire is in excess of narration and language brings
one back to the notion of simulation. It brings one also to the key paradox of
Klossowski's attempt to write 'le phantasme'. By recourse to certain devices and
narrative conventions (e.g. the use present historic or the imperfect, the indeterminacy
oflocation and character identity) Klossowski makes it clear the 'le phantasme' is
paradoxically absent from the writing which describes it. The text may gesture toward
an impersonal space which is without a subject, it may mimic that space, but the text is
always, in the final analysis, woven from linguistic and narrative conventions which
imply subject positions (even if it is in the use of proper names, or the subject/object
divisions of a grammatical sentence).
The attempt to render the uniqueness of 'le phantasme', the uniqueness of that
moment where the subject is abolished in 'le revet, is always compromised by the fact
that writing is always constituted in codes and conventions which are necessarily far
from unique (a code or convention must by definition be shared). This is the tension
which structures the writing of the 'phantasme' inKlossowski's novels. However much
the text might resist the reduction of fantasy to a subject-position it is necessarily
constituted within language. Language cannot but affirm subject positions insofar as it
always poses a grammatical 'I' or a proper name who writes and speaks (Klossowski
the author) and therefore also along with the subject I an object 'you'. Klossowski as a
writer seeking to render the uniqueness and impersonality of'le phantasme' is caught in
a double bind. Every moment he seeks to affirm the impersonality of desire his writing
at the same time has recourse to the 'code des signes' which structures and articulates
Klossowski is trying to simulate in the scenes of sexual fantasy described here. See Maurice
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fixed subject positions. Like Roberte Klossowski says no but at the very same moment
and against himself he also always says yes: in the moment he seeks to negate the
fixity of the subject he also affirms it. Writing 'le phantasme'leads the writer to this
impasse where he is always doing two contradictory things in the same instant.
Affirming the intensity of impersonal desire always also affirms the person who
affirms. The scene of fantasy, as it is written, carries with it this dual and paradoxical
affirmation. It is the paradoxical relationship between these two moments (the
'personal' and 'impersonal') which will be discussed in the following section.
The problem posed turns around the question of where this moment of aporia
or impasse might lead the critic of Klossowski's texts? Ifhe or she does wish to
analyse a cultural unconscious at work in his writing which betrays male patriarchal
desire (and as should be clear this is not the case here), then does not this persistence
and unavoidability of subject positions justify such a reading? It might argued that,
whether the text gestures toward the impersonal or not, what one is left with is an
artefact which necessarily betrays the presence of a subject, that is Klossowski himself.
Although he may wish to affirm the anonymous or the impersonal, ultimately, is it not
he who writes, his subjectivity which affirms itself in that impasse which the writing of
'le phantasme' constitutes? If a 'phantasme' is, as Klossowski describes it, 'une vision
interieure', is it not Klossowski who sees, Klossowski who must bear the responsibility
for the violence done to Roberte. On this reading, however Klossowski might seek to
construct this violence within his novel as impersonal, as the violence of anonymous
'forces obscures', what one witnesses is, arguably a form of a rationalised violence.
Blanchot, L'Amitie, (paris: Gallimard, 1971), p. 163 and p, 169.
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This persistence of an identifiable subject brings one to the next part of this
discussion. The question is, crucially, whether this impasse of representing 'Ie
phantasme' constitutes a recuperation of the text (into structures of meaning which are
both appropriative and patriarchal) and a failure of its gesture towards the impersonal,
or whether such an impasse or moment of aporia can itself be construed of as a
transgressive gesture. In the first instance this question brings one back to Klossowski
himself and his comments on the visual, visionary nature of his work (both the painting
and the writing). If masculine violence there be in these texts, is it not the violence of




Car en effet Ie Bain de Diane est un evenement imprevisible et exterieur aActeon; Ie
Bain de Diane est au-dehors : Acteon pour Ie decouvrir n'a point a Ie situer en tel au
tel endroit, mais doit sortir de son propre esprit; alors ce que voit Acteon se produit
au-dela de la naissance de toute parole: il voit Diane se baignant et il ne peut dire
ce qu'il voit",
IIY a eu rupture absolue avec l'ecriture. Passant de la speculation au speculaire, je
me trouve en fait sous la dictee de /'image. C'est la vision qui exige que je dise tout ce
que me donne la vision",
'Le primat de la vision'
Klossowski's insistence on the visionary nature of his work has been discussed by a
number of his commentators, most notably by Alain Arnaud in his book written for
Seuil's 'Les Contemporains' series". This emphasis on vision as an almost
revelationary moment has also led his work to be compared to that of both Blake and
Fuseli'". In an interview with Alain Arnaud published originally in La Ouinzaine
litteraire, Klossowski implies that the visionary and also visual aspect of his work
becomes the most important aspect of his work when he devotes himself exclusively to
painting in 1972 (this is most explicit in his comment cited above). His comment
indicates that the shift from writing to painting involves a movement from an
abstraction or conceptual idiom ('speculation') to the concreteness of a visual idiom
('speculaire'l'image'). Yet the quotation from Le Bain de Diane (dating from 1956)
3S Le Bain de Diane. pp. 68-9.
36 'Entretien avec Alain Arnaud', La Ouinzaine litteraire. 381 (1-15 November 1982), 16-18 ~
Ressemblance, (Marseille: Andre Dimanche, 1984), pp. 99-111), p. 102. All references to this
collection of essays will be to this volume giving the page number and prefaced with the
abbreviation R.
37 Alain Arnaud, Pierre Klossowski, (paris: SeuiI, 1990).
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shows that even when he is, for the most part, devoted to the writing of essays and
fiction the moment of vision, as that which gives the initial impetus to writing is
nevertheless all important",
This is not seeing or vision in the ordinary sense. Seeing would normally imply
a subject who sees, an object seen and a space in which both are situated the one
relative to the other. In order to see the vision of Diana bathing Actaeon must 'sortir
de son esprit' and the vision cannot be situated in any specific place. This indeed is a
strange kind of vision. How, indeed, can one see by stepping outside of one's mind
when seeing itself must be dependant upon an individual mind or consciousness? In
this respect the passage from Le Bain de Daine cited above suggests that not only does
the vision occur 'au-dela de la naissance de toute parole' but beyond seeing also. This
is a vision which, like the scenes of fantasy in La Revocation, cannot be given a locus,
and in which the selfwho sees (Actaeon) must exceed his own consciousness, must
transcend that faculty which allows him to see. The idiosyncratic nature of
Klossowski's use of visual and visionary terms to describe his writing is reflected in a
comment he makes on the composition of the novel Le Baphomet :
L'ensemble fut ecrit rapidement comme si je n'avais qu'a transcrire une dictee,
ou mieux : Ie decrivant tel un spectacle auquel j'assistais sans jamais omettre
les paroles que les diverses attitudes des acteurs me suggeraient, au point de
me croire sur les lieux ales entendre" [Klossowski's emphasis].
38 See Alain Jouffroy, Le Secret Pouvoir du sens, (paris: Ecriture, 1994), pp. 15-17 and J.-F.Lyotard,
Discours, figure, p. 225, note 33.
39 In fact Klossowski's first exhibition of paintings was also in 1956. This was a private exhibition
given at the Cours de Rohan (Klossowski's residence) and featured some of his portraits (e.g. of
Gide, Breton and Bataille); see Arnaud, Pierre Klossowski. p. 188.
40 'Notes et eclaircissements pour Le Baphomet' postface to Jean Decottignies, Klossowski. (paris:
Veyrier, 1986), reprinted in Le Baphomet. (paris: Gallimard, 1965); reprinted
Gallimard/Imaginaire, 1987, pp. 225-32, p. 225.
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This suggests quite clearly that the scenes and tableaux that make up Klossowski's
novel exist first and foremost as visual, visionary moments. Indeed, the novel is written
as ifKlossowski, the author, were viewing a spectacle, a visual scene. Yet his
language also carries with it a quite different emphasis. At the same time as he is
viewing a spectacle Klossowski is also transcribing a dictation 'sans omettre les
paroles' which the poses of the actors suggest to him. The scenes envisioned by
Klossowski as he writes Le Baphomet may indeed have a visual force but they are also
at the same time apprehended in the verbal forms which are proper to written
language.
So how is one to make sense of Kloss owski's visions? They do not occur in
any locatable space; they imply a self who sees and yet which must in the process
transcend or go beyond itself They are visual and 'au-dela de la naissance de toute
parole', yet at the same time are intimately bound up with and inseparable from 'la
parole'. Given these difficulties what kind of distinctions can be drawn between
Klossowski's writing and his painting? If his visions are already like a 'dictee', or are
already distinctly linguistic it would clearly be problematic to attempt draw any
hierarchy between the two (by affirming one as somehow more visual and immediate).
At the same time this question of vision raises sexual political considerations which
have already been alluded to. Klossowski's use of the terms vision and seeing do not
imply the positioning of a stable subject and an object. They do not imply a clearly
differentiated space within which subject and object are entirely distinct and where the
former could be said to appropriate or violate the other.
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If Klossowski's idiosyncratic use of the term 'vision' is not qualified properly in
the manner just outlined one runs the risk of likening him to either some kind of a
Christian mystic on the one hand or a phallocentric, not to say misogynistic, voyeur on
the other. Alain Arnaud likens him to the former in his Seuil monograph when he
argues that Klossowski's entire oeuvre is founded upon the 'Primat de la puissance
visionnaire et de ses revelations' and says of Klossowski himself: 'it ne connait qu'une
seule loi : la vision'. To an extent this is true but the language Arnaud uses to describe
Klossowski's visions constantly recalls that of religious revelation and suggests the
existence of a moment when the subject encounters, in however fragmentary a way, a
point of origin, essence and immediate contact with the Divine. Klossowski's vision is,
for Arnaud, 'la vision primitive', 'la vision immediate' and 'une vision essentielle',
which he links explicitly to Klossowski's readings of Augustine" and his assimilation
of Catholic doctrine as it is embodied in the proclamations of the second Council of
Nicaea". These theological influences are certainly central to Klossowski's formation
as a writer and essayist and leave their mark throughout his writing (in, for instance,
the scholastic dialogues ofRoberte ce soir or in the elaboration upon Gnostic heresies
in Le Baphomett3. Yet, as was shown in the opening chapter, there comes a point in
41 Arnaud, Pierre Klossowski, p. 42, p. 17, p. 49, p. 87, p. 62 and p, 66.
42 Arnaud, Pierre Klossowski, p. 43. In reference to Klossowski's use of the term simulacrum Arnaud
refers to the text of the Second Council of Nicaea in which the simulacrum was considered to be
'une image "residuelle" de la vision primitive, "prototypique", dirait le vocabulaire conciliaire'
p.49.
43 Klossowski' s use of theological language in his later texts is essentially parodic, a staging of a
discourse which no longer functions in reference to a unitary Truth (the One God who was the
central reference in the first edition of Sade mon prochain) but which denounces itself in order
to affirm the many over the One. For a useful discussion of Klossowski's later use of theological
discourse see Jean-Pol Madou, Demons et simulacres dans l'reuvre de Pierre Klossowski, (paris:
Klincksieck, 1987), pp. 43-63. Madou comments: 'Loin d'etre un systeme monolithique,la
theologie fait apparaitre, a la faveur de sa theatralisation par la fiction klossowskienne, la
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his career where he tries to move beyond a Christian affirmation of origin to a more
complex 'polytheistic' point of view. How, then, can 'la vision' be defined in such a way
as it no longer carries with it such theological implications?
The violence of vision.
It is important that such an alternative formulation be made because if one does
accept the implications of Arnaud's construction (i.e. the essentially theological,
affirmation ofa stable subject who sees) then this makes accusations of voyeurism and
misogyny all the more credible. It has been suggested that Klossowski's 'visions' are
not the transcription of a specific content, of something seen and then subsequently
represented, but rather imply something which goes beyond a subject who sees. If, like
Arnaud, one does posit some form of 'visionary subject', then the sexual scenes
narrated in the Roberte trilogy can be constructed, not as 'impersonal' scenes of
fantasy irreducible to a stable self, but rather as the violent projections of a masculine
gaze - that of the 'subject' Klossowski himself - which is indicative ofa wider cultural
violence towards women. This is not the view taken here but one which is argued
forcibly and comprehensively by Anne-Marie Dardigna throughout her book Les
Chateaux d'Eros44. The sexual tableaux of Klossowski's novels, the primacy of the
visual element and centrality of the image are judged as follows :
pluralite des disputes et des controverses dont eUes est issue, la multiplicite des sources oil elle
s'origine : Tertullian, saint Augustin, Averroes, Duns Scot, Maitre Eckhart, saint Thomas
d' Aquin. S'affichant comme pluriel, le discours theologique chez Klossowski s'enonce d'une
maniere quasi-carnavalesque comme une polyphonie de voix dont les eclats de rire et de colere
prennent, a l' ombre des gardiens de I' orthodoxie romaine, des aspects grimacants et subversifs' •
pp.44-5.
44 Anne-Marie Dardigna, Les Chateaux d'Eros. ou les infortunes du sexe des femmes, (paris:
Maspero,1980).
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Image, c'est-a-dire, vision interiorisee, absorbee et recomposee par
l'imagination, corps de femme ou deja se marque le travail de la volonte
masculine.
L'image feminine n'est en effet rien d'autre que le corollaire du regard
masculin. Les femmes, sur la scene erotique, n'etant jamais sujet, ne peuvent
manifester qu'un regard reflet du regard masculin, c'est-a-dire un regard ou
elles ne voient rien d'autre qu'elles-rnemes. L'enjeu du narrateur dans le proces
de sa narration, c'est la reduction du corps feminin au statut d'objet regards".
This comment brings one to the heart of what is at stake in any interpretation of
Klossowski's conception of 'vision'. The clear distinction made between the subject
who sees and the object which is seen allows Dardigna to speak of the reification of
the image of woman, of her appropriation beneath a masculine gaze. At the same time
Dardigna recuperates Klossowski's writing within the logic of identity and
representation which, it has been argued, his post-Christian position contests. Both
Klossowski's fiction and his painting, because of the primacy attributed to the visual
and to vision, are be brought back within the essentially theological tradition of
Western thought and logic. This tradition is characterised as explicitly male in the
theoretical work ofLuce Irigaray. In her essay 'Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un'" Irigaray
argues that this rationalist, male tradition is centred around a masculine language and
discourse which excludes the feminine and any expression of female desire. Speaking
from within the philosophical discourses inherited from this tradition Irigaray can only
hypothesise as to what the language of female desire would be : 'Le desir de la femme
ne parlerait pas la meme langue que celui de l'homme, et il aurait ete recouvert par la
45 Les Chateaux d'Eros, p.ll O.
46 See Ce Sexe qui n'en est pas un, (paris: Minuit, 1977), pp. 21-32. Oardigna's text is heavily
influenced by Irigarayan arguments and in particular she makes important references to
Irigaray's Speculum de l'autre femme (paris: Minuit, 1974).
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logique qui domine I'Occident depuis les Grecs'". Moreover Irigaray goes on to
maintain that this male discourse is dominated by an economy of the visual or what she
calls the 'scopic' :
Dans cette logique, la prevalence du regard et de la discrimination de la forme,
de l'individualisation de la forme, est particulierement etrangere a l'erotisme
feminin. La femme jouit plus du toucher que du regard, et son entree dans une
economie scopique dominante signifie, encore, une assignation pour elle a la
passivite : elle sera Ie bel objet a regarder".
On this reading Klossowski's promotion of' la vision', associated firmly by Jrigaray
with a dominant male economy and a Western tradition dating back to the Greeks,
would allow his work to be placed firmly within a tradition of male domination (and
this is clearly the move made by Dardigna). His painting and writing could be opposed
to a putative feminine economy which is based upon touch and which would respect
plurality, difference, and the otherness of the self to itself(indeed all the motifs which
the argument of this thesis has associated with Klossowski's writing!).
This is the main thrust ofDardigna's argument in Les Chateaux d'Eros :
Klossowski's visions, it is claimed, provide an image of woman reduced to the status
of object and in so doing include her as a sign of exchange between men in a discourse
of male power. In the light of these arguments it is clear that Klossowski's use of
'vision interieure' needs to be differentiated from traditional forms of seeing that are
implied by Dardigna's use of 'Image' and Irigaray's notion of 'economie scopique'.
47 Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un, p. 25.
48 Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un, p. 25.
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Envisaging the invisible,
Firstly it is important to note the difference in expression between Klossowski
himself and Dardigna's language in the comment drawn from Les Chateaux d'Eros
cited above. While Klossowski, as was indicated earlier, speaks of 'la vision interieure'
the latter refers to what she calls a 'vision interiorisee'. This is a crucial difference in
emphasis. An 'interiorised' vision implies an existing representation which has been
internalised. It implies an inside of a subject and an outside of objects. In the
interiorised vision, subject-object relations which subsist in an exterior social space
(relations of power and domination) are reproduced in an internal or mental scene of
fantasy. The violence of social relations repeats itself in the image of fantasy. A vision
which is 'interieure' in the Klossowskian sense obeys a very different logic. It implies
an encounter with the limit of sense itself. It does not appeal to an inside and an
outside or a differentiation between subject and object but rather marks a limit point of
the self beyond which any distinction between self and other is suspended". 'Vision
interieure' implies an abolition of space which overturns also the distinctions Irigaray
makes between a 'masculine' economy characterised by the dominance of the scopic
element, and a 'feminine' economy based on touch.
In L'Espace litteraire" Maurice Blanchot describes a kind of vision which does
not imply the clear divisions traditionally associated with seeing (the seer and the seen)
49 In relation to Klossowski it is better to use the terms self and other (as this discussion has done)
rather than subject and object. The first formulation carries with it the connotations of the self as
arbitrary role or mask which were investigated in the second chapter. The subject-object
distinction necessarily implies fixed positions and in the context of philosophy (after Descartes)
carries with it connotations of an autonomous rational ego. See Blanchot on his preference for
the distinction 'moi/autrui' (following Husserl and Levinas) in L'Entretien infini, pp. 70-105.
so Maurice Blanchot, L 'Espace litteraire (paris: Gallimard, 1955).
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and elaborates on the nature of the image which such vision produces. In order to keep
it distinct from the theological implications pertaining to the act of seeing which have
been outlined here Blanchot uses the term 'fascination' :
Pouquoi la fascination? Voir suppose la distance, la decision separatrice, le
pouvoir de n'etre pas en contact et d'eviter dans le contact la confusion. Voir
signifie que cette separation est devenue cependant rencontre. Mais qu'arrive-t-
il quand ce qu'on voit, quoique a distance, semblent vous toucher par un
contact saisissant, quand la maniere de voir est une sorte de touche, quand voir
est un contact a distance?
Blanchot goes on to add 'Ce qui nous est donne par un contact a distance est l'image,
et la fascination est la passion de l'image'?'. What Blanchot is elaborating is not a
notion of seeing in the normal sense. Rather his formulation implies a relationship to
the image which does not appeal to the fixed positions of a subject and an object.
Klossowski's obsession with the image of Roberte is closer to Blanchot's 'fascination'
than it is to Dardigna's 'vision interiorisee'". Interior vision is that point of dissolution
where 'la decision separatrice' of self and other is overturned and therefore it cuts
across the distinction made by Irigaray between a scopic economy which fixes
identities and a 'sensible' economy which blurs boundaries and affirms difference.
Vision in this sense is neither intelligible nor sensible. It is perhaps 'une sorte de touche'
but only insofar as it affirms a moment where boundaries which might come into
SI L'Espace litteraire, p. 28 and p. 29.
52 In his essay on Klossowski 'Le Rire des dieux' Blanchot remarks, in language which echoes these
formulations from L'Espace litteraire, that while the central notion of 'tableau' might suggest
that Klossowski's ceuvre is a visual one, this ultimately is not the case, and here it is useful to
cite at length: 'Un tableau. en principe, fait appel cl ce sens de droiture qu'est la vue. Sans
doute, ce qu'on voit dans le monde et, cl plus forte raison, par l'art plastique, on ne le voit qu'a
distance, par la distance et cl condition de ne pas le toucher: l'intact -I'inaccessible - seul est
visible [ ] Or, les tableaux imaginaires et les scenes qui ne le sont pas moins, jouent, dans
les recits de Klossowski, le role de l'inimaginable et, par le mode d'un langagc rigoureusemcnt
reflechi, se voient (cela est, en effet, presque visible) retires de I'immediat qui est leur lieu pour
etre introduit dans celui d'une reflexion ou d'abord tout se suspend et s'arrete comme au seuil
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contact or touch each other are abolished. Nor indeed is vision in any conventional
sense visual at all. Speaking of the act of painting in the essay 'Retour a l'Hermes
Trismegiste" Klossowski comments:
chaque fois que l'artiste travaillerait a un tableau, quel qu'en soit le "motif', ce
serait a contrefaire son modele invisible - (R,96).
'La vision interieure', therefore, is the seeing of something unsee able, where no one
sees. The force of this term 'modele invisible' brings to the fore the paradoxical status
of Klossowki's use of the term vision. The vision or 'phantasme' that the artist
simulates in his painting and writing is not something visual. 'La vision interieure' is
not only the vision of something 'au-dela de la naissance de toute parole', as
Klossowski had written in Le Bain de Diane it is also the vision of something prior to,
beyond or beneath the visual.
The propriety of vision.
The question that occupied the discussion of writing in the preceding section
must now be reposed, namely the question of whose fantasy it is that is being
portrayed in the fictional text. If, in the scene offantasy, nothing is in fact seen, and
the self who sees exceeds itself and in no real sense actually sees, then one cannot
speak of the vision of, say Roberte, being proper to Klossowski. If the sexual scenes of
Roberte ce soir and La Revocation are not the simulation of a visual moment prior to
language then, one cannot talk of 'Klossowski's' visions in terms which would suggest
that they are somehow proper to him (to that identity construct going by the name
meme de la vision, puis se reflechit, c'est-a-dire se dedouble, se dissout, jusqu'a se retirer dans
la pure invisibilite abstraite', L'Amitie (paris: Gallimard, 1971), pp. 194-95.
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Pierre Klossowski). The motif of impersonality which was introduced earlier now
reasserts itself Klossowski addresses this relation between the image ofRoberte and
the problem of propriety in the postface of Les Lois de l'hospitalite. In that discussion
he describes a moment of vision which descended upon him whilst working in a garden
Fascine par Ie nom de Roberte en tant que signe, alors que j'etais dans
le jardin sans plus rien voir de l'ensoleillee verdure autour de moi, n'ayant
d'autre vision que la penombre insituable ou se jouait la lueur de sa main
degantee - je me decide a decrire ce qui doit se passer dans cette penombre, ici
illusoire. Je refere au nom de Roberte ce que je vois et que je ne verrais point a
defaut de ce nom.
La penombre, la lueur de l'epiderme, le gant, autant de designations non
pas de choses existantes ici a rna portee, mais formant un ensemble au gre de
l'irreelle penombre, Tout de meme c'est a moi, qui choisis ces termes,
qu'appartient la faculte de les fixer. Vais-je encore pretendre que ce n'est pas de
la "representation" et que la pensee s'appartient a elle seule, non comme rna
faculte, mais comme une intensite qui m'a trouve ici, au milieu de la verdure -
car, cette intensite, ou irait-elle, sije n'etais pas la? (LH,335).
This quotation is worth dwelling on in some detail. Firstly it is significant that
Klossowski uses the term 'Fascine' to describe his predilection for the 'nom de
Roberte' which is reminiscent of Blanchot's term 'fascination' and his definition of it as
'la passion de l'image'. Secondly it is clear that, although he refers to vision and what
he sees, it is clear that what he sees are not 'choses existantes' but rather 'la
penombre'. He sees penumbra, that area of partial shadow which is on the borderline
between visibility and invisibility, that point at which visibility succumbs to darkness.
For Klossowski this 'vision interieure' clearly does not seek to reproduce or stage a
conventional representation within the theatre of the mind.
53 Pierre Klossowski, La Ressemblance, pp. 93-98.
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At the end of the preceding discussion of the writing of the sexual scenes of La
Revocation and Roberte ce soir it was shown that even though the scenes of sexual
fantasy might seek to gesture towards the impersonal they were always also still
caught up in the conventions of language which implied a person (at the very least the
person who writes). Klossowski makes this point explicitly here. This vision of
Roberte, in all its minute details, may be an encounter with the impersonal, with 'une
intensite' or with a mode of thought which 's'appartient a elle seule', but in the
depiction of these details 'c'est amoi, qui choisis ces termes, qu'appartient la faculte de
les fixer'. The scene of fantasy one reads in a novel or contemplates in a painting must
ultimately not be impersonal but a result of, as Klossowski puts it, 'rna faculte', the
staging of fantasy through recourse to cultural schemata or modes of representation
imply conscious activity (that of painting or writing, selection of detail etc.). That
strange moment of vision, of seeing the unseeable, may be an encounter with
impersonal and invisible forces but can only ever be rendered by the use of terms
which are part oflanguage and ofidentity. Yet Klossowski emphasises that in the
moment of vision itself it is not the writer who penetrates into 'la penombre' but rather
is touched and overcome by it. That the writer must use conventional language to
speak of such an experience does not affect the intensity itself:
n'est-ce pas une intensite qui me traverse et qui fait vibrer quelque chose que je
traduis de facon tout a fait arbitraire par les termes "penombre", "lueur
d'epiderme", "gant" ... quandje ne serais moi-meme qu'intensite pure
qu'attendait la pensee de personne pour se designer par ces termes? (LH,336).
In the moment of vision subjectivity is dissolved into a unique point of intensity. This
language of impersonality, of 'la pensee de personne' recalls Klossowski's
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commentaries on Nietzsche. The experience Klossowski is alluding to is like the
thought of Eternal Return. What is at stake once more is consciousness at its 'plus
haute intensite' (the point at which it is abolished) and the possibility of thought
finding a sign to designate such an intensity, to translate it into language. That sign
could be the sign of the 'Cercle Vicieux' or the 'nom de Roberte' (or indeed the key
sign of'Sodomie' in the writings of Sade). Klossowski, amongst the greenery of his
garden, brushed by 'la penombre insituable' and 'fascine par le nom de Roberte' does
not have a vision which is proper to him, which is 'his', but he is invaded by forces
which are prior to his 'himness'. In the end he does not really see at all but is touched
by the invisible, his 'himness' is dissolved into 'la pensee de personne', or as Blanchot
puts it:
Quiconque est fascine, ce qu'il voit, it ne le voit pas cl proprement parler, mais
cela Ie touche dans une proximite immediate, eela le saisit et l'accapare, bien
que cela le laisse absolument cl distance. La fascination est fondamentalement
liee cl la presence neutre, impersonnelle, le On indetermine, l'immense
Quelqu'un sans figure. EIle est la relation que le regard entretient, relation elle-
meme neutre et impersonnelle, avec la profondeur sans regard est sans
contour, l'absence qu'on voit parce qu'aveuglante, S4
But if 'la vision' as Klossowski uses the term is not visual, and the image which vision
envisages does not refer to anything one can see, to 'choses existantes', then what
exactly is the status of the image? The image is an image of something unseen and
unsayable, something outside the sphere of representation altogether; this brings one
back to the notion of the 'simulacrum', Seeing is no longer what is most important to
an understanding of Kloss ow ski's use of the term 'vision', rather one is returned to
questions oflanguage and writing.
54 L 'Espace litteraire, pp. 30-31
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The opening line of the lengthy passage cited earlier provides a clue to
situating the status of the image in Klossowski's work . He describes himself as :
'Fascine par le nom de Roberte en tant que signe' (LH,335). Klossowski's image of
Roberte cannot be separated from the sign which is the 'nom de Roberte'. This point is
made very clearly by Klossowski in his interview with Alain Arnaud when he states :
'L'image est un signe mais d'un univers autre que celui des signes signifiants' (B,I05).
The image is a sign which exists at a limit point between what Blanchot calls
'l'immense Quelqu'un sans figure'ss and the everyday signs oflanguage and
communication (the 'code des signes quotidiens'). The terms 'image', 'vision
interieure' and 'phantasme' come together here insofar as they all seek to represent
that unrepresentable and unique limit point between on the one hand the chaotic and
impersonal movements of 'impulsions' and on the other the codified sign systems of
language and representation. Because 'l'image' or 'Ie phantasme' do not figure
anything which is already figured or figurable, they exist on this limit point and are
themselves neither visible nor representable. This limit point is unique in such a way
that no other sign can represent it without falsifying the force ofits singularity. 'Le
phantasme' constitutes that moment when the light of figurablity shades into 'la
penombre insituable' of the unrepresentable. IfKlossowski does find words to
designate this unique limit point it is only in the language of everyday signs, a language
of common currency and exchange which is far from unique. The signs 'lueur
d'epiderme' and 'gant' figure this moment of intensity, this unique sign which refers to
ss L 'Espace litteraire, p. 30.
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no other sign, but at the same time they signal its absence, the fact that they do not
properly express it or in any way coincide with it.
Such a movement from an impersonal intensity designated by a 'phantasme' to
a conventional sign which in turn designates the 'phantasme' involves a double
simulation. The 'phantasme' simulates a movement of intensity, it is a figure of that
intensity only insofar as it also expresses its difference from it. As a limit point between
the universe of 'impulsions' and the world of signs it is another term for the 'demon
simulateur' that plays such an important role in Le Bain de Diane. The 'phantasme',
like the demon, deals between the space of human consciousness (language/
representation) and that of the divine (chaos, 'forces obscures', intensities or
'impulsions'). Yet, as has been indicated the signs 'lueur d'epiderme' and 'gant' also
simulate. They affect to represent the uniqueness of'le phantasme' and yet are always
part of the 'code des signes' which exists only through being shared and understood by
all those who speak and think. The 'code', by virtue of its very codification is the
antithesis of the unique. Hence the language which designates the 'phantasme' is
always a 'simulacre', always the simulation ofa simulation". The simulacrum does not
simulate an originary moment of 'authentic' vision but simulates that always already
false and dissimulated moment of the 'phantasme', that vision without vision. At the
56 This lack of coincidence between 'phantasme' and 'simulacre' is emphasised by lean-Pol Madou
who writes: 'Ne se confondant jamais avec le phantasme, le simulacre en tient lieu, it en est le
gage, le valant pour. Bien qu'il soit constitue de signes communicables, Ie simulacre est Ie gage
de l'incommunicable' and later goes on to add 'En effet, le simulacre est un masque qui, se
denoncent comme tel, trace les contours de ce qu'il dissimule', Demons et simulacres dans
l'reuvre de Pierre Klossowski, p. 88 and 92. Madou does not, however, emphasise this quality of
double simulation that is being discussed here, i.e. the crucial point that the 'phantasme' as
('demon simulateur') is already a simulation. This is crucial if one is to recognise that the
simulacrum is not just a 'bad copy' (as Plato would have it) but is an image which overturns
both model and copy.
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end of Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux in the 'Note additionnelle a la semiotique de
Nietzsche' Klossowski describes this relation between language and 'Ie phantasme' as
follows:
le langage est le simulacre de la singularite obstinee de notre phantasme : car si
nous avons recours au langage, c'est que par la fixite des signes it offre aussi
l'equivalent de notre singularite obstinee S7
The fixity of the 'code des signes' allows the 'phantasme' to be written but because of
that very fixity the 'phantasme' can never be reducible to writing or coincident with it.
It is always absent from what is written in the way that was discussed in the preceding
section. The simulacre can stand in for the 'phantasme' but only on the basis of what
Klossowski calls an 'echange frauduleux'". The exchange between the 'phantasme'
and the 'simulacre' is always fraudulent because the one is never really equivalent to
the other. If the 'simulacre' does offer an equivalence with the 'phantasme' it is only
on the basis of a radical non-equivalence. It always only simulates or parodies the
fantasy (which is itself a simulation or parodyj'", Again all the motifs that have
previously been explored (parody, myth, translation) are implicated in this movement
from 'phantasme' to 'simulacre' from 'vision interieure' to the reproduction of that
S1 Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux, p. 367.
S8 Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux, p. 367.
S9 In L'Economie libidinale Jean-Francois Lyotard criticises Klossowski for his assertion that the
simulacrum 'offre aussi l'equivalent de notre singularite obstinee' arguing that in positing the
possibility of such an equivalence he betrays a residual attachment to the language of
representation. Lyotard however seems to miss the full force of the use of 'echange frauduleux'
and of the idea of simulation. This crucial self-conscious dissimulation which structures the
simulacrum undermines Lyotard's criticism. See J.-F.Lyotard, L'Economie libidinale (paris:
Minuit, 1974), pp. 57-103, see in particular pp. 96-98. Blanchot, however, picks up on the
ambiguity of the term 'equivalent' in the context of Klossowski's writing: 'Mais Ie mot
"equivalent" est trompeur, a moins de le prendre dans un sens nouveau: cela ''vaut pour", mais
non pas a la maniere dont, dans Ie symbole ou I' allegorie, le signe vaut pour quelque sens
transcendant ou immanent. Car ici c'est le sens qui vaut pour le signe, et l'equivalence n'est
jamais donnee dans une ega lite, ffit-elle infinie, mais plutot dans une pure inegalite', Amitie, p.
198.
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vision in the novel or on canvas. The simulacrum is always a conventional sign but its
conventionality is always clearly signalled and therefore so is its difference from the
uniqueness and singularity of the 'phantasme'.
Painting and writing.
The relation of Kloss ow ski's painting to his writing is now thrown into a new
light. Ifit is not possible to speak ofa prior, distinctly visual, moment of vision at the
origin of Klossowski's artistic creation then there is no reason for a painting to offer a
more immediate rendering of 'Ie phantasme' than would writing. Both a painted
canvas and a written scene of sexual encounter appeal to conventional signs or
representations, they both simulate 'Ie phantasme' on the basis of an 'echange
frauduleux'. Because both the novel and the painted canvas use conventional signs
they might equally be said to be forms of writing. Klossowski says as much in his
interview with Alain Arnaud when he says: 'Je traite la peinture comme une
hieroglyphic' ffi,102). But this does not mean that there is no difference between
Klossowski's paintings and his novels. Clearly a very different kind of space and use of
signs is operating in the one and the other. Klossowski addresses this question in a
short article entitled 'Roberte et la coiffeuse'f". He begins by asserting that:
Une scene decrite et la merne scene en tant que tableau sont deux modes
d'apprehension aussi differents entre eux que leur objet meme semblerait
identique."
The scene of Roberte attached to the parallel bars as it appears inLa Revocation and
as it appears on canvas seem to portray the same moment in different forms but this is
60 'Roberte etla coiffeuse', Obliques, 1 (1972), 95-102.
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not necessarily the case ('leur objet [...] semblerait identique')' Their resemblance the
one to the other, Klossowski would argue, is an occasion for their divergence from
each other. Indeed painted and written sexual fantasy do not refer to the same scene at
all, as Klossowski goes on to argue :
Le passage altematif de l'expression graphique ou picturale a l'ecriture, de
celle-ci a celle-la, ne revele pas necessairement une seule propension originaire,
mais une maniere d'eprouver des instants obsessionnels dans deux espaces
differents, dut-il s'agir du meme motifprovoquant une apprehension
differente.f"
The 'instant obsessionnel' is neither originary (being always a simulation of an
intensity or 'impulsion') nor is it ever the same twice (being unique and singular). If
recognisable elements are repeated e.g. parallel bars, the physiognomy of'Roberte, her
gloves etc. then this is because the same motifs are adopted and reproduced in
different media with an 'apprehension differente'.
What, then, one may wonder is the specificity of these two different types of
apprehension, that of 'l'expression graphique ou picturale' and of 'l'ecriture'? If there
is no hierarchy between the two, if one cannot say that painting is a more immediate
rendering of interior vision, then why did Klossowski renounce writing so firmly in
favour of painting and drawing? Towards the end of'Roberte et la coiffeuse'
Klossowski offers some explanation of what seems to be his preference for the painted
image over the written word. Discussing the situation of an artist who is both painter
and writer, he makes the point that the visual image of the painting allows a greater
possibility of divergence from the codification and fixed meanings of written language
61 Obliques, p. 95.
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QueUe que soit la singularite graphologique d'une ecriture, cette singularite
reste astreinte automatiquement au trace fonctionnel des signes. Or, chez Ie
peintre ou le dessinateur le meme trace graphologique recupere son autonomie
pour se dechainer "calligraphiquement" en "caracteres", divagants par rapport
a ceux de l'ecriture."
Written language always carries with it a closer complicity with functionality. By this
Klossowski refers to the ability of language to communicate fixed meanings on the
L
basis of exchange value (X being equivalent to Y) andl!e1ation of this functioning of
language to the world of institutions, both social and economic (this is the relationship
between language and institutions which was described in the discussion of'Le
Philosophe scelerat' in Chapter One). The painted image is less abstract and therefore
less implicated in the production of concepts than is the written word. In his 'Lettre a
Patrick Waldberg,64 Klossowski describes this difference in terms of a universality of
abstraction, proper to writing, and a universality of the concrete which is proper to the
language of the painted canvas :
on peut tout juste dire que pour le tableau it existe une universalite du concret
qui lui assure se jouissance immediate - done en somme "animale" - tandis que
pour le texte en revanche it regne une universalite de l'abstrait qui, s'agissant du
poeme, ne fait que supprimer ses donnees idiomatiques. En sorte qu'un tableau
ne peut etre pretexte qu'a une nouvelle invention".
The opposition between the painting and the written scene of fantasy is not derived
from the ability of the former to render 'vision' more immediately. Rather the painted
image preserves more of its autonomy; it is recuperated with greater difficulty into the
realm of abstract meanings and fixed interpretations. The painting, therefore, is more
62 Obliques, p. 102.
63 Obliques, p. 102.
64 Preface to Patrick Wahlberg, Les Dcmeures d'Hypnos (paris: Editions de la Difference, 1976), pp.
9-13.
65 Les Demeures d'Hypnos, p.ll.
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likely simply to provoke another 'phantasme' and therefore another 'simulacre', rather
than engender a rational interpretative discourse".
This 'universalite du concret' which is proper to the 'hieroglyphic' of the
painted image perhaps explains Klossowski's apparent preference for painting rather
than fiction in his post-1972 output. His preference does not imply a hierarchy ofa
visual over a written medium as such, but rather a difference between two sorts of
writing, one being more implicated in conceptuality and abstraction than the other.
Nevertheless it must be re-emphasised that both forms of expression are writing
insofar as they rely on conventional signs, on the parodic use of the stereotype to
designate the uniqueness of the 'phantasme'. As Klossowski puts it in his essay 'Du
tableau en tant que simulacre' in La Ressemblance : 'Toute invention d'un simulacre
presuppose le regne de stereotypes prevalents' (B,77). For Klossowski all expression
is stereotyped because it is dependent on the 'code des signes'. What is importance is
the manner in which the stereotype is undermined or rather singularised by the
'phantasme' .
The violence of the 'simulacre'.
This tension between the singularity of interior vision and the generality of the
language used to figure it was described at the end of the preceding discussion of the
scene of fantasy as an impasse; an impasse which carried with it a dual affirmation. The
66 Klossowski's analysis of Sade's writing as well as his commentary ofLe Bain de Diane showed the
way inwhich the designation of singularity always failed, and led to repetition or reiteration. If
the simulacrum is recuperated into a rational discourse, then there is no further need to repeat
because it no longer designates an obsessive singularity; rather it is returned to the false
equilibrium of truth.
scene of fantasy affirmed the intensity of impersonal desire whilst at the same time
affirming stable subject positions in its recourse to conventional signs and language. It
has been argued that the contradictory terms of this impasse relate to each other on the
basis of 'simulation' and the 'echange frauduleux' which takes place between the
'phantasme' and the generality oflanguage. It has also been argued that Klossowski's
use of the term 'vision' does not imply an appropriating male gaze, but rather also
entails a movement of simulation; a movement in which the invisible is envisaged at the
limit point of the visible, in which the subject is dissolved into a point of intensity.
Because the simulacrum carries with it the force of this double simulation (the
'phantasme' simulating an intensity, the 'simulacre' simulating the 'phantasme') it
functions differently from a conventional use of the stereotype.
The violence of the stereotype (the 'code des signes') lies in its suppression of
diversity and plurality; it substitutes a simple representation for what in fact are
complex and multiple phenomena. It claims to have a universal reference and therefore
functions to underpin ideological positions and the appropriations of power. The
stereotype, for example, of a woman who is being raped and who in the process is
shown secretly to enjoy the experience could be said to express the phallocentric aim
of being in control offemale desire, insofar as it constructs the woman as an always
willing object of male possession. The is just the stereotype which was discussed
earlier in the context of Roberte's sexual encounters in La Revocation de I'Edit de
Nantes. The simulacrum, however, because it is parodic and paradoxical (it speaks of
that which cannot be spoken) always carries with it an ironic relation to the simple
representations of the conventional stereotype. It does not designate any Truth or
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ideological presupposition but seeks to undermine universality by fraudulently
designating a singular moment of intensity. As an ironic staging of the stereotype, the
simulacrum constitutes its exaggeration to such an extent that its point of reference
cannot be a universal but is returned to the obsessive singularity which characterises
the 'phantasme' :
Le simulacre ne simule efficacemem la contrainte du phantasme qu'en
exagerant les schemes stereotypes: rencherir sur le stereotype et I'accentuer
c'est accuser I'obsession dont il constitue la replique (B,78).
The violence of the simulacrum is therefore different from the violence of the
stereotype in its conventional form. The stereotype appeals to a universal Truth and in
so doing appropriates and suppresses diversity and multiplicity. The simulacrum, in
accentuating the stereotype so as to mimic 'le phantasme', affirms singularity over
universality. It suspends the movement towards Truth, interrupting the violence of the
stereotype. The violence of the simulacrum is that of the unique against the universal".
The simulacrum reproduces the violence of the stereotype but only to exaggerate it
and tum it back upon itself.
This, ultimately, is the function of the scenes of sexual fantasy in Roberte ce
soir and La Revocation and in Klossowski's painting. The writing or painting of
fantasy is not a matter of seeing, nor of a male gaze and its appropriations, but rather
67 Madou alludes to this problem and in particular the way in which Klossowski's use of stereotype
seeks to differentiate itself from pornography: 'C'est en deconstruisant ou en grossissant
demesurement les schemes stereotypes de la sensibilite et de la representation que Klossowski
cherche afixer les fulgurantes et ephemeres manifestations d'un signe unique sous la contrainte
duquel se resserre sa pensee' and later affirms on this basis: 'C'est en effet aux demons
pornographes comme aux rigeurs de la Loi que Klossowski dispute la physionomie de Roberte',
Demons et simulacres dans l'reuvre de Pierre Klossowski, p, 9 and p. 12. This is an important
point, I think. and indicates that a sympathetic reading of Klossowski's work (which would
differentiate itself from Dardigna' s view) would not only reject any complicity of certain key
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of the production of simulacra. The simulation of fantasy seeks to affirm the singular
over the universal. The rape ofRoberte at once stages the violence of the stereotype in
its movement toward Truth (it stages the possession of Robert e) but at the same time
suspends that movement. In Roberte ce soir or La Revocation writing seeks to possess
Roberte in that moment when she succumbs to desire and becomes uniquely other
from herself Yet the language of the text clearly indicates that that impersonal
moment of intensity is not here, not reducible to language. The unique sign which is
the 'nom de Roberte' eludes the narrative; 'Roberte' is not to be possessed. The motif
of suspension is a key point around which the simulacra of Roberte's possession tum.
The failure of possession and the ironic relation of the simulacrum to the stereotype
are affirmed in this motif The final image of Roberte ce soir offers an image of just
such a suspension, an image of Roberte being eternally withheld and beyond
possession :
Roberte, la jupe encore relevee, d'une main semble rajuster sa gaine ou ses bas,
tandis que de l'autre du bout des doigts elle tend une paire de cles a Victor que
celui-ci touche sans les prendre jamais : car l'un et l'autre semblent en suspens
dans leur positions respectives (LH,173).
Such an image of suspension also underpins the use of tenses which was discussed
earlier. Just as Victor remains fixed in his movement towards Roberte here so the
protagonists of the other scenes are halted in their progress towards possession. The
use of the present tense in the parallel bars episode or of the imperfect tense in the
scene of Roberte and the 'collegiens' both served to interrupt the temporal flow of the
narrative, to suspend narrative time and place it in a time of repetition and eternity.
scenes with pornography as it is marketed today but would see such scenes as specifically anti-
pornographic.
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The simulacrum, always designating its difference from itself, suspends and interrupts
the possession of Roberte, thereby indicating that the keys to Truth are withheld and
will always be withheld. The simulacrum situates writing outside the time of logical
progression and universal Truth and places it under the sign of repetition and eternity,
where thought is returned to a point of intensity, and dissolved within the movement
of the impersonal.
Economies of writing.
It is clear why some critics have mistaken the nature of Klossowski's writing
and painting. On one level it is arguable that he does reproduce traditional schema of
the reification of the female body and its appropriation by a violent desire. Yet in
exaggerating these schema, in self-consciously playing upon them, he writing
articulates a suspension of the very movement of violence itself The play of the
simulacrum suspends the appropriation of one subject by another in favour of another
form of violence. The forces of 'impulsions' or the intensity of the 'phantasme' do not
imply the aggressive desire of an identifiable subject but rather precede any subject.
They imply a singularity which performs violence upon the generality of language and
the stability of the conscious subject (this, of course, parallels Klossowski's
reformulation of the question of violence in the 1967 edition of Sade mon prochain).
This amounts to the positing of two different economies of language, one based on the
circulation of conventional stereotypes (the 'code des signes') and upon the principle of
equivalence or sameness, the other based upon the circulation of simulacra and the
principle of non-equivalence or difference. The stereotype represents something and
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signals its coincidence with that which it represents; the simulacrum always signals its
lack of coincidence with what it represents.
This latter economy of writing was described at the end of the last chapter as
theatre or spectacle. The artifice and sense of simulation that such a designation
implies has been reaffirmed here in the discussion of the simulacrum. A mode of
writing based on an economy of difference would contest the writing of representation
and is a motif which has been implicit throughout the preceding analyses of all
Klossowski's writings. But Klossowski's work not only employs what could be
referred to as a different economy of writing but also explicitly problematises and
offers a critique of the notion of economy itself. How, for instance, can one talk of an
economy of difference at all when the very notion of economy is dependent upon the
principle of equivalence and exchange (and therefore upon a logic of representation)?
This second economy of writing is, on these terms, itself an impossibility. The strange
custom from which the Roberte trilogy takes its name offers an image of a form of
exchange based on difference rather than sameness and at the same time articulates the
impossibility of such a form of exchange. 'Les Lois de l'hospitalite', as Octave seeks to
practise them, highlight the impossibility of an economy founded upon difference and
problematise the notion that such an economy in some way transgresses one based
upon equivalence. In the end a discussion of the simulacrum as a form of economy




Qui donne pour ne pas recevoir prend a chaque lois possession de qui, ayant recu
pour etre, ne peut rendre; d'avance ce demier s'est tout entier donne a la puissance
qui s'augmente, au lieu de diminuer, en donnant sans recevoir pour reprendre
davantage qu'elle n'a donne
La Monnaie vivante'"
Octave's desire is to give his wife to guests of his household. The more
unfamiliar the guest, the greater his desire to offer this unusual hospitality. Yet Octave
seeks to give his wife in order to possess her more thoroughly, more absolutely. To
this end he institutes a singular practice of welcome : 'les lois de l'hospitalite' which
give the Roberte trilogy its name. Yet how is one to make sense of such a strange
custom and in what sense can one give something away in order better to possess it?
In the practice of 'les lois de l'hospitalite' the key Klossowskian motifs of the
'phantasme', the 'nom de Roberte' and of transgression are brought together under
the sign of economy or exchange. Questions of economy, and more explicitly of an
economy based upon the gift rather than barter (the exchange of goods of equivalent
value) lie at the heart of the debate surrounding writing and transgression in France
from the thirties onwards. The linking of a notion of economy with language and
questions of meaning was already well established by this time. For instance Nietzsche
in his early essay Uber Wahrheit und Luge im aussermoralischen Sinn' compares
words to coins. Words he argues are given a value in much the same way as is money.
Likewise Saussure in his Cours de linguistiQue generale speaks of verbal signs as
261
functioning according to their 'valeur' in the system of'language'". The question of
transgression in its relation to language and writing is developed from the thirties
onwards within a wider critique of the notion of economy itself". One of the most
important contributions to this particular critique of economy can be found in the work
of Georges Bataille". Bataille's reading of Marcel Mauss lead him to promote a form
of economy based upon the gift (taking as its model native American forms of ritual
exchange such as the potlatch). The appeal of the gift economy lies in the way it
challenges the omnipotence of conventional exchange based as it is upon the principle
of equivalence. The circulation of goods in the form of gifts constitutes a system of
exchange which, Bataille would argue, precedes and exceeds the economy of identity
and meaning (in which one thing is given a value equal or equivalent to another).
Bataille's conception finds its fullest elaboration in his 1949 work La Part maudite"
where he develops his notions of general and restricted economy within the context of
both historical and contemporary perspectives", Bataille's discourse on economy, and
particularly on the notion of a gift economy is a key frame of reference for any
understanding of Kloss ow ski's 'lois de l'hospitalite'.
68 La Monnaie vivante (paris: Editions Eric Losfeld, 1972); re-edition (without photographs by Pierre
Zucca) Paris: Joelle Losfeld, 1994, p. 54.
69 Cf. Roland Barthes, 'Saussure, le signe, la democratic' in L' Aventure semiologigue, (paris: Seuil,
1985), pp. 221-26.
70 This begins most crucially with Marx's Capital (subtitled A critique of political economy) and its
attempt to challenge the basis of traditional economic thinking (i.e the imposition of a general
principle of equivalence or the subordination of use value by exchange value).
71 The critique of economy becomes a central term of reference for thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s in
the wake of Bataille's reflections. This has been developed most significantly by Lyotard inhis
work L'Economie libidinale.
72 Georges Bataille, La Part maudite, (Euvres completes, vol.7.
73 Although this opposition does not necessarily function in any straightforward way. See Derrida's
essay on Bataille in L'Ecriture et la difference, (paris: Seuil, 1967), pp. 369-407.
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In fact all of the motifs of Kloss owski's writing which have so far been
examined intersect with this question of economy or exchange. Whether it be
perversion in Sade's writing, the sign of the Vicious Circle in Nietzsche's discourse, or
indeed the 'signe unique' itself in Les Lois de l'hospitalite, all these terms have their
particular value within Klossowski's writing because they function paradoxically as
signs of that which is inexchangeable. The 'signe unique', for example, refers only to
itself; it is equivalent to nothing other than itself It is, therefore, a sign which is not a
sign, it does not function within language since linguistic signs always function on the
basis of equivalence. The singularity of perversion or the intensity of Eternal Return
are likewise placed outside the codified sign systems of human thought and language.
The conclusion of the previous discussion spoke of Klossowski's writing in terms of
two 'economies oflanguage', the one based upon meaning and sameness (the 'code des
signes') the other based upon non-equivalence or difference (the fabrication of
simulacra). Yet how is it possible to exchange the inexchangeable? Or, put another
way, how is it possible to think an economy of difference when the very notion of
economy seems to imply an exchange or circulation of goods which can only take
place on the basis of some rule of equivalence (by which one thing is substituted for
another according to agreed principles)?
It is in answer to this question that Bataille champions the Amerindian ritual of
the potlatch in La Part maudite and Klossowski formulates the custom of 'les lois de
l'hospitalite' in the trilogy of that name. In both cases an attempt is made to formulate
a mode of exchange which transgresses or overturns classical economy in favour of an
'economy' of the gift.
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A contradictory custom - 'Les lois de l'hospitalite '.
Unlike Bataille in La Part maudite, Klossowski has recourse to fiction in order
to stage a system of exchange predicated upon the gift. In a densely argued few pages
towards the beginning ofRoberte ce soir. Octave's formulation of'les lois de
l'hospitalite' is presented in a language couched in terms borrowed from Scholastic
philosophy. It is also formulated in a manner which carries with it echoes ofBataille's
project of the Sacred, implying both a transgression of the Law and a merging or
subject and object. The master of the household, in the first instance, seeks to offer up
his wife to visitors in order to institute a more essential relationship with them than he
would otherwise have :
le maitre de ceans recherche avec l'etranger qu'il recoit une relation non plus
accidentelle, mais essentielle. L'un et l'autre ne sont d'abord que des substances
isolees, sans communication l'une avec l'autre, qui ne soit toujours
qu'accidentelle : toi qui te crois loin de chez toi chez quelqu'un que tu crois
etre chez soi, tu n'apportes que des accidents de ta substance, en tant qu'il font
de toi un etranger, a celui qui te recoit dans tout ce qui ne fait de lui-meme
qu'un hote accidentel (LB,ll 0).
Klossowski's use of the term 'communication' here alludes to both the Catholic
doctrine of tl'incommunicabilite des etres' on the one hand and the Bataillian theory of
the sacred and transgression on the other. The former, a doctrine derived from
Thomist philosophy, describes the existence of a human being as a substance which is
doubly determined, principally by its essence (essentia), and secondarily by what are
called accidents", Accidents are secondary because they can be altered or undergo
74 Of which there are nine: quantity (quantum), quality (quale), action (actio), passion (passio),
relation trelatio or essead), place (ubi), time (quando), possession and situation (habitus and
situs). For a full account of this theory of accidents and essence see Etienne Gilson, Le
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transformation without affecting essence. They define the contingency of human
beings and their being in the world relative to other substances (human beings).
Substance is isolated because it can only know another substance accidentally, that is it
can apprehend only accidents not essence. All communication between human beings
is therefore relative rather than essential. That which is most essential to a human
being remains always incommunicable '. For Octave his ritual of hospitality is a means
of apprehending essence :
parce que le maitre de ceans invite ici l'etranger a remonter a la source de
toutes substances au-dela de tout accident, voici comment il inaugure une
relation substantielle entre lui et l'etranger, qui en verite sera un rapport non
plus relatif, mais absolu, comme si, le maitre etant confondu avec l'etranger, sa
relation avec toi qui viens d'entrer n'etait plus qu'une relation de soi a soi-meme
(LH,110).
In what sense, however, can the offering up of a spouse to a fortuitous stranger
constitute a penetration of accidental attributes to the essence of substance? It is here
that the relation of 'hospitality' to a Bataillian conception of communication and the
sacred gives shape and context to Octave's singular desire.
In my first chapter I examined Bataille's theory of transgression in the context
of his writing on Sade. The key element in this discussion was Bataille's insistence that
in transgressing limits placed upon behaviour by social taboos the Sadeian hero was
Thomisme (paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992). See in particular pp. 22-24 and pp.
55-73.
7S For a discussion of Klossowski's use of a theological notion of incommunicability see Alain
Arnaud, Pierre Klossowski, pp. 93-108. It goes without saying that Klossowski is adapting this
doctrine to his own parodic ends; for Klossowski it is not the essence of the Self which is
incommunicable (the Self being an arbitrary role or mask) but the pre-personal or impersonal
movements of intensity which underpin the Self (as a foundation which is without foundation).
For further discussion of Klossowski's use of this doctrine see Deleuze's essay 'Klossowski ou
les corps-langages', Logigue du sens (paris: Minuit, 1969), pp. 325-50; see in particular pp.
338-39. See also lean-Pol Madou, Demons et simulacres dans l'reuvre de Pierre Klossowski, p.
50.
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unleashing energies which overturned also the limits of the Selfas a discrete entity.
This dissolution of the Self/Other, subject/object distinction in the act of transgression
Bataille refers to as 'la communication'. This, of course, is not communication in the
conventional sense since it does not refer to contact between two discrete entities but
rather the dissolution of these entities. In L'Experience interieure Bataille speaks of the
'extase' which gives rise to 'la communication' as follows:
II n'y a plus de sujet = objet, mais "brechejsic] beante" entre l'un et l'autre et,
dans la breche, le sujet, l'objet sont dissous, i1y a passage, communication,
mais non de l'un Iil'autre : l'un et l'autre ont perdu l'existence distincte"
Octave's attempt to inaugurate 'une relation substantielle entre lui et l'etranger' recasts
this experience of transgression and communication. In 'giving' his wife to a guest of
his household, in requiring Roberte to commit adultery, Octave is enacting a
transgression of that most sacred of limits, that is to say the bond of Christian
marriage. This moment re-enacts or recasts the experience of 'la conscience sadiste' as
it was outlined in the first version of Sade mon prochain. The violation of the sacred
bonds of marriage is also at the same time a more general violation of God's Law.
However, the terms of this transgression in this instance are more complicated (not to
say convoluted) and need some further explanation.
The edict of hospitality is formulated in such a way that both Octave and
Roberte are assigned two roles the former expressing their conventional social
functions and the latter indicating their functions as both giver and gift. Octave the
'maitre de ceans' is doubled into 'l'hote'. Roberte the 'rnaitresse de ceans' whose
identity is defined by her social function as wife (or for example as the aunt of
76 Georges Bataille, CEuvres completes. vol. 5 (paris: Gallimard, 1987), p.74.
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Antoine) is doubled up as 'l'hotesse'. In both cases the second term refers to Octave
and Roberte in relation to the law of hospitality. They become either host or hostess
only in relation to the act of 'giving 'Roberte' in such a way that hospitality is 'l'essence
meme de l'hote et de l'hotesse' (LH, 110). In the scholastic terms outlined above the
'maitre' and 'maitresse' denote accidental (contingent) identity whilst the terms 'hote'
and 'hotesse' denote essential identity. In this sense 'les lois de l'hospitalite' as a ritual
of transgression assimilates the thomist conception of accidents to the Bataillian notion
of the limit as that which marks the Selfas a discrete entity. Both accidents as
contingent determinations and limits as restrictions or taboos structure identity as it is
socially given. In offering his wife to a stranger Octave seeks to transgress those limits
which constitute Roberte in her accidental identity (that of 'Ia maitresse de ceans') :
La notion de maitresse de ceans, est prise sous la raison d'existence; elle n'est
une hotesse que sous la raison de l'essence : cette essence est done limitee par
son actualisation dans l'existence en tant que maitresse de ceans, Et la trahison
n'a done ici d'autre fonction que de rompre cette limitation (LH, Ill).
Roberte given to the 'invite' is projected out of her accidental identity (wife, aunt) to
be revealed in her essence (Roberte). Yet at the same time, and most crucially, this act
of transgression decomposes the limits which separate the 'hate' and the 'invite' so
that they 'communicate' in the Bataillian sense and become interchangeable. It is
interesting to note that the French language itself incorporates this possibility insofar
as the word 'hate' can denote both host and guest. At some level language does not
discriminate between these apparent opposites in a manner which reflects what is at
stake in the act of hospitality itselt~77.
77 For an illuminating discussion of the resonances set up around the terms 'hOte' and 'hOtesse' see
Madou, Demons et simulacres dans l'o:uvre de Pierre Klossowski, p. 108. Madou's discussion
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So there are two key moments to 'les lois de l'hospitalite", firstly that Roberte,
on being possessed by a stranger, is propelled out of her accidental role ('maitresse')
to reveal her essential identity (essential because as 'hotesse' Roberte is propelled
outside her conventional social identity in the transgression of the marriage bond).
Secondly the 'hote' and 'invite' cease to be separate entities as limits are overturned in
the transgressive act :
l'hote s'actualise dans l'invite, ou si tu veux, ilactualise une possibilite de
l'invite, aut ant que toi, l'invite, une possibilite de l'hote. La delectation la plus
eminente de l'hote a pour objet l'actualisation dans la maitresse de ceans de
I'essence inactuelle de l'hotesse (LH, 110).
Octave, as he inaugurates an essential relation with the guest, seeks to possess the
essence of Rob ert e (as 'hotesse'). The guest possesses Roberte in her essence
(liberated from the limitation of 'Ia maitresse') but at the same moment Octave
becomes interchangeable with the guest. The 'hote' is both host and guest in such a
way that allows Octave to 'know' his wife in a manner that would otherwise be denied
him.
Hospitality, therefore, is a means by which Octave seeks to possess the essence
of Roberte. Without this ritual of giving his wife to a fortuitous guest Octave knows
Roberte only relatively or accidentally. As 'maitre de ceans' he knows Roberte only as
'maitresse de ceans'. But by actualising the essence ofRoberte as she is taken sexually
by his guest, and by confounding himself with his guest he knows her and possesses
her absolutely. His hope in instituting the law of hospitality is that:
turns around words he links together in the following series: 'hospitalite, hopital, hOte,otage,
hostie, ostensoir, autel', all of which figure in key episodes of the Roberte trilogy.
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it saisira cofite que coute l'essence de l'hotesse dans l'infidelite de la maitresse
de ceans. Car ce qu'il veut, c'est la posseder infidele, en tant que hotesse
remplissant fidelement ses devoirs (LH,Ill).
It is in this sense that Octave gives in order better to possess. His project (like that of
the Sadeian hero) is broadly speaking a dialectical one. Octave loses Roberte in order
better to affirm his propriety over her. The negation of the bonds of marriage through
the adulteration ofRoberte is a suppression but also a conservation (a 'suppression
conservatrice' or Aufhebung in the manner outlined in the first chapter in relation to
Kojeve). Octave is seeking to use the contradictory nature of his act as a means of
imposing a totality and unity on the relation between his own self and that other which
is Roberte. Yet this act of dialectical assimilation founders upon its very impossibility.
Octave knows, for instance, that in the act of giving Roberte the identities of
'hote' and 'invite' are dissolved and confounded. At the moment when his own
identity is subject to dissolution he seeks to possess, he seeks to accrue something to
himself in the moment that he ceases to be himself The gesture which would allow
him to possess Roberte at the same time suspends his identity (since it has become
interchangeable with that of the 'invite') and suspends the principle of propriety by
which he could be said to 'own' or 'possess' anything at all. The possession of
Roberte is a gesture which renders itself impossible in the moment it occurs. At the
same time he desires to possess Roberte in her infidelity, yet that infidelity is
constituted only insofar as she is '[ une] hot esse remplissant fidelement ses devoirs'.
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The gesture of hospitality, both as a transgressive act and as a dialectical project,
appears to be an impossible enterprise from the outset 78.
Bataille's discourse on the 'potlatch' in La Part maudite can shed some light on
the paradoxical nature of this custom?" Bataille's critique of expenditure was outlined
briefly in the opening discussion of this thesis. His proposition that human existence is
always in excess of itself, that rational systems can never know any closure and always
produce an 'excedant', forms the basis of his meditation on economy in La Part
maudite. The distinction Bataille posits between a restricted and general economy
finds its expression within the economic sphere proper in the opposition between a
circulation of goods based on barter and one based on deliberate wastage or
dilapidation of wealth. Barter, or the exchange of goods on the basis of equivalence, is
developed into its most sophisticated form in capitalist economy (which accrues and
appropriates). Dilapidation, or the futile expenditure of goods, is developed into social
78 Interestingly, Daniel Withem chooses to gloss the structure set up in the ritual of hospitality in
Lacanian terms. Of the visits payed by the 'invite' he says: '11est necessaire de les relever dans
le jeu et par le jeu des ordres lacaniens, dans et par le jeu dechirant du symbolique, de
l'imaginaire. Nous avancons ceci : Ie visiteur du recit klossowskien met un pied dans l'ordre des
contrats et un pied dans I' ordre des simulacres; it marche ainsi dechire entre la contrainte du
retour et le leurrre du revenir; it parait danser sur un pied et sur un ordre, et changer aussitot de
pied, et d'ordre; ilprogress en dansant; it danse lejeu de I'outre, ilfait lejeu d'un troisieme
ordre ou le tableau lui-meme parait prendre et perdre pied: le reel', Pierre Klossowski : Le
Corps impie, p. 112. The strength of this reading lies in the way it highlights the double nature
of Klossowski's writing, the fact that it both uses the stereotypes of the 'code des signes' and
undermines them in favour of singularity. Withem's reading also allows the 'visiteur' as a point
in a structure to be a position occupied by the reader. The 'invite' as intermediary (be it figured
as demon, colosse or dwarf) becomes a locus which can be occupied '3 tour de role' by reader,
Octave and Klossowski alike precisely because it alludes to a point where identity is overturned
in favour of a moment of impersonal intensity. It might seem difficult given the context in which
Klossowski is writing not to assimilate such a triadic structure to the lacanian orders. Clearly,
however, such a reading is useful but by no means exhaustive.
79 For some useful commentaries on Bataille's discourse on economy see Carolyn Bailey Gill (ed.),
Bataille. Writing the Sacred (London, Routledge, 1995). See in particular Geoffrey
Bennington's article 'Introduction to economics I', pp. 46-57, and Denis Hollier, 'The use value
of the impossible', pp. 133-53. See also Michael Richardson, Georges Bataille (London,
Routledge, 1994).
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practices of sacrifice (as in the Aztec culture) or into the circulation of goods through
a ritual of giving or potlatch (practised primarily, but by no means exclusively, by
natives of North America). In the custom of the potlatch, Bataille argues, the
paradoxical nature of human existence is acted out and affirmed.
The potlatch is a paradoxical custom because in the act of giving it represents a
wastage but also an accumulation in the sense that it increases the prestige of the
giver. According to this ritual one gives and the amount that is given becomes an
affirmation of status or rank. The onus is then on the receiver to give in return in order
not to be in a permanently subservient position with regard to the giver (although the
return of the gift is usually at a much later stage). Potlatch is, as it were, a form of
challenge. Wealth is given away (or sometimes just destroyed) in order to affirm the
quantity of one's wealth; the more one gives the greater one's accumulation of
prestige. In the rite of potlatch goods that could be put to good use are expended
uselessly but this expenditure (or negation of use value) is converted into a symbolic
accrual. Bataille's point is that the potlatch, unlike traditional economy, does not seek
to convert use value (labour, enjoyment) into exchange value (money), nor does it
seek to stock up resources in view of exchange, rather it wastes profligately . Yet this
wastage is, at the same time, 'made use or. This makes the potlatch a paradoxical
gesture which simultaneously implies both wastage and use. The potlatch articulates an
impossible moment as it seeks to make use of profligacy. It expresses in the very same
gesture moments which are radically opposed to each other. The potlatch:
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utilise a contresens la negation qu'il fait de l'utilite des ressources qu'il gaspille.
n fait ainsi tomber dans la contradiction non seulement lui-meme mais en entier
l'existence de l'homme'".
This contradiction exactly parallels the impossibility of Octave's attempt to possess
Roberte in the ritual giving of 'les lois de l'hospitalite'. Like Octave's custom the
potlatch enacts a project (a giving which is at the same time an attempt to possess)
which undermines itself because it simultaneously articulates two diametrically
opposed instances: wastage (the giving ofRoberte or an item in the ritual of the
potlatch) and accumulation (the 'possession' ofRoberte or the accrual of prestige). In
the same manner as 'les lois' the potlatch represents the impossibility ofa giving which
would also be a form of keeping where the giver: 'place la valeur, le prestige et la
verite de la vie dans la negation de l'emploi servile des biens, mais au meme instant fait
de cette negation un emploi servile'!'. In enacting such a gesture the potlatch affirms
the paradoxical basis of human life itself It affirms that any project of total isation or
dialectical synthesis is always predicated upon a radical expenditure which overturns
such a project.
Both the potlatch and 'Les lois de l'hospitalite' show the degeneration of
dialectical thinking (where identity or utility are negated and yet maintained) into a
moment of aporia or paradox. As a form of gift exchange the potlatch repeats the
appropriative movement of human thought when it reaches that limit where it can no
80 Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, vol. 7, p. 75.
81 Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, vol. 7, p. 75. Bataille comments in La Part maudite : 'Nul ne
peut a la fois connaitre et ne pas etre detroit, nul ne peut a la fois consumer la richesse et
l'accroitre' Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, vol. 7, p. 76. This sentence could apply equally
to Octave's custom (he seeks to possess at the moment when his own self is dissolved) and to the
ritual of potlatch (which gives in order to accrue).
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longer appropriate but rather self-destructs (the moment which, for Bataille, Sade's
writing also embodies). Bataille writes:
En effet, la contradiction du potlatch ne se revele pas seulement dans toute
l'histoire, mais plus profondement dans les operations de la pensee".
Human existence as it attempts to 'saisir ce qu'elle voulut elle-meme insaississable,
[d'] utiliser ce dont elle refusa !'utilite,s3 is shown to be always divided from itself,
always in contradiction with itself, without any hope of that contradiction being
sublated into a greater synthesis.
In 1947 Klossowski responded to this crisis of dialectical thought by affirming
the greater unity of God. Yet the paradoxical moment which the potlatch or laws of
hospitality embody has been shown to be present throughout all of Klossowski's
writings. The paradoxical nature of both hospitality and potlatch lies in the way they
both seek to bring into exchange that which properly speaking is inexchangeable. In
the same way the Sadeian libertine, as portrayed in first version of Sade mon prochain,
impurely desired to possess purity (that of the Virgin). Actaeon's attempt to possess
Diana, Nietzsche's wish to think the thought that overturns thought itself (Eternal
Return) are all expressions of the same impossible desire.
As we have seen the sexual scenes of La Revocation de l'Edit de Nantes and
Roberte ce soir also stage that same moment (in the preceding discussion of writing
and painting 'le phantasme'). In this sense the fictional 'lois de l'hospitalite' (the ritual
of giving inaugurated by Octave) operate as a kind of mise en abyme of the sexual
episodes. It has been argued that the sexual scenes seek to embrace or represent the
82 Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, vol. 7, p. 76.
83 Georges Bataille, <Euvres completes, vol. 7, p, 75.
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'phantasme' in an impossible gesture (the 'phantasme' being outside language and
conscious thought). This parallels Octave's attempt to possess Roberte in the ritual of
hospitality. Just as language seeks to articulate what is outside itself in these sexual
scenes, Octave seeks to possess Roberte at the moment when he is outside of himself,
at the moment when he is interchangeable with the 'invite' and is no longer a subject
who can possess (the principle of propriety having been overturned). 'Les lois de
l'hospitalite', the ritual of giving which gives the Roberte trilogy its name, provide an
image of the desire at work in the narrative itself as it attempts to describe Roberte
'hors d'elle-meme', succumbing to sexual pleasure and becoming different from
herself The writing of the 'signe unique' or the 'phantasme' is figured by this notion
of hospitality as an impossible attempt to possess.
This conception of impossibility, articulated in Bataille's potlatch and Octave's
'lois de l'hospitalite' is by now a familiar term of reference within this discussion. Yet,
even at the risk of some repetition, it is necessary to give a full explanation of Octave's
unusual custom because the narrative of the Roberte trilogy introduces an important
ambiguity into the motif of exchange which this custom embodies. The paradoxical
gesture articulated by 'les lois de l'hospitalite' brings this discussion back to the
question of transgression as it was articulated within the context of Kloss ow ski's
earlier and later writings on Sade.
Theodore's dilemma - '['essence de [,hotesse '.
Theodore's dilemma in Le Soufileur, the third final and novel ofLes Lois de
l'hospitalite, has its origin in two key sentences from Octave's discourse on hospitality.
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Itwas shown earlier that Octave's desire with regard to Roberte was to : 'la posseder
infidele, en tant que hotesse remplissant fidelement ses devoirs'. In casting Roberte out
of herself in her role as 'maitresse de ceans' to possess her as 'hotesse', Octave is
taking a certain risk. He is gambling on the fact the 'hotesse', in her essence, is faithful
to the 'hote'. Octave writes:
Si l'essence de l'hotesse est dans la fidelite Iil'hote, cela pennet Ii l'hote de faire
surgir aux yeux de l'invite l'hotesse, essentielle dans la maitresse de ceans
existante (LH,111).
What this means is that Octave can possess Roberte only through transgressing the
bonds of marriage if Roberte, in her essence, remains within and is faithful to those
bonds in the first place. By transgressing the limits of the marital unit Octave affirms
them (and therefore his propriety of Robert e) all the more. And yet what if, muses
Octave, the essence ofRoberte was in infidelity? What if she were never, in her
essence, bound by those bonds? Octave poses the question and offers his own answer :
Si l'essence de l'hotesse etait dans l'infidelite, l'hote aura beau jouer, il aura
perdu d'avance (LH,111).
The functioning of'les lois de l'hospitalite', however contradictory, depends on this
question of the essence or essential identity ofRoberte and this question is really a
question of her self-sameness (her fidelity to herself rather than to Octave). The gift of
Roberte to a stranger casts her outside of herself in the transgression of the marriage
bond (her role as 'rnaitresse de ceans'). Yet ifRoberte is essentially already unfaithful,
already outside of herself, then the act of transgression has no value. How can one
transgress a limit which has, in a crucial sense, always already been transgressed? If the
essence of Roberte is not self-same, if she is always unfaithful to herself, then she has
always already also been unfaithful to Octave. Her act of infidelity which is dictated by
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'les lois de l'hospitalite' is therefore no longer a faithful act of infidelity (as Octave
wishes) because it is not an act of infidelity at all. Octave's contradictory attempt to
possess Roberte has failed before it has even begun, because Roberte is already
outside of those limits he seeks to infringe in order to possess her.
This question of the essence and fidelity of Roberte in relation to the laws of
hospitality is played out in the narrative ofLe Souffieur and turns around the
possibility of two types of giving and two types of transgression. In Le Souffieur it is
Theodore Lacase, the narrator, who is married to Roberte. Theodore Lacase is also a
novelist and author of a work going by the name of Roberte ce soir in which one
Octave institutes a strange custom of welcome. Like many of the proper names in
Klossowski's novels the name of Theodore Lacase is highly suggestive and
overdetermined. 'Lacase', for instance, suggests a reference to 'casa' or house.
Lacase, then, is a double of Octave, the 'maitre de ceans', and, like his double,
promotes within his household a code of hospitality which involves the adulteration of
Roberte84• Within the narrative ofLe Souffieur, then, Roberte ce soir is Theodore's
84 The name Theodore also means' Gift of God', an allusion which associates him even more closely
with the act of giving and the attempt to possess the essence of Roberte (which parallels
Actaeon's attempt to possess the divinity of Diane). Other names within this text are also
suggestive. Ygdrasil, drawn from Norse mythology, means Tree of Life. Le Souffleur, like La
Vocation suspendue before it, can be read as a 'roman Iiclefs'. In this context Ygdrasil may be
identified as Jacques Lacan (which poses the question as to what links one might make between
the Tree of Life and Lacan's work?). Guy de Savigny who has ambivalent relations with
Theodore and a daughter called Julie appears to be Bataille (is the aristocratic name a personal
aside?). All these allusions are kept necessarily veiled and offer no definitive answers or
interpretations. Klossowski's use of the 'roman Iiclef again places his writing under the sign of
repetition. Just as the figure of Theodore repeats the character of Octave (and K. repeats that of
Theodore) without any form of identity being established between them, so the various figures of
these novels might be said to repeat historically existing figures (Bataille, Lacan and Klossowski
himself). However, as one might expect, this repetition does not imply a mimetic project but
rather designates the already fictional status of those selves who go by the proper names
Bataille, Lacan and Klossowski. This essentially articulates a transgression of the whole
life/fiction dichotomy and thus of the autobiographical genre in general. Jean Decottignies in his
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creation and 'Les lois de l'hospitalite' Theodore's obsession. Le Souffieur can therefore
be read as a mise-en-abyme of the writing of Roberte ce soir and shows the
narrator/author of this text to be subject to the same moment of aporia or dissolution
as Octave. On first reading, Le Souffieur is a story which can appear highly convoluted
and confusing. This is because it is essentially the story of a confusion, namely a
confusion centring on the identity of Roberte, Theodore's wife. The confusion arises
from the fact that Roberte has a double. Theodore, who stages enactments of Roberte
ce soir in his apartment for friends and acquaintances, desires to see Roberte doubled,
cast out of herself as she is taken by another. These rehearsals ofRoberte ce soir
represent a theatrical enactment of 'les lois de l'hospitalite', although the reader is led
to believe that Roberte has indeed had relations with one of Theodore's friends (one
Guy de Savigny).
Yet Theodore's nightmare begins when, one evening during one of the
'repetitions' ofRoberte another woman arrives in the apartment, Roberte's double in a
very literal sense, and begins to struggle with his wife. The struggle ends, one of the
woman leaves, and yet in the confusion Theodore is not quite sure which one. From
this point on Theodore can never be sure of anything at all. He cannot be certain
whether what he sees is real or imagined, whether the Roberte he encounters is the
Roberte he knows or her unfamiliar double. His narrative proceeds with strange
work partially devoted to Klossowski (the rest is devoted to Stendhal and Giono) articulates this
describing the movement of Klossowski's text as a perversion of the autobiographical: "Telle est
la perversion imposee a la pratique autobiographique : prodiguant d'une part les conditions de
cette pratique, sous la forme de ces designations a la faveur desquelles l'identite du signature
force la cloture fabulaire pour s'installer au ceeur du recit que ron fera agir l'oubli de soi et
vaciller la memoire constitutive de la personne. Pratique foncierement ambigue, par laqueUe
l' auteur des Lois de l'hospitalite joue et risque son propre statuto Deplacement du recit
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indications such as 'Ce qui se passa le lendemain - si lendemain il y eut - comment le
decrire maintenant?' (LH,233) and has the air of a descent into hallucination and
madness. Le Souft1eur is the story of Theodore's attempt to hold onto his sanity and
uncover the mystery and uncertainty concerning the true identity of his wife. What he
uncovers is a long history of collusion between two woman whose resemblance the
one with the other has allowed for a most singular form of role swapping. Throughout
the years of his marriage Theodore has believed himself to be the husband of one
Roberte, 'veuve de geurre' and former wife of a 'commandant D.'. Roberte's strange
double he identifies as one Valentine K. wife ofK. the writer (who bears a strange
resemblance to Theodore himself) but also supposedly a widow who was once married
to a 'docteur Rodin'.
The more Theodore learns the greater and more definitive his confusion
becomes. Roberte and Valentine K., Theodore learns from his friend Guy, found it
necessary to swap identities during the occupation whilst working for the Resistance.
Valentine became Roberte, Roberte became Valentine. Roberte was therefore the real
widow of'le docteur Rodin', Valentine the real widow of 'le commandant D.'
(Roberte being Valentine and Valentine being Roberte). In the years after the war this
confusion of roles was never resolved, but rather was exploited all the more. Theodore
must confront the possibility that the wife of K. is Roberte and that Roberte is in fact
the wife of K. In this case Roberte, his wife, is not his wife and a woman who is not
his wife is his wife. In fact Theodore can never know which is which, whether the two
have swapped roles again or swapped back in a cycle which renders the identity of
autobiographique ou revocation de la biographie?', Jean Decottignies, L':E;criture de la fiction
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Roberte forever uncertain. This is a repetition of the role swapping which occurs in La
Revocation de l'Edit de Nantes between Sante-Sede and Binnsnicht. In both cases the
identities of the two figures involved become exchangeable in such a way as to
radically undermine the principle of identity. One never knows which is which and
under such circumstances there is no possibility one role being proper to the figure
who bears it (Valentine might just as well be Roberte and vice-versa). Once again what
this exchangeability affirms is that identity is only ever an arbitrary role or mask.
This point is emphasised when, after his conversation with Guy, Theodore
visits his friend and psychoanalyst docteur Ygdrasil (who in years previously had the
docteur Rodin's widow as his secretary). He confronts Ygdrasil with the following
conclusion :
ou bien Roberte est aussi la femme de ce K. et done la veuve d'un certain
docteur Rodin, ou bien elle n'est pas la femme de K., mais bien la veuve du
commandant D. et dans ce cas j'aurais vecu ... tantot avec l'une, tantot avec
l'autre ... (LH,281).
This radical confusion and uncertainty surrounding the identity ofRoberte represents a
crisis not just for Theodore's sanity but also for the functioning of his 'lois de
l'hospitalite'. His conversation with Ygdrasil soon shifts to a discussion of the
implications of the uncertainty surrounding Roberte for Theodore's custom of
hospitality.
Theodore and Ygdrasil disagree on the subject of economy. Theodore desires
exchange as the giving of a gift (embodied in the ritual of offering Roberte to a
stranger). Like Octave he seeks to give in order better to possess, as he tells Ygdrasil :
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), p. 190 (discussion of Klossowski pp. 151-95).
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On ne donne jamais ce qu'il y a d'inechangeable, mais toujours l'on prete pour
mieux posseder ce que l'on a (LH,303).
Ygdrasil, on the other hand does not believe in property and possession. The
adulteration of a wife by her husband so that the latter can affirm his ownership of the
wife all the more is an unacceptable alternative. For Ygdrasil the circulation of goods
or, more importantly in this context, the sexual traffic between men and women can
only take place as a free circulation, one without ownership or propriety, where giving
is always accompanied with receiving. Ygdrasil's logic dictates the 'mise en commun
des hommes et des femmes' :
L'adulteration de l'epouse par l'epoux, on ne peut pas vivre avec une semblable
idee. La pratique de l'hospitalite, telle que vous la concevez ne saurait etre
unilaterale. Comme toute hospitalite, celle-la aussi, et particulierement celle-la,
exige la reciprocite absolue pour etre viable, et c'est le pas que vous ne voulez
pas franchir : la mise en commun des femmes par les hommes et des hommes
par les femmes. Voila le corollaire de vos lois de l'hospitalite, la seule
legitimation universelle de l'adulteration de l'epouse par l'epoux, sans quoi tout
ceci ne reste qu'un pur phantasme 0\1 la morale monogamique se transgresse
eperdument pour revenir sur elle-meme, 0\1 le sacrement de mariage ne se
verifie que par le sacrilege, vestige d'une theologie dont les miasmes vous
empoisonnent ... (LH,303).
One must receive as well as give, claims Ygdrasil, or the act of transgression embodied
in 'les lois de l'hospitalite' will always be limited and will always confirm the limits
which it seeks to transgress. Ygdrasil's insistence on the reciprocity of the gift must
not be confused with a notion of barter or the exchange of goods on the basis of
equivalence. In the latter, two individuals exchange goods of equal value (this is where
the conversion of use value to exchange value would occur, most usually in the fixing
ofa price). In the reciprocal gift advocated by Ygdrasil each individual engages
separately in an act of giving, both of which acts affirm themselves as singular and
unique (constituting a circulation of gifts rather than an exchange of goods). Gilles
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Deleuze makes just such a confusion between these two forms in his commentary on
Klossowski in the appendix ofLogique du sens'. Deleuze cites Ygdrasil's instruction
to Theodore: '11faut maintenant aller jusqu'au bout, consentir Iiechanger Roberte
contre d'autres femmes, accepter d'etre infidele IiRoberte comme vous vous obstinez Ii
vouloir qu'elle le soit Iivous-meme,8S. Deleuze comments on Theodore's response as
follows:
Theodore reste sourd, il sait que la vraie repetition est dans le don, dans une
economie du don qui s'oppose Ii l'economie mercantile de l'echange
(...hommage IiGeorges Bataille)86.
Yet Ygdrasil's notion of 'la mise en commun des femmes par des hommes et des
hommes par des femmes' does not constitute a return to 'l'economie mercantile'.
Rather it expresses a more radical economy of the gift87. If, as Deleuze says,
Theodore's formulation of the gift is a homage to Bataille (and the notion of potlatch)
then Ygdrasil's formulation is also an implicit critique. A gift without return confirms
the limits it transgresses, it confirms possession. Or for Octave/Theodore it enacts the
moment where: 'la morale monogamique se transgresse eperdument pour revenir sur
elle-meme'. If the gift is universalised, as Ygdrasil proposes, then everyone gives,
every one receives and the whole notion of propriety, ownership or of limits is
abolished. The gift is radicalised because giving functions no longer as an affirmation
85 Deleuze, LogiQ1Jedu sens, p. 334
86 Logigue du sens, p. 334
87 Decottignies, whose commentary relies heavily upon and frequently cites Deleuze, follows him in
this judgement of Ygdrasil : 'Y gdrasil reproduit ici l' effort restitutif qui depuis un siecle et
demi, desamorce la fiction denommeefantastique; representant eminent de la race «mercantile».
Installer Theodore dans l'emploi de malade mentale (une forme s'il en estl), n'est-ce pas Ie
meilleur moyen de justifier et par consequence d' aplanir toutes les incongruites dont il est
l'instigateur, de preserver toutes les identites que menace la pensee et les discours de ce
perturbateur?', L'Ecriture de la fiction, p. 166.
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of possession but as an act of gratuity which overturns possession (and thus, as will
become clearer, the notion of giving itself).
Ygdrasil wants Theodore to give properly and to this end Theodore must learn
also to receive, must allow everyone to give. In this context the dual or indeterminate
identity ofRoberte is decisive. The Roberte that Theodore took to be his wife was,
when he first met her, active in collecting alms on behalf of the Salvation Army : she is
the very image of moral uprightness and fidelity (and indeed of salvation). Valentine
K, wearer offurs and excessive make-up, is the very image of a dissolute woman". In
fact she has been installed as an 'hotesse' in a public brothel, the 'Hotel de
Longchamp'. The significance of the 'Hotel de Longchamp' is divulged to the reader
through an article authored by K himself Sexual encounters in this house of pleasure
are categorised in a number of ways but the main principle is anonymity. Masks are
worn and identities kept secret in an anonymous traffic of bodies. The monies derived
from the activities of the 'Hotel' are all added to the coffers of the state and, because
of this, those men who allow their wives to become hostesses are placed into a lower
tax band. From the moment he first discusses the 'Hotel' with Guy de Savigny
Theodore is determined (because of personal financial pressures) not to be forced to
place Roberte there as a hostess. K however has no such scruples. As a reader and
devotee of Fourier, he is a firm believer in 'la mise en commun phalansterienne=" of
88 This, of course recalls, the figures of Justine and Juliette from Sade' s novels. An essay by
Klossowski devoted to these two characters is included as a preface to La Nouvelle Justine.
suivie de l'histoire de Juliette sa sreur, in the Cercle du livre Precieux edition of Sade's
complete works, 'Justine et Juliette', Sade, <Buvres Completes, tome VI (1966), pp. 67-79.
89 In parallel the later Klossowski is also a reader and commentator on Fourier's work. See Pierre
Klossowski 'Entre Marx et Fourier' in Denis Hollier Le College de sociologie (paris:
GallimardlIdCes, 1979[new revised edition 1995]), pp 586-87 [pp. 883-85 new edition] and Les
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men and women. K, like Ygdrasil, believes in a free circulation of bodies, in a
radically gratuitous and generalised giving which abolishes all propriety and identity.
If Theodore's wife is the faithful Roberte he always thought she was, then his
construction of 'les lois de l'hospitalite' has the sense which he desires. If, however, his
wife is Valentine K then the 'essence de l'hotesse' lies in her essential infidelity - the
giving has as it were always already taken place and Theodore has nothing to give, no
possession to affirm. It has been made clear that Roberte's identity is overturned and
becomes arbitrary role or mask in the play of substitutions which has taken place
between 'Roberte la salutiste' and 'Valentine K l'hotesse de l'Hotel de Longchamp'.
In the confusions and doubling of Le Souftleur the entire edifice of'Les lois de
l'hospitalite' as a form of giving shifts in its emphasis. Theodore in giving Roberte has,
it seems, 'perdu d'avance' because he can never be sure of the essence of his hostess.
The infidelity of Valentine K means that just as Theodore seeks to offer Roberte to a
stranger he might already have received a gift from K himself and what he gives was
never his to give. Giving has become more radical and seems to have moved beyond
Theodore's limited conception (where giving is always also possessing) to a point
where giving abolishes possession itself (and as will become clear by implication also
abolishes giving itself).
Le Souftleur introduces into the narrative of Les Lois de l'hospitalite two
discourses on the gift which at the same time embody two different types of
transgression. The first gift, that of Octave/Theodore, transgresses limits of propriety
in order then to affirm them. The second gift, that ofYgdrasil and K, transgresses
Derniers Travaux de Gulliver suivi de Sade et Fourier (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1974). See
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limits in order to abolish them entirely in an affirmation that they have always already
been transgressed. These two discourses on the gift mark the break between the earlier
and the later Klossowski. Where in 1947 Sade was seen to deny God's Law yet at the
same time affirm it, in Klossowski's 1967 version of Sade mon prochain Sade's atheism
was shown to be 'foncier' in that it affirmed the fragile nature of all norms (both
rational and theological); it affirmed the fact that norms always inevitably engender
and are overthrown by that which they seek to repress (perversion). The notion of 'Ia
prostitution universelle des etres' overturned God, the law and any possibility of
identity and self-sameness within being. Ygdrasil's and K.IS formulation of giving as a
free circulation or communisation of bodies constitutes just such a 'prostitution
universelle des etres' and parallels Klossowski reading in his later commentary on
Sade. Le Souftleur therefore is the process of the 'guerison' of Theodore. When he
wakes up at the end of the novel the narrator has become K. and his crisis over the
identity of his wife has passed. Le Souftleur recounts the movement of one type of
transgression to another. It tells of a giving which refuses to receive which is displaced
by a more universal notion of the gift. Only in the second type of giving can humanity
free itself from the tyranny of moral law and attain to innocence, as Ygdrasil puts it :
La mise en commun des femmes et des hommes prepare la voie a l'innocence,
bien plus, en assure le terrain, et chasse du domaine des sexes le sentiment de
la faute et le malheur, qui s'engendrent mutuellement (LH,304).
The story ofLe Souftleur speaks of a transition from guilt to innocence. It tells on one
level the story of Kloss ow ski himself in his transition from a Catholic who read
transgression one way in 1947 to a non-Christian who reads transgression in a very
also La Monnaie vivante (passim).
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different way in 1967. This transition speaks ofa Klossowski who moved from an
affirmation of theological unity to a more radical anti-Christian affirmation of
multiplicity (which as the second chapter has shown is closely bound up with his
reading of'Nietzsche)'".
Yet this differentiation is more complicated than such a straightforward
formulation might imply. This is because Le Souftleur - and Les Lois de l'hospitalite as
a whole - does not end on a simple affirmation of one form of giving over the other
(i.e. Klossowski's rejection of his earlier Selt) but also problematises this second notion
of the gift and the second form of transgression which it implies. Indeed, the
relationship between the first form of giving (Octave/Theodore) and the second
(YgdrasiVK.) is more complex than may at first seem to be the case. This, once again,
is because of the very impossible nature of YgdrasiVK. 's universalised notion of the
gift itself
Derrida and the impossible gift.
For Ygdrasil and K. the act of giving is an act of radical gratuity. When one
gives according to the law of 'la mise en commun des hommes et des femmes' one
90 Decottignies describes these two forms of transgression as 'transgression ethique' and as
transgression properly speaking. The former is placed under the rubric of a simple disobeying of
moral codes: 'Transgression ethique que de «faire le mal en depit de I'imperatif du bien»; que
de dire ou ecrire ce qu'il ne faut pas dire. A reduire ainsi le sens de la transgression, on aplanit
les conflits fondamentaux du langage et l' on esquive la violence specifique de toute prise de
parole', L'Ecriture de la fiction, pp. 171-72. This is clearly reminiscent of the use the surrealists
made of Sade and of Klossowski 's treatment of him in relation to 'categories morales' in the
1947 version of Sade mon prochain. Likewise Decottignies' description of the second type of
transgression reflects Klossowski's later writing practice: 'il faut bien admettre que la pratique
la plus lucide consiste a elaborer un langage qui declare sa propre insuffisance : un langage qui,
loin de s'evertuer ales reduire, affiche comme insurmontables les contradictions qu'engage sa
simple formulation', L'Ecnture de la fiction, p, 172.
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gives in the knowledge that this gesture is universally reciprocated, in the knowledge
that what one gives has already been given and that giving never asks to possess that
which it gives. This is giving in its pure form, one which does not seek to indebt but
which affirms itself as a singular and gratuitous event. Yet, asks Derrida in his essay
Donner Ie temps91, how is such a gift possible? Does not a gift in a sense always indebt
the person who receives it and if nothing belongs to anyone person in the first instance
(as 'la mise en commun des hommes et des femmes' seeks to affirm) to what extent is
a gift a gift at all?
Derrida argues in his essay that any act of giving is indeed bound up with
impossibility. In other words he argues that if a gift is to be a gift it must not return to
the giver. Derrida repeats Ygdrasil's criticism of Theodore. Ygdrasil's contention is
that 'les lois de l'hospitalite' and the act of giving (in order better to possess) are not
'viable'. Indeed, as he puts it : 'on ne peut pas vivre avec une semblable idee'
(LH,303). For Derrida the gift, 's'il y en a', must never accrue or affirm possession:
S'il yadon, Ie donne du don (ce qu'on donne, ce qui est donne, Ie don comme
.chose donnee au comme acte de donation) ne doit pas revenir au donnant (ne
disons pas encore au sujet, au donateur au a la donatrice). 11ne doit pas
circuler, il ne doit pas s'echanger, ilne doit en tout cas pas etre epuise, en tant
que don, par le proces d'echange, par le mouvement de la circulation du cercle
dans la forme du retour au point de depart92.
If one gives any recognition of indebtedness or gratitude this affirms that the gift is the
property of the giver and that in a crucial sense the gift returns to the giver; the giver
accrues what has been given Gust as the potlatch gave away in order to accrue status) :
'Pour qu'il y ait don, il faut qu'il n'y ait pas de reciprocite, de retour, d'echange, de
91 Jacques Derrida, Donner Ie temps I (paris, Galilee, 1991).
92 Donner le temps I,pp. 18-19.
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contre-don ni de dette. Si l'autre me rend ou me doit, ou doit me rendre ce que je lui
donne, it n'y aura pas eu don, que cette restitution soit immediate ou qu'elle se
programme dans Ie calcul complexe d'une differance a long terme?". The essence of
the gift lies in the fact that in never incurs a debt, never asks for a return; therein lies
its radical gratuity. It must be noted that Derrida use of the term 'reciprocite' differs
crucially from that ofYgdrasil's in Le Souffleur. When Ygdrasil tells Theodore he
must learn to receive as well as give he insisting that giving must be generalised to an
extent where propriety (and therefore any notion of debt) is abolished. When Derrida
says that the gift, to be a gift, must not be reciprocated he is making the same point,
i.e. that it must not indebt and must not affirm possession. They say the same thing in
different ways. But, again, is this gift, as a radical act of gratuity which does not indebt
or require a return possible?
Derrida pushes his argument further to make the point that the gift is the
essence of impossibility. For the gift to be a gift, Derrida asserts, it must not be
recognised as such by either the don 0 If' or the recipient, it must not manifest itself as
a gift :
A la limite, Ie don comme don devrait ne pas apparaitre comme don: ni au
donataire, ni au donateur. 11ne peut etre don qu'en n'etant pas present comme
don. Ni a l'''un'' ni a 1"'autre,,94(Derrida's emphasis).
The gift can only properly speaking be a gift if it does not present itself as a gift,
because if donator or donatee recognise it as such, some form of debt or exchange will
be incurred. Awareness of the gift as it is given always means that a symbolic return is
made either in the gratitude of the receiver (a recognition of indebtedness) or in the
93 Donner Ie temps I. p. 24.
287
.
expectation of gratitude from the side of the giver. In both cases the gratuity of the gift
or that which constitutes its essence as gift is annulled. For Derrida the giving of the
gift is an impossible event because 'S'il se presente, il ne se presente plus,9s. This
impossibility of the gift is also its paradoxical double bind :
l'impossibilite ou le double bind du don: pour qu'il y ait don, il faut que le don
n'apparaisse meme pas, qu'il ne soit pas percu comme don".
The gift is only present in its absence, it can only occur insofar as it never occurs. This
paradoxical and impossible status of the gift, and the logic of the double bind which
underpins it, also informs the notion of gift as gratuity as it is advocated by Ygdrasil
and K. in Le Souffieur.
Derrida's concern in his essay is wide-ranging and specifically seeks to address
this problematic of the gift in terms of the Heideggerian formulation 'es gibt Sein'. The
intricacies of this argument are not relevant within the context of this discussion. What
is highly relevant however is Derrida's remark that this coincidence of the gift with
impossibility renders any rigorous discourse on the gift itself impossible:
Si le don s'annule dans l'odyssee econornique du cercle des qu'il apparait
comme don ou des qu'il se signifie comme don, il n'y a plus de "logique du
don"; et il y a tout cl parier qu'un discours consequent sur le don devient
impossible: it manque son objet et parle, au fond, toujours d'autre chose'".
This comment is directly relevant to Ygdrasil's discourse on the gift in Le Souffieur. If
giving is abolished as soon as any subject is aware of the gift as gift, then how can the
universalised giving promoted by Ygdrasil and K. take place in the first instance? If a
conscious act of giving always necessarily implies a recognition of debt (and hence
94 Donner le temps I, pp. 26-7.
95 Donner Ie temps I, p. 28.
96 Donner Ie temps I.p. 29.
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propriety and possession) and therefore an annulment of the gratuity of the gift, is not
the act of giving always also ultimately as Theodore first conceived it? Ygdrasil or K.'s
conception of the gift will always in reality function in the same way as Theodore
conceives it; the gift will always affirm possession and annul itself as a singular and
gratuitous event.
'L'incommunicabilite des lois de l'hospitalite t.
Klossowski comments on the impossibility that underpins 'la mise en commun
des hommes et des femmes' in his article 'Protase et apodose'". 'Les lois de
l'hospitalite' and the experience which they seek to articulate are, Klossowski argues in
'Protase et apodose', unintelligible. They cannot be formulated in any way which will
express the singularity of Octave's desire. Under the sub-heading of
'L'incomrmmicabilite des lois de l'hospitalite' Klossowski's argument affirms the
'absence de lieu proprement conceptuel de cette coutume' (PA,12). This absence ofa
conceptual space in which Octave's custom can be properly situated implies that
whatever conceptual schema the reader is offered in order to make sense of
hospitality, such a schema excludes that which is most essential to its essence. This is
so first and foremost because Octave and Roberte are a married couple :
S'agissant ici de la vie d'un couple, le comportement d'Octave a l'egard de
Roberte et les reactions de celle-ci ne sont apprehendes par le lecteur quia
travers le schema de la logique monogamique de l'adultere (PA,12).
97 Donner Ie temps I.p. 39.
98 'Protase et apodose', VArc, 43 (1970), pp. 8-20; special issue devoted to Pierre Klossowski.
Reference to this article will be to this volume giving the page number and prefaced with the
abbreviation PA.
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This is the logic that Octave himself puts forward : he seeks to break the bonds of
marriage, to force Roberte's infidelity so that she will be faithfully unfaithful and he can
possess her as she is possessed by another. Yet this monogamous logic of adultery,
this act of giving as it is conceived of by Octave/Theodore means that the reader
apprehends motives, causes and effects of this custom as a series of experiences: 'qui
ne correspondent jamais au tout indissoluble vecu par Octave' (PA,12). Any
conceptual formulation of hospitality, argues Klossowski, forecloses a proper
apprehension of hospitality, prompting him to pose the following question: 'A quoi
done se heurte un enonce intelligible des lois de l'hospitalite?' (PA,13). To answer this
question he returns to the issue of language, the 'Ie code des signes quotidiens', and
the problem of stereotypes. What this suggests is the extent to which language as a
codification of signs is structured by a logic of impossibility :
Nul contenu d'experience ne se peut communiquer jamais qu'en vertu des
ornieres conceptuelles que Ie code des signes quotidiens a creusees dans les
esprits; et, inversement, le code des signes quotidiens censure tout contenu
d'experience : ainsi l'experience it l'origine des lois de l'hospitalite ne peut se
decrire que selon les stereotypes de la representation coutumiere (PA,13).
The contention that the 'code des signes' suppresses the singularity of experience has
already been discussed in the preceding section. What is interesting here is that
Klossowski's comment here repeats the logic (or a-logic) of the double bind that
Derrida attributes to the gift in Donner Ie temps. The gift only appears as a gift insofar
as it is annulled or rendered absent as a gift. By the same token what makes experience
communicable (shared conceptual schema) also renders it incommunicable (these
shared schema foreclose the singularity of experience). What renders the gift and
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communication possible (exchange or the 'code des signes') at the same time renders
them impossible.
This logic of the double bind applies also to 'les lois de l'hospitalite' as a
discourse on the gift. If the logic of monogamous adultery cannot communicate the
experience which the laws of hospitality seek to formulate then, Klossowski insists,
neither can the logic of 'Ia mise en commun des hommes et des femmes' which
appears to be its successor in the narrative ofLe Souflleur. At first appearance the
monogamous logic of adultery (Theodore's gift) appears to be in direct opposition to
the logic of 'la prostitution universelle des etres' or, as Klossowski calls it in this
article, 'la logique du libertinage'. It is an inversion of monogamous logic: where one
is based on ownership and identity the other is based upon the abolition of ownership
and identity :
La logique du libertinage pur et simple repond du point de we conceptuel a
l'abolition du principe d'identite, soit de la signification permanente du sujet et
de l'objet-sujet : done le regne de l'arbitraire (PA,14).
Klossowski goes on to conclude :
Ainsi l'inversion de la logique monogamique de l'adultere (soit de la
transgression) s'exprime rationnellement par le postulat de la prostitution
universelle - basee sur l'abolition de la propriete du moi - telle que Sade l'a
illustree (PA, 14).
Yet because the "enonce' of libert inage or prostitution 'releve de l'inversion de la
logique monogarnique de l'adultere' (PA,14) and because it can be understood only in
terms of this inversion, they remain dependent on the limit in the same way as does the
monogamous logic of adultery. Ygdrasil or K.may promote a universalised giving
expressed in the doctrine of 'Ia mise en commun des hommes et des femmes' but such
a doctrine can only be formulated in terms which borrow from and invert Theodore's
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more restricted logic of the gift. Where Theodore seeks to transgress the limit in order
to confirm it (a gift which affirms possession), Ygdrasil seeks a form of transgression
which affirms the abolition oflimits (a radically gratuitous gift). Yet the
conceptualisation of this second form of transgression within the 'code des signes' (as
prostitution or libertinage) remains dependent on the limit. As an inversion of
Theodore's conception of transgression it still works within the notion of limits it seeks
to abolish or as Klossowski puts it
On demeure ici dans Ie meme lieu conceptuel : au nom du principe d'identite,
soit de propriete, c'est un meme interdit qui frappe cl la fois l'adultere et la
prostitution universelle, et parce que l'un et l'autre sont l'enonce de ce meme
interdit, c'est precisement cet interdit qui garantit l'expression intelligible des
contenus d'experience nommes adultere ou prostitution (PA,14)99.
The gift advocated by Ygdrasil in his discussion with Theodore is, as Derrida describes
it, an impossible gift: "S'il se presente, il ne se presente plus'. The gratuity which the
'mise en commun des hommes et des femmes' conceptualises is abolished in the very
act of conceptualisation - it functions in the same way as Theodore's gift in the same
moment it seeks to move beyond it.
IfLe Souftleur is the story of the transition of one kind of transgression to
another, then, what kind of transition can this be said to be when those two kinds
appear indistinguishable the one from the other? On one level, Le Souftleur can be
read as a transition from one type of giving to another, one type of transgression to
another. Yet as a whole it also reveals a relationship between the two which implies
that they can never quite be differentiated the one from the other that they always
99 Theodore makes this very point in his discussion with Ygdrasil : 'la prostitution universelle ne se
peut pratiquer si elle ne presuppose l'attrait de la transgression du mariage : l'epouse, prostituee
par l'cpoux, n'en reste pas moins l'epouse' (LH,304).
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overlap or are dependent on each other. Theodore, at the height of his confusion,
learns that he will never know which Roberte is which, whether his wife is the faithful
'salutiste' or the venal Valentine K.. Is he giving away a wife whose essence is in 'la
fidelite' or 'l'infidelite'? Is he giving something which still belongs to him or something
which has always already been given away? If the identity of Roberte has become
radically indeterminate, then so has the transgression of Octave's/Theodore's ritual of
giving enshrined in 'les lois de l'hospitalite", Given this indeterminacy, this custom
must always necessarily be read both ways as an act which affirms limits (Theodore)
but at the same time as an act which affirms the radical abolition of limits (Ygdrasil,
K.). The custom articulated in 'Les lois de l'hospitalite' affirms the gift as possession
and at the very same time affirms the gift as a gratuitous event which abolishes any
possibility of possession. This is because, as Theodore puts it to Ygdrasil, the second
form of giving 'n'est [... ] qu'un simulacre du don', it is the gift ofa gift, which can
never be present as gift, and which is always foreclosed in the moment of its
enunciation. The second form of gift is always only a parody of a gift, always returns
to the first form which, because it always seeks a return, is never a gift. Klossowski's
discourse on the gift in Le Souffieur and 'Protase et apodose' leads one back once
more to the motif of parody and simulation. At the same time this return to the motif
of parody suggests what the more radically transgressive force of Klossowski's texts
might be.
The shift in Klossowski's conception of transgression between his Christian
writings of the thirties and forties and his post-Christian outlook which dominates
from the fifties onwards finds its expression in the narrative ofLes Lois de l'hospitalite.
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Yet the differentiation between the one and the other cannot properly be made since
the latter form of transgression can only be formulated in terms which repeat those of
the former. The latter always returns to the former. The difference between the two,
since a shift in emphasis has nevertheless taken place, lies, precisely, in the motif of
parody which strikes Klossowski's later conception of transgression. Klossowski,
when he publishes Les Lois de l'hospitalite in 1965, affirms the impossibility of his
discourse on the gift. Such a discourse, Ygdrasil argues, must be radicalised in order
to free itself from a dependence on the concept of propriety and possession. Yet this
new conception of the gift can only parody a form of giving which is never present as
giving. The impossible discourse on the gift parodies itself, it is never really a
discourse on the gift; instead it confirms Derrida's contention that: 'il manque son
objet et au fond parle toujours d'autre chose'!".
The logic of parody repeats the logic of the double bind101• What makes the
gift possible makes it impossible. In the same way what allows for the communication
of hospitality also renders it incommunicable. This means that the gift that does
present itself or the hospitality which is communicated are always simulacra or
parodies (of the gift, of hospitality). Klossowski's discourse on the gift and
100 Donner le temps I.p. 39.
101 It is interesting to note that seemingly the only exchange between Klossowski and Derrida which
has been recorded is on the subject of parody and took place at the colloquium on Nietzsche at
Cerisy in 1971. Just as this discussion has analysed two types of transgression so Derrida
(during the discussion which follows Klossowski's paper 'Circulus Vitiosus') remarks that there
are two types of parody : 'Ne faut-il pas distinguer entre deux sortes de parodie, dont l'une, sous
pretexte de le concerter, fait le jeu de I' ordre politique etabli (lequel aime beaucoup un certain
type de parodie et y trouve sa propre confirmation) et, d'autre part, une parodie qui peut
effectivement deconstruire I'ordre politique etabli? Y a-t-il une parodie qui marque
effectivement Ie corps politique, par opposition a une parodie qui serait une parodie de parodie,
qui jouerait a la surface de I' ordre politique, qui consisterait a Ie chahuter au lieu de le
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transgression insofar as they always affirm themselves as parodic returns one to the
motif the simulacrum. The simulacrum itself always implies an impossible necessity
(the necessity of representing the 'phantasme', or the giving of the gift) as well as a
necessary impossibility (the 'phantasme' is necessarily in excess of representation, the
gift is never given) - this, exactly, is the logic of the double bind. Parody becomes
parody when the grounds of possibility of a certain gesture are also the grounds of its
impossibility such that the gesture can only ever occur as a simulation of itself and
therefore can never be itself, can never be self-identical. Perversion, the 'phantasme',
or the 'signe unique' have a notional existence as such because of the language that
articulates them, because of the theoretical or fictional discourse which give them
meaning. Yet since all these (perversion, 'phantasme' and 'signe unique') are outside
of language, the very language which allows them to present themselves means that
they are never present, that, in fact, they never present themselves. They are only ever
mimed or parodied. In the same way the radical gift of 'Ia prostitution universelle'
always returns to the limited gift articulated by the 'logique monogamique de
l'adultere'. The notion of prostitution is dependent on that of adultery for its very
articulation in a movement which renders that articulation impossible. Yet this is not to
be construed as the failure or ultimate recuperation of transgression. In Klossowski's
post 1959 writing transgression is never the breaking of a taboo or the crossing of a
limit, rather it occurs in and through the movement of parody.
Parody, as the simulation of an always absent, of an always already simulated
instant, overturns all possibility of origin. Parody is always a parody of a parody (a
detruire?', Nietzsche Aujourd'hui, vol. 2 (Paris: U.G.E., 1973), pp. 111-12. These two types of
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simulation of an always already simulated moment). So, although Klossowski's text
inevitably remains within the system oflanguage, of the 'code des signes', the parodic
gesture has transgressive force because it affirms that the system is without
foundation, that it is really only ever a parody itself, that it is not self-same and never
can be.
The problem of the limit and of parody is implicitly raised by Blanchot in his
essay on 'La Voix narrative' and in particular in relation to what he calls 'Ie neutre'.
Blanchot articulates this problem of the limit as follows:
La vie est dite limitee. La limite ne disparait pas, mais elle recoit du langage le
sens, peut-etre sans limite, qu'elle pretend limiter: le sens de la limite, en
l'affirmant, contredit la limitation du sens ou du moins la deplace; mais, par la,
risque de se perdre le savoir de la limite entendue comme limitation du sens.102
In the naming of the limit, Blanchot argues, the limit receives its sense as limit yet at
the very same moment is no longer a limit. The limit named has been displaced since to
receive its sense as limit it is brought within the system oflanguage and therefore
annulled as limit (in much the same way as the gift is annulled in Derrida's critique).
The limit is delimited, perhaps infinitely. Any attempt to name the limit (or to
transgress it in any straightforward sense) is therefore parodic; such an attempt names
a limit which never presents itself as limit and in this paradoxical movement the very
meaning of the limit in the conventional sense is overturned. The double bind repeats
itself once again : what makes possible the naming of the limit of sense also makes that
naming impossible since the sense of the limit is never coincident with the limit of
sense. This impossible movement of naming the limit is one of both enablement and
parody seem to correspond very well to the two types of transgression outlined here.
102 Maurice Blanchot, L 'Entretien infini, pp. 556.
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disablement which repeats the paradox or aporia to which this thesis has returned over
and again.
The parodic gesture, the impossible of naming the limit (or giving of the gift) is
both affirmation and negation. Naming the limit affirms the limit (insofar as it gives the
limit meaning as limit) yet at the same time it negates the limit (it renders the limit
absent as limit, it delimits the limit). Since as it is both, it is neither the one nor the
other, or rather the whole structure of binary opposition collapses and with this the
dialectical movement of thought itself. That process of knowledge which accrues,
accumulates and totalises is neutralised or subject to hiatus, is given up to repetition.
This is the force of Blanc hot's term (which is not a term) 'Ie neutre'. The suspension of
oppositions articulated by both Blanchot's 'neutre' like Klossowski's parody displaces
the functioning of thought and language. By overturning origin and suspending
dialectical progression it withdraws identity from the system of language (affirms that
it is never self-identical but always other to itself) and thus gestures towards an infinite
alterity.
It is only in this suspension of thought and withdrawal of identity or self-
sameness that Klossowski's texts affirm the impersonality of 'le phantasme', the
repetition of Eternal Return or the singularity of perversion. It is in this sense alone
that they can be said to be radically transgressive. In the aporia of parody the other is
allowed to speak, or as Blanchot puts it :
L'autre parle. Mais quand l'autre parle, personne ne parle, car l'autre [...] n'est
precisement jamais seulement l'autre, it n'est plutot ni l'un ni l'autre, et le neutre
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qui le marque le retire des deux, comme de l'unite, l'etablissant toujours au-
dehors du terme, de l'acte ou du sujet ou il pretend s'offrir.l'"
The gesture ofRoberte's hands, as one opposes the other in a moment suspended in
infinity, repeats the gesture of all Klossowski's writing. Across the figures of Sade,
Nietzsche and Roberte, as well as many others who have not been discussed here, this
same gesture repeats itself, transforms itself in a movement which ruins all sameness
and all Self. Indeed parody itself is repetition. What must present itself yet is always
abolished in the moment of its presentation, is still struck by the necessity of presenting
itself. Klossowski's discourse on the gift in Les Lois de l'hospitalite reveals the
impossibility and the necessity of his writing as a whole, its parodic force and the
suspension or withdrawal of identity which it enacts. A vast circulation of proper
names has given life to this discussion : Sade, Nietzsche, Diana, Roberte, Octave,
Theodore and Klossowski himself. In this circulation of proper names the gift is
always given but also always at the very same time it is withheld.
103 Maurice Blanchot, L 'Entretien infini, p. 556
Conclusion - The persistence of parody.
Parole de commentaire : if ne s 'agit pas de toute critique, dans les sens
tres varies, encore que confus, que ce mot supporte. II s 'agit,par une
pretention qui peut-etre, en effet, enveloppe toute critique, de repeter
l'ceuvre. Mais la repeter, c 'est saisir - entendre - en elle la repetition qui
la Jonde comme ceuvre unique.
Maurice Blanchot. 1
At the very end of his book on - and with - Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington
raises an interesting problem. In having attempted to explicate and represent
faithfully Derrida's texts and arguments, he has, he claims, necessarily been
unfaithful to those very texts and arguments : 'En essayant de repeter fidelement la
pensee de Derrida, nous l'avons trahi,2. The attempt to represent as a totality a
body of thought which questions the very concepts of representation and totality
can only ever be a form of betrayal. It is interesting to note within this context that
Bennington does not, in fact use the verb 'representer' but rather 'repeter'. What
the discussion of Klossowski's oeuvre (and in particular his reading of the doctrine
of Eternal Return) has shown is that repetition is always a non-identical
transformation. In one sense repetition is always a form of betrayal because it
always repeats difference. The problem of commentary, repetition and infidelity
encountered by Bennington as he writes on Derrida is the same as that encountered
by the preceding discussion of Kloss owski's essays and fiction.
In an attempt to respond properly to Klossowski' s writing, I have discussed
its historical progression, its key themes and motifs, which I have then related to
other thinkers and writers with similar concerns. Through an exposition of a wide
number of Kloss ow ski's works my argument has sought properly to situate and
1 Maurice Blanchot, L'Entretien infini, p. 570.
2 Geoffrey Bennington. Jacques Derrida (paris: Seuil, 1991), p.292.
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problematise the paradoxes of his thought and writing. Yet this proper response to
these texts by dint of its own propriety is revealed to be an improper response. By
constructing a history around, and conferring a coherence upon, Klossowski's
writing, this discussion has shown the way in which it resolutely refuses, suspends
or otherwise abolishes the concepts of history and coherence per se (and the
principle of identity upon which they are dependent). So, like Bennington's
commentary on Derrida, my own commentary has been unfaithful in the very
moment of its fidelity. It has necessarily taken Klossowski's work as a meaningful
whole and as a historical unity, whilst claiming that it speaks only of its own lack of
self-identity, its difference from itself, its absence as a whole. In faithfully
describing Klossowski's novels and essays in terms of their content, meaning and
textual strategy this discussion has been wholly unfaithful.
The fact that any proper response to Klossowski's writing will also always
inevitably be an improper response returns one to the motif of parody. In
commenting on Klossowski's writing one can only ever parody it; one can only
ever be faithful to it by betraying it. Parody, it has been argued, is always a matter
of repetition. A commentary on Klossowski's work is inevitably parodic insofar as
it repeats the work but is also necessarily different from the work, in that as it
always betrays the work. As has been argued throughout this thesis, parody here is
not being used in the traditional sense i.e. parody as a treacherous distortion of an
original moment, but rather parody is simulacrum : a repetition of difference which
overturns the notion of both original and copy and destroys the possibility ofan
authentic origin". Klossowski's writings are themselves only ever a matter of
3 This is a point made by Gilles Deleuze in the discussion that followed Klossowski ' s paper at the
Cerisy conference on Nietzsche in July 1972 ('Circulus Vitiosus Deus') : 'La parodie
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parody, they are themselves only ever simulacra, staging an always already
simulated intensity. This means that, although commentary must necessarily affirm
these writings as a point of origin, it must also at the very same time affirm that
they are never originary.
The parodic operation of Kloss ow ski's text ultimately persists in the
commentary of these texts. Klossowski wrote of Nietzsche in 'Nietzsche, le
polytheisme et la parodie' : 'pour autant que l'on est amene cl interpreter la pensee
d'un esprit que l'on cherche cl comprendre ou a faire comprendre, it n'en est point
qui, autant que Nietzsche, amene son interprete cl le parodier'". The same has been
true of this commentary. Because the proper reading of Kloss ow ski has at the same
time paradoxically been an improper reading, proper and improper no longer
function in opposition to each other. Since the one necessarily entails the other
such an opposition is suspended.
The suspension of proper and improper in relation to commentary is a
necessary consequence of parody. One can be faithful or unfaithful to a text, have a
proper or improper response to that text, only if the propriety of that text is upheld,
only ifits status as point of origin is secure. When, in the movement of parody, the
distinction between original and copy, proper and improper are suspended,
commentary becomes something very different. Klossowski's work no longer
functions as a secure point of origin and commentary can no longer be an attempt
to seize or interpret the totality of an eeuvre in all its unity and coherence. Rather it
becomes a repetition of the oeuvre. Commentary is placed, like Klossowski's texts
effi~ce au sens nietzscheen ou au sens de Klossowski, ne pretend pas etre copie d'un
m~ele, mais dans son acte parodique eUerenverse du meme coup et le modele et la copie',
NIetzsche Aujourd'hui? Vol. I, p. 114.
4 Un Si Funeste Desir, pp. 187-88.
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themselves, under the sign of repetition. This is not a matter of repeating the 'truth'
of his writing but as Blanchot puts it: 'repeter [1' ceuvre], c'est saisir - entendre-
en elle la repetition qui la fonde comme ceuvre unique", Since commentary
parodies a text which has always already parodied itself, commentary, in a sense,
repeats repetition.
In this way we, as commentators on Klossowski, necessarily become like
Klossowski himself, seeking, perhaps obsessively, to seize an obsessive movement
of repetition (the repetition of the texts themselves). Yet, as might now be
expected, this is a strange and paradoxical instance oflikeness since we become
like Klossowski only insofar as we understand that Klossowski is always already
unlike himself We, as commentators, understand Pierre Klossowski only insofar as
we understand that the proper name 'Pierre Klossowski', as a signature appended
to a corpus, has been dispersed in the incessant movement of parody and of the
simulacrum. We become like him only insofar as our own writing, in its attempt to
seize and rationalise the repetition which founds Klossowski's work, inevitably
travesties, betrays and parodies the work and therefore repeats that repetition.
As we seek to seize the singularity or repetition which founds Klossowski's
writing (in its very absence of foundation), we, as commentators, will never cease
to repeat, to be seized ourselves and taken up by repetition. Seized by the necessity
of such unceasing repetition, we, as commentators, may then understand that we
are always, like Klossowski, unlike ourselves.
5 L'Entretien infini. p. 570.
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